Читать книгу Dark Seas - JE Harrold - Страница 19

Commencement of Action

(Plan 2)

When 25 miles south of Gavdo at 0600/28 March and on a S.E.’ly course the VALF – as already noted – had sighted an enemy aircraft and, after the Ilex and Hasty had joined his screen, turned at 0645 to course 200°, speed 20 knots, with the intention of avoiding further enemy air reconnaissance. The 0739 enemy report from the Formidable’s A/C ‘F’ was still being studied by VALF at 0745 when the Orion sighted the enemy astern, and at 0752 the VALF altered course to 140° and increased speed to 23 knots. Shortly afterwards (0755) the ships astern were seen to be three cruisers with some destroyers, and speed was increased to 28 knots. Suspecting them to be 8-in. cruisers of the Zara class, which were faster than his own and could outrange them, he decided to try to draw them towards our battleships, some 90 miles to the eastward. At 0802 he reported their position17 and his own. Though not aware of it at the time he was “very uncomfortably placed” with a second powerful enemy cruiser squadron (Force Z) out of sight to the north-east in a position to cut him off from our battle fleet; also, the Vittorio Veneto was some 16 miles on his port quarter, steering S.E. His first enemy report was amplified at 0812 and simultaneously the enemy (3rd Division) opened fire, range 25,000 yards. Admiral Iachino comments on the opening range:

“The Trieste Division opened fire at 22,000 metres and the first salvoes fell very short... the distance between the two groups was in fact never less than 24,000 metres (i.e., 27,000 yards). Atmospheric conditions were most unfavourable for range finding at great distance, especially with the old range finders fitted in the Trento and Trieste. These instruments actually did not succeed in giving any reading before opening fire,18 and even afterwards their observations were ‘jumpy’, uncertain and inaccurate.”

The sea was smooth and visibility good (15 miles). The enemy concentrated on the Gloucester, which zig-zagged to avoid being hit. At 0829 the range had decreased to 23,500 yards and the Gloucester fired three salvoes which, though falling short, caused the Italian cruisers to alter course away and draw outside the British gun range; there resuming a parallel course the Italian cruisers continued firing, though their salvoes were all falling short. Both forces continued speeding to the south-east when at 0854 the aspect of affairs was abruptly changed by a report of enemy battleships. This originated from British aircraft 5F which had seen at 0805 what appeared to be a force of three enemy battleships in a position 34° N., 24° 16’ E., steering to the south-west (210°) at 20 knots. As Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell at 0805 had been only seven miles from that identical position and must have sighted them himself had they been there, he considered the position was “manifestly incorrect”,19 but there remained the possibility of enemy battleships being somewhere in the vicinity. At 0855 the enemy cruisers ceased fire, and turning to port went off to the north westward on an approximate course of 300°, having been ordered by the Italian C.-in-C. to break off the engagement, as he considered that his cruisers were being drawn too far into waters under control of our aviation. The VALF reported the enemy’s alteration of course and decided to follow and try to maintain touch. At 0936 he reported the enemy still in sight bearing 320°, 16 miles, course 320° speed 28 knots. During this phase of the action the Vendetta developed engine trouble, and was detached to Alexandria.