Читать книгу The Nuremberg Trials: Complete Tribunal Proceedings (V. 12) - International Military Tribunal - Страница 11

“Illegal pamphlets, inciting to rebellion, are being distributed and even posted up everywhere; and there can therefore be no doubt that the security situation is extremely serious.”

Did the Governor General express himself in that manner at the time?

BÜHLER: When I took part in that meeting, the Governor General spoke about the situation for some time, but the details I cannot recollect.

DR. SEIDL: What happened after that?

BÜHLER: I had only one impression. In the previous months the Governor General had succeeded, by taking great pains, in imposing on the Police a procedure for courts-martial which had to be observed in making arrests and dealing with suspicious persons. Furthermore, the Police had to concede that the Governor General could refer the sentences of a summary court-martial to a reprieve commission and that the execution of sentences could take place only after the sentences had been confirmed by the Governor General. The statements of the Governor General during this conference in the middle of May 1940 made me fear that the Police might see in these statements the possibility for evading the court-martial and reprieve procedure imposed on them. For that reason I asked the Governor General for permission to speak after he had finished his statement. The Governor General cut me short at first and stated that he wanted to dictate something to the secretary in a hurry, which the latter was then to dictate to a stenotypist at once and then put it into its final version. Thereupon the Governor General dictated some authorization, or order, or some such document; and with absolute certainty I remember that after he had finished dictating, the secretary and I think, quite definitely, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, the Commander of the Regular Police, left the room. I am saying this in advance because it explains the fact that everything that happened afterwards has not been recorded in the minutes. The secretary was no longer present in the room. I expressed my fears, saying that these requirements laid down for court-martial procedure should be observed under all circumstances. I am not claiming any particular merit in this connection, because if I had not done it then this objection would have been raised, I am convinced, by Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart, or the Governor General himself would have realized the danger which his statements might have caused in this respect. At any rate, in reply to my objection, and without any debate, the Governor General stated at once that arrests and shootings could take place only in accordance with the court-martial procedure, and that sentences of the summary courts-martial would have to be examined by the reprieve commission.

In the ensuing period these instructions were followed. I assume that it is certain that the reprieve commission received all sentences pronounced by these courts-martial and dealt with them.

DR. SEIDL: Another entry in Frank’s diary, 12 July 1940, leads one to the conclusion that at first these leaders of the resistance movement concerned were merely arrested. I quote a statement of the Governor General:

“Regarding the question what is to be done with the political criminals caught in connection with the AB Action, a discussion is to take place in the near future with State Secretary Dr. Bühler, Obergruppenführer Krüger, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, and Ministerial Counsellor Wille.”

Who was Ministerial Counsellor Wille, and what task did he have in that connection?

BÜHLER: I might say in advance that there is a gap in my memory which makes it impossible for me to say for certain when the Governor General told Brigadeführer Streckenbach that in all cases he would have to observe court-martial procedure and respect the reprieve commission. On the other hand, I think I can remember for certain that at the time this discussion took place between Krüger, Streckenbach, Wille, and me, arrests only had taken place and no executions. Ministerial Counsellor Wille was the head of the Department of Justice in the Government and was the competent official for all matters concerning reprieves. The Governor General wanted these matters dealt with by a legally trained, experienced man.

During the conference with Krüger, Streckenbach, and Wille it had been ruled that the persons who had been arrested up to that time were to be subjected to court-martial procedure and that sentences had to be dealt with by the reprieve commission. The Police were not exactly enthusiastic about this. I remember that Krüger told me privately after the conference that the Governor General was a jack-in-the-box with whom one couldn’t work, and that in the future he would go his own way.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that this has been gone into in too great detail.

DR. SEIDL: Yes, I am coming to the end of my questions.

Witness, during a Police meeting in 1940 on 30 May, the Defendant Dr. Frank mentioned among other things the following: “The difficulties we had had with the Kraków professors were terrible. If we had handled the matter here, it would have taken a different course.” Who arrested these professors, and to what extent was the Governor General concerned with this matter?

