Читать книгу Dark Seas - JE Harrold - Страница 21

The C.-in-C.’s Movements, 28 March

Meanwhile the C.-in-C.,20 after receiving at 0827 the Vice-Admiral’s sighting report of 0802, had increased speed to 22 knots (0832) and altered course to 310°. The situation did not for the moment appear “unduly alarming”, but twenty minutes later he ordered the Valiant (0851) to proceed at her utmost speed to join VALF, detaching the Nubian and Mohawk to accompany her. The Warspite (with slight condenser trouble)21 and the Barham remained in company with the Formidable (Plan 1), which had been ordered at 0833 to range a torpedo striking force, while the aircraft at Maleme were also ordered at 084922 to attack the enemy cruisers (See Attack by Maleme Striking Force on the 3rd Division). Aircraft reports were then coming in indicating another enemy force to the northward, though their presence was by no means certain. Aircraft 5F’s report (at 0805) of battleships might be correct, or on the other hand she might be mistaking cruisers for battleships, a not uncommon error at the time arising from the similar silhouettes of the Cavour class battleships and the cruiser Garibaldi class, two of which were with Force Z. At 0847 the C.-in-C. received a report from aircraft 5F that touch was lost with the enemy cruisers and destroyers (probably enemy Force X), which she had reported at 0839 well to the southward of the 0722 position given by aircraft 5B.

By 0918, the C.-in-C. knew that the enemy cruisers: (Force X) had broken off action and were retiring to the north-west, being reported by VALF and aircraft 5H as steering 320° or 300° respectively, speed 28 knots. At about this time the Gloucester’s aircraft, which had been catapulted for spotting duty at 0831, reported another enemy force23 to the northward of Force X. This report was not received in any other ship as the aircraft did not use the correct frequency nor was it passed on by the Gloucester. The receipt of this signal in the flagship would have helped to dispel the uncertainty created by indefinite and confusing reports received from the reconnaissance aircraft, which were not using “Duty letters” and in some cases were omitting their position.

At 0922, the C.-in-C. decided to hold back the Formidable’s striking force until the situation cleared and a signal was accordingly sent (0925) to R.A.F. 201 Group to send his flying boats to locate and shadow the enemy fleet in the Crete-Africa area between 25° and 23° E.