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“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by the Armed Forces. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. . . . An effort must be made to deal the enemy a heavy or decisive final blow right at the start. Considerations of right or wrong, or treaties, do not enter into the matter.”

Do you remember those words being said?

MILCH: I cannot remember exactly what the words were. I know that it was a question of the Polish Corridor and Danzig, that in this connection Hitler explained what complications might follow in the West, and what he intended to do about it; but what he said in detail I can no longer remember.

MR. ROBERTS: Was any protest made by any of these honorable men at the breach of Germany’s pledged word?

MILCH: During this meeting it was impossible for anyone present to speak at all. Hitler addressed us from his desk, and after the speech he left the room. A discussion did not take place; he did not allow it.

MR. ROBERTS: You say it is impossible for an honorable man to protect his honor, Witness?

MILCH: I cannot remember Hitler’s actual words shown here.

MR. ROBERTS: Can you give the Tribunal your opinion of it?

MILCH: At this meeting I did not have the impression that Hitler said anything contrary to the obligations entered into. That I cannot remember.

MR. ROBERTS: Are you now saying that those minutes are wrong?

MILCH: No, I cannot say that either. I can only say I have no recollection of the exact words used. Whether the minutes are completely correct I do not know either. As far as I know they were recorded subsequently by one of the adjutants present.

MR. ROBERTS: Because we know that is exactly what Germany did 12 months after, when she broke her pledged word to Belgium, to the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and brought misery and death to millions. You know that now, do you not?

MILCH: That I know, yes; but as soldiers we had nothing to do with the political side. We were not asked about that.

MR. ROBERTS: Do you call the honoring of . . .

DR. RUDOLPH DIX (Counsel for the Defendant Schacht): I do not speak now for the Defendant Schacht, but for the entire Defense. I ask the Tribunal that the witness be questioned about facts, and not about his opinion as to moral standards.

THE PRESIDENT: He is being asked about facts.

MR. ROBERTS: You have just said that you know now—we know, that 12 months later Germany did violate the neutrality of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

MILCH: But we do not know what the reasons were for this, and what other obligations these countries might have entered into. It was not a job of the soldiers to judge this.

MR. ROBERTS: Was it not a job of the soldier to object if he was asked to break his country’s word?

MILCH: I fully agree with you, if a soldier breaks his word in matters which are his province and where he has a say as a soldier. As regards matters quite outside his province, which he cannot judge and about which he knows nothing, he cannot be made responsible and called to account.

MR. ROBERTS: You can only speak for your own knowledge. Are you saying that you did not know that your country was pledged to observe the neutrality of these three small countries?

MILCH: That I have read in the Reichstag speech. But I did not know how the other side had reacted to that promise. It was not known to me, and it could easily be that the other side did not at all want this protection, or this promise, or this guarantee. The soldier could not judge this at all; only the political authorities could know this.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, we perhaps will have to ask that of the soldiers in the High Command, who are now in the dock, when they get in the witness box. But I put it to you it must have been common knowledge in Germany that Hitler was giving guarantees and assurances to all these smaller countries?

MILCH: Hitler proposed and offered many things. He offered limitations of armaments for all countries; he offered not to use bombers; but in these cases also his proposals were not accepted. Therefore the political authorities alone could know what they should and could demand from their soldiers. The only duty of a soldier is to obey.

MR. ROBERTS: Will you please answer my question. That was not an answer at all to my question. We know the facts now, Witness, from the documents, from your own German documents. I want to test your knowledge and your ideas of honor. Did you not think it grossly dishonorable to give a pledge on 28 April, and to make secret resolution to break it on 23 May?

MILCH: You are right, if the situation had not changed in any way, and that I cannot judge.

MR. ROBERTS: You must have your own code of honor, even though you are in the service. You know, of course, that the neutrality of Norway was violated?

MILCH: Yes, according to our knowledge and in our opinion it was violated twice.

MR. ROBERTS: Do you know that on the 12th and 13th of March 1940 Jodl was putting in his diary, “The Führer is still looking for a pretext” to give out to the world for an invasion of Norway? Do you know that?

MILCH: I do not know this diary and this entry.

MR. ROBERTS: You took an active part in the invasion of Norway, did you not?

MILCH: A few days after the invasion started I was in command of the air force up there for a short time.

MR. ROBERTS: You had actually a command in Norway?

