Читать книгу The Nuremberg Trials: Complete Tribunal Proceedings (V. 9) - International Military Tribunal - Страница 8

Table of Contents

THE PRESIDENT: We will have no open session tomorrow.

GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I want to say a few words with respect to the statement of Defense Counsel Stahmer. When speaking about the document concerning the German atrocities at Katyn, Defense Counsel Stahmer stated that it was not in his possession. I do not want to speak about the nature of this document. I want to report to the Tribunal that on 13 February this document, as Exhibit USSR-54—30 copies of it, all in the German language—was given to the Document Room for the purposes of the Defense. We did not think that we had to present the document to each Defense Counsel separately. We considered that if the document were given to the Document Room, the Defense would take the necessary steps concerning it. That is all I wish to say on this matter.

DR. LATERNSER: There must be a misunderstanding about the number of this document. It was submitted at that time in open session by the Russian Prosecutor as Exhibit Number USSR-64. USSR-64 has not been distributed. I have not received it, and upon request at Information Room of the Defense, upon two requests, I have not been able to obtain it.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will inquire into the matter.

[The witness Bodenschatz took the stand.]

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Previous to the spring of 1943, as I understand you, Hermann Göring was a man of great influence in the councils of the Reich?

BODENSCHATZ: Before the year 1943—that is, until the year 1943—Hermann Göring always had access to the Führer, and his influence was important.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In fact, it was the most important in Germany outside of the Führer himself, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Within the Reich he had great influence, very great influence.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Air power was his special mission and his special pride, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: As an old airman, he was very proud to be able to build up and lead the Air Force.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He had more confidence in air power as a weapon of war than most of the other men of his time, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: At any rate he was convinced that his Air Force was very good. But I have to repeat what I said before, that at the beginning of the war, in the year 1939, that stage had not been reached by the Air Force. I repeat that at that time the Air Force was; as far as leadership, training, and material were concerned, not ready for war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But ever since you first went with Hermann Göring you had been rapidly building up the Air Force, had you not?

BODENSCHATZ: The building up of the Air Force went relatively fast.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when you first went with Göring—I have forgotten what year you said that was.

BODENSCHATZ: I came to Hermann Göring in April 1933. At that time there was no Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, but only a Reich Commissariat for Aviation. But even at that time, the beginning of the building up of the Air Force—the first beginnings—started. It was only after 1935, however, when freedom from armament restriction was declared, that it was speeded up.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the building up of the Air Force was very largely in bombers, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: It was not mainly bombers; it was mixed, both fighters and bombers.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring also had charge of the Four Year Plan?

BODENSCHATZ: He was commissioned by the Führer to carry out the Four Year Plan.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He also held several other offices, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring, besides being Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, was put in charge of the Four Year Plan. Before that, at the beginning of the seizure of power, he was Minister of the Interior and Prime Minister of Prussia, President of the Reichstag and Reichsforstmeister.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I notice that you use here, as you have used in your interrogations by the United States, the expression “seizure of power.” That was the common expression used in your group, was it not, to describe the coming to power of Adolf Hitler?

BODENSCHATZ: It cannot be used in this sense. At that time it was completely legal because the National Socialist Party was then the strongest party, and the strongest party nominated the Reich Chancellor, and the strongest party had, as such, the greatest influence. It must not be interpreted to mean that they usurped the power, but that they had the most influential and prominent position among the parties, that is, by the completely legal means of election.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You want to change the word “seizure”?

BODENSCHATZ: I have to change that. It is only an expression which was common usage in the press at that time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring got along without any open break with Hitler until 1945, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Until the year 1945 there was no open break. The arrest was only quite at the end, as I have said before.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the arrest was the first open break that had occurred between them, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, the first big break between the two which was apparent to the public. But since the year 1943, as I have said before, there was already a gradual estrangement in the attitude of the two men.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But that was kept from the public, was it not, kept from the German people?

BODENSCHATZ: It was not so visible to the public. It was a development which took place gradually from the spring of 1943 to 1945—first to a small extent, and then the tension became greater and greater.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When the arrest was made it was made by the SS, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: I only heard that. It was said that in Obersalzberg a unit of SS had arrived which arrested Hermann Göring in his small house and confined him there. As to that, perhaps the witness who is going to testify later, Colonel Brauchitsch, who was present at this arrest and who was arrested himself, can give more details.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were not arrested by the SS?

BODENSCHATZ: At that time . . . since 20 July 1944, when I was seriously injured, I had been in the hospital. I was close to Berchtesgaden, at Bad Reichenhall, convalescing.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whenever there were conferences which you attended, was it not the custom, at the conclusion of Hitler’s address to the group, for Göring as the ranking man present, to assure the Führer on behalf of himself and his fellow officers of their support of his plans?

