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MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, an hour later, following the conversation between Göring and Seyss-Inquart with which I dealt this morning, the Defendant Göring telephoned to Dombrowski in the German Legation in Vienna. I have reference to the telephone conversation marked “TT” on Page 2, Part C, of Document 2949-PS. In that conversation, in the first place, the Defendant Göring showed concern that the Nazi Party and all of its organizations should be definitely legalized promptly. I quote from Page 2 of the transcript:

“Göring: ‘Now to go on, the Party has definitely been legalized?’

“Dombrowski: ‘But that is—it is not necessary even to discuss that?’

“Göring: ‘With all of its organizations.’

“Dombrowski: ‘With all of its organizations within this country.’

“Göring: ‘In uniform?’

“Dombrowski: ‘In uniform.’

“Göring: ‘Good.’

“Dombrowski calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have already been on duty for one-half hour, which means everything is all right.”

In addition, Göring stated that the Cabinet—the Austrian Cabinet—must be formed by 7:30 p.m. and he transmitted instructions to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart as to who should be appointed to the Cabinet. I quote from Page 3 of the English text of the transcript of the conversation:

“Göring: ‘Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Führer, and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One thing I have forgotten: Fischböck must have the Department of Economy and Commerce.’

“Dombrowski: ‘That is understood.’

“Göring: ‘Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security and Bahr is to have the Armed Forces. The Austrian Army is to be taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the Justice Department.’

“Dombrowski: ‘Yes, yes.’

“Göring: ‘Give me the name.’

“Dombrowski: ‘Well, your brother-in-law, isn’t that right?’ ”

—That is Hüber, the brother-in-law of the Defendant Göring.—

“Göring: ‘Yes.’

“Dombrowski: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘That’s right, and then also Fischböck.’ ”

And about 20 minutes later, at 5:26 p.m., Göring was faced with the news that Miklas, the President, was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, and he issued instructions as to the ultimatum that was to be delivered to Miklas. I quote from the telephone conversation between Göring and Seyss-Inquart, in Part E of the folder, the part marked with capital R, Pages 1 and 2:

“Göring: ‘Now remember the following: You go immediately, together with Lieutenant General Muff, and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the frontier, will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lieutenant General Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please inform us immediately about Miklas’ position. Tell him there is no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we received before, action was delayed, but now the situation is such that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship.’ ”

—There follows in the transcript a sentence which is broken up.—“ ‘M.’ ”—I suppose that means Lieutenant General Muff.—“ ‘does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party with all its organizations.’ ”

—There is again an interruption in the transcript.—“ ‘And then call out all the National Socialists all over the country. They should now be in the streets; so remember, report must be given by 7:30. Lieutenant General Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4 minutes.’ ”

An hour later, at 6:28 p.m., Göring had an extensively interrupted telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When he told Keppler that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Göring said—I read from Part H, about a third of the way down on the page:

“Göring: ‘Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him. Just go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that S. I.’ ”—Seyss-Inquart—“ ‘shall call on the National Socialist guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order.’ ”

After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed the Defendant Göring that Miklas was still sticking to his old viewpoint, although a new person had gone in to talk to him, and there might be definite word in about 10 minutes. The conversation proceeded as follows—I quote from Page 2 of Part H, beginning about the middle of the page:

“Göring: ‘Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes back; then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich Chancery as usual, but it has to be done fast. I can hardly justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power. All right?’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘But if he threatens?’

“Göring: ‘Yes.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Well, I see; then we shall be ready.’

“Göring: ‘Call me via Blitz.’ ”

In other words, Göring and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. The plan which was already discussed involved the use of both the National Socialist forces in Austria and the German troops who had been crossing the borders. Later that night Göring and Seyss-Inquart had another conversation at about 11 o’clock. This was after the ultimatum had expired. Seyss-Inquart informed Göring that Miklas was still refusing to name Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as follows, and I quote from Part I of this folder:

“Göring: ‘OK’ ”—What’s the German word for OK? Schön.—“ ‘I shall give the order to march in and then you make sure that you get the power. Notify the leading people about the following which I shall tell you now. Everyone who offers resistance or organizes resistance will immediately be subjected to our court martial, the court martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Including leading personalities; it does not make any difference.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes, they have given the order not to offer any resistance.’