MILCH: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: I think it necessary to clear up a point which apparently concerns a misunderstanding by the interpreter. I have just heard that a diary entry by the Defendant Jodl has been wrongly translated back into German. The German text says “nach einer Begründung,” that is “for a justification.” I also believe the word “justification” is in the English translation. It should not have been interpreted as “Ausrede,” that would be “prétexte” in French and that is something quite different.

MR. ROBERTS: Whatever it reads in the translation, Witness, would you agree that according to the entry in the diary, the Führer was still looking for it, whether it was a reason or an excuse?

Now I want to ask you only one more question on this side of the case.

You know that Belgrade was bombed in, I think, April 1941?

MILCH: I heard about that from the Army report at the time.

MR. ROBERTS: Without any declaration of war, or any warning to the civilian population at all, you heard that?

MILCH: That I do not know, no.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you not discuss it with Göring?

MILCH: The attack on Belgrade? No; I cannot remember.

MR. ROBERTS: Did not even he express regret, shall we say, regarding the large-scale bombing of a large capital without even one hour warning to the civilian population?

MILCH: I do not know. I cannot remember any such conversation.

MR. ROBERTS: That is murder, is it not?

[There was no response.]

MR. ROBERTS: Perhaps you would rather not answer that question?

MILCH: I cannot answer “yes” or “no,” because I know nothing of the circumstances of the attack. I do not know whether war had been declared; I do not know whether a warning had been given. Neither do I know whether Belgrade was a fortress, nor which targets were attacked in Belgrade. I know of so many bombing attacks about which the same questions could be asked in the same manner.

MR. ROBERTS: I asked the question, Witness, because we had the use of the document in front of us, and knew that it was Hitler’s order that Belgrade was to be suddenly destroyed by waves of bombers, without any ultimatum, or any diplomatic arguments, or negotiations at all. Would I put that question if I had not known of the document? Let me turn to something else.

MILCH: May I say I have heard of this document only today because you quoted it.

MR. ROBERTS: I want to put to you now an incident with regard to the Camp Stalag Luft III at Sagan. Do you know about what I am talking?

MILCH: Yes, I know about that now.

MR. ROBERTS: Do you know that on 24 and 25 March 1944 about 80 air force officers, British and Dominion, with some others, escaped from the Stalag Luft III Camp?

MILCH: I know about this from the British interrogation camp in which I was kept, where the whole case was posted up on the wall.

MR. ROBERTS: We will come to that in a moment. Do you know that of those 80, 50 were shot?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: In various parts of Germany and the occupied countries from Danzig to Saarbrücken; you have heard of that?

MILCH: I heard that about 50 were shot, but did not know where.

MR. ROBERTS: Have you heard that quite unusually the bodies were never seen again, but that urns said to contain their ashes were brought back to the camp; you heard of that?

MILCH: I heard of it in the camp where I was kept, from Mr. Anthony Eden’s speech in the House of Commons.

MR. ROBERTS: You heard that although these officers were reported by your Government as having been shot while offering resistance or trying to escape, yet not one was wounded, and all 50 were shot dead.

MILCH: At first I heard only the official report in Germany, that these officers had been shot while resisting or trying to escape. We did not believe this version, and there was a lot of discussion about this without precise knowledge. We were afraid that these men might have been murdered.

MR. ROBERTS: You were afraid that murder had been committed. It does appear likely, does it not?

MILCH: We got that impression, as the various details we heard could not be pieced together.

MR. ROBERTS: It is quite clear that if that was murder, the order for that murder would have to come from a high level, is it not?

MILCH: Certainly. I heard further details about this from the Inspector General for Prisoners of War, General Westhoff, while both of us were in captivity in England.

MR. ROBERTS: Now, I want to ask you, first of all, about the Prisoner-of-War Organization. Was the Prisoner-of-War Organization a department of the OKW?

MILCH: In my opinion, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Which was called KGW, Kriegsgefangenenwesen?

MILCH: I cannot say anything about its organization, because I do not know. I only knew that there was a chief of the Kriegsgefangenenwesen with the OKW.

MR. ROBERTS: And was the chief of the Kriegsgefangenenwesen at that time Major General Von Graevenitz?

MILCH: Von Graevenitz, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: This was an air force camp? Stalag Luft III was an air force camp?

MILCH: Yes. So it was called, but I understand that all prisoners were under the OKW. That is what I thought. I cannot, however, state this definitely because I did not know much about that organization.