BODENSCHATZ: Of course I was not present at all conferences. I only took the part of listener. At these discussions, or shall we say conferences, in which I took part, it happened from time to time that the Reich Marshal made a remark at the end and gave assurance that the will of the Führer would be carried out. But at the moment I cannot remember specifically any such conference.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You cannot remember any conference at which he did not do it either, can you?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes. It was not always done; on the contrary, he did not do it as a rule. In the Reichstag Hermann Göring always made a concluding speech, after a session had ended, expressing his confidence in Adolf Hitler.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did he not do that at every meeting of officers at which the Führer was present?

BODENSCHATZ: May I ask you to repeat the question? I have not quite understood it. I beg you to excuse me, but I would like to mention that owing to my injury I have lost 60 percent of my hearing, and therefore I beg you to excuse me if I ask for repetitions. Please, repeat your question.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Quite all right, Sir. Do you know of any conference between Hitler and his High Command at which Göring did not close the meeting, as the ranking officer present, by making assurances of support to Hitler’s plans?

BODENSCHATZ: Some of the conferences I attended were concluded by a declaration of that nature. There were, however, many conferences—in fact most of the conferences—when nothing further was said at the end. When the Führer had finished his speech, the meeting was ended.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In 1943, when Göring began to lose influence with Hitler, it was a very embarrassing time for Göring, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring suffered from this fact. He often told me that he would suffer very much on that account.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From the fact that the Führer was losing confidence in him?

BODENSCHATZ: What was that?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was suffering from the fact that the Führer was losing confidence in him? Was that what was causing his suffering?

BODENSCHATZ: That may have been part of the reason, but differences of opinion arose about the Luftwaffe.

MR. JUSTICE. JACKSON: Now, in the spring of 1943 it was apparent to you and apparent to him that the war was lost for Germany, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say that. The Reich Marshal did not tell me in 1943 that the war was lost, but that there were great difficulties, that it would become very dangerous; but that the war was definitely lost—I cannot remember that the Reich Marshal at that time, in the spring of 1943, made a statement to me of that kind, or a similar one.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Reich Marshal had given his assurance to the German people, had he not, that it would not be possible for them to be bombed, as Warsaw, Rotterdam, and other cities were bombed?

BODENSCHATZ: As far as I know, he did not give the assurance in those words. Before the war, when our Air Force was growing—I mean at the beginning of the war, when the great successes in Poland and in France were manifest—he said to the German people that the Air Force would do its job and do everything to spare the country from heavy air raids. At the time that was justified. It was not clearly foreseen then that matters would develop differently later.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then he had given his assurance to the German people, had he not, that the Luftwaffe would be able to keep enemy bombers away from Germany?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember that he gave an official assurance to the German people in the form of a decree or a big speech. At times it was said that the German Air Force, after the successes in Poland and France, was at its peak. I do not know of any official statement whereby it was made known to the German people.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At all events, it became apparent in the spring of 1943 that any such assurance, if it had been given, was misleading?

BODENSCHATZ: In the year 1943 the conditions were entirely different, owing to the fact that the British and American Air Forces came into the picture in such large and overwhelming numbers.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was also true that the air defenses of Germany were proving entirely inadequate to cope with the situation; is that not a fact?

BODENSCHATZ: The air defense of Germany was very difficult, as the entire defense did not depend on the air crews alone, but it was also a radio-technical war, and in this radio-technical war, it must be admitted frankly, the enemy was essentially better than we were. Therefore it was not only a war in the air, but if was also a radio war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It had become apparent that Germany could not cope with it—is that not a fact?—by 1943.

BODENSCHATZ: In the year 1943 it was not yet a hundred percent clear. There were fluctuations, low and high points. Efforts were made to increase the fighter strength at the expense of the bombers. It was not one hundred percent obvious that the enemy air force could not be opposed successfully. That became obvious only after the middle of 1944.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Führer lost confidence in Göring as the bombing of German cities progressed, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, indeed, from the moment the British Air Force started with their large-scale attacks on German cities, particularly when the first heavy British air attack on Cologne took place. From that moment it was obvious that differences of opinion, at first not too serious, were arising between the two men.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Hitler accused Göring, did he not, of misleading him as to the strength of the air defenses of Germany?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know that the Führer ever accused the Reich Marshal of any offense in this respect. Discussions between Adolf Hitler and the Reich Marshal were, in spite of all tension, always very moderate. The criticism is said to have become more vehement only later, in 1944 and the beginning of 1945. But I was not present, because I had been off duty since 20 July 1944.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you a question. I did not intend to imply that the Führer accused him of an intentional misstatement, but he had misled him or he had misunderstood the strength of Germany’s air defenses. Was that not generally understood in your circle?

