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THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, had you finished your examination?

DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions to ask the witness.

[The witness Milch resumed the stand.]

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like to refer again, very briefly, to the extent of the unpreparedness of the Luftwaffe for war in 1939. While on this subject I should like to ask whether the collaboration of the Luftwaffe with the OKW, the Army, and the Navy had been secured in 1939?

MILCH: In my opinion, the Luftwaffe was not prepared for a major war in 1939. No mutual agreements of any kind existed with the other branches of the Armed Forces. At any rate, I knew of no such agreements.

DR. LATERNSER: Had such agreements with other branches of the Armed Forces existed, would you have known about them?

MILCH: I imagine so, since at that time I certainly would have been involved in these matters.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the co-ordination like between the more important departments of the Luftwaffe?

MILCH: From 1937, it was rather loose. The General Staff, the technical branch and the personnel office were detached; they worked independently and more or less on their own.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you have just mentioned the General Staff. What do you understand by the German “General Staff of the Luftwaffe”?

MILCH: General Staff means in German leaders’ assistants; in other words, junior officers who had been given specialized training, and who acted as assistants to troop commanders, from divisional commanders upwards.

DR. LATERNSER: Of whom did the General Staff of the Luftwaffe consist?

MILCH: It consisted of the officers in the administrative sections of the General Staff, from the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe himself downwards, and also of officers who had been assigned as staff officers to divisions and corps in the field and to air fleets.

DR. LATERNSER: What time limits were set for the formation of new units of the Luftwaffe?

MILCH: The formation of larger units had not yet been ordered, although they had been discussed quite a long time before the outbreak of war. It was intended to create a larger Air Force later, but, as far as I can remember, the plans envisaged were scheduled for completion in 6 or 8 years.

DR. LATERNSER: In what year would the plans have been completed?

MILCH: I should think about 1944-1946.

THE PRESIDENT: Not only is there some technical fault—we are getting two translations at once—but both the witness and the defense counsel are going too fast.

DR. LATERNSER: Did an organization exist already in 1939 for day- and night-fighter planes?

MILCH: No, it did not exist at that time.

DR. LATERNSER: Did an organization exist for bomb warfare?

MILCH: Not to the extent necessary for a war of aggression.

DR. LATERNSER: What progress had been made at that time in the building of airfields?

MILCH: Airfields had been built with runways up to 1,000 meters, but these were only suitable for fighter planes and not for loaded heavier bombers.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the position of the Luftwaffe Signal Corps network?

MILCH: The operational network, that is, the cable network for operations, did not exist at that time; it had to be improvised and built up later on during the war.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the position of the Aircraft Observer Corps?

MILCH: This also had not yet been organized. Reverting to the question of bombers, the most I can add is that originally, in the early years, models of 4-engine bombers, which would also have been suitable for night use, were put into production. Although technically perfect, these bombers were abandoned—I believe in 1937. It was thought that the big expense entailed by such heavy bombers should be avoided, since, at that time, nobody was thinking of war. This was at the time when Field Marshal Kesselring was Chief of the General Staff, and the question was submitted for decision to the Reich Marshal, who agreed to the discontinuance of these large bombers.

DR. LATERNSER: When was that?

MILCH: One moment, I will just look it up. On 29 April 1937 the Reich Marshal, acting on the recommendations of the Chief of the General Staff, stopped the production of these long-distance bombers. Therefore, in 1939, there were no night bombers which could in any way compare with English machines of the Lancaster type, et cetera.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the position of the Luftwaffe crews?

MILCH: We had just sufficient personnel replacements for a comparatively small Luftwaffe at that time. The lack of personnel replacement was the greatest handicap of all in building up the Luftwaffe. The whole question of time limits, and so on, depended on the training of personnel. It was the personnel question which regulated the pace. It was possible to build planes more rapidly, but it was not possible to expedite the training of the crews. And, as I said on Friday, this was the main consideration when dealing with the question of time limits. Pilots and technical personnel are of no use unless thoroughly trained. It is much worse to have half-trained personnel than no personnel at all.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, I do not want to interrupt your cross-examination but we have been sitting here for nearly 20 minutes now, and all I have got from it is that the Luftwaffe was not ready for war in 1939. It seems to me too much is being taken up with detail.

DR. LATERNSER: I have one more question on this matter. Were there any reserves of aluminum, magnesium, and rubber; and did any means exist for producing these materials?

MILCH: Not in sufficient quantities.

DR. LATERNSER: And now—one last question. Witness, during your testimony on Friday, you mentioned “Basic Order Number 1.” You also gave us the contents of this order. In this connection I would like to ask: Was this order strictly observed, or not?

MILCH: Yes, very strictly.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions to ask the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defendants’ counsel want to ask the witness any questions?

DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer): I request permission to ask the witness a few questions.

[Turning to the witness.] Witness, do you remember when Hitler demanded the construction of bomb-proof aircraft factories in caves or concrete shelters?

MILCH: As far as I remember it was when the British started the heavy raids in 1943.

DR. FLÄCHSNER; Do you remember a conference on the Obersalzberg at the beginning of April 1944, and what you told Hitler at the time about the difficulties in the building industry, and the orders issued by Hitler on that occasion?