MR. ROBERTS: Was the directorate for supervising the air force camps, or the inspectorate, rather, called Inspectorate Number 17?

MILCH: There was an inspectorate, which as its name indicated had to deal with supervision. What it had to do and what were its tasks, I cannot say. Whether it was just for interrogation, I do not know.

MR. ROBERTS: Was the head of that Major General Grosch?

MILCH: I cannot say, it is possible, I know the name but not whether he held that post.

MR. ROBERTS: And the second in command, Colonel Waelde?

MILCH: Not known to me.

MR. ROBERTS: You were Number 2 in the Air Force at the Air Ministry in March 1944, were you not?

MILCH: There were several Number 2 people at that time. I held the same rank as the chief of the general staff, the chief of the personnel office, and the chief of technical armament, who were independent of me and on the same level. As to seniority, I ranked as second officer in the Air Force.

MR. ROBERTS: Was there a conference in Berlin on the morning of Saturday, the 25th of March, about this escape?

MILCH: I cannot remember.

MR. ROBERTS: Did not Göring speak to you about that conference?

MILCH: I have no recollection.

MR. ROBERTS: Did Göring never tell you that there was a conference between Hitler, Himmler, himself, and Keitel on that Saturday morning?

MILCH: No. I do not know anything about that. I do not remember.

MR. ROBERTS: At which the order for the murder of these recaptured prisoners of war was given?

MILCH: I cannot remember. According to what I heard later, the circumstances were entirely different. I had information about this from the previously mentioned General Westhoff and also from General Bodenschatz.

MR. ROBERTS: General Westhoff we are going to see here as a witness. He has made a statement about the matter saying . . .

MILCH: I beg your pardon. I could not hear you just now. The German is coming through very faintly. I can hear you, but not the German transmission.

MR. ROBERTS: General Westhoff . . .

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: . . . has made a statement . . .

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: . . . and we are going to see him as a witness.

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: So perhaps I had better not put his statement to you, because he is going to give evidence. Perhaps that would be fairer from the point of view of the Defense. But are you suggesting that action against these officers, if they were murdered—to use your words—having escaped from an air force camp, that action could have been taken without the knowledge of Göring?

MILCH: I consider it quite possible in view of the great confusion existing in the highest circles at that time.

MR. ROBERTS: High confusion in March 1944?

MILCH: All through there was terrible confusion.

MR. ROBERTS: But it is quite clear . . .

MILCH: Hitler interfered in all matters, and himself gave orders over the heads of the chiefs of the Wehrmacht.

MR. ROBERTS: But did you never discuss this matter with Göring at all?

MILCH: No. I cannot remember ever speaking to Göring about this question.

MR. ROBERTS: Do you not think this is a matter which reflects shame on the Armed Forces of Germany?

MILCH: Yes; that is a great shame.

MR. ROBERTS: Yet Göring never spoke to you about it at all? Did you ever speak to Keitel?

MILCH: I could not say. During that time I hardly ever saw Göring.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you ever speak to Keitel about it?

MILCH: No, never. I saw even less of Keitel than of Göring.

MR. ROBERTS: Was there not a General Foster or Foerster at the Air Ministry?

MILCH: Yes, there was.

MR. ROBERTS: General Foerster?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Was he director of operations?

MILCH: No. He was chief of the Luftwehr. As such he had to deal with replacements of personnel and he worked with the departments concerned, with the General Staff, and also the Reich Marshal. During the war he was also in charge of civil aviation, and in that capacity he worked together with me, but during the war it was a very small job . . .

MR. ROBERTS: I was going to ask you, did he ever mention this shooting to you?

MILCH: I have been asked that before, but try as I may I cannot remember. It is possible that in the course of conversation he may have told me that officers had been shot, but whether he did so, and in what way, under what circumstances, I cannot recollect. I did not receive an official report from him; I had no right to ask for one either.

MR. ROBERTS: If Foerster told you, did you ever report it to Göring?

MILCH: I cannot remember a conversation with Foerster about it: I do not think I spoke to him. He did not give me a report either, which I should have had to pass on to Göring. Such a report would have been given by him to Göring direct, through quite different channels and much quicker.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you take any steps to prevent this shooting from being carried out?

MILCH: When I first heard about it it was not clear to me what had actually happened. But even if it had been clear, it was evident from what Westhoff told me that it would unfortunately have been too late.

MR. ROBERTS: Why too late?