“Göring: ‘Yes, it does not matter; the Federal President did not authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Well, now you are officially authorized.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.’ ”

I am sorry; that conversation took place at 8 o’clock, instead of 11. I meant to say 8 o’clock. It is quite interesting to me that when the Defendant Göring was planning to invade a peaceful neighboring state, he planned to try what he referred to as major war criminals before German court martial, the leading personalities.

So much for the conversation with respect to the plan of action for taking over power. Something else very significant was sent on that subject over the telephone, at least so far as those transcripts indicate. But there was another historical event which was discussed over the telephone. I refer to the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart sent to the German Government requesting the German Government to send troops into Austria to help Seyss-Inquart put down disorder. A conversation held at 8:48 that night between Göring and Keppler proceeded as follows—I read from Page 1 of Part L:

“Göring: ‘Well, I do not know yet. Listen, the main thing is that if Inquart takes over all powers of Government he keeps the radio stations occupied.’

“Keppler: ‘Well, we represent the Government now.’

“Göring: ‘Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen carefully. The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes: The provisional Austrian Government which, after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, considered it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request for support in its task of preventing bloodshed. For this purpose, it asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible.’

“Keppler: ‘Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets but everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the professional groups.’ ”

Now let us talk about sending German troops to put down disorder. The SA and the SS were marching in the streets, but everything was quiet. And a few minutes later, the conversation continued thus, reading from Page 2 of Part L:

“Göring: ‘Then our troops will cross the border today.’

“Keppler: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as possible.’

“Keppler: ‘Well, send the telegram to Seyss-Inquart in the office of the Federal Chancellor.’

“Göring: ‘Please show him the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are asking him—well, he does not even need to send the telegram. All he needs to do is to say, “Agreed.” ’

“Keppler: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘He should call me at the Führer’s or at my place. Well, good luck. Heil Hitler.’ ”

Well, of course, he did not need to send the telegram because Göring wrote the telegram. He already had it. It must be recalled that in the first conversation, Part A, held at 3:05 p.m., Göring had requested Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon, but now the matter was so urgent that Göring dictated the exact wording of the telegram over the telephone. And an hour later, at 9:54 p.m. a conversation between Dr. Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went on as follows, reading from Part M:

“Dietrich: ‘I need the telegram urgently.’

“Keppler: ‘Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees.’

“Dietrich: ‘This is marvelous. Thank you.’

“Keppler: ‘Listen to the radio. News will be given.’

“Dietrich: ‘Where?’

“Keppler: ‘From Vienna.’

“Dietrich: ‘So Seyss-Inquart agrees?’

“Keppler: ‘Jawohl.’ ”

Next the actual order to invade Austria. Communications with Austria were now suspended but the German military machine had been set in motion. To demonstrate that, I now offer in evidence captured Document C-182, offered as Exhibit USA-77, a directive of 11 March 1938 at 2045 hours, from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This directive, initialed by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, orders the invasion of Austria in view of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The directive reads:

“Top secret; Berlin, 11 March 1938, 2045 hours; Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, OKW,”—with other symbols—“35 copies, 6th copy. C-in-C Navy”—pencil note—“has been informed. Re: Operation Otto. Directive No. 2.

“1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian Government have not been fulfilled.

“2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw before the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting. The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.

“3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to Directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.

“I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all forces to the full as quickly as possible.”

Signed Adolf Hitler; initialed by Jodl and by a name that looks like Warlimont.

And then some interesting communications with Rome to avoid possibility of disaster from that source. At the very time that Hitler and Göring had embarked on this military undertaking, they still had a question mark in their minds, and that was Italy. Italy had massed on the Italian border in 1934 on the occasion of July 25, 1934—the Putsch. Italy had traditionally been the political protector of Austria.

With what a sigh of relief did Hitler hear at 10:25 p.m. that night from Prince Phillipp von Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just come back from the Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. The situation can really be grasped by the rereading of the conversation. The record of the conversation shows the excitement under which Hitler was operating when he spoke over the telephone. It is a short conversation, and I shall read the first half of it from Part N of the transcript of 2949-PS. I am afraid your title Part N may be blurred on the mimeographed copy. “H” is Hessen and “F” is the Führer.

“Hessen: ‘I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. Il Duce accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He had been informed from Austria; Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had then said it would be a complete impossibility; it would be a bluff; such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus, and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that Austria would be immaterial to him.’

“Hitler: ‘Then please tell Mussolini I will never forget him for this.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes.’

“Hitler: ‘Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make a quite different agreement with him.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, I told him that, too.’