MILCH: Yes. On that occasion Hitler ordered very solid structures to be built. I believe he demanded six large bomb-proof factories, each with 600,000 square meters floor space. Later on, Speer, who had been absent from the April meeting through illness, raised objections to these orders. He considered this construction work to be on far too large a scale and that it was too late to undertake it. Later he obtained permission for all factories which by June 1944 were not in a sufficiently advanced stage of construction—that is, which could not start working by the beginning of 1945—to be discontinued immediately.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: I am above all interested in the question of labor. At this discussion on the Obersalzberg, did the Führer allocate the requisite labor for the construction of the factories demanded by him?

MILCH: Yes. I think I remember rightly that, in answer to the objection raised by one of the gentlemen present, he said that he himself would see that the labor was made available.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, you said that Herr Speer was opposed to these constructions. What happened then? Speer was not present at that meeting?

MILCH: No, he was ill at the time.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Can you tell us briefly what happened?

MILCH: During Speer’s illness, requests reached the Führer from other quarters that Speer should be relieved of construction work. Difficulties arose owing to the fact that whereas in theory Speer still remained in charge of building, in practice the work was nearly all taken out of his hands. He was no longer able to have any say in construction work, since it had been decided that the construction department of the Todt Organization should receive orders direct from Hitler. Thus, Speer was excluded more and more from this sphere of activity. A great deal was said at that time about large-scale constructions, but very little work was actually done on them.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did Hitler give a written order to Herr Dorsch, and did he have it shown to Speer? Do you know anything about it?

MILCH: As far as I can remember, such a written order was given and it was also sent to Speer. I have a vague recollection that Speer once showed me such an order.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: One last question on this matter. In this way, Dorsch, who had been directly commissioned by the Führer, took over the responsibility for these buildings and the necessary manpower?

MILCH: Yes.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, you were a member of the Central Planning Board. Can you tell me if the Central Planning Board was authorized to make decisions on the use of foreign or German labor and its allocation?

MILCH: No.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did the Central Planning Board ever make decisions of this kind?

MILCH: The Central Planning Board had been set up for the distribution of raw materials only; but a certain control over transportation devolved upon it. However, the matter of transportation was independent of any activity concerning allocation of raw material. It had no say in the allocation of labor. If the Central Planning Board attempted to obtain some influence as to the allocation of workers, it was because it was at the same time responsible for armaments, and therefore best able to judge the existing requirements. But here, too, considerable difficulties were encountered, and this branch of the Central Planning Board’s work had to be dropped.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: So no decision was ever reached? We have records before us which show that labor problems were sometimes discussed by the Central Planning Board.

MILCH: Yes, very frequently, as the armament offices which were represented on the Central Planning Board were greatly concerned with labor problems; but these discussions mostly concerned food supplies and extra rations for the workers.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: And now—one last question on the subject. Did the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in any way look upon the Central Planning Board as authoritative, that is, as the final arbiter in the total plan for the utilization of manpower?

MILCH: No, he could not do that, as he himself represented that authority.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were there any reserves of German workers in 1943 or 1944, and did Speer request the utilization of this German manpower instead of foreign labor?

MILCH: Yes, again and again Speer made strong representations that any German labor still available, even if difficult to mobilize, should be brought in and put to work. This reserve consisted mostly of female labor, women of professional circles and social stations who in wartime had nothing to do apart from domestic work.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, you have already told us that the Defendant Speer was a sick man in 1944. Could you tell us approximately when his illness began and when it ended?

MILCH: His illness started in February, and I think it lasted until about June.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you. Do you know anything about this long illness being exploited in order to undermine severely his influence and authority? Can you tell me who was primarily interested in doing that?

MILCH: His influence was undermined in the above-mentioned building projects. It is very difficult for me to name here the individuals who probably hoped to succeed him.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did matters improve, or did they become worse after 20 July?

MILCH: Actually, as time went on they became worse. Speer’s position became more difficult than ever, as the whole of Speer’s views differed more and more from Hitler’s official opinion.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you. Now, may I remind you of something else? In February 1945, by a Hitler order, the Defendant Speer was entrusted with the distribution of motor vehicles; and you, if I am correctly informed, were appointed as his representative. Can you tell me what the transport situation was like at that time, and to what extent the armaments output depended on the transport situation?

MILCH: In those days, the transport situation was so deplorable, owing to the American daylight raids, that the transport system was no longer able to carry even the most essential commodities and armament materials. Our great forge, the Ruhr district, was particularly hard hit, as well as the transport system carrying products from the Ruhr to the finishing industries in Central Germany, Berlin, and Saxony. If very stringent measures had not been taken and extraordinary powers granted, total collapse, due solely to transport difficulties, would have become only a matter of hours. That was the situation at that time.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Could Speer, in his position, be expected to give preferential treatment to armaments when available transport was allocated? What did he actually do?

MILCH: No; Speer, like myself, saw quite clearly that the whole armament question could no longer influence the situation at that stage. Therefore, acting on his own initiative, he gave priority to the movement of food supplies for the population. The most urgent job was to remove the foodstuffs from the German territory in danger of being lost to the enemy.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were these measures only taken to safeguard the current food supply, or were they long-term measures?

