Читать книгу The Nuremberg Trials (Vol. 1-14) - International Military Tribunal - Страница 247
Afternoon Session
ОглавлениеMR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just referred again to the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Bürckel in July 1939, which outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership problem following the retirement of Reinthaler.
In referring to the situation in 1935, he mentioned some of the contacts with the Reich Government, that is, the German Government, in the following terms. I quote from Page 4 of the English text of that report, and I believe from Page 4 of the German text of the Rainer report, which is 812-PS, that is Exhibit USA-61:
“In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which were, apart from the Gauleiter”—Gau leaders—“also Globocnik and Rainer. Schattenfroh then claimed, because of an instruction received from the imprisoned Leopold, to have been made deputy country leader. A group led by engineer Raffelsberger had at this time also established connection with departments of the Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German racial agency, et cetera), and made an attempt to formulate a political motto in the form of a program for the fighting movement of Austria.”
And, again, the Rainer report sets forth the situation a little later in 1936. I quote from Page 6 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of the German text:
“The principles of the construction were:
“The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple manner and without compromise, according to the principle of organizing an elite to be available to the illegal Land Party Council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal chances should be used without revealing any ties with the illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal Party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at the top of the Party leadership. All connections with the Party in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the Führer. These said that the German State should officially be omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP and that auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, et cetera, should be established in the foreign countries bordering Austria.
“Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who had connection with Dr. Waechter which originated from Seyss-Inquart’s support of the July uprising. On the other side, Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and especially well-established relations with Christian Social politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the Styrian Heimatschutz”—home defense—“and became a Party member when the entire Styrian Heimatschutz was incorporated into the NSDAP. Another personality who had a good position in the legal field was Colonel Glaise-Horstenau who had contacts with both sides. The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of these two persons of whom Glaise-Horstenau was designed as trustee to the Führer.”
The Rainer report thus discloses the dual tactics of the Austrian Nazis during this period of keeping quiet and awaiting developments. They were maintaining their secret contacts with Reich officials, and using native personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart. The Nazis made good use of such figures, who were more discreet in their activities and could be referred to as nationalists. They presented, supported, and obtained consideration of demands which could not be negotiated by other Nazis like Captain Leopold.
Seyss-Inquart did not hold any public office until January 1937, when he was made Counsellor of State. But Rainer, describing him as a trustworthy member of the Party through the ranks of this Styrian Heimatschutz, points him out as one who strongly influenced the agreement of July 11, 1936. The strategic importance of that agreement will be considered a little later. Rainer’s report, as I have said before, was hardly likely to over emphasize the significance of Seyss-Inquart’s contribution.
That the Nazis, but not the Austrian Government, did well to trust Seyss-Inquart is indicated by the next document. I propose to offer in evidence Document 2219-PS as Exhibit USA-62. This is a letter dated 14 July 1939, addressed to Field Marshal Göring. The document is a typed carbon of the letter. It ends with the “Heil Hitler” termination, and it is not signed, but we think it was undoubtedly written by Defendant Seyss-Inquart. It was the carbon copy found among Seyss-Inquart’s personal files, and such carbon copies kept by authors of letters usually are not signed. On the first page of the letter there appears a note in ink, not indicated in the partial English translation, reading, “Air Mail, 15 July, 1515 hours, Berlin, brought to Göring’s office.” The main text of the letter consists of a plea for intercession on behalf of one Mühlmann, whose name we shall meet later, and who, unfortunately, got into Bürckel’s bad graces. I shall quote the extract part of the document which has been translated into English, and which starts, I believe, on Page 7 of the German text:
“At present in Vienna, 14 July 1939;
“To the General Field Marshal
“Sir:
“If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final decisions are at stake. At this time of pronounced activism”—Aktivismus—“this will certainly be regarded as a fault of my personality. Yet I know that I cling with unconquerable tenacity to the goal in which I believe, that is Greater Germany”—Grossdeutschland—“and the Führer. And if some people are already tired out from the struggle and some have been killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready to go into action. This, after all, was also the development until the year 1938. Until July 1934, I conducted myself as a regular member of the Party. And if I had quietly, in whatever form, paid my membership dues (the first one, according to a receipt, I paid in December 1931) I probably would have been an undisputed, comparatively old fighter and Party member of Austria, but I would not have done any more for the union. I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime on its own ground in order to give the Führer a chance to use whatever method he desired.”—I would like to call particular attention to that sentence.—“I told myself that this Austria was worth a mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an iron determination because I and my friends had to fight against the whole political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short, against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our political annihilation; it would have deprived the Führer of the means and tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for Austria, as became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully conscious of the fact that I am following a path which is not comprehensible to the masses and also not to my Party comrades. I followed it calmly and would without hesitation follow it again, because I am satisfied that at one point I could serve the Führer as a tool in his work, even though my former attitude even now gives occasion to very worthy and honorable Party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid attention to such things because I am satisfied with the opinion which the Führer and the men close to him have of me.”
That letter was written to one of the men close to him—Field Marshal Göring. I think that suffices to demonstrate Seyss-Inquart as one whose loyalty to Hitler, a foreign dictator, and to the aims of the Nazi conspiracy, led him to fight for the Anschluss with all the means at his disposal.
It is appropriate at this time to offer in evidence a document from the Defendant Von Papen, and to see how he thought the doctrines of National Socialism could be used to effect the aim of the Anschluss. I offer Document 2248-PS as Exhibit USA-63. This document is a letter from Von Papen to Hitler, dated July 27, 1935. It consists of a report entitled, “Review and Outlook 1 Year after the Death of Chancellor Dollfuss.” After reviewing the success that the Austrian Government had had in establishing Dollfuss as a martyr, and his principles as the patriotic principles of Austria, Von Papen stated—and I quote the last paragraph of the letter, beginning on Page 1 (Page 146 of the German text):