MILCH: Because Westhoff was the first officer to have knowledge of it. When he was informed he was told that the order had already been carried out. I may say that General Westhoff made this statement and will confirm it.

MR. ROBERTS: Very well, you never went to Göring at all in the matter, as you say.

MILCH: I do not know anything about it.

MR. ROBERTS: Now I am going to deal further with three short points. With regard to the use of labor for the armament industry, Mr. Justice Jackson has asked you questions on that. Was labor from concentration camps used?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Would you just look at Document Number 1584-PS: That is shorthand note 1357, 12 December, in the afternoon.

Is that a teletype from Göring to Himmler, dated 14 February 1944? There are various code numbers; then, to Reichsführer SS—that was Himmler, Reichsminister Himmler. Who actually sent that teletype? It is signed by Göring, but he would not be dealing with questions of labor, would he?

MILCH: I could not say, I could not say from whom it originated.

MR. ROBERTS: That was a subject with which you dealt, was it not, the provision of labor for air armament?

MILCH: Only while I had to do with air armament did I send demands for labor to the respective offices. But this telegram did not come from my office.

MR. ROBERTS: If it did not come from your office, whose office did it come from?

MILCH: It deals with various matters, there is first the question of another squadron.

MR. ROBERTS: Please answer the question, whose office did it come from?

MILCH: I cannot say that offhand.

MR. ROBERTS: Very well.

MILCH: I do not know.

MR. ROBERTS: Second sentence: “At the same time I request that a substantial number of concentration camp prisoners be put at my disposal for air armament, as this kind of labor has proved to be very useful.” You had frequently used concentration camp labor, had you?

MILCH: Latterly, yes. May I ask, is the teletype dated the 15th and what is the month?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I told you, Witness, 14 February 1944. It is on the top.

MILCH: Yes, I could not read it here.

MR. ROBERTS: No, I quite understand. And did Himmler respond by providing you with 90,000 further concentration camp prisoners? I refer to Document 1584-PS, Number 3, dated 9 March 1944. It is to the “Most Honored Reich Marshal” from Heinrich Himmler. It says: “At present approximately 36,000 prisoners are employed for the Air Force. It is proposed to bring the number up to 90,000.”

Then he refers in the last paragraph: “The transfer of aircraft manufacturing plants underground requires a further 100,000 prisoners.”

Now, those were concentration camp internees, Witness?

MILCH: Yes; I see that from the letter.

MR. ROBERTS: You said you were almost ignorant of the conditions in concentration camps?

MILCH: No; I do not know anything about that.

MR. ROBERTS: You have not seen the films taken when the camps were captured?

MILCH: No.

MR. ROBERTS: The grim contrast—just wait a moment—the grim contrast between the plump and well-fed guards and civilians and the skeletons of the internees?

MILCH: I have not seen the film, but I saw photographs when I was in England.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you close your eyes deliberately to what was going on in Germany?

MILCH: No, it was not possible for us to see it.

MR. ROBERTS: You, in your position, could not know what was going on?

MILCH: It was absolutely impossible.

MR. ROBERTS: Now then, I just want to deal very shortly with a matter upon which Mr. Justice Jackson touched, but he did not read the letter. That is the question of the experiments for the purpose of Air Force research. I am anxious to refer to as few documents as possible, but I can give the reference.

Do you know that on 15 May 1941, and the reference is shorthand note 1848, Document Number 1602-PS, that Dr. Rascher wrote to Himmler?

MILCH: I did not know him. I think I mentioned that during my interrogation.

MR. ROBERTS: He had very dangerous experiments to make for which no human being would volunteer. Monkeys were not suitable, so he asked for human subjects which Himmler at once provided—said he would be glad to provide human subjects for the experiment. Now, that was in 1941. Did you know that was taking place?

MILCH: No, I did not know anything about that.

MR. ROBERTS: Now, Rascher was . . .

MILCH: I did not know Rascher personally.

MR. ROBERTS: He was a doctor on the staff of the Air Force.

THE PRESIDENT: But, Mr. Roberts, this is not a letter to this witness, is it?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I am leading up to it. The next letter is a letter signed by this witness. That was preliminary. Perhaps I had better come to the letter which he signed now; I am much obliged.

I want to put to you now Document Number 343-PS, and I also want to put to you, if the officer in charge of the documents would be so good, I want to put to you Document Number 607-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, he has already been cross-examined upon this letter, has he not?