MILCH: The intention was to move all available and transportable food to a place of safety.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, motor transport was a particularly difficult problem at the time. Was the number of trucks and the quantity of fuel to drive them cut down when transport was allocated to the armaments industry; and what orders regarding trucks did Speer issue in mid-February? Do you know?

MILCH: I know that trucks were always in such short supply in the armament industry that not even essential orders could be filled. All kinds of alternative transport had to be found, such as electric trains, a great number of horse carts, and other vehicles. But, as far as my knowledge goes, here too, Speer used this means of transport for the benefit of the German population in order to maintain some sort of food distributing organization.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Fuel was, at that time, one of the most serious bottlenecks, was it not?

MILCH: It was, in fact, the most serious bottleneck of all.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, do you happen to know that after February 1945 Speer granted priority to repair work on nitrogen factories producing fertilizers for agriculture, which meant that repairs to fuel producing plants had to take second place?

MILCH: Yes, I do know, because Speer discussed with me in great detail the emergency measures to be taken, now that we were faced with imminent and inevitable collapse. He was of the opinion that first and foremost everything that was still possible should be done to help the German people to get through the very hard times which would follow the collapse. These first measures dealt with food supplies, salvage of food supplies, and transport for distribution.

Secondly, he sought to avoid the destruction of the German factories still in our possession, which was in direct opposition to Hitler’s “scorched earth” tactics.

Thirdly, he discussed the switch-over from war to peacetime production of such factories as might still be standing. First of all, he had in mind agricultural machinery and spare parts, and banked upon the assumption that, if once the orders were placed, they would be carried out in spite of the upheaval—for instance, even if some German factories passed into enemy hands, or when, the fighting having ceased, the government armament contracts would automatically fizzle out.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, we have now connected up an entire series of questions and I am most grateful to you. I should, however, like to ask you one more question: Could you give us any further details about the prevention of destruction?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, will you explain to me why this evidence that you are calling now is relevant and to what charge it is relevant?

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, the Defendant Speer is charged with participating in the conspiracy and in the common plan for waging aggressive warfare until 7 May 1945. If I can now prove that his activities, at least for some time before that date, were incompatible with such common plan, then this item of evidence would be relevant to the question whether this charge of the Indictment is justified or not.

THE PRESIDENT: All the evidence that you have been giving for the last 15 minutes was related to 1943 and 1944, and was related to conferences with reference to the erection of factories for the production of bombers and the fact that—as far as I have understood it—the fact that Speer was engaged more on attempting to feed the German people than on building armament factories. What that has to do with it, I have not any idea.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: The first point referred to Document 1584-PS, which the Prosecution submitted as incriminating my client. The document says that, at a conference on the Obersalzberg, the construction of certain factories was ordered, and that 100,000 Hungarian Jews were employed on this construction. The purpose of the interrogation of this witness was to establish that the Defendant Speer could not be held responsible for this construction, since Hitler had given the order for this work directly to somebody else, and to eliminate this particular point submitted by the Prosecution in support of their charge. That was the purpose of the first question. The purpose of the second question, concerning the avoidance of destruction and the safeguarding of agricultural produce and the food supply of the German people, is connected with the accusation of participating in a conspiracy for the execution of a common plan; whereas all the activities, just confirmed by the witness, were to serve an entirely different aim and had just the opposite effect to the common plan alleged by the Prosecution. They did not serve the war effort but were directed towards peacetime economy.

THE PRESIDENT: There is no charge against Speer on the ground that he attempted to feed the German people during the war. The Prosecution have not laid that against him as a charge.

DE. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I never said that the Prosecution had raised this charge against him. There must have been a mistake in the transmission.

[Turning to the witness.] One last question, Witness. Can you tell us to what extent Speer informed the Führer at a later date of the results of the heavy air raids on Hamburg and on other cities?

MILCH: He gave the Führer the fullest information and repeatedly drew his attention to the difficulties.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you.

DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, did the Central Planning Board also concern itself with labor problems?

MILCH: Yes.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were the manpower requirements established?

MILCH: They were established by the industries and reported through the labor exchanges. We also submitted figures on the shortages of manpower in the armament industry.

DR. SERVATIUS: May I interrupt you? What did you do, once the requirements were established? And what was the purpose of establishing them?

MILCH: They showed the shortages in manpower caused by the continual calling up of the workers for war service.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was this not done in order to bring in more workers?

MILCH: The request for more workers came from the factories. We supported the factories in their negotiations with Sauckel by telling him that such and such an industry had applied for so and so many workers. We also told him which of their figures were too high according to our calculations.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did the figures represent the total sum of the workers needed?

MILCH: No. It was a general figure according to the statistics supplied by Sauckel’s labor exchanges.

DR. SERVATIUS: Who fixed the requirements, Sauckel or the applicants for labor?

MILCH: The factories did.

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the Central Planning Board’s task in connection with labor problems?

MILCH: The Central Planning Board dealt with the distribution of raw materials. It also had to see that raw materials were made available . . .

DR. SERVATIUS: My question concerns the workers and not raw materials.

MILCH: Please wait until I have finished what I want to say. You will then understand what I mean. The raw materials had to be produced and their production called for workers. For instance, in the mining industry and the aluminum factories . . .

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, may I interrupt you? It is clear that workers are essential for production; but what I want to know is who made the request for labor, and who finally decided as to the numbers of workers required?