BODENSCHATZ: There could be no question of misleading. The reports which the Air Force made to the Führer were always correct. The weaknesses of the Air Force were also reported to the Führer.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What were the efforts that were made by Göring, which you refer to as tremendous efforts, to recapture his influence with the Führer?

BODENSCHATZ: The Reich Marshal, whenever there were conferences, asked through me that he might participate. The Reich Marshal came more frequently than usual to the Führer’s headquarters, and he also said to me, “I will try everything to regain the right contact with the Führer.” He said that personally to me.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he was particularly careful after the spring of 1944 not to do anything that would offend the Führer?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say anything more about the year 1944, because then I was no longer active. I had no further contact.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this bombing of German cities had become very troublesome from the point of view of the German people’s criticism of the government, had it not, in 1944?

BODENSCHATZ: The German people suffered terribly under these bombing attacks, and I can only say one thing—that Adolf Hitler suffered most from them. When at night the bombing of a German city was reported, he was really deeply moved, and likewise the Reich Marshal, because the horror of such a bombing was indescribable. I have experienced a few such bombings in Berlin myself, and whoever has lived through that, will never forget it as long as he lives.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And this was all becoming very embarrassing to Hitler and to the Reich Marshal, was it not, to explain to the German people why this was going on?

BODENSCHATZ: That did not have to be explained, because the German people felt it. No explanation was given. It was only said that all possible measures would be taken to master this peril.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew at that time, and the Reich Marshal knew, that no measures could be taken that would prevent it?

BODENSCHATZ: No, no, no. I emphasized before that it was a radio-technical war, and there were moments when, in the defense, we could counter the measures of the enemy while constantly discovering a new means to hit him.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you made the announcement to the German people that all means would be taken, you had then no means at your disposal, that you knew of, to use, did you, to prevent the bombing of the German cities?

BODENSCHATZ: Oh yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What were they, and why were they not used?

BODENSCHATZ: There were, for example, the following means: The most important areas were protected by anti-aircraft guns. Then there were radio-technical means, jamming transmitters, which would have made it possible, and which partly did make it possible, to jam the radio sets in the enemy aircraft.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The movement to satisfy the German people under the bombing attacks was a matter of great concern to the Reich Marshal, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: The Reich Marshal was very anxious that the population should be informed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And see that the population was satisfied, was he not?

BODENSCHATZ: It is easy to say “satisfied.” He could only assure the German people that he would do everything in his power to master these attacks.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, have you seen the Reich Marshal and Hitler when the reports came in of the bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam and of Coventry?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember whether I was present when the reports came.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never saw any such reactions on their part on those bombings, I take it?

BODENSCHATZ: I only know that Warsaw was a fortress which was held by the Polish Army in very great strength, provided with excellent pieces of artillery, that the forts were manned, and that two or three times Adolf Hitler announced that civilians should be evacuated from the city. That was rejected. Only the foreign embassies were evacuated, while an officer with a flag of truce entered. The Polish Army was in the city defending it stubbornly in a very dense circle of forts. The outer forts were very strongly manned, and from the inner town heavy artillery was firing towards the outskirts. The fortress of Warsaw was therefore attacked, and also by the Luftwaffe, but only after Hitler’s ultimatum had been rejected.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was Coventry a fortified city?

BODENSCHATZ: Coventry was no fortress. Coventry, however, was a city which housed the key industry of the enemy air force, in which the aircraft engines were built, a city in which, as far as I know, many factories were situated and many parts of these aircraft engines were manufactured. In any case, the Luftwaffe had at that time received orders to bomb only the industrial targets. If the city also suffered, it is understandable, considering the means of navigation at that time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were interrogated in November of 1945, were you not, by Colonel Williams?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I was interrogated.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Colonel Williams asked you about certain fictitious incidents along the German-Polish border late in August of 1939, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, he asked me about that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And would you care to tell the Tribunal what you know about the fictitious incidents along the Polish border?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know anything positive. I was asked by Colonel Williams whether I knew in advance about the incident of the Gleiwitz broadcasting section. I told him I knew nothing about it. It was only that the incidents on the Polish border were very similar to those which happened on the Czech border. It may have been presumed—that was only my opinion—that they were perhaps deliberate. But I had no positive proof that anything had been staged on our part.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you tell him on the 6th of November 1945, as follows: