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DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): May it please the Court, I should like to make an application. I am Dr. Sauter, counsel for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. On 30 October the Defendant Von Ribbentrop requested that his former secretary, Margareta Blank, at that time in the Remand Prison in Nuremberg, be placed at his disposal in order that he might dictate his reply to the Indictment, as well as a description of the manner in which he performed his official duties in the last 7 or 8 years.

On 11 November 1945 the Tribunal allowed this request. The Defendant Von Ribbentrop was therefore able to dictate for a few hours, but this was stopped for reasons unknown to him. Neither has the Defendant Von Ribbentrop had returned to him the shorthand notes or the typed transcript. He has not been able to dictate any more to Fräulein Blank.

On 15 November Ribbentrop repeated his request regarding the witness Blank, but up to the present she has not been placed again at his disposal. The Defendant Ribbentrop therefore requests the President to give instructions that his former secretary, Margareta Blank, again be placed at his disposal in order to take down the necessary notes from dictation. Such permission appears to be absolutely essential to enable the Defendant Ribbentrop properly to prepare his own testimony and the testimony of the defense witnesses.

Particularly in the case of Von Ribbentrop, the material to be treated is so voluminous, that no other way of treating it appears feasible to us. The Defendant Von Ribbentrop has a further request to make. He has repeatedly asked that some of his former colleagues, in particular Ambassador Gauss, Ambassador Von Rintelen, Minister Von Sonnleitner, Professor Fritz Berber, and Under State Secretary Henke, be brought to Nuremberg as witnesses, and that he be permitted to speak to these witnesses in the presence of his counsel. This request had in part been refused by the Court on 10 November. The remaining part has not yet been decided.

It is quite impossible for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop to give a clear and exhaustive account of the entire foreign policy for the last 7 or 8 years if nothing is placed at his disposal except a pencil and a block of writing paper. Even the White Books of the Foreign Office, for which he has asked, could not be placed at his disposal. In view of the fact that the data concerning Germany’s foreign policy during the last 7 or 8 years is so extensive, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop cannot possibly recall every single date, every event, every document, et cetera, unless his memory is refreshed by his being able to speak with his former colleagues.

Apart from this the Defendant Von Ribbentrop has been in the habit of taking a great many soporifics during the last 4 years, especially bromides, and his memory has suffered in consequence. It would not be very helpful to the investigation of historical truth in a field which interests not only this Court, but also, to an even greater extent, the outside world, if Von Ribbentrop during his examination, might have to state at every turn that he could no longer recollect these details.

Defendant Von Ribbentrop therefore applies to the Court and begs that his above-mentioned colleagues be brought here and that he receive permission to discuss with them matters pertaining to the Trial, in order that he may prepare for further proceedings.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already intimated to defendant’s counsel that all applications should, as far as practicable, be made in writing, and they consider that the applications which have how been made orally should have been made in writing. They will consider the facts with reference to the applications in respect of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop’s secretary. The other applications as to witnesses and documents, which have been made in writing, have been considered, or will be considered by the Tribunal.

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I say in this connection that the applications which I have today submitted have been repeatedly lodged with the Court in writing, but my client is anxious lest he experience difficulties in preparing for his own hearing and the hearing of the defense witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: As was announced at the sitting on Friday, Counsel for the Prosecution were to try to arrange with defendants’ counsel some satisfactory arrangement with reference to the production of documents in the German language. In accordance with that announcement, Counsel for the Prosecution saw Counsel for the Defense, and representatives of the Prosecution and the Defense appeared before the Tribunal and the Tribunal has provisionally made the following arrangement:

1. That in the future, only such parts of documents as are read in court by the Prosecution shall in the first instance be part of the record. In that way those parts of the documents will be conveyed to defendants’ counsel through the earphones in German.

2. In order that defendants and their counsel may have an opportunity of inspecting such documents in their entirety in German, a photostatic copy of the original and one copy thereof shall be deposited in the defendants’ counsel room at the same time that they are produced in court.

3. The defendants’ counsel may at any time refer to any other part of such documents.

4. Prosecuting counsel will furnish defendants’ counsel with 10 copies of their trial briefs in English and five copies of their books of documents in English, at the time such briefs and books are furnished to the Tribunal.

5. Defendants’ counsel will be furnished with one copy of each of the transcripts of the proceedings.

That is all. I call upon the prosecuting counsel for the United States.

MR. ALDERMAN: If it pleases the Tribunal, may I make, Mr. President, one inquiry with regard to your reference to trial briefs? On my section of the case I shall not expect to hand up trial briefs to the Court. Whatever I have in the nature of trial briefs will be put over the microphone. I wonder if that is satisfactory?

THE PRESIDENT: I think what I said meets that case.

MR. ALDERMAN: I thought so, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Because what I said was that the defendants’ counsel would be furnished with 10 copies of the trial briefs in English at the same time that they are furnished to the Tribunal. Therefore, if you don’t furnish the trial briefs to the Tribunal, none will be furnished to the defendants’ counsel.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. When the Tribunal rose on Friday last, I had just completed an introductory statement preliminary to the presentation of evidence on the aggressive war aspect of the case. In that introductory statement I had invited attention to the parts of the Charter and to the parts of the Indictment which are pertinent to this aspect of the case. I had also discussed the relationship between recorded history and the evidence to be presented, indicating what sort of additions to recorded history would be made by the evidence contained in the captured documents.

I then indicated to the Court that I would first proceed by presenting singly a handful of captured documents, which, in our opinion, prove the corpus of the crime of aggressive war, leaving no reasonable doubt concerning the aggressive character of the Nazi war, or concerning the conspiratorial premeditation of that war. I indicated to the Tribunal that after proving the corpus of the crime in this way I would follow the presentation of this evidence with a more or less chronological presentation of the case on aggressive war, producing evidence in greater detail of the relevant activities of the conspirators from 1933 to 1941.

As the members of the Tribunal may understand, it is easier to make plans about presentation than to keep them. There have been, by necessity, some changes in our plans. I indicated on Friday that to a certain extent the American case under Count One and the British case under Count Two would interlock. The British Chief Prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shawcross, is by force of circumstances, required to be in London this week. He expects to be back next week. The intention now is that when he returns Monday he will make his opening statement covering Count Two of the Indictment and such interrelated parts of Count One of the Indictment as have not by then been presented. So that what is at the moment planned, if it meets with the Court’s views, is that I shall continue, as far as I may within 2 days of this week, on the detailed story as to aggressive war; that thereupon we shall alter the presentation and present some other matters coming under Count One. Then, following the British Chief Prosecutor’s opening statement on Monday of next week, we shall continue jointly with the chapters on Poland, Russia, and Japan, as parts of both Count One and Two. While that may not be strictly logical, it seems to us the best method with which to proceed under the circumstances.

I turn now to the period of 1933 to 1936, a period characterized by an orderly, planned sequence of preparations for war. This is the period covered by Paragraphs 1 and 2 of IV (F) of the Indictment. This may be found at Page 7 of the printed English text of the Indictment.

The essential character of this period was the formulation and execution of the plan to rearm and to reoccupy and fortify the Rhineland in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties, in order to acquire military strength and political bargaining power to be used against other nations.

Hitler’s own eloquence in a secret speech delivered to all Supreme Commanders on 23 November 1939, at 1200 hours, is sufficient to characterize this phase of the Nazi conspiracy. This document comes to hand as a captured document found in the OKW files—OKW is Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht (the High Command of the Army, Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces)—and was captured at Flensburg. The document is numbered 789-PS in our numbered series of documents.

I have in my hand, if the Court please, the German original of this document in the condition in which it was captured, and I wish to offer the document in evidence and have it given the proper serial number as the United States prosecutor’s exhibit. The serial number, I understand, is United States Exhibit 23. I would ask that the German text of the original be handed to the German interpreters.

If the Court please, understanding the ruling just made by the presiding justice, although I have offered the entire document, as it is a very long speech, I shall not read into the record the entire speech. Of course the presiding judge said defense counsel may insert any other parts of it as they wish.

I shall begin reading at the beginning, and read a little more than half of the first page in the English text. I am advised that the German original is marked with a blue pencil at the point where I shall stop reading. I will read the English translation:

“November 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Führer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Führer gives the following speech:

“The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of the world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of our Armed Forces was only possible in connection with the ideological”—the German word is “weltanschaulich”—“education of the German people by the Party.”

If I may interpolate just to comment on that interesting German word “weltanschaulich”, I take it that ideological is about as close a translation as we can get, but the word means more than that. It means a whole attitude towards the world, a way of looking on the world.

“When I started my political task”—I am quoting again—“in 1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough observation of the events of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of setbacks which were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought me success. Moreover, I had a clear recognition of the probable course of historical events and the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I, after long internal conflict, became a politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many setbacks. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything, beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the Armed Forces. First, reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second task: To release Germany from its international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be pointed out: Secession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the Disarmament Conference. It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that, militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me was very small. Then, beginning of the fortification of the whole country, especially in the west.

“One year later, Austria came.”—I suppose he meant Austria went.—“This step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate, and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn’t quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the East and then in the West, or vice versa.”

There are some curious antitheses of thought in that speech, as in most of Adolf Hitler’s speeches. In one sentence he combines guidance by Providence with the making of brutal decisions. He constantly speaks of how very few people were with him, and yet the mass of the German people were with him. But he does give a brief summary of the gist of what is contained in the allegations of the Indictment, to which I have invited your attention:

The organization of the mass of the people, then extending to the Armed Forces, and the various brutal decisions that he did make, about which history knows.

That long document contains other material of great interest. It may be that we shall advert to other portions of it later. At this point, however, I have simply asked the Court to focus attention on the matter I have just read and its bearing on the development of the conspiracy during the period 1933 to 1936.

Another captured document is sufficient to demonstrate the preparations for war in which the Nazi conspirators were engaged during this period. I refer to a top-secret letter dated 24 June 1935 from General Von Brauchitsch to the Supreme Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. Attached to that letter is a copy of a secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and a copy of a decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 on the Council for the Defense of the Reich.

These documents were captured in the OKW files at Fechenheim. This group of documents is numbered 2261-PS in our numbered series of documents. It seems to us one of the most significant evidences of secret and direct preparations for aggressive war.

I gave expression to a typographical error. That was General Von Blomberg instead of Brauchitsch.

I have the original of these documents. I ask that they be admitted into evidence as Exhibit USA-24.

The top page of that document, which I shall read in full, is the letter signed “Von Blomberg, Berlin, 21 June 1935, Top Secret”; headed “The Reich Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, No. 1820/35 Top Secret L II a.”

“To: The Supreme Commander of the Army, the Supreme Commander of the Navy, the Supreme Commander of the Air Forces.

“In the appendix I transmit one copy each of the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935, and of a decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reich Defense Council. The publication of the Reich Defense Law is temporarily suspended by order of the Führer and Reich Chancellor.

“The Führer and Reich Chancellor has nominated the President of the Directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, to be ‘Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy.’

“I request that the copies of the Reich Defense Law needed within the units of the Armed Forces, be ordered before 1 July 1935 at Armed Forces Office (L) where it is to be established with the request that the law should only be distributed down to corps headquarters outside of the Reich Ministry of War.

“I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more.”

Signed by “Von Blomberg.” Underneath that is an indorsement:

“Berlin, 3 September 1935; No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a. To Defense-Economic Group G-3, copy transmitted (signed) Jodl.”

“There is attached thereto, if the Tribunal please, the statute referred to as the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, or rather it was enacted by the Reich Cabinet, and it starts with the statement: “The Reich Cabinet has enacted the following law that is hereby made public.”

There follows a law in detail covering preparations for state of defense, mobilization, appointment of this Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy, with plenipotentiary authority for the economic preparation of the war, and a Part III providing for setting of penalties.

The law is signed:

“The Führer and Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler; the Reich Minister of War, Von Blomberg; the Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick,” one of the defendants. And at the bottom of it there is this note—that is on Sheet 4 of the original German, I think:

“Note on the Law for the Defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935. The publication of the Law for the Defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935 will be suspended. The law became effective 21 May 1935. The Führer and Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler.”

So that although the law itself stated that it was made public, the publication was suspended by Adolf Hitler; although the law became immediately effective.

There is further attached a copy of the decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 on the council for the defense of the realm which deals largely with organization for economic preparation for the war and which I think was discussed by my colleague, Mr. Dodd, last week.

There can be no question that this law of May 21, 1935 was the cornerstone of war preparations of the Nazi conspirators. The relationship of the Defendant Schacht to this preparation is made transparently clear by this captured document.

So much, for the time being, on the preparatory phase of the conspiracy, 1933 to 1936.

As indicated earlier, the next phase of aggression was the formulation and execution of plans to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, in that order.

This is the phase of the aggression covered by Paragraphs 3 (a), (b), and (c) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing at Pages 7 to 8 of the printed English text.

One of the most striking and revealing of all the captured documents which have come to hand is a document which we have come to know as the Hossbach notes of a conference in the Reich Chancellery on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours, in the course of which Hitler outlined to those present the possibilities and necessities of expanding their foreign policy, and requested—I quote: “That his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.” And so with this document we shall present to the Tribunal and to the public the last will and testament of Adolf Hitler as he contemplated that last will and testament on 5 November 1937. The document comes to hand through the United States Department of State and it is authenticated by the seal of the Secretary of State of the United States. It is Document Number 386-PS in our series of numbered documents. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-25.

Before reading it, I note at the start that the recorder of the minutes of this meeting, then Colonel Hossbach, was the Führer’s adjutant. I note also the presence at this conspiratorial meeting of the Defendant Erich Raeder. The Defendant Constantin von Neurath was present. The Defendant Hermann Wilhelm Göring was present. The minutes of this meeting reveal a crystalization towards the end of 1937 in the policy of the Nazi regime. Austria and Czechoslovakia were to be acquired by force. They would provide Lebensraum (living space) and improve Germany’s military position for further operations. While it is true that actual events unfolded themselves in a somewhat different manner than that outlined at this meeting, in essence the purposes stated at the meeting were carried out. The document destroys any possible doubt concerning the Nazis’ premeditation of their Crimes against Peace. This document is of such tremendous importance that I feel obliged to read it in full into the record:

“Berlin, 10 November 1937. Notes on the conference in the Reichskanzlei on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours.

“Present: The Führer and Reich Chancellor; the Reich Minister for War, Generalfeldmarschall Von Blomberg; the C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr Von Fritsch; the C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. H. C. Raeder; the C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst Göring; the Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, Freiherr Von Neurath; Oberst Hossbach” (the adjutant who took the minutes).

“The Führer stated initially that the subject matter of today’s conference was of such high importance that its detailed discussion would certainly in other states take place before the Cabinet in full session. However, he, the Führer, had decided not to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences of his 4½ years in government; he desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy, and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon, in the case of his death, as his last will and testament.

“The Führer then stated: The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space. The German nation comprises 85 million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form a homogeneous European racial body, the like of which cannot be found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If there have been no political consequences to meet the demands of this racial body for living space, then that is the result of historical development spread over several centuries and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation”—The German word used there, is not “nation”; it is “Volkstum”—“at its present high level. An arrest of the decrease of the German element in Austria and in Czechoslovakia is just as little possible as the preservation of the present state in Germany itself.”

I interpolate that I can but think that this is not a good translation of the German because to me the sentence seems meaningless.

“Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a number, of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of the existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about one to three generations.

“Before touching upon the question of solving the need for living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.

“Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National Socialist State policy, which is the basis”—that is the basis of autarchy—“Assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows:

“A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but not total autarchy can be attained:

“1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials, autarchy is feasible.

“2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, cannot.

“3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.

“4. Edible fats—possible.

“B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite capital NO.

“The general increase of living standards, compared with 30 to 40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand and an increase of personal consumption among the producers, the farmers themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increased demand, therefore they represent no actual increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could not be avoided.”

I interpolate, that if I understand him he means by that, “no autarchy; we must participate in world trade and commerce.”

“The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

“Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalization is impossible in a continent which has developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but not a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies, as well as generally.

“Participation in world economy: There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuation would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do not offer any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18) an industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonies, again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonization; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, and economic need will also drive Germany to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.

“The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. There is a pronounced military weakness in those states which base their existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are dominated by Britain, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency and this explains the great weakness of our food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in Geneva and in satisfied states. Should the security of our food situation be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we will not copy liberal capitalistic policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is not a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material-producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root”—I interpolate, there is that German word “Rassekern” again (the racial root)—“has for this purpose the most favorable foundations in the heart of the European continent. The history of all times—Roman Empire, British Empire—has proved that, every space, expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.”

[A recess was taken.]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, after the somewhat jumbled discussion which I have just read of geopolitical economic theory and of the need for expansion and Lebensraum, Adolf Hitler, in these Hossbach notes, posed this question—and I quote:

“The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.