BÜHLER: On 7 or 8 November 1939, when the Governor General arrived in Kraków to begin his activities, all professors of the University of Kraków were arrested by the Security Police without his knowledge and taken away to concentration camps in the Reich. Among them were acquaintances of the Governor General, with whom shortly before he had had social and academic connections through the Academy for German Law. The Governor General used his influence on Obergruppenführer Krüger persistently and uninterruptedly until he achieved the release of the majority of these professors from concentration camps.

This statement of his, which contradicts this, was made, in my opinion, for the purpose of placating the Police, for the Police did not like releasing these professors.

DR. SEIDL: What basically was the attitude of the Governor General concerning mobilization of labor?

BÜHLER: The Governor General and the Government of the Government General were always attempting to get as many Polish workers for the Reich as possible. It was clear to us, however, that the employment of force in recruiting workers might bring about temporary advantages but that recruitment of workers in that way would not promise much success in the long run. The Governor General gave me instructions, therefore, to conduct extensive and intensive propaganda in favor of employment in the Reich and to oppose all use of force in the recruitment of workers.

On the other hand the Governor General wanted to make his recruitment of workers for the Reich successful by demanding decent treatment for Polish workers in the Reich. He negotiated for many years with the Reich Commissioner for the Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, and improvements were in fact achieved. The Governor General was especially opposed to the identifying of Jews and Poles by distinguishing marks in the Reich. I remember a letter from Reich Commissioner Sauckel in which he informed the Governor General that he had made every effort to insure the same treatment for Polish workers as for other foreign workers, but that his efforts were no longer crowned by success whenever the influence of the Reichsführer SS opposed them.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to another point. Under Number USA-275 the Prosecution has submitted Document 1061-PS, which is a report of Brigadeführer Stroop on the destruction of the ghetto in Warsaw. Were you, or the Governor General, informed beforehand about the measures planned by the Security Police?

BÜHLER: I certainly was not. As to the Governor General, I do not know that he was informed about any such plans.

DR. SEIDL: What did you learn afterwards about the events at the ghetto in Warsaw in 1943?

BÜHLER: I heard what practically everybody heard—that an uprising had broken out in the ghetto which had long been prepared; that the Jews had used the building materials given them for the purpose of air-raid protection to set up defense works; and that during the uprising violent resistance was encountered by the German troops.

DR. SEIDL: I now come to the Warsaw uprising of 1944. To what extent did the administration of the Government General participate in the quelling of that revolt?

BÜHLER: As our comrades in Warsaw were encircled by the insurrectionists, we asked the Governor General to apply to the Führer for assistance to bring about a speedy quelling of the Warsaw revolt. Apart from that the administration assisted in the welfare of the population in connection with the evacuation in the battle zone of the quarters that were to be destroyed. But the administration did not exercise any authority here.

DR. SEIDL: On 4 November 1945 you made an affidavit. The affidavit bears the number 2476-PS. I shall now read to you that affidavit, which is very brief, and I shall ask you to tell me whether the contents are correct. I quote:

“In the course of the quelling of the Warsaw revolt in August 1944, approximately 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw (a Polish estimate) were taken away to German concentration camps. As a result of a démarche made by the Governor General, Dr. Frank, to the office of Reichsführer SS Himmler, the latter prohibited further deportations. The Governor General tried to secure the release of the 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw who had already been taken to concentration camps in the Reich. The Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner, refused this request, made in writing as well as orally on the occasion of a visit of mine to Berlin in September or October 1944, on the grounds that these inhabitants of Warsaw were being used in the secret manufacture of armaments in the Reich and that therefore a general release was out of the question. However, he would be willing to consider individual applications favorably. Individual applications for release from concentration camps were granted by Kaltenbrunner during the subsequent months.

“Contrary to the Polish estimate, the number of persons taken from Warsaw to concentration camps in the Reich was estimated to be small by Kaltenbrunner. I myself reported to my office Kaltenbrunner’s statement regarding the number of internees, and after a renewed investigation I found that the above-mentioned figure of 50,000 to 60,000 was correct. These were the people who had been taken to concentration camps in Germany.”

I now ask you, are the contents of this affidavit, made before an American officer, correct?

BÜHLER: I can supplement it.

THE PRESIDENT: Before he supplements it, is it in evidence? Has it yet been put in evidence?

DR. SEIDL: It has the number 2476-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: That doesn’t prove it has been put in evidence. Has it been put in evidence? Dr. Seidl, you know quite well what “put in evidence” means. Has it been put in evidence? Has it got a USA exhibit number?

DR. SEIDL: No, it has not a USA exhibit number.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you are offering it in evidence, are you?

DR. SEIDL: I don’t want to submit it formally in evidence; but I do want to ask the witness about the contents of this affidavit.

THE PRESIDENT: But it is a document, and if you are putting it to the witness, you must put it in evidence and you must give it an exhibit number. You cannot put documents to the witness and not put them in evidence.

DR. SEIDL: In that case I submit this document as Document Number Frank-1.

I now ask you, Witness, whether the contents of this affidavit are correct, and, if so, whether you can supplement this affidavit.

BÜHLER: Yes, I should like to supplement it briefly. It is possible that I went to see Kaltenbrunner twice about that question—not only once—and after Kaltenbrunner had refused to release these people the second time, on the strength of my experiences with the camp commandant in Camp Pruszkow, I had the impression that it was not in Kaltenbrunner’s power to order such a release. He didn’t talk to me about that.

DR. SEIDL: But from his statements you had the impression that perhaps he too did not have the power to release those people?

BÜHLER: During those conferences I had brought up questions about the Polish policy, and from these conferences I had the impression that I might gain Kaltenbrunner’s interest in a reasonable Polish policy and win him over as an ally in negotiations with Himmler. At any rate, talking to me, he condemned the methods of force used by Krüger. I gathered from these statements that Kaltenbrunner did not want to see methods of force employed against the Poles and that he would have helped me if he could.

DR. SEIDL: The Soviet Prosecution has submitted a document bearing the Exhibit Number USSR-128 (Document Number 3305-PS). It is a teleprinted message from the intelligence office of the Higher SS and Police Leader East addressed to the Governor General and signed by Dr. Fischer, then Governor of Warsaw. Under Figure 2 it reads as follows:

“Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach has been given the new task of pacifying Warsaw, that is to say, of laying Warsaw level with the ground during the war, except where military considerations of its value as a fortress are involved. Before the destruction, all raw materials, all textiles, and all furniture will be removed from Warsaw. The main task will fall to the civil administration.

“I herewith inform you that this new Führer decree regarding the razing of Warsaw is of the greatest significance for the further new policy regarding the Poles.”

As far as you can recollect, how did the Governor General receive and view that telegram? And to what extent was his basic attitude altered on the strength of that message?

BÜHLER: This telegram referred to instructions which Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach had received from the Reichsführer SS. The administration in the Government General did not welcome the destruction of Warsaw. On the contrary, I remember that, together with the Governor General, ways which might be used to avoid the destruction of Warsaw were discussed. Just what was really tried I cannot recollect. It may be that further steps were not taken because of the impossibility of achieving anything.

DR. SEIDL: I now turn to another subject.

THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, before I continue the interrogation of the witness Dr. Bühler, I should like to inform you that I forego the interrogation of the witness Helene Kraffczyk; so this witness will be the last one.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Defendant Dr. Frank has been accused by the Prosecution of not having done everything within his power to ensure the feeding of the population of the Government General. What can you say about that?

BÜHLER: The decisive reason, the real cause, why the population in the Government General could not be supplied as efficiently and as satisfactorily as in Germany was the lack of co-operation on the part of the Polish population in the measures taken by the Germans to bring about a just and equal distribution of food quotas. This lack of co-operation was caused by patriotic considerations, the aversion to German domination, and the continuous, effective propaganda from the outside. I do not believe that there was a single country in Europe where so much was pillaged, stolen, and diverted to the black market, where so much was destroyed and so much damage was done in order to sabotage the food program, as in the Government General.

To give one example: All the dairy machinery, which had been provided with great pains, and the chain of dairies, which had been organized with difficulty, were destroyed again and again so that a more or less comprehensive control of milk and fat supplies could not be carried out. I estimate that the fat sold on the free market and the black market in the Government General was several times the quantity of that controlled and distributed officially.

Another decisive reason may be seen in the fact that the Government General had been carved out of a hitherto self-contained governmental and economic structure and that no consideration had been given effecting a proper economic balance.

The large centers of consumption in the Government General, that is to say, the cities such as Warsaw, Kraków, later Lvov, and also the industrial area in the center of Poland, had previously received their supplies to a very large extent directly from the country through the standing market. In these areas of the Government General there was a lack of granaries; a lack of refrigerators; there was no systematic chain of dairies; and storehouses of all kinds were lacking—all necessary for the directing or controlling of a supply economy by the state.

The Government General had to construct all these things step by step, and therefore the supplying of the population was proportionately difficult. It was not intended to supply the population fully right away; the supplies were to be improved gradually. I always saw to it that the directives issued for combating the black market allowed margins for the acquisition of foodstuffs and that the inhabitants of the cities were given the opportunity of contacting the producers. In 1942 the rations were to have been increased; then an order came from the Delegate for the Four Year Plan that rations were not to be increased and that certain quotas of foodstuffs were to be allocated to the Reich. Most of these foodstuffs were not taken out of the area, but were consumed by the Armed Forces on the spot. The Governor General fought continually against the authorities of the Four Year Plan, in order to achieve an increase and an improvement in the food supplies for the Polish population. That struggle was not without success. In many cases it was possible to increase the rations considerably, especially those of the workers in armament industries, and other privileged groups of the working population.

To sum up I should like to say that it was not easy for the population of the Government General to get its daily food requirements. On the other hand there were no famines and no hunger epidemics in the Government General. A Polish and Ukrainian auxiliary committee, which had delegations in all districts of the Government General, saw to the supply of foodstuffs for those parts of the population which were in greatest need. I used my influence to have this committee supplied with the largest possible amount of foodstuffs, so that it should be able to pursue its welfare work successfully, and it is known to me that that committee took special care of the children of large cities.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, what were the measures that the Governor General took to safeguard art treasures in the areas under his administration?

BÜHLER: With a decree of 16 December 1939 the Reichsführer SS, in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality, had already ordered, without informing the Governor General, that all art treasures of the Government General were to be confiscated and transported to the Reich. The Government General was successful in preventing this transport to a great extent.

Then a man arrived in the Government General from the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, State Secretary Mühlmann, who claimed to have plenary authority from the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. I asked to see that authorization. It was signed, not by Göring himself, but by somebody in his circle, Gritzbach. He was entrusted with the task of safeguarding the art treasures of the Government General in the interests of the Reich. In order to bring this commissioner—provided as he was with plenary authority from the Reich—into line with the Government General, the Governor General entrusted to him, in addition, the task of collecting together the art treasures of the Government General. He collected these art treasures and also had catalogues printed; and I know, from conferences which took place with the Governor General, that the Governor always attached the greatest importance to having these art treasures kept within the area of the Government General.

DR. SEIDL: The prosecution, under Number USA-378, that is Document 1709-PS, submitted a report about the investigation of the entire activity of the Special Commissioner for the Collection and Safeguarding of Art and Cultural Treasures in the Government General. On Page 6 of that report it reads, and I quote:

“Reason for investigation: Order of the State Secretary of the Government of the Government General of 30 June 1942 to investigate the entire activity of the Special Commissioner appointed for the collection and safeguarding of art and cultural treasures in the Government General, according to the decree of the Governor General of 16 December 1939.”

I ask you now what caused you in 1942 to give this order for investigation, and did the report lead to serious charges?

BÜHLER: The investigation was found necessary because of the possibility of a collision of duties, in the case of State Secretary Mühlmann, between the order given by the Reich and the order given by the Governor General. I had also heard that some museum pieces had not been properly taken care of. The investigation showed that State Secretary Mühlmann could not be blamed in any way.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has submitted another document, 3042-PS, Exhibit USA-375. It is an affidavit by Dr. Mühlmann, and I quote:

“I was the Special Commissioner of the Governor General of Poland, Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the Government General, from October 1939 to September 1943. Göring in his capacity as chairman of the Reich Defense Council had commissioned me with this duty.

“I confirm that it was the official policy of the Governor General, Hans Frank, to take into safekeeping all important art treasures which belonged to Polish public institutions, private collections, and the Church. I confirm that the art treasures mentioned were actually confiscated; and it is clear to me that in case of a German victory they would not have remained in Poland, but would have been used to complement German art collections.”