MILCH: The factories made the request and Sauckel decided on the figures. He placed at their disposal as many workers as he could get, but the numbers were always below the figure requested.

DR. SERVATIUS: In this connection did he have a free hand, or did the Führer make the decisions?

MILCH: As far as I know, the Führer intervened very frequently and Sauckel was often summoned to confer with Hitler.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were there not discussions at the Führer’s headquarters on all essential programs, especially those involving manpower?

MILCH: No, not all programs; but occasionally these matters were discussed. However, the discussions with the Führer about labor problems were mostly very brief. He did not wish to discuss the wider issues of this matter.

DR. SERVATIUS: What had the Four Year Plan to do with the matter?

MILCH: The Four Year Plan, as far as I know, also dealt with these problems. But I rather think that in this respect it served as an auxiliary organization for Hitler, who did not wish to discuss these matters in detail.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know that according to decrees Sauckel had to subordinate himself to the Four Year Plan, that is, to Göring, and that he had to receive orders from him?

MILCH: I do not exactly know how matters stood.

DR. SERVATIUS: One more question. How did the workers, the foreign workers, behave? Were they willing and hard working?

MILCH: The majority were excellent workers.

DR. SERVATIUS: How do you account for that?

MILCH: In the first years these workers were pleased to be able to get work and food. We treated them well, as far as I can judge, and their rations were larger than those of the German population. They received extra rations on the same scale as the German workers for heavy and very heavy physical work, also for overtime. The French and Russian workers worked exceptionally well. I occasionally heard complaints about the Dutch workers.

DR. SERVATIUS: Are you familiar with Sauckel’s regulations concerning the welfare of the foreign workers?

MILCH: I remember that on one occasion Sauckel spoke to us on this subject at the headquarters of the Central Planning Board.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did he show a humane or a severe attitude?

MILCH: His intentions were entirely humane. Sauckel had been set a very difficult task by Hitler. As far as I know, he had been a workingman himself and, as a seaman, had worked very hard in his time; consequently, he was kindly disposed towards workers.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to ask the witness.

PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Witness, did you take part in the 1937 Wehrmacht maneuvers?

MILCH: In Mecklenburg, I believe.

DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, that is so. Do you remember if any foreign officers were present as guests?

MILCH: Yes. I know that a large British military mission was present and a general, who later was appointed Governor of Gibraltar.

DR. JAHRREISS: General Ironside?

MILCH: Yes, Ironside. I spoke to him personally and also welcomed some of the gentlemen of his staff. There were also Italian officers and officers from many other countries; at the moment I cannot say exactly what countries—I have forgotten.

DR. JAHRREISS: Was there by any chance a French military mission as well?

MILCH: I think, so, but I cannot say for certain—I cannot remember so far back. But I did speak to General Ironside.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know if at that time these foreign officers were also shown the most up-to-date German armament equipment?

MILCH: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: Was all the equipment demonstrated in action?

MILCH: Everything was demonstrated in action, with the exception of a new plane not yet in use; but even this was shown.

DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know if we, that is, Germany, also allowed foreign powers to inspect our air raid precautions equipment?

MILCH: Yes, on many occasions. A Mr. Fraser came to see me from England, together with Lord Trenchard. Mr. Fraser was interested in air raid precautions equipment, and was immediately shown the latest developments.

DR. JAHRREISS: When was that, please?

MILCH: I think it was in 1937 or 1938, but I will see if I can find the date. [Referring to his notes.] It was on 1 July 1937.

DR. JAHRREISS: Do you remember if anybody else came from England at a later date?

MILCH: It was later followed by a personal interchange between our services and the British. I myself, having brought them together, took no further part in the matter.

DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. One more question. Do you remember the conflict which arose over the reoccupation of the Rhineland?

MILCH: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: You also know how great was the excitement it caused.

MILCH: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did the Luftwaffe also take part in the reoccupation of the Rhineland—to be precise, on the left bank of the Rhine?

MILCH: I cannot, at the moment, answer this question. The reoccupation of the Rhineland was so sudden that I was taken unawares while on leave. When I returned, the occupation was well under way. I know that Düsseldorf had been occupied and that the Luftwaffe had taken part. I myself went there a few days later.

DR. JAHRREISS: But that is on the right bank of the Rhine?

MILCH: That is on the right bank.

DR. JAHRREISS: Then you know nothing about the left bank of the Rhine?

MILCH: No, I cannot say anything about it at the moment. I do not believe there was an airfield there; anyhow, I cannot remember exactly.

DR. JAHRREISS: You say that the reoccupation of the Rhineland was very sudden. But had nothing been arranged beforehand by the Luftwaffe to provide for such an event?

MILCH: The decision was made when I was on leave and everything we had was naturally used for this purpose, but we did not have very much.

DR. JAHRREISS: Quite so, but let us get it quite clear. Was the Luftwaffe told to be ready for the first time while you were on leave?

MILCH: Yes, definitely; otherwise I would not have gone on leave.

DR. JAHRREISS: What was the earliest date on which the Luftwaffe was given the alert before the reoccupation?

MILCH: It might have been a matter of 14, 15, or 16 days. That would be the maximum.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, on Friday you made a statement about the part played by the Luftwaffe in the military operations for the completion of the Anschluss policy in March 1938. On what day did the preparations begin?

