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Introduction Dr J. E. Harrold

The Battle for Cape Matapan stands out as the biggest and most decisive battle between surface fleets in the Mediterranean during World War II. It also stands out among the series of staff battle summaries concerning the theatre of operations in the Mediterranean by warranting a publication of its own. Written shortly after the war, the summary presents an initial review of the battle, drawing on the accounts of those present on both sides. As such, it provides the most detailed and vivid account of ship and aircraft movement as the enemy is hunted, trailed, avoided and engaged. It also conveys the ‘fog of war’ in which accurate intelligence combines with the inaccurate and misleading to paint an often confusing picture of events. Written so soon after the event, there is inevitably little reflection in the account, which is also rendered incomplete by the omission of the role played by ULTRA in enabling the British to read Italian and German signals. Its original ‘restricted’ classification meant it was only to be released to certain individuals, including select foreign governments and international organisations, but was not otherwise to be made generally available to the public. However, this summary presents a unique insight into one of the last fleet engagements in naval history and therefore warrants a wider readership.

Unlike the Atlantic, control of the Mediterranean was not a matter of national survival for Britain. However, since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 it had become a valuable lifeline between the United Kingdom and its dominions in Asia and Australasia, a significance reinforced as demand for Middle Eastern oil emerged. Moreover, its strategic importance as the major means of supply and communication with theatres of war from North Africa to the Middle East, the Balkans and Italy ensured that the fight for control of the Mediterranean would continue until the end of the war in Europe.

It was not until June 1940 that the Mediterranean became a major problem for Britain, caused by two seismic shifts in the war: the entry of Italy into the war followed only days later by the collapse of France. At once Britain had lost an ally and gained an enemy, the impact of which was most keenly felt in the Mediterranean. The Italian Navy (Regia Marina), under the command of Admiral Angelo Iachino, presented a formidable opponent; modern, well designed and generally faster than its older Royal Navy (RN) counterparts; it also had the advantage of being able to focus solely on the war in the Mediterranean while Britain and the Allies had to stretch resources to cover the Atlantic and later the Pacific. It had been designed principally to provide home defence against the French Navy, a role it was clearly not required to fulfil, and preferred to remain ‘a fleet in being’, reluctant to engage in battle, save for the protection of the occasional convoy, while continuing to pose a sizeable threat to its opponents.1 The apparent reluctance of the Regia Marina to engage in battle was in part due to its limited supply of fuel.2 When it did venture out it suffered other significant deficiencies, notably the lack of organic (sea-launched) aircraft, the absence of radar and the centralised land-based command of the Italian Naval Headquarters (Supermarina), which denied Italian commanders the freedom of action enjoyed by their British counterparts. All these factors were to weigh against the Regia Marina when it met the RN at Cape Matapan.

By comparison, the British Mediterranean Fleet, which included the Australian light cruiser HMAS Perth and the destroyer HMAS Stuart, under the command of Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham (know as ABC) began the war smaller3 and older. All three battleships engaged at Matapan, HMS Warspite, Valiant and Barham had been present at the Battle of Jutland, 25 years earlier. Crucially, each but Barham, together with other more modern British ships, was fitted with radar. The RN also enjoyed the presence of an aircraft carrier, although by the time the two fleets met at Matapan it had already been necessary to replace one carrier, the damaged HMS Illustrious, with Formidable. The ensuing battle would be ‘the first time that carrier- borne aircraft played a vital and indispensable role in a main fleet action’.4 A further advantage would also present itself at Matapan; the legacy of pre-war night-fighting training. Indeed Cunningham could claim to be ‘arguably the most expert ‘night-fighter’ in the Royal Navy’, while the Italians neither expected nor prepared for action after dark.5

Initial engagements between the two fleets had been largely inconclusive, the Regia Marina preferring a safe escape to open battle. However, there could be no escape when, assisted by long-range American built photo-reconnaissance aircraft, the British targeted the Italian naval base at Taranto on the evening of 11 November 1940, with the aim of reducing the Italian threat to essential convoys from Malta to troops in North Africa. The attack, conducted by Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers from HMS Illustrious, severely damaged two battleships and sank a third; arguably the psychological impact was as devastating as the material one on the Italian fleet. The RN now enjoyed superiority in capital ships; however, it remained outnumbered in lesser classes; ‘command of the sea’ was still far from secured.6