MR. ROBERTS: I did not think the letter was read or was dealt with sufficiently. I believe Your Lordship thinks it was.

THE PRESIDENT: The letter was put to him. I do not know whether it was actually read.

MR. ROBERTS: I shall be guided by the Court entirely. I know the matter was touched upon. I felt perhaps the letter should be read but I may be quite wrong.

THE PRESIDENT: I am told it was not read but the two letters were put to him.

MR. ROBERTS: I agree. If Your Lordship would be good enough to bear with me for a very few minutes I can perhaps deal with the matters I think should be dealt with.

[Turning to the witness.] You will see that on the 20th of May 1942—this is your letter to “Wolffy,” is it not, that is Obergruppenführer Wolff, and that is signed by you is it not?

MILCH: Yes, I signed it. That is the letter which, as I said this morning was submitted to me by the Medical Inspection department and from which it appears that we wanted to dissociate ourselves from the whole business as politely as possible.

MR. ROBERTS: The point of the letter is, if I may summarize it, that you say: “In reference to your telegram of 12 May our Medical Inspection department . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, if I remember right, when these letters were put to the witness he said he had not read them; that he signed them without reading them.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, My Lord, perhaps I had better leave the matter if Your Lordship thinks I am going over ground which has been trodden too often.

[Turning to the witness.] Are you asking this Tribunal to believe that you signed these two letters to Wolff, who was liaison officer, was he not, between—who was Wolff?

MILCH: No, Wolff was not liaison officer, he was Himmler’s adjutant. He sent a telegram to us, apparently for the attention of the Medical Inspection department. The Medical Inspection department replied via my office because for some reason or other it did not appear expedient to reply direct. I stated in my interrogations that these letters, though signed by me, were not dictated in my office, but that for this reply from the Medical Inspection department my stationery was used as was customary. I had nothing to do either with our high altitude experiments or with the Medical Inspection department, nor was I in any way connected with experiments by the SS.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you know that these pressure chamber experiments were being carried out with human bodies, human souls, provided by Dachau?

MILCH: On whom they were made appears from the letter submitted to me by the Medical Inspection department. In the Air Force we made many experiments with our own medical officers who volunteered for it; and as we did it with our own people we considered it to be our own affair. We, therefore, did not want any experiments by the SS; we were not interested in them. We had for a very long time experimented with our own people. We did not need the SS, who interfered in a matter which did not concern them; and we could never understand why the SS meddled with this matter.

MR. ROBERTS: Did not Himmler write you a letter—the reference is shorthand note 1852—in November 1942, that is Document Number 1617-PS, in which he says: “Dear Milch: . . . both high pressure and cold water experiments have been carried out. . . .” and that he, Himmler, provided asocial persons and criminals from concentration camps? Do you remember that letter?

MILCH: This letter was shown to me but I cannot remember this letter either. I do not know why Himmler wrote to me at all. These letters were always passed on direct by my office, without my seeing them, to the respective offices of the Medical Inspection department and replied to via my office. I was not in a position to do anything in this respect because I did not know what it was all about, nor had I any idea of the medical aspect.

MR. ROBERTS: If you say you know nothing about letters which you signed I cannot carry the matter any further.

Now I want to deal with the last point.

MILCH: During the course of the day I had to sign several hundred letters and I could not know what they dealt with in detail. In this particular case it was a question for a specialist and I merely signed in order to relieve the Medical Inspector of responsibility who, for the reason mentioned this morning, did not want to sign himself.

MR. ROBERTS: Very well, I am leaving that point.

Now then, the last point. You said on Friday that a German general has been executed for looting jewelry. Where did the looting take place?

MILCH: I cannot say that. I seem to recollect that it was in Belgrade. The name of the general is General Wafer, this I still remember.

MR. ROBERTS: It was jewelry looted from Belgrade?

MILCH: That I cannot say. I know only what I said on Friday.

MR. ROBERTS: So the German authorities regarded the death penalty as a suitable one for looting; apparently that is right.

MILCH: I could not hear the question.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, perhaps it was a comment. I will ask you the next question. What was the value of the jewelry which was looted?

MILCH: I can say only that I do not know how it was stolen, or what was stolen, or how valuable it was; but only that it was said to be jewelry which he had appropriated and that he was sentenced to death.

MR. ROBERTS: Did Göring ever speak to you about his art collection he was getting from occupied countries?

MILCH: I do not know anything about that.