I ask you now: Is it correct that the Governor General from the very beginning considered all art treasures which had been safeguarded the property of the Government General?

BÜHLER: Insofar as they were state property, yes; insofar as they were private property, they were temporarily confiscated and safeguarded; but the Governor General never thought of transferring them to the Reich. If he had wanted to do that, he could have taken advantage of the war situation itself in order to send these art treasures to Germany. But where the witness obtained his information, as contained in the last sentence of his affidavit, I do not know.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted a document, L-37, under Exhibit Number USA-506. It is a letter of 19 July 1944 from the commander of the Security Police and SD of the district of Radom, to the branch office of Tomassov. There it says, among other things, and I quote:

“The Higher SS and Police Leader East issued the following order on 28 June 1944:”

I skip a few sentences and then quote:

“The Reichsführer SS, with the approval of the Governor General, has ordered that in all cases where assassinations of Germans or attempts at such assassinations have occurred, or where saboteurs have destroyed vital installations, not only the perpetrators are to be shot but also all their kinsmen are likewise to be executed and their female relatives above 16 years of age are to be put into concentration camps.”

Is it known to you whether the Governor General ever spoke about this question with the Reichsführer SS and whether he had given any such approval?

BÜHLER: I know nothing about the issuing of an order of that kind. Once during the second half of 1944, an order came through my hands relating to the joint responsibility of kin, but I cannot say whether that concerned the Reich or the Government General; it was a police order, I should say. If it had had that formula, “with the approval of the Government General,” I should have questioned the Governor General on that point.

DR. SEIDL: Would such an approval have been consistent with the fundamental attitude of the Governor General to this question as you knew it?

BÜHLER: The fundamental attitude of the Governor General was on the contrary opposed to all executions without trial and without legal reasons.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that from 1940 on the Governor General complained continually to the Führer about the measures taken by the Police and the SD?

BÜHLER: Yes; I myself drew up at least half a dozen memoranda of about the length of the one submitted, addressed to the Führer direct or to him through the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. They contained repeated complaints with regard to executions, encroachments in connection with the recruiting of workers, the importation of inhabitants of other regions without the permission of the Governor General, the food situation, and happenings in general which were contrary to the principles of an orderly administration.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted one of these memoranda under the number USA-610. This is a memorandum to the Führer of 19 June 1943. Is this memorandum essentially different to any previous or later memoranda; and what, basically, was the attitude of the Führer to such complaints and proposals?

BÜHLER: This memorandum, which has been submitted, is somewhat different from the previous ones. The previous memoranda contained direct accusations with regard to these happenings and the encroachments by the Police. When these memoranda remained unsuccessful, acting on the order of the Governor General, I drew up the complaints contained in this memorandum of June in the form of a political proposal. The grievances listed there were not caused by the government of the Governor General; rather they were complaints about interference by outside authorities.

DR. SEIDL: In the diary we find on 26 October 1943 a long report about the 4 years of German construction work in the Government General which was made by you yourself. On the basis of what documents did you compile that report?

BÜHLER: I compiled that report on the basis of the material which the 13 main departments of the government had given me.

DR. SEIDL: Now a question of principle: What, basically, was the attitude of the Governor General to the Polish and Ukrainian people, as you know it from your 5 years’ activity, as the head of the government?

BÜHLER: The first principle of all was that of keeping peace in this area and of increasing the usefulness of this area as far as possible by improving its resources, economically speaking. In order to achieve that, decent treatment of the population was necessary; freedom and property must not be infringed upon. Those were the principles of policy according to which, acting on the order of the Governor General, I always carried out my functions as state secretary of the government.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General also tried within the framework of wartime conditions to grant the population a certain minimum of cultural development?

BÜHLER: That was the desire of the Governor General, but the realization of this desire very frequently met with resistance on the part of the Security Police, or the Propaganda Ministry of the Reich, or it was made impossible by conditions themselves. But in principle the Governor General did not wish to prohibit cultural activity among the Polish and Ukrainian populations.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that he tried particularly to revive higher education and that, evading the directives from the Reich, he instituted so-called technical courses in colleges?

BÜHLER: Instruction was certainly given at the technical schools by Polish professors in Warsaw and Lvov which corresponded approximately to a university education. As a matter of principle, the Governor General also wanted to open secondary schools and seminaries for priests, but that always failed because of the objections of the Security Police. As no agreement could be reached, and acting on the order of the Governor General, in October 1941 on my own authority I promised the opening of secondary schools and, I believe, of seminaries for priests with a certain advisory autonomy for the Poles. Two days after this announcement the Führer’s opinion was transmitted to me that I had no authority to announce such measures.

DR. SEIDL: Dr. Frank’s diary often mentions the principle of unity of administration and the fact that the Governor General was the deputy of the Führer in this territory and the representative of the authority of the Reich. Does this conception tally with the facts? What other authorities of the Reich and the Party came into the administration of the Government General?

BÜHLER: The authority of the Governor General was limited from the very beginning in many important respects. Thus, for instance, before the establishment of the Government General, the Reichsführer SS had been invested with full power in the matter of the preservation of German Nationality in all occupied territories. The Delegate for the Four Year Plan had equal authority and power to issue decrees, in the Government General. But many other offices as well, such as those for armaments, post, railways, building, and other departments tried, and tried successfully, to take over parts of the administration of the Government General or to gain some influence over it. After the Governor General had lost his offices as Reichsleiter in 1942, there was a special rush in this direction. I might almost say that it became a kind of sport to diminish the prestige of the King of Poland.

DR. SEIDL: Who appointed, dismissed, and paid the police officials in the Government General and otherwise saw to their interests from the point of view of the Civil Service?

BÜHLER: That was done exclusively by Himmler’s administrative office in Berlin.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that even officials of the administration of the Government General were arrested by Krüger and that it was not possible for even the Governor General to effect their release? I remind you of the case of Scipessi.

BÜHLER: Yes. I can confirm that from my own experience. Even from my own circle people were arrested without my being notified. In one such case I instructed the commander of the Security Police that the official was to be released within a certain space of time. He was not released, and I demanded the recall of the commander of the Security Police. The result was that Himmler expressed his special confidence in this commander of the Security Police and the recall was refused.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, how long was the Government General able to work at all under normal conditions?

BÜHLER: I might almost say, never at any time. The first year was taken up in repairing destruction caused by the war. There were destroyed villages, destroyed cities, destroyed means of transport; bridges had been blown up in very large numbers. After these destroyed objects had been repaired, as far as it was possible under war conditions, the Government General became again the deployment area for the war against the East, against the Russians, and then the transit area to the front and the line of communications area. It was the great repair shop for the front.

DR. SEIDL: Another question: During the war Himmler presented to the Reich Government the draft of a law concerning the treatment of anti-social elements. What was the attitude of Dr. Frank towards this draft?

BÜHLER: As far as I can remember...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that the matters which the witness is going into are really matters of common knowledge. Everyone knows about that. I think you might take the witness over this ground a little bit faster than you are.

DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir. He has given the answer already.

Witness, during the war did the government of the Reich...

THE PRESIDENT: But I am speaking of the future, Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir.

[Turning to the witness.] During the war, Himmler submitted to the Reich Government, the draft of a law concerning the treatment of anti-social elements.

BÜHLER: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: What was the attitude of the Governor General to this?

BÜHLER: The Governor General protested against this. At the conference which I had with Heydrich in February 1942 the latter asked me as a special request to ask the Governor General to retract his protect against the law. The Governor General refused to do this.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has presented a chart which shows Dr. Frank as having authority over the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Thierack. Did such a situation ever exist?

BÜHLER: That must be an error; such a situation never existed.

DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, were the relations between the Governor General and the Reichsführer SS Himmler?

BÜHLER: The Governor General and the Reichsführer SS Himmler as individuals were so different...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I thought we had been hearing all morning what the relations were between the Governor General and the Reichsführer.

DR. SEIDL: Then I will not put that question.

Witness, the Soviet Prosecution, under Exhibit Number USSR-93, (Document Number USSR-93), submitted an appendix to the report of the Polish Government. The appendix is entitled “Cultural Life in Poland.” I have shown it to you once before and would like you to tell me whether the Governor General, or his government, ever actually issued such directives?

BÜHLER: I do not remember ever having signed such directives or having seen any such directives signed by the Governor General. This document submitted to me, seems to me to be a fake or a forgery. That can be recognized from the contents.