Ashore, Mussolini was attempting to assert Italian military might. Using the previously invaded and occupied Albania as a springboard, Italian forces invaded Greece on 28 October 1940. Unfortunately for the Italian dictator, his adventure rapidly and vividly highlighted the fallacy of his ambition to reclaim the glory of the Roman Empire; not until the intervention of German forces did Greece eventually fall. The invasion of Greece also provoked Britain to become involved, the government deciding to send an expeditionary force of Commonwealth troops from North Africa to the new front in Greece. This was a commitment the British could ill afford and was arguably intended as much to demonstrate, particularly to the still neutral USA, their resolve to continue to fight the Axis powers.7 The safe passage of men and material from Alexandria to Greece would place further responsibility on Cunningham’s fleet which, since Germany’s increased presence in-theatre, was also required to deal with the threat posed by the German bombers of Fliegerkorps X, recently arrived from Norway.

It was against this background that the characteristically cautious Supermarina would order Admiral Iachino to take his fleet to sea. The reasons for this decision were summarised by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy, Admiral Campioni as: “(i) the volume of shipping between Egypt and Greece; (ii) the need to allow the Navy to go into action; and (iii) the pressure from the Germans”.8 Of all these imperatives it is the latter which appeared decisive; as Iachino himself is quoted in the Battle Summary, the German instance on offensive cruises in the Eastern Mediterranean “was in the final analysis the determining cause of our operation at the end of March”.9

The Supermarina’s plan was to intercept British convoys to the north and south of the island of Crete, thus disrupting their route for resupply from North Africa to Greece. This would involve a formidable fleet of one battleship, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and 13 destroyers. The battleship Vittorio Veneto, in which Iachino flew his flag, was so new that it had avoided destruction at Taranto and boasted nine 15-in guns and a top speed of 30 knots. The only omission was of air cover and reconnaissance; this was promised by the Luftwaffe although in reality it failed to materialise properly. The fleet left Naples on 26 March, encouraged by German intelligence reports that the British could muster just one battleship and no operational aircraft carrier, since Illustrious had been bombed by German planes in Malta harbour. The reality was that the British had in fact three operational battleships and the aircraft carrier Formidable had arrived on station earlier in March.

According to the Battle Summary, it was at 1220 on 27 March that an RAF Sunderland Flying Boat reported a force of enemy cruisers, which subsequently persuaded Cunningham to proceed to sea himself.10 However, it is now known that ULTRA decryptions of German and Italian signals had already alerted the British to the Regia Marina’s intentions; the deployment of a reconnaissance plane in clear view of the Italians being intended to deflect any suspicions among the enemy that their signals were being read.11 Forewarned, Cunningham had subtly suspended all but one convoy sailing, allowing his forces to focus on searching for the enemy. Meanwhile, despite the loss of surprise Iachino was ordered to continue, although he was now to concentrate his forces south of Crete and sweep north past Cape Matapan. For the Supermarina the political imperative to engage the British outweighed any military considerations.12

The proceeding Battle Summary provides the most comprehensive account of ship and aircraft movements from 27 to 29 March and therefore does not require repeating here. However, given the complications and intricacies of the engagement an overview of the battle is nonetheless useful. The British fleet was divided into two main Forces. Cunningham led the battleship squadron, based at Alexandria and composed of the three battleships, a carrier and four destroyers. The second cruiser and destroyer force, based at Piraeus (Greece) was led by Vice Admiral Pridham-Wippell, referred to throughout the summary as Vice Admiral Light forces (VALF). Two additional forces constituted a further flotilla of destroyers and two submarines. The Regia Marina was similarly divided into two cruiser/destroyer forces and the Vittorio Veneto battle group.