MR. ROBERTS: May I read you a piece of evidence, shorthand note 2317, and it is an order of Göring signed on the 5th of November 1940.

“Göring to the Chief of the Military Administration in Paris and to the Einsatzstab Rosenberg:

“To dispose of the art objects brought to the Louvre in the following order of priority:

“First, those art objects . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, he has never seen this document and he says he knows nothing about it.

MR. ROBERTS: If your Lordship pleases, if you do not think I should put it to him . . .

[Turning to the witness.] You say Göring never discussed with you his art collection?

MILCH: No.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you not know that valuable art objects, according to an inventory over 21,000 objects, were taken from the western occupied countries?

MILCH: No; that is not known to me.

MR. ROBERTS: What ought the general who looted the jewelry, perhaps from Belgrade, to have done with it? Given it to the Führer, or given it to Göring?

MILCH: I ask to be excused from answering this question.

GEN. RUDENKO: Will you please tell me when you heard of Hitler’s plan to go to war with the Soviet Union? In January 1941?

MILCH: As I said on Friday, I heard in January from Reich Marshal Göring that Hitler had told him he expected there would be an attack on Russia. Then for several months I heard nothing more about the whole thing, until by chance I found out from a subordinate that war with Russia was imminent and preparations for the clothing of the troops were being made.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you know about Case Barbarossa?

MILCH: I had heard the name, and I heard the plan expounded at a Führer conference with the commanders of the various army groups and armies 1 or 2 days before the attack.

GEN. RUDENKO: And when did this take place—1, 2 days before the invasion?

MILCH: I will let you know the exact date in a minute.

GEN. RUDENKO: Please do.

MILCH: On 14 June. That is about eight days before the attack which took place on the 22d.

GEN. RUDENKO: And before that, you had neither heard of, nor seen this plan?

MILCH: I say that I had probably heard the name Barbarossa before.

GEN. RUDENKO: And how long before?

MILCH: That I cannot say, because during the months of January, February, March, and also in April I was outside Germany and I did not return until May. I was in Africa, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the West.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am interested in the period when you were in the High Command of the German Air Force. Were you in Germany in December and January?

MILCH: In December 1940.

GEN. RUDENKO: So?

MILCH: Only part of December as during that month I was in France and also in Italy.

GEN. RUDENKO: And where were you in January 1941?

MILCH: I was in the West, and as far as I remember not one day in Germany.

GEN. RUDENKO: But you just told us that in January 1941 you had a talk with Göring about the plan of war against the Soviet Union.

MILCH: Yes, I . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: In January 1941?

MILCH: Yes, on 13 January, but I cannot say now whether I spoke to Göring in France, or whether it was over the telephone, or whether I was in Germany for a day or two. That I cannot say, I did not make a note of it.

GEN. RUDENKO: Excuse me; what has a telephone conversation to do with an attack on the Soviet Union?

MILCH: Not an attack on Russia, but an attack by Russia on Germany was mentioned at that time, and we had . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: You mean to say you discussed over the telephone the question of an attack by the Soviet Union on Germany?

MILCH: No, I have not stated anything like that, but I said I do not know whether I received the information on a special line which could not be tapped, or whether the Reich Marshal told me about it in France, or whether on that particular day I was in Germany.

GEN. RUDENKO: And when did you discuss this question with Göring, and when did Göring express his apprehension as to this war against the Soviet Union?

MILCH: That was on 22 May.

GEN. RUDENKO: The 22nd of May 1941?

MILCH: 1941, yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: And where was this question discussed?

MILCH: In Veldenstein near Nuremberg.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you discuss this question with Göring alone, or was anybody else present at this conversation?

MILCH: At that time only with Göring. We were alone.

GEN. RUDENKO: And you assert that Göring did not wish to go to war with Russia?

MILCH: That was my impression.

GEN. RUDENKO: So. And why did Göring not want this war against the Soviet Union? This was a defensive war, was it not?

MILCH: Göring was opposed to such a war, because he wanted, all of us did . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: He was opposed also to a defensive war?

MILCH: He personally was against any war.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is strange. Maybe you will be able to give me precise reasons why Göring did not wish war against the Soviet Union.

MILCH: Because a war on two fronts, especially a war against Russia, as I saw it, meant losing the war; and I believe that many fighting men and others thought as I did.

GEN. RUDENKO: So you too were opposed to a war against the Soviet Union?

MILCH: Yes, most definitely so.