DR. SEIDL: In the diary we find a large number of entries referring to the policies of the Governor General which seem to contradict what you yourself said before as a witness. How can you explain these contradictions?

BÜHLER: These statements by the Governor General, which have also been called to my attention during previous interrogations, do not merely seem to contradict what I said; they very clearly do contradict what I had to say as a witness. As I myself heard such statements frequently, I have tried to understand how he came to make such statements; and I can only say that Frank perhaps took part more than was necessary in the conferences and affairs of the government officials. There was scarcely a conference in which he did not take part. Thus it happened that he had to speak many times during one day, and I might say that in 99 out of 100 cases he spoke on the spur of the moment, without due reflection, and I frequently witnessed how after making such grotesque statements he would try in the next sentences, or at the next opportunity, to retract them and straighten them out. I also witnessed how he rescinded authority which he had delegated on the spur of the moment. I am sure that if I could go through the diary for every one of these statements, I would be able to give you a dozen—dozens of other statements to the contrary.

DR. SEIDL: Frank’s diary includes...

BÜHLER: I should like to say the following: When the Governor General was working with the members of his administration, he never made such statements; at least I cannot remember any. Those statements were always made when the Higher SS and Police Leader was sitting next to him, so that I had the impression that he was not free at such moments.

DR. SEIDL: The diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank covers about 10,000 to 12,000 typewritten pages. Who kept this diary—he himself or somebody else?

BÜHLER: According to my observations, the diary was kept by stenographers. At first by one stenographer, Dr. Meidinger, later by two stenographers, Nauk and Mohr. The procedure was that these stenographers were in the room during conferences and took notes.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that to a certain extent these stenographers received reports from a third person as to what was said at a conference?

BÜHLER: I often noticed that these stenographers did not take the trouble to record everything literally, but merely wrote summaries of the sense. I was also sometimes asked what this or that person, or what the Governor General, had said or thought in some particular instance.

DR. SEIDL: Did the Governor General see these entries in the diary or read them later?

BÜHLER: From what I know of the Governor General I do not believe that he read them over.

THE PRESIDENT: How can this witness tell whether he read the notes later?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the witness, Dr. Bühler, was the Governor General’s closest collaborator.

THE PRESIDENT: If you wanted to put that sort of question, you should have asked the Defendant Frank.

DR. SEIDL: A further question, Witness. According to your observations what caused the Governor General not to destroy that diary, but to hand it over when he was arrested?

BÜHLER: On 15 March for the last time I was...

THE PRESIDENT: That, again is a matter which rests in the mind of Dr. Frank, not of this witness, why he did not destroy it.

DR. SEIDL: He has answered the question already, and I forego the answer of the witness.

[Turning to the witness.] Now, one last question. In 1942, after the speeches made by Dr. Frank, he was deprived of all his Party offices. What effect did that have on his position as Governor General?

BÜHLER: I have already referred to that. It weakened his authority considerably, and the administration in the Government General became increasingly difficult.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct, that the Governor General repeatedly, both in writing and orally, tendered his resignation?

BÜHLER: Yes, written applications for resignation I often worded myself; and I know that he also asked orally many times to be permitted to resign, but that this was never approved.

DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions for the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions?

DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, is it correct that by far the largest number of the Polish workers who came to Germany, came into the Reich before April 1942, that is, before Sauckel came into office?

BÜHLER: I cannot make any definite statement about that, but I know that the recruitment of labor produced smaller and smaller results and that the main quotas were probably delivered during the first years.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were the labor quotas which had been demanded from the Governor General reduced by Sauckel in view of the fact that so many Poles were already working in the Reich?

BÜHLER: I know of one such case; Sauckel’s deputy, President Struve, talked to me about it.

DR. SERVATIUS: Is it true that Himmler for his own purposes recruited workers from the Polish area, without Sauckel’s knowledge and without observing the conditions which Sauckel had laid down?

BÜHLER: I assume that that happened. Whenever I was told about roundups of workers, I tried to clear matters up. The Police always said, “That is the labor administration,” and the labor administration said, “That is the Police.” But I know that once, on a visit to Warsaw, Himmler was very annoyed at the loafers standing at the street corners; and I consider it quite possible that these labor raids in Warsaw were carried out arbitrarily by the Police without the participation of the labor administration.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know Sauckel’s directives with regard to the carrying out of labor recruitment?