“Hitler: ‘As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin; nothing matters.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

“Hitler: ‘Listen, I shall make any agreement, I am no longer in fear of the terrible position which would have existed militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I forget that.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

“Hitler: ‘I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even if the whole world were against him.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

The Tribunal will recall the reference in Jodl’s diary to the letter which Hitler had sent to Mussolini. It is dated March 11. It may be found in the official publication Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 135, Number 24-a. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of it, and you will find a translation of it appearing in our Document 2510-PS. In this letter, after stating that Austria had been declining into anarchy, Hitler wrote—and I quote:

“I have decided to re-establish order in my fatherland—order and tranquility—and to give to the popular will the possibility of settling its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly and by its own decision.”

He stated that this was an act of self-defense; that he had no hostile intentions towards Italy. And after the invasion, when Hitler was at Linz, Austria, he communicated his gratitude to Mussolini once more in the famous telegram which the world so well remembers. I again cite Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, Page 156, Number 29, the translation of the telegram being in our Document 2467-PS, and the document reads: “Mussolini, I will never forget you for this.”

We now shift our scene from Vienna to Berlin. We have shifted our scene, I meant, from Vienna to Berlin. It may now be appropriate to come back to Vienna just long enough to recall that late in the evening of March 11, President Miklas did appoint Defendant Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart’s appointment was made at 11:15 p.m. This is noted in Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 137, Number 25-a, and a translation of the announcement is in our Document 2465-PS.

Then something had to be done in London to smooth things over there and, accordingly, one more act played on the international scene is set down in the Air Ministry telephone transcript. On Sunday, March 13, 1938, the day after the invasion, Defendant Göring who had been left in Berlin in charge of the Reich by Hitler, who had gone to his fatherland, phoned Defendant Ribbentrop in London. I find this conversation very illuminating as to the way in which these defendants operated, using, if I may employ American vernacular, a kind of international “double talk” to soothe and mislead other nations. I quote from Part 1 of item W of Document 2949-PS:

“Göring:”—speaking to Ribbentrop in London:—“ ‘As you know, the Führer has entrusted me with the administration of the current government procedures (Führung der Regierungsgeschäfte), and therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the radio.’

“Ribbentrop: ‘Yes, it is fantastic, is it not?’

“Göring: ‘Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely overshadowed. The Führer was deeply moved, when he talked to me last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political things. Well, this story that we had given an ultimatum is just foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist Ministers and the representatives of the people (Volksreferenten) have presented the ultimatum. Later on more and more prominent people of the movement participated, and as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist Ministers asked us to back them up so that they would not be completely beaten up again and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told them we would not allow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war, under any circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg’s direct order or with his consent, the communists and the Reds had been armed and were already making demonstrations, which were photographed with “Heil Moskau” and so on. Naturally, all these facts caused some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Vaterländische Front would fight to the last man. One could not know that they would capitulate like that, and therefore Seyss-Inquart, who already had taken over the Government, asked us to march in immediately. We had already marched up to the frontier before this, since we could not know whether or not there would be a civil war. These are the actual facts which can be proved by documents.’ ”

There the Defendant Göring was giving to the Defendant Ribbentrop the proper line that he should take in London as to how to explain what had happened in Austria. Of course, when the Defendant Göring said that his story about this matter could be proved by documents, I don’t think he had in mind that his own telephone calls might constitute documents.

Another rather interesting item begins on Page 3 of the English text of this Part W—still Göring talking to Ribbentrop in London. This is at the bottom of the page:

“Göring: ‘No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you had spoken already to these people. I want you once more,—but no, not at all once more, but generally speaking—tell the following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has given an ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because the ultimatum was presented to him by Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President, but that it also was given by the others, and as far as I know, just a military attaché came along, asked by Seyss-Inquart, because of a technical question.’ ”—you will recall that he was a lieutenant general directed by Göring to go along—“ ‘He was supposed to ask whether, in case Seyss-Inquart would ask for the support of German troops, Germany would grant this request. Furthermore, I want to state that Seyss-Inquart asked us expressly, by phone and by telegram, to send troops because he did not know about the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and so on; because arms had been distributed there. And then he could not know how the Fatherland Front might react since they always had had such a big mouth.’

“Ribbentrop: ‘Herr Göring, tell me, how is the situation in Vienna; is everything settled yet?’

“Göring: ‘Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with some companies, in order to secure the airfields, and they were received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17th division marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also, I want to point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw, but that they got together and fraternized immediately with the German troops, wherever they were stationed.’ ”

These are quite interesting explanations that the ultimatum was by Seyss-Inquart alone and not by Göring; that Lieutenant General Muff, the military attaché, was along just to answer a technical question, and that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly by telephone and telegram for troops. But, perhaps to understand this conversation, we must try to create again the actual physical scene of the time and place as Göring talked over the phone. I quote eight lines from Page 11 of the English text, about in the middle, Part W:

“Göring: ‘Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.’

“Ribbentrop: ‘I shall see you this afternoon.’

“Göring: ‘The weather is wonderful here—blue sky. I am sitting here on my balcony—all covered with blankets—in the fresh air, drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in. I have to make the speech. And the birds are twittering, and here and there I can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful over there.’ ”—that is, Vienna.

“Ribbentrop: ‘That is marvelous.’ ”

May it please the Tribunal, I have practically come to the end of the material relating to the aggression against Austria. In a moment I shall take up quite briefly the effects of the Anschluss, some of the developments which took place after the German troops marched across the border. What is to come after that is an epilogue, but before developing the epilogue, it may be appropriate to pause briefly for just a moment. I think that the facts which I have related to the Tribunal today show plainly certain things about the defendants involved in the conspiracy, and among the conspirators who particularly took action in the Austrian matter were Von Papen, Seyss-Inquart, Ribbentrop, Von Neurath, and Göring.

First, I think it is plain that these men were dangerous men. They used their power without a bridle. They used their power to override the independence and freedom of others. And they were more than bullies squeezing a smaller foe. They were very sly bullies. They compounded their force with fraud. They coupled threats with legal technicalities and devious maneuvers, wearing a sanctimonious mask to cover their duplicity. I think they are dangerous men.

In accordance with the directive of March 11, our Document C-182, Exhibit USA-77, the German Army crossed the Austrian border at daybreak, 12 March 1938. Hitler issued a proclamation to the German people announcing the invasion, and purporting to justify it. I refer again to Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, Page 140, Number 27, “Proclamation of Hitler.” The British Government and the French Government filed protests. The German Government and the Austrian National Socialists swiftly secured their grip on Austria. Seyss-Inquart welcomed Hitler at Linz, and they both expressed their joy over the events of the day. Seyss-Inquart in his speech declared Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain inoperative. I refer to the speech of Seyss-Inquart at Linz on 12 March 1938, as contained in the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 144, Number 28-a, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, and which you will find translated in our Document 2485-PS.

For a view of what was happening in Vienna, I offer in evidence our Document L-292, telegram 70, American Legation, Vienna, to the American Secretary of State, 12 March 1938, and I offer it as Exhibit USA-78. I quote it in full:

“Secretary of State, Washington; March 12, noon.

“Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping leaflets ‘National Socialist Germany greets its possession, National Socialist Austria and her new Government in true indivisible Union.’

“Continual rumors small German troop movements into Austria and impending arrival Austrian Legion. SS and SA in undisputed control in Vienna. Police wear swastika arm bands. Schuschnigg and Schmidt rumored arrested. Himmler and Hess here.”—Signed—“Wiley.”

The law-making machine was put to work immediately on the task of consolidation. For all of this material I shall merely refer the Tribunal to the German sources and to the document number of the English translation, but I think I need not offer these legislative acts in evidence but shall merely invite the Court to take judicial notice of them.

First, Miklas was forced to resign as President. I refer to Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 147, Number 30-b. Our translation is in our Document 2466-PS.

In this connection the Court will no doubt recall Göring’s telephone conversation as shown in Document 2949-PS, that in view of Miklas’ delay in appointing Seyss-Inquart, Miklas would be dismissed. Seyss-Inquart became both Chancellor and President.

He then signed a Federal Constitutional Law of March 13, 1938 for the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, which in turn was incorporated into the Reich Statute of Reunion, passed the same day, German law. I cite for that the Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 237, Number 21, a translation of which will be found in our Document 2307-PS.

This Federal Constitutional Law declared Austria to be a province of the German Reich. By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provided (by the way, on the Constitutional Law to which I just referred there appear as signatories the following names:

Adolf Hitler, Führer and Reich Chancellor; Göring, General Field Marshal, Reich Minister of Aviation; Frick, Reich Minister of the Interior; Von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs; R. Hess, Deputy Führer.)

By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides, and I quote:

“Germany acknowledges and will respect the independence of Austria within the frontier, which may be fixed in a treaty between that state and the principal Allied and Associated Powers. She agrees that this independence shall be inalienable.” (JN-2)

Similarly, the Austrian action violated Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which provides:

“The independence of Austria is inalienable, otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently, Austria undertakes, in the absence of the consent of the said Council, to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another power.” (JN-3)

This basic Constitutional Law provided for a plebiscite to be held on 10 April 1938 on the question of reunion, but this was a mere formality. The plebiscite could only confirm the union declared in the law. It could not undo Germany’s union with, and control over, Austria.

To illustrate the way in which legal consolidation was swiftly assured under conditions of occupation of Austria by troops, it is not necessary to do more than review some of the acts passed within the month.

Hitler placed the Austrian Federal Army under his own command and required all members of the Army to take an oath of allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander. A translation of the pertinent document will be found in our 2936-PS, and I refer to the instruction of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, concerning the Austrian Federal Army, March 13, 1938, Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 150.

Public officials of the Province of Austria were required to take an oath of office swearing allegiance to Hitler, Führer of the German Reich and people. Jewish officials as defined were not permitted to take the oath.

I refer to a decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor concerning the administration of oath to the officials of the Province of Austria, March 15, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 245, Number 24, the translation being in our Document 2311-PS.

Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various Reich Laws, including the law of 1933 against the formation of new political parties, and the 1933 Law for the Preservation of Unity of Party and State.

I refer to the first decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor concerning the introduction of German Reich Law into Austria, 15 March 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 247, Number 25, the translation being in our Document 2310-PS.

Hitler, Frick, and Göring ordered that the Reich Minister of the Interior be the central authority for carrying out the reunion of Austria with the German Reich. I cite the order pursuant to the law concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, March 16, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 249, Number 25, translated in our 1060-PS.

In connection with Germany’s extensive propaganda campaign to insure acceptability of the German regime, it may be noted that Goebbels established a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna.

I cite the order concerning the establishment of a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna, March 31, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 350, Number 46, translated in our Document 2935-PS.

The ballot addressed to soldiers of the former Austrian Army as “German soldiers” asked the voters whether they agreed with the accomplishment and ratification on March 13, 1938 of the reuniting of Austria with Germany.

I cite the second order concerning plebiscite and election for the Greater German Reichstag of March 24, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 303, translated in our Document 1659-PS.

The ground work was fully laid before the holding of the plebiscite “for German men and women of Austria” promised in the basic law of March 13.

Then, the importance of Austria in further aggression. Could we run that screen up, or is the chart still behind it? Well, the Court will remember the chart.

The seizure of Austria had now formed that lower jaw to the head of the wolf around the head of Czechoslovakia. Germany’s desire to consummate the Anschluss with Austria and her determination to execute that aim in the way and at the time that she did—that is, with threat of military force, quickly, and despite political risk—was due to the importance of Austria in her further plans of aggression.

The conference held November 5, 1937, planning for aggressive war in Europe, outlined as objectives in Austria the conquest of food through expulsion of a million people and the effective increase in fighting strength, in part through the improvement in the frontier.

I cite again Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25. Austria was to yield to Germany material resources, and moreover, she provided ready cash taken from the Jews and from the Austrian Government.

One of the first orders passed after the Anschluss was an order signed by Hitler, Frick, Schwerin von Krosigk and Schacht for the transfer to the Reich of the assets of the Austrian National Bank. I refer to the order for the transfer of the Austrian National Bank to the Reichsbank, March 17, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 254, Number 27, translated in our 2313-PS.

Austria also yielded human resources. Three months after the Anschluss there was enacted a decree requiring the 21-year-old men, Austrian men, to report for active military service. I refer to the decree regarding registration for active military service in Austria during 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 634, translated in our 1660-PS.

And the acquisition of Austria improved the military strategic position of the German Army. I invite the Court’s attention to a document which I introduced in the case on preparation for aggression, L-172, Exhibit USA-34, which was a lecture delivered by General Jodl, Chief of the German Staff of the Armed Forces, on 7 November 1943, at Munich, to the Gauleiter. Only one page of that lecture appears in this particular document book, and I quote from one paragraph on Page 5 of the English text, which is Page 7 of Jodl’s lecture, which reviewed the situation in 1938:

“The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas, until then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany—a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia—Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Her own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with vigor before effective aid from the west could be expected to arrive.”

The Nazi conspirators were now ready to carry out the second part of this second phase of their aggression and to take over Czechoslovakia.

Logically, if the Tribunal please, we should proceed at this point with the story about Czechoslovakia. For reasons that I explained earlier in the week we have had to change our plans somewhat from a strictly logical order, and the plan at present is that on Monday I shall go forward with the Czechoslovakian part of the aggressive war case.

At this point it is planned by our staff to show a motion picture, and it will take some few minutes to make the physical arrangements in the courtroom, so that if the Court should feel like recessing, those arrangements could be made.

THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell me how long the showing of the picture will take?

MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is about an hour.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes then, shall we now, or until the picture is ready?

[A recess was taken.]

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, Sir, supplementing what Mr. Alderman has said, we have had to readjust our presentation to some extent. Tomorrow morning, a witness will be offered for interrogation. Then Mr. Alderman on Monday; and Sir Hartley Shawcross will make the opening statement for the British Empire on Tuesday morning.

The film this afternoon, at the request of defendants’ counsel, made in writing to the Court, has been exhibited to defendants’ counsel on day before yesterday evening in this courtroom. I personally requested Dr. Dix to convey the invitation to Defense Counsel to witness the film. Eight of them came. Dr. Dix advised me kindly that he would not come unless he was forced to come.

I now present Mr. Dodd, who will have charge of the presentation.

MR. DODD: If it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution for the United States will at this time present to the Tribunal, with its permission, a documentary film on concentration camps. This is by no means the entire proof which the prosecution will offer with respect to the subject of concentration camps, but this film which we offer represents in a brief and unforgettable form an explanation of what the words “concentration camp” imply.

This subject arises appropriately in the narrative of events leading up to the actual outbreak of aggressive war, which, as Mr. Alderman’s presentation shows, was planned and prepared by the Nazi conspirators. We propose to show that concentration camps were not an end in themselves but rather they were an integral part of the Nazi system of government. As we shall show, the black-shirted guards of the SS and the Gestapo stood ranged behind the official pages of the Reichsgesetzblatt.

We intend to prove that each and every one of these defendants knew of the existence of these concentration camps; that fear and terror and nameless horror of the concentration camps were instruments by which the defendants retained power and suppressed opposition to any of their policies, including, of course, their plans for aggressive war. By this means they enforced the controls imposed upon the German people, as required to execute these plans, and obliterated freedom in Germany and in the countries invaded and occupied by the armies of the Third Reich.

Finally, we ask the Tribunal in viewing this film to bear in mind the fact that the proof to be offered at a later stage of this Trial will show that on some of the organizations charged in this Indictment lies the responsibility for the origination, the control, and the maintenance of the whole concentration camp system: Upon the SS, the SD—a part of the SS which tracked down the victims—upon the Gestapo, which committed the victims to the camps, and upon other branches of the SS which were in charge of the atrocities committed therein.

Commander James Donovan will introduce the film with a statement explaining its source and its authenticity.

COMMANDER JAMES BRITT DONOVAN, USNR. (Prosecution Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, I refer to Document Number 2430-PS, concerning the motion picture entitled “Nazi Concentration Camps” and to the affidavits of Commander James B. Donovan, Lieutenant Colonel George C. Stevens, Lieutenant E. R. Kellogg and Colonel Erik Tiebold contained therein. The affidavits of Colonel Stevens and of Lieutenant Kellogg are also contained in the motion picture, and thus will be in the record of the Tribunal. With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now, however, read into the record those affidavits not appearing in the film.

THE PRESIDENT: In the absence of any objection by the Defense Counsel, we don’t think it is necessary to read these formal affidavits.

COMMANDER DONOVAN: Yes, Sir. The United States now offers in evidence an official documentary motion picture report on Nazi concentration camps. This report has been compiled from motion pictures taken by Allied military photographers as the Allied armies in the West liberated the areas in which these camps were located. The accompanying narration is taken directly from the reports of the military photographers who filmed the camps.

While these motion pictures speak for themselves in evidencing life and death in Nazi concentration camps, proper authentication of the films is contained in the affidavits of the United States Army and Navy officers to which I have referred.

As has been stated, this motion picture has been made available to all defense counsel and they possess copies in their Information Room of the supporting affidavits duly translated.

If the Tribunal please, we shall proceed with the projection of the film, Document 2430-PS, Exhibit USA-79.

[Photographs were then projected on the screen showing the following affidavits while at the same time the voices of the respective affiants were reproduced reading them.]