GEN. RUDENKO: Strange. Your statements are not very consistent. On the one hand, you say that the Soviet Union was going to attack Germany, and on the other hand that German officers did not want a war with the Soviet Union.

MILCH: May I explain again. On 13 January Göring told me that Hitler had the impression that Russia intended to march against Germany. That was not Göring’s opinion, neither was it mine. I assume it was Hitler’s opinion which he had expressed as his own.

GEN. RUDENKO: Excuse me. Do I understand that neither you nor Göring thought this opinion of Hitler’s to be correct?

MILCH: I can only speak for myself. I often expressed it as my view that Russia would not go against us. What Göring thought about it I could not say. He did not talk to me about it. You should ask him.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, and now I shall ask you. You mean to say that you personally did not share Hitler’s opinion? And you mean that Göring, too, did not want a war against the Soviet Union?

MILCH: On 22 May, when I spoke to Göring about this matter and urgently requested him to do everything to prevent a war with Russia, he told me that he had used the same arguments with Hitler but that it was impossible to get Hitler to change his mind; he had made his decision and no power on earth could influence him.

GEN. RUDENKO: I see. You mean that Göring was opposed to a war with the Soviet Union, because he thought it impracticable while you were at war with England, and he wanted to prevent war on two fronts?

MILCH: From a purely military point of view, yes; and I believe that if war had been avoided at that time it would not have come about later.

GEN. RUDENKO: And you seriously maintain that it is possible to talk about a preventive war so far ahead, and at the same time to work out Case Barbarossa and all the directives to implement it, as well as gaining allies for the attack on Russia? Do you seriously believe in the preventive character of such a war?

MILCH: I do not understand the meaning of the question.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you think one could make known that the Soviet Union was going to attack Germany, and at the same time work out an aggressive plan against the Soviet Union, and this as early as December 1940, as appears from the dates of the official documents?

MILCH: As I understand it, Hitler, expecting an attack by Russia—if he really expected it—said that he had to meet a Russian invasion by a preventive war. This, however, has nothing to do with the opinion for which I have been asked here. Speaking for myself, I did not unreservedly hold the view that Russia would invade us. Without being able to judge the situation as a whole, I personally believed that Russia in her own interest, which I tried to visualize, would not do this.

GEN. RUDENKO: I understand. I should like to put a few questions to you with regard to the prisoners of war. The employment of prisoners of war, especially from the Soviet Union, on work in the aircraft industry has already been mentioned here.

MILCH: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: What is your attitude to employing prisoners of war on work against their own country? What do you think of that?

MILCH: It is, of course, not a nice thing to do; but as far as I know it was also done to our prisoners of war by all the other countries.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am talking of Germany now. You say it is not a nice thing. Is not that a rather mild way of putting it?

MILCH: It depends upon what the others do. All laws of warfare are based on reciprocity, as long as there is any reciprocity.

GEN. RUDENKO: I should like you to answer my question. What was the German High Command’s attitude to this kind of employment? Do you consider that by this employment the regulations of international law were being violated?

MILCH: That is a moot point which even now is not clear to me. I only know that orders were given to employ them, and to use these men, as well as women, in the struggle for our existence.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider this to be a legitimate order?

MILCH: I cannot judge that; that depends upon conditions and, as I said, upon reciprocity.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I ask to have this question and answer stricken from the record. The witness has been asked to give a legal opinion, and it is not for him to do so; since the question is not admissible, the answer too should be stricken.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko?

GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to say I did not realize that the witness did not know whether or not this was a violation of international law. I had every reason to believe that the witness was competent to answer this question, the more so as at the beginning of his statement today, and on Friday, he mentioned the ten rules of the soldier, which he said must not be broken as they were based on international law. I thought, therefore, the witness to be competent to answer the question concerning the use of prisoners of war by the Luftwaffe against their own country. If the Tribunal considers this question to be inadmissible, I will of course withdraw it.

THE PRESIDENT: The question might have been framed differently, as to whether it was not a breach of the rules set out in the soldiers’ pay book. However, as to international law, that is one of the matters which the Tribunal has got to decide, and upon that, of course, we do not wish the evidence of witnesses.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes. I still have two questions to put to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: We wanted to rise at half-past 4. If it is your intention to ask some more questions, perhaps we had better rise now, or, have you finished?

GEN. RUDENKO: We had better call a recess now, because I may still have a few questions to put to this witness.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 12 March 1946 at 1000 hours.]