MILCH: The preparations began less than 48 hours beforehand. That I know exactly.

DR. JAHRREISS: And when did you first learn that military preparations were to be made for the solution of this problem?

MILCH: About 36 hours before the march into Austria.

DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you.

DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Witness, am I right in assuming that you were never in a position to issue orders to, that is, never had anything to do officially with either the Gestapo or with the concentration camps?

MILCH: No, I never had anything to do with them.

DR. KAUFFMANN: When did you first hear of the establishment of these camps?

MILCH: Through the general announcements in 1933 that concentration camps, or rather that one concentration camp had been established.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you, during the years which followed, receive more detailed information concerning further establishments of this kind?

MILCH: Until the war ended I had heard of Dachau and Oranienburg only. I knew nothing at all about any other concentration camps. At my own request and in the company of some high-ranking officers of the Luftwaffe, I inspected Dachau in 1935. I saw no other concentration camps, nor did I know anything about what happened in them.

DR. KAUFFMANN: During your inspection, what impression did you get of the establishment itself and the treatment of the internees, et cetera?

MILCH: At that time there was so much talk about these camps, also in Germany in our officers’ circles, that I decided to judge for myself. Himmler gave his immediate consent to my request. At that time, I believe, Dachau was the only concentration camp in existence. There I found a very mixed assortment of inmates. One group consisted of major criminals, all habitual offenders; other groups consisted of people who repeatedly committed the same offense which were not crimes, but only offenses. There was another group of persons who had participated in the Röhm Putsch. One of the men I recognized as having seen before. He had been a high-ranking SA leader and was now an internee. The camp, run on military lines, was clean and properly organized. They had their own slaughterhouse and their own bakery. We insisted on having the food of the internees served to us. The food was good and one of the camp leaders explained that they fed the inmates very well as they were engaged on heavy work. All the inmates whom we approached explained the reason for their internment. For instance, one man told us that he had committed forgery 20 times; another, that he had committed assault and other offenses 18 times. There were many cases of this kind. I cannot, of course, say if we were shown everything in this large establishment.

DR. KAUFFMANN: You have just mentioned that the question had been discussed in military circles, among the officers. Later, when you returned, did you convey your impressions of Dachau to anyone?

MILCH: I scarcely mentioned them to anybody, only if my more intimate comrades broached the subject. As I have said before, I did not go alone; there were several other gentlemen with me and, no doubt, they too must have had occasion to discuss this subject in smaller circles.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Unheard of acts of cruelty were perpetrated in the concentration camps. Did you come to hear of them and, if so, when did you first hear of them?

MILCH: On the day on which I was captured it was revealed to me for the first time when internees from an auxiliary camp in the vicinity were led past the place where I was captured. This was the first time I saw it for myself. The rest I learned in captivity from the various documents which we were shown.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then it was completely unknown to you that more than 200 concentration camps existed in Germany and in the occupied territories.

MILCH: It was completely unknown to me. I have already mentioned the two camps whose existence was known to me.

DR. KAUFFMANN: It could be held against you that it must have been impossible not to know of these facts. Can you explain to us why it was not possible for you to obtain better information regarding existing conditions?

MILCH: Because the people who knew about these conditions did not talk about them, and presumably were not allowed to talk about them. I understand this to be so from a document in the Indictment against the General Staff, in which Himmler—also erroneously considered as one of the high-ranking military leaders—had issued an order to this effect. This document dealt with some conference or other of high-ranking police leaders under Himmler, in 1943, I believe.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Am I right in saying that any attempt to disclose conditions prevalent in the concentration camps was impossible unless the person in question was ready to risk his life?

MILCH: In the first place the large number of concentration camps was unknown to everybody, as it was unknown to me. Secondly, nobody knew what went on there. This knowledge was apparently confined to a very small circle of people who were in [on] the secret. Further, the SD was very much feared by the entire population, not only by the lower classes. If anybody tried to gain access to these secrets he did so at the peril of his life. And again, how could the Germans know anything about these things, since they never saw them or heard about them? Nothing was said about them in the German press, no announcements were made on the German radio, and those who listened to foreign broadcasts exposed themselves to the heaviest penalties, generally it meant death. You could never be alone. You could depend upon it that if you yourself contravened that law, others would overhear and then denounce you. I know that in Germany a large number of people were condemned to death for listening to foreign broadcasts.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did it ever come to your knowledge that there had been mass deportations of Jews to the Eastern territories? When did you first hear about it?

MILCH: I cannot give the exact date. Once, in some way or other, I can no longer remember how, the information did reach me that Jews had been settled in special ghetto towns in the East. I think it must have been in 1944 or thereabout, but I cannot guarantee that this date is exact.

DR. KAUFFMANN: You have just mentioned ghettos. Did you know that these mass deportations were, in effect, a preliminary step to mass extermination?

MILCH: No, we were never told.

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I ask you further if, in this connection, you had any idea about the existence of the Auschwitz extermination camp?

MILCH: No. I first heard of the name much later. I read it in the press after I was captured.

DR. KAUFFMANN: So-called Einsatzkommandos were employed in the East, where they carried out large-scale exterminations, also of Jews. Did you know that these Einsatzkommandos had been created by order of Adolf Hitler?

MILCH: No. The first I heard of these Einsatzkommandos was here in prison in Nuremberg.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you know that a special campaign was launched for the extermination of Jewish citizens in the southeastern provinces of the Reich, which, according to the statement of the leader concerned, named Eichmann, caused the death of from 4 to 5 million Jews?

MILCH: No, I know nothing at all about it. This is the first time I have heard the name Eichmann mentioned.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Am I correct in stating that in Germany, under the regime of an absolute leader, any opposition to a supreme order would most probably have meant death?

MILCH: That has been proved in many hundreds of cases.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Am I also correct in stating that the peril would have been equally deadly even if the order had been opposed on legal and moral grounds?

MILCH: I believe that here, too, one would have had to be prepared to pay the penalty, and not only one’s own, but the family’s as well.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you. I have no more questions to ask.

DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Witness, I have only a short question to ask you. You told us, on Saturday or on Friday, that in 1937 you had discussions with an English mission. This mission was headed by Air Vice Marshal Courtney. I should like to know from you if, in the course of these discussions, it was agreed that the competent German and British authorities should exchange information concerning the establishment plans for their respective Air Forces?

MILCH: Your surmise is correct.

DR. SIEMERS: How was the agreement made?

MILCH: The agreement was drawn up in writing.

DR. SIEMERS: Had the British and German Air Forces establishment plans for each year?

MILCH: No. The plans covered several years.

DR. SIEMERS: How many years ahead were covered by the 1937 plan?

MILCH: I cannot tell you from memory. At that time it may possibly have covered 2 or 3 years.

DR. SIEMERS: That would have been from 1938 till 1940?

MILCH: Possibly 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940. I cannot say for certain. I have forgotten.

DR. SIEMERS: Had this plan a technical name? Was it called “Establishment Plan,” or did it have some other name?

MILCH: I cannot remember now. We generally referred to it as the projected establishment plan.

DR. SIEMERS: On the English side, were the plans also drawn up to cover a definite period—say 3 years?

MILCH: I believe the periods covered were very much the same. The system was more or less the same.

DR. SIEMERS: I thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution now wish to cross-examine? Mr. Justice Jackson, I am sorry to have called you up. Perhaps it would be convenient to adjourn for 10 minutes now.

[A recess was taken.]

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Witness, you are a prisoner of war of the United States at the present time?

MILCH: No, I am not a prisoner of war of the United States. I was an English prisoner of war, and since I have been here I have been declared an internee. I do not know what that means. At any rate, it is not correct to apply it to a prisoner-of-war officer taken by the enemy during action before the end of hostilities.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have been allowed to confer with counsel both while this Trial was in progress and . . .

MILCH: I have been able to confer with some of the Counsel for the Defense, not with all of them. I assume that the other Defense Counsel did not desire it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you will save a great deal of time if you will answer my questions as briefly as possible and with “yes” or “no” where possible. You have been allowed to prepare, keep, and bring to the Court notes after your consultations with counsel?

MILCH: The notes which I had with me were made by me before I conferred with defendants’ counsel.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have made none of the notes since your consultations with counsel?

MILCH: I made one note for myself about one consultation. It was merely about a date which had been mentioned to me and which otherwise I could not have remembered.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you occupied a very high position in the German Air Force?

MILCH: I was Inspector General.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You frequently attended conferences on behalf of Göring?

MILCH: On behalf of Göring, very rarely.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You deny that you attended conferences on behalf of Göring frequently?

MILCH: No. I do not deny it at all, but I was called upon to attend some of these conferences by virtue of my own office. I rarely had occasion to represent Göring as he usually attended these conferences himself.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You had a very large part in building up the Luftwaffe, did you not?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were honored for that, were you not, in 1941, by the Hitler regime?

MILCH: 1941—no; I believe, Mr. Justice Jackson, you mean 1940.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: 1940—well, perhaps I am wrong.

MILCH: You mean the promotion to Field Marshal, don’t you?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When was your promotion to Field Marshal?

MILCH: On 19 July 1940.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you not receive a gift from the Hitler regime in recognition of your services?

MILCH: In 1942, on the occasion of my fiftieth birthday, I received a recognition.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the recognition was in the form of cash, wasn’t it?

MILCH: Yes, it was a cash recognition, with which I could buy myself an estate.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what did it consist of?

MILCH: The sum amounted to 250,000 marks.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And now you come here to testify, as I understand your testimony, that the regime of which you were a part put Germany into a war for which it was in no way prepared. Do I understand you correctly?

MILCH: It is correct insofar as Germany in 1939 entered into a war for which she was not prepared as far as the Air Force was concerned.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the head of the Air Force ever give any warning of that fact to the German people?

MILCH: That I am unable to say. I do not believe he could do that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not know that he ever did do it, do you?

MILCH: I cannot remember that he ever gave such a warning to the people publicly. I assume that the warning was given to his superior military officer.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what officer would be above him?

MILCH: That would be the Führer, Adolf Hitler.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Führer, yes.

MILCH: As a soldier, the Reich Marshal could not address himself to the public.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, can you point to any time at any meeting of the High Command, or at any other meeting that the Führer called, when Reich Marshal Göring, in the presence of any of these people, raised the question that Germany was not prepared for war?

MILCH: I cannot remember such a conference, because such conferences were held only between the two people concerned. The Reich Marshal never strongly opposed the Führer in public, or before any large group of his officers, because Hitler would not have tolerated such opposition.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know of any occasion when any one of the defendants in the box ever took a public position against going to war?

MILCH: Publicly, no; I cannot remember any occasion. But I rather think that also to the gentlemen who now stand accused the whole question of the war came as a great surprise.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You would like to believe that?

MILCH: I do believe it, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do believe it. How long did it take the German Armed Forces to conquer Poland?

MILCH: To conquer Poland—18 days, I believe.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Eighteen days. How long did it take to drive England off the Continent, including the disaster of Dunkirk?

MILCH: I believe 6 weeks.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How long did it take to overrun Holland and Belgium?

MILCH: A few days.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How long did it take to overrun France and take Paris?

MILCH: Two months in all.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And how long did it take to overrun Denmark and take possession of Norway?

MILCH: Also a short time. Denmark took a very short time, because Denmark gave in immediately, and Norway gave in in a few weeks.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you testify, and you want this Tribunal to understand you, as an officer, as saying that there was no preparation known to the officers in advance of those movements? Is that your testimony as an officer?

MILCH: Pardon me, I did not understand you just now.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified that those were all surprise movements to the officers of the Luftwaffe. You were surprised at every one of them, you said.

MILCH: I said, surprised by the outbreak of war, because at first it was a question of Poland only. The other actions came very much later and there was more time to prepare for this war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now, relative to Poland, you do not deny that Germany was well prepared for a war with Poland, or do you?

MILCH: The might of Germany, as compared with Poland, was powerful enough. What I meant to imply when speaking of preparedness for war in my testimony, was a degree of preparedness for entering a world war. For that Germany was not prepared in 1939.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But she was prepared for the campaign that she initiated, was she not?

MILCH: I would not say that; I would say that of course she had armaments, in the same way as every other nation with armed forces. Our armed forces were made ready against Poland and, to our own surprise, proved sufficiently powerful to crush Poland in a very short time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Would you question or deny that, relative to the other powers on the Continent of Europe, Germany was the best prepared for war on the first day of September 1939?

MILCH: I believe that, taking it all round, the British Air Force at that time was stronger than the German.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you in reference to the Continental powers. Do you question that Germany was far better prepared for war than any of her immediate neighbors?

MILCH: I am convinced that France and Poland, according to their respective strength, were just as well prepared for war as Germany. They had the advantage of a longer time in which to arm, whereas Germany could only begin to arm 5 years before the outbreak of the war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did you first meet Hermann Göring?

MILCH: I believe in the year 1928.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was he then? What position did he hold?

MILCH: He was then a member of the Reichstag.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what were you doing? What was your business?

MILCH: I was then Director of the German Lufthansa, a civil aviation concern.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you have some discussions with Hermann Göring at about that time as to the use of an Air Force if the Nazi Party came to power?

MILCH: At that very early time, no.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did you first discuss that with Göring?

MILCH: I believe Göring spoke to me on this subject in 1932, when a plan was formed to take over the government in 1932. It was believed already at that time that the other parties would form a government together with the National Socialists. On that occasion, I think, Göring did speak of the possibility of Germany being freed from armament restrictions, given a government at the helm which included the National Socialists.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Following that you became a member of the Nazi Party, did you not?

MILCH: I joined the Party only after 1933. When I again became an officer my membership lapsed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You waited until after they had seized the power?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you recall a conversation that you had with Hermann Göring on the 28th of January 1933?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And where did that take place?

MILCH: In my own residence.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he call upon you?

MILCH: I had guests in my house that evening, and he suddenly arrived because he wanted to talk to me very urgently.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And will you relate to the Tribunal the conversation that you had with Göring at that time?

MILCH: He told me that an agreement had now been reached with the other parties in question for the formation of a coalition government with the National Socialists. Reich President Von Hindenburg had agreed to the appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor in this government.

He asked me whether I would be ready to offer my collaboration in an Air Ministry to be set up. I proposed two other persons instead of myself, explaining that I did not wish to leave the Lufthansa. Göring rejected them and insisted that I place myself at his disposal.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you agree to do so?

MILCH: I asked for his permission to think the matter over, and I made my consent dependent on whether Hitler would insist.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what did Hitler do?

MILCH: I accepted on the 30th, after Hitler had told me once again that he considered my technical knowledge and ability in the field of aviation to be indispensable.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So, on the day that the Nazi Party came to power, you took over the task of building a Nazi air force, did you not?

MILCH: No, not an air force. The immediate problem was the linking up of all the various branches of aviation which existed at that time. For instance, there was one civil aviation transport company, or there might have been two. There were the aviation industries, the training schools for civilian pilots, the meteorological service, and I believe there were several research institutes. That, I think, covers the entire field of aviation of that time—but it had nothing to do with an air force.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Perhaps, I will say, you took over the task of making Germany predominant in the air?

MILCH: No, I cannot agree with that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Put it in your own way. Tell us what you did; what your object was in taking over this new task.