The VALF set out first to hunt for evidence that the Regia Marina was at sea; by 27 March it became apparent that it was and that evening, unnoticed by the Italians and Germans, Cunningham’s fleet departed Alexandria to rendezvous with Pridham-Wippell. The first positive sighting of the enemy came around 0745/28 when Vice-Admiral Sansonetti’s cruiser force spotted the VALF and opened fire. Knowing himself to be outgunned Pridham-Wippell altered course in an attempt to draw his opponent towards the big guns of Cunningham’s battle fleet. After an hour of gunfire and chasing, Iachino, suspicious of the British retreat ordered his own ships to join the Vittorio Veneto battle fleet in a similar attempt to lure his enemy towards greater fire-power; he was still unaware of Cunningham’s ever closer presence at sea. By the time of the next encounter at 1050 VALF was trapped between Iachino’s and Sansonetti’s forces. Pridham-Wippell’s only option was again to beat a hasty retreat behind clouds of smoke. Relief finally arrived at 1127 in the shape of a group of Albacore torpedo bombers, originally launched from Formidable in an attempt to slow down the faster Italian ships. Without air cover of his own, Iachino had little choice other than to turn for home waters. Vittorio Veneto had not been hit on this occasion; however, a second strike from the carrier, conducted between 1510–1525 proved more effective, with one torpedo hitting the battleship, causing it to stop temporarily and take on water. The price of this strike was the loss of the attacking aircraft and its crew of three, including the squadron leader Lieutenant Commander J. Dalyell Stead RN; remarkably these were to be the only losses suffered by the British during the battle. However, it was not long before Iachino was underway again, albeit at a much slower rate of knots. Meanwhile land-based RAF bombers from Greece and Fleet Air Arm bombers from Crete also joined in the attacks, but to little effect. A third and final strike launched from Formidable met with more success, hitting the heavy cruiser Pola and causing her to stop dead in the water; the significance of this hit was to prove far greater than could initially have been imagined. An hour later, onboard Vittorio Veneto, Iachino, unaware of the relative proximity of British ships, finally made the fateful decision to send Vice Admiral Cattaneo with the cruisers Zara and Fiume and four destroyers to assess Pola’s situation and render assistance as necessary. Iachino’s motives for making this decision are considered in some detail in the Battle Summary, for it was to turn the events of the following night from tragedy to disaster for the Regia Marina.13

Meanwhile, disappointed to have missed the Italian flagship yet again, Cunningham had despatched eight destroyers, led by Captain P. J. Mack in Jervis, to continue the hunt. It had now become clear to the British Commander-in-Chief that if he was to engage the enemy with minimal risk to his own ships he would have to attack at night to avoid heavy aerial bombardment from land-based aircraft from Sicily. However, as the destroyers and VALF both continued to close in on the Vittorio Veneto, Cunningham’s battle fleet came across Cattaneo’s rescue party. With Pola fixed on Valiant’s radar, Cattaneo’s ships were sighted close by; the battleships opened fire at such a range, Cunningham remarked, that ‘‘even a gunnery officer cannot miss’’.14 That they were able to do so was in no small part due to the searchlights from the British ships that illuminated their targets. One of these searchlights, midship on Valiant, was manned by a young Prince Philip, whose dedication to his duty earned him a mention in despatches.15 Soon after, Zara, Fiume and the destroyer Alfieri were all fatally hit. Fiume sank shortly after while Zara, Alfieri and the destroyer Carducci were later finished off by RN and RAN destroyers from Cunningham’s escort group, the battleships having withdrawn to safety. Finally, having removed survivors, the stricken Pola was sunk by two torpedoes.

Meanwhile, Mack and Pridham-Wippell had continued their pursuit of Vittorio Veneto; however the chase was unintentionally lost when VALF responded to Cunningham’s signal for all forces not engaged in sinking the enemy to retire north eastwards to avoid attack from the Luftwaffe once daylight returned. The next day (30 March) the British Mediterranean Fleet returned safely to port having dealt a devastating blow to the Regia Marina’s surface fleet: for the loss of just one British aircraft and its three-man crew the Italians had lost three heavy cruisers, and two destroyers; their newest battleship had suffered significant damage while some 3,000 men had been killed, injured or captured. Nevertheless, in Cunningham’s final analysis, quoted in the Summary: ‘‘The results of the action cannot be viewed with entire satisfaction since the damaged Vittorio Veneto was allowed to escape’’.16

Certainly the war for control of the Mediterranean was far from won and the Royal Navy and its allies would continue to suffer devastating losses. But these losses would be at the hands of aircraft and submarines. Had the Regia Marina’s surface fleet survived, Allied casualties could only have been greater, not least during the subsequent evacuations from Crete and Greece. The failure of such operations could have proved fatal for the future of campaigns around the Mediterranean. By the time of the Battle of El Alamein in October – November 1942, the British Eighth Army was better armed and better supplied than Rommel’s Afrika Korps, despite a considerably longer supply route.17 It may be a truism but ultimately a war between nations can only be won on land. A war can, however, be lost at sea when the survival of peoples and their fighting forces is dependent upon safe and open access to the seas.

References

1. Hough, R. (1999), Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century, Constable, London, pp.120-121.

2. Greene J. & Massignani, A. (1998), The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943, Chatham Publishing, London, pp.143-144. Provides a detailed examination of Italian fuel supplies and their impact on Italian operations; ultimately it is impossible to know if the Regia Marina would have ventured out more if there had been a greater supply of fuel available.

3. See following Battle Summary, for ratio of RN/RAN to Regia Marina ships.

4. Pack, S. W. C. (1961), The Battle of Matapan, B.T. Batsford Ltd, London, p.7.

5. Goldrick, J. ‘Cunningham: Matapan, 1941.’ In Grove, E. (ed.) (1994) Great Battles of the Royal Navy as Commemorated in the Gunroom, Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, Bramley Books, London, p.198.

6. Brown, D. (2001), The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. Vol. II November 1940–December 1941, Frank Cass, London, p.xiv.

7. Hough, R. (1999), Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century, Constable, London, p.123.

8. Greene, J. & Massignani, A. (1998), The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943, Chatham Publishing, London, p.146.

9. See following Battle Summary. The Admiral is also quoted complaining at not been consulted with regard to the preceding Italo-German naval conference held at Merano, 13-14 February.

10. See following Battle Summary.

11. Greene, J. & Massignani, A. (1998), The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943, Chatham Publishing, London, pp.159-160. It was widely suspected by the Italians that the loss of the element of surprise was due to the presence of a traitor.

12. Scalzo, A. M. (2001): Battle of Cape Matapan: World War II Italian Naval Massacre, www.historynet.com./battle-of-cape-matapan-world-war-ii-italian-naval-massacre.htm.

13. See following Battle Summary.

14. Goldrick, J. ‘Cunningham: Matapan, 1941’ in Grove, E. (ed.) (1994) Great Battles of the Royal Navy as Commemorated in the Gunroom, Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, Bramley Books, London, p.203.

15. Brandreth, G. (2004), Philip and Elizabeth: Portrait of a Marriage, Century, London, p.152-153.

16. See following Battle Summary.

17. Macintyre, D. (1964), The Battle for the Mediterranean, B.T. Batsford Ltd, London, p.15.

Bibliography

Brandreth, G. (2004), Philip and Elizabeth: Portrait of a Marriage, Century, London.

Brown, D. (2001), The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. Vol. II November 1940–December 1941, Frank Cass, London.

Goldrick, J. ‘Cunningham: Matapan, 1941’ in Grove, E. (ed.) (1994), Great Battles of the Royal Navy as Commemorated in the Gunroom, Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, Bramley Books, London.

Greene, J. & Massignani, A. (1998), The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, Chatham Publishing, London.

Grove, E. (ed.) (1994), Great Battles of the Royal Navy as Commemorated in the Gunroom, Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth. Bramley Books, London.

Holloway A. (1993), From Dartmouth to War: A Midshipman’s Journal, Bucklands Publications Ltd, London.

Hough, R. (1999), Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century, Constable, London.

Macintyre, D. (1964), The Battle for the Mediterranean, B.T. Batsford Ltd, London.

Pack, S. W. C. (1961), The Battle of Matapan, B.T. Batsford Ltd, London.

Scalzo, A. M. (2001), Battle of Cape Matapan: World War II Italian Naval Massacre, www.historynet.com./battle-of-cape-matapan-world-war-ii-italian-naval-massacre.htm.