Читать книгу Disarmament and Decommissioning in the Nuclear Domain - Jean-Claude Amiard - Страница 30

The UN has entrusted the IAEA with the task of monitoring the application of the NPT, known as safeguards. States are divided into three groups, the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS), the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) and the three states (India, Israel and Pakistan) that have not signed the NPT Treaty.

There are four main types of guarantee agreements: General Guarantee Agreements (GGAs), Limited Guarantee Agreements, Voluntary Submission Agreements (VSAs) and emergency measures.

The Generalized Guarantee Agreements concern all the NNWS and the text is the result of compromises, in order to encourage the NNWS to adhere to this new control regime. In order to provide an appropriate and identical legal framework for all signatories, a model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/153 (corrected 1983), was developed in 1971 [AIE 75] by a committee of experts from IAEA Member States. This GGA is currently in progress with 174 NNWS. However, because of Iraq’s clandestine military nuclear program, in 1997 it was decided to reinforce the verification standard by an Additional Protocol (AP, i.e. INFCIRC/540) [IEA 97]. This AP – which remains optional – ensures faster access to suspect sites for IAEA inspectors and better control of nuclear materials. As of December 2015, the IAEA had concluded five VSAs and APs, 173 GGAs, 121 APs and three Elemental Agreements. As of December 21, 2018, 134 states have adhered to the AP standard and 14 are in the process of implementation [COL 18].

Limited Warranty Agreements are reserved for certain states (India, Israel, Pakistan), which have not signed the NPT. They have concluded more limited safeguards agreements with the Agency (of the INFCIRC/66 type), which only apply to nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material and facilities specified by the agreement (thus designated by the state).

Voluntary Submission Agreements (VSAs) are reserved for NWS that are not required to enter into a safeguards agreement with the Agency. All five states have done so. France, for example, has signed a safeguards agreement modeled on the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements concluded between the IAEA and the NNWS. Under this agreement (INFCIRC/290), signed on July 27, 1978, France subjects the nuclear material it designates in selected facilities, or parts of facilities, to IAEA safeguards. To take account of the safeguards exercised by the EURATOM, the safeguards agreement concluded by France is trilateral in nature, with EURATOM being a party to the agreement.

The emergency measures decreed by the IAEA concerned three points (declaring a new nuclear installation within 180 days; declaring international transfers and the production of uranium and thorium concentrates; effectively resorting to special inspections) [IRS 19a].

IAEA controls under the NPT Treaty are called “purpose” controls. Their objectives are to ensure that nuclear material in the agency’s custody is not used for non-peaceful purposes. Since the Additional Protocols’ entry into force, the agency’s controls are no longer limited to nuclear material, but extend to the provision of information concerning the nuclear industry.