“German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strong points overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retroactively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.

“England is not in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us, owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer be expected. Any resistance on England’s part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are not in British hands, for example, Angola. French favors would probably be of the same nature.

“A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well armed. The Führer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable.”—Meaning, I take it, the British Empire.—

“Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the ancient Germans to subjugate ancient Rome.

“Alongside the British Empire today a number of states exist which are stronger than it. The British mother country is able to defend its colonial possession only allied with other states and not by its own power. How could England alone, for example, defend Canada against attack by America, or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by Japan?

“The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect:

“(a) Ireland’s struggle for independence.

“(b) Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her half measures, left the door open for Indians, at a later date, to utilize the non-fulfilment of constitutional promises as a weapon against Britain.

“(c) The weakening of the British position in the Far East by Japan.

“(d) The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which—by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius—expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the Abyssinian war is a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the Mohammedan world.

“It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of their ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the motherland, is nine to one, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must not allow the level of our population to become too low.”

I take it he meant by that: “Keep the population of occupied territories low in comparison with ours.”

“France’s position is more favorable than that of England. The French Empire is better placed geographically; the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal politics. In the life of the nations, parliamentary governments ruled only 10 per cent of the time, approximately; whereas, totalitarian governments ruled 90 per cent of the time. Nevertheless, we have to take the following into our political consideration as power factors:

“Britain, France, Russia, and the adjoining smaller states.

“The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great for Silesia, and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870 had prevented Austria from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions ‘when’ and ‘how’. In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.”

I interpolate: The Tribunal will recall the specific allegation in the Indictment that at this meeting there emerged three different plans, any of which might be utilized.

“Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers’ Corps, are practically concluded.”

I remind the Tribunal that this meeting was on 5 November 1937, but he is contemplating the period 1943-45.

“Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular, the secrecy of ‘special weapons’ cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.

“In comparison with the rearmament, which will have been carried out at that time by other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943-45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do not possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered a point of weakness in the regime. Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves, we should be forced on the offensive.

“What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45, no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

“On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice but to act. If the Führer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

“Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against Germany, then the time for action against Czechoslovakia has come.

“Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war against another state that it cannot proceed against Germany.

“For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria, simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would hardly be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia’s desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards the north or the west.

“Once Czechoslovakia is conquered—and a mutual frontier, Germany-Hungary is obtained—then a neutral attitude by Poland in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with Poland remain valid only as long as Germany’s strength remains unshakable; should Germany have any setbacks then an attack by Poland against East Prussia, perhaps also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into account.

“Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943-45, then the behavior of France, England, Poland, and Russia would probably have to be judged in the following manner:

“The Führer believes personally, that in all probability England and perhaps also France, have already silently written off Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long, drawn-out European war, would be decisive factors in the non-participation of England in a war against Germany. The British attitude would certainly not remain without influence on France’s attitude. An attack by France, without British support, is hardly probable, assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our western fortifications. Without England’s support it would also not be necessary to take into consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would have, as a consequence, the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally, we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia’s defense measures will increase in strength from year to year and that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian Army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5 to 6 million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from Czechoslovakia, and of 1 million from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany, militarily and politically, would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

“No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question, since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.

“The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland’s attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with Russia in the rear.

“Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this needs to be taken into consideration at all, in view of Japan’s attitude.

“Should case 2 occur—paralyzation of France by a civil war—then the situation should be utilized at any time for operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany’s most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.

“The Führer sees case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur, he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.

“Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war in Spain, the Führer does not see an early end to hostilities there.

“Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by Franco,”—the English text says “France”; it means “Franco”—“a further 3 years’ duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view, a 100 per cent victory by Franco is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish peninsula, it would mean the end of Italian intervention and of the presence of Italy in the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions in the Balearic Isles cannot be tolerated either by France or by England and could lead to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in White (that is, Franco’s) hands, could participate on the side of Italy’s enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via Germany. The Führer believes that Italy’s military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against France on the western frontier and carry out operations against France from Libya, against the North African French colonial possessions.

“As a landing of French and British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to upper Italy would be extremely difficult, and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will, to a great extent, paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany, France will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan fighting forces.”

There again I think that must be a defective English translation. “French lines of communication by the Italian fleet,” must mean “fresh lines,” or something in that connection.