MILCH: My first task was to develop the various branches in order to build up a large air transport system.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You then made visits to France and England, and on your return reported to Hitler personally, did you not?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you returned from England, did you warn Hitler against the activities of Ribbentrop?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did you tell Hitler about the activities of Ribbentrop in England?

MILCH: That I had gained the impression in England that Von Ribbentrop was not persona grata.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, when you were interrogated before, didn’t you state after your capture that you told Hitler that if he did not get rid of Ribbentrop soon he was going to have trouble with England? Is that not what you told Hitler in substance?

MILCH: I cannot now remember the exact words.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But is that not the sense of it?

MILCH: I was of the opinion that another man should be sent to England to bring about mutual understanding as to policy, in accordance with the wish so often expressed by Hitler.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Before you talked with Hitler about that, you had discussed it with Göring, had you not?

MILCH: With whom?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring.

MILCH: About the journey? Or about what?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: About Ribbentrop.

MILCH: No, I did not discuss him with the Reich Marshal.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There came a time when some engineers were sent to Russia, were they not, to inspect the air construction there, factories, facilities, and that sort of thing?

MILCH: Yes, that is correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This was a group of engineers, and you had something to do with sending them there, did you not?

MILCH: No, I had nothing to do with that group. At that time technical research was not under my control.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Under whose orders were they?

MILCH: Under General Udet, who, in turn, was under the Reich Marshal.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when they came back, you learned that they had reported that Russia had greater capacity for building airplane engines than all six of the German factories, did you not?

MILCH: Yes, that is correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What order did Göring give about that information being made available even to the Führer?

MILCH: Göring did not believe the information at that time. I know that from the words of General Udet.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that you stated to the interrogators before that Göring called these experts defeatists, forbade them to repeat that information to anybody, and threatened them with the concentration camp if they repeated that information? Did you say that or didn’t you?

MILCH: I never said it in that form.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, use your own words and tell us just what Göring said on that subject.

MILCH: At a considerably later date, when the question of American armament figures came up, the Reich Marshal said to me, “Now, you too are going to turn defeatist and believe these large figures.” I told him then that I did indeed believe these figures; but that had nothing to do with the Russian matter.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were those Russian figures ever reported to Hitler, to the Reichstag or in any way made public to the German people?

MILCH: The Russian figures? That I cannot say. I had nothing to do with the matter. The American figures were undoubtedly submitted to Hitler, but Hitler did not believe them.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified on Friday, I believe, that you knew that the commencement of the war with Russia would mean the annihilation of Germany. I remind you of that, and that is correct, is it not?

MILCH: Not the destruction—the defeat. I think I said annihilation or defeat.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You went to Reich Marshal Göring to protest against the entrance into the Russian war, is that right?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did Göring agree with you that it would end in the defeat of Germany?

MILCH: No, he did not agree. He had to be extremely cautious in his statements in deference to his relations with Hitler. I told him the cause for Germany’s difficulties and he nodded. His words gave me the impression that he had already put the same arguments to Hitler, and that he had been unsuccessful.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, he agreed with you that it would end with the defeat of Germany, but did not want it said to Hitler, is that right?

MILCH: No, I would not go as far as that. When I said that this meant the defeat of Germany, I was voicing the conclusion reached by me. He merely agreed that this war should be avoided at all costs and that it would prove a misfortune for Germany. That was the way he put it; he did not use the word “defeat” in this connection.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it mentioned by you?

MILCH: I mentioned that to open a second front against so strong an enemy would mean the defeat of Germany.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did he disagree with you about that? Did he take issue with you about that?

MILCH: No, he did not argue about it, he only declared himself opposed to taking on anything else, as he considered it impossible to do so; what we thought would not make the slightest difference and it would only give Hitler the impression that we in the Luftwaffe were defeatists.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you did not attempt any further to convey the information, from which you thought Germany would be defeated if she entered into war with Russia, to Hitler or to any other officer of the High Command?

MILCH: It was impossible for me to do so. I could not act against the order of my superior officer.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Of the Reich Marshal?

MILCH: Yes, of the Reich Marshal.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, so far as you know, after his talk with you he never conveyed the information to Hitler that it was your opinion that the war would end in disaster?

MILCH: I had the impression that he had previously discussed the subject with Hitler but without any degree of success, because with Hitler that was impossible.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, but you had been abroad for Hitler and reported to him and he apparently had confidence in you, and I am asking you if Hermann Göring ever reported to Hitler that you, from your information, felt that it was a disaster to go into that war?

MILCH: My trips were not made at Hitler’s order. They were made in response to invitations from foreign governments to the Luftwaffe and at the order of the Reich Marshal. It was only because I was aware of the importance of these trips and because I incidentally heard political statements—in spite of my reluctance at the time, since they did not concern me as a soldier—that I thought it my duty to report personally to Hitler.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did Göring direct you to do that?

MILCH: To go to Hitler? Yes, Göring told Hitler about it and Hitler ordered me to report to him. I myself did not say, “I am now going to see Hitler,” but I received an order to that effect from Hitler himself.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he did not send you to Hitler until he knew what you were going to report?

MILCH: No, he himself had . . .

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So he did know?

MILCH: He himself had no cognizance of the subject. He had no time to receive me.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring had no time to receive you?

MILCH: No. Göring at that time had many other matters on hand and he did not want to hear about these things.