Читать книгу The War at Home - Helen Bradford - Страница 12

In historical writing, it is often asked whether events were inevitable and destined to happen, or whether different decisions or actions could have produced another set of outcomes. Although such questions could be dismissed as mere speculation, a consideration of alternative outcomes can broaden and deepen our insight into certain events.

The question is often posed whether the tragic camp deaths during the harsh winter of 1901 could have been prevented. In retrospect, there was an opportunity to steer history in another direction on 28 February 1901 when Kitchener and General Louis Botha met in Middelburg. The meeting arose from Kitchener’s desire to prevent a protracted war and Botha’s attempt to gain an understanding of the potential peace terms envisaged by the British. According to a message conveyed to Kitchener by Botha’s wife, Annie, Botha was convinced that peace was necessary. Although he held that the republics should retain their independence, he was keen to explore other options.

Far left: He and his enemy broke bread together, but did not reach an early peace: the costs of General Louis Botha’s failed talks with Lord Kitchener in Middelburg, February 1901, would be borne by civilians. Left: Field Marshal Lord Kitchener

At their meeting, Kitchener tried to persuade Botha not to commandeer the surrendered burghers again, and he undertook not to burn the farms of fighting burghers if their families were not actively assisting them. But such an arrangement would have been difficult to apply practically, and Botha firmly believed that, as a Boer general, he was legally entitled to commandeer the surrendered burghers.

The British also proposed a number of peace terms and offered to install a semi-representative government. However, Botha maintained that a nation fighting for its independence could not accept terms that did not incorporate republican independence – a non-negotiable term. Consequently, after a short correspondence the negotiations came to nothing. Botha maintained afterwards that, where human efforts to achieve peace had failed, the matter should be left in the hands of the Supreme Being.

The time for peace did arrive – more than a year later. The question is whether it was due to providence or the war-weariness of both parties. The war ended when the Peace of Vereeniging was signed on 31 May 1902. Ironically, the terms, which the Boers accepted, did not differ much from the offer that had been made in February 1901. They relinquished their independence and accepted a form of self-government under the British Crown. Other issues, such as amnesty for Cape rebels, compensation for losses and the position of black people, were also broadly in line with the conditions that had been discussed in Middelburg.

The question then arises, what did the Boer leadership gain by continuing the war for another 15 months, especially in light of the deaths in the camps and the lack of any material differences between the two sets of peace terms that were offered? After the failed Middelburg talks, the ferocity of the war intensified and the mortality rate of women and children rose steeply in the cold winter of 1901.

Annie Botha, the general’s wife with a fashionable taste for large hats

At the root of these problems was the inability of the two military commanders to arrive at a feasible agreement at an earlier stage. Botha prioritised the continuation of the war and insisted on republican independence. The hardened militarist Kitchener did not have full authority during the negotiations and had to consider the wishes of politicians such as Milner (who had misgivings about the talks). Subsequently, he continued with his already established methods of arson and transportation of civilians to concentration camps. If the Boers were not willing to be persuaded, according to Kitchener, they would have to live with the consequences of their decision. Neither Kitchener nor Botha could have known in February 1901 how exceptionally cold the coming winter would be. But the plight of civilians had also not been their top priority and was given only cursory attention at the Middelburg talks. The political and military aims of both parties were of greater importance.

Thereafter, the issue of the concentration camps became a political football. In December 1901, after frequent complaints had been made about the situation in the camps, Kitchener told the Boer leaders that if they were concerned then they could look after their compatriots themselves, and he would not expand the camps any further. Botha wrote in a letter that he found it ironic that Kitchener would suggest such a policy at a stage when the commandos lacked the means to sustain themselves. Kitchener had transported the women and children to camps at the start of the guerrilla war – when the Boers were still able to care for them. While the respective military commanders were accusing and blaming one another, the women and children continued to suffer.

The camps were developed with various kinds of shelter, including some solid constructions.

If one considers the minor differences between the peace terms of Middelburg and Vereeniging, it can be argued that the camp inmates were inadvertently sacrificed in the struggle for liberation. There had been an opportunity to end the war at an earlier stage: it was not taken because military and political priorities dominated. Although military commanders did not necessarily see it this way, this potential turning point could have made a fundamental difference.

A family life regained, if still in British custody: this hendsopper, or prisoner of war who had taken the oath of neutrality, was thus permitted to join his family in a camp.

No shortage of peaceful men along Peace Street, the name given to this road in the Winburg camp

On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence that the women in the camps were predominantly in favour of the continuation of the struggle and encouraged their husbands to keep fighting. The bittereinder men, too, had no remorse about continuing with the guerrilla war, and they blamed the deaths in the camps exclusively on the British forces. By persevering in the struggle, the bittereinders also ensured that they were not simply overrun on the battlefield by the British shortly after Middelburg, which could have encouraged British politicians to pursue more punitive peace terms than those eventually agreed upon in May 1902. The bittereinders’ ingenious fighting tactics and astonishing endurance have captured the imagination of people not only in South Africa, but also around the world, and have been admired by several generations of Afrikaners, in particular.

Although there was conflict between Kitchener and Milner about the way in which the war should be conducted to subjugate the republican armies, the British side never seriously considered diminishing its resort to arson – the fundamental reason for the existence of the camps. Even when it became evident that the scorched-earth policy did not have the desired effect, the British remained undeterred. The prevailing opinion among them was that they had burnt so many farms already that sparing a few hundred in 1901 would not lessen the bittereinders’ resolve.

Concentration camps indirectly originated from changing patterns in Western warfare in the late nineteenth century. In South Africa, the basis for establishing such camps was formed by developments concerning the surrendered burghers and the British scorched-earth policy. Civilian women were caught up in hostilities from the outset. Although this was not in keeping with contemporary conventions governing the conduct of war, it did not diminish the British supreme command’s resolve and, once established, the camp system was not easily reversed. Moreover, both sides failed to take advantage of the only possible opportunity to terminate the camp system because of their military and political differences.

The dramatic events that occurred on the plains of the Orange Free State and Transvaal were to have notable long-term repercussions. During the 1930s and 1940s, the tragedy of the camps was used as an ideological building block to underpin the robust Afrikaner nationalism of the time. The intense emotions unleashed by the camps were destined to cast a long shadow.

Mushrooming misery: the Klerksdorp concentration camp.