BÜHLER: I have not seen them in detail, and I don’t remember them. I know only that Sauckel stated, on the occasion of a visit in Kraków, that he had not ordered the use of violence.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was that a speech of Sauckel’s?

BÜHLER: No, it was a conference.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you recall an address which Sauckel made in Kraków to the various authorities?

BÜHLER: He spoke as a Party speaker.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did he make any statements there about the treatment of workers?

BÜHLER: These statements were made at a conference which preceded the visit to the Governor General.

DR. SERVATIUS: And what was the nature of his remarks?

BÜHLER: My people had told him and his people that there had been encroachments, and he answered that he had not ordered the use of violence and denied that these events—the arrest of people in motion picture houses or other places of assembly—had ever been ordered or decreed by him.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the structure of the labor administration in the Government General?

BÜHLER: The Labor Department was part of my field of authority.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have any immediate influence on the carrying out of labor recruitment?

BÜHLER: Not only did he have influence, but he also sent a deputy who was not under my authority.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was it possible for that deputy to carry out the recruitment of labor direct?

BÜHLER: If he wanted to, yes.

DR. SERVATIUS: In what manner? Could he give any instructions, or direct orders?

BÜHLER: The recruiting units set up by Sauckel were not under my authority. I tried on several occasions to get these people within my organization, but these attempts were always countered with the argument that these recruiting units had to be used in all the occupied territories and that they could not be attached to one particular area.

In other words, Sauckel’s deputy in the Government General, President Struve, who was also in charge of the Labor Department, was on the one hand dependent on Sauckel’s directives and did not need to pay attention to me but was also on the other hand responsible to me to the extent that he acted as president of the Labor Department.

DR. SERVATIUS: What branches handled forced recruitment whenever that became necessary? Could the recruiting units do that?

BÜHLER: I do not know. The deputy always denied the fact of forced recruitment.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions? Does the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, I should like to define your official position more accurately. As from 1940 and until the moment of the liberation of Poland you were Frank’s chief deputy, were you not?

BÜHLER: From the end of September until November 1939 I served the Governor General in a leading position on his labor staff. In November 1939 I became Chief of the Department of the Governor General; that was the central administrative office of the Governor General, in Kraków. During the second half of the year 1940 the designation of this function was changed to “State Secretary of the Government,” and I was State Secretary of the Government until I left Kraków on 18 January 1945.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently you were the chief deputy of the Defendant Hans Frank.

BÜHLER: My field of activity was definitely limited. I had to direct the administrative matters. Neither the Police, nor the Party, nor the Wehrmacht, nor the various Reich offices which were directly active in the area of the Government General, were under my authority.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When Frank was away, who was then his deputy?

BÜHLER: The deputy of the Governor General was Seyss-Inquart, Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And after Seyss-Inquart left?

BÜHLER: After the departure of Seyss-Inquart there was a gap. I cannot recall the month, but I think it was in 1941 that I was assigned as deputy of the Governor General. But that appointment was approved only with certain modifications. I was supposed to represent the Governor General only when he was neither present in the area nor...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Answer me briefly. When Frank was away, did you carry out his duties?

BÜHLER: I answer as my conscience dictates. Whenever Frank was not present within the area, and could not be reached outside the area, then I was supposed to represent him.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand. That means that you took over when he was away.

BÜHLER: Yes, whenever he could not be reached outside of the area either.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, yes. That is precisely what I am asking about.

I should like the witness to be shown the typed transcript of the report on a conference of 25 January. Will you show him, first of all, the list of those who were present. The Tribunal will find the passage that I desire to quote...

THE PRESIDENT: What year? You said the 25th of January.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: 1943, Mr. President. Your Honors will find it on Page 7, Exhibit Number USSR-223, (Document Number USSR-223), Paragraph 6.

Witness, is that your signature among the list of those present?

BÜHLER: My signature, yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means you were present at that conference.

BÜHLER: 1943, yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall quote three sentences from the typed transcript of the report. Please hand the original to the witness.

I quote three sentences from this document. It is Dr. Frank’s speech: