Читать книгу Disarmament and Decommissioning in the Nuclear Domain - Jean-Claude Amiard - Страница 33

Some states voluntarily conceal a number of activities in the nuclear field that could lead to military applications. This was first observed in Iraq in 1981. This NPT signatory country was developing a nuclear program with a military vocation. It was demonstrated that a country bound to the IAEA by a comprehensive safeguard agreement could carry out activities contrary to the treaty without the IAEA’s knowledge.

By declaring its renunciation of weapons of mass destruction in December 2003, Libya revealed the existence of a nuclear program for military purposes, unsuspected by the IAEA. While taking advantage, officially, of its adherence to the NPT and of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, Libya had been able to import certain nuclear materials, carry out conversion activities, set up a centrifuge park intended to enrich uranium and obtain documentation relating to the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons [CHE 10]. This action was the work of A.Q. Khan, who sold the plans for a bomb and first-generation centrifuges to the Libyan President Gaddafi.

Finally, very serious doubts were expressed about Syria’s nuclear activities. The American intelligence services transmitted information to the IAEA, that the installation destroyed by the Israeli air force in September 2007 at the Dair Alzour site, was a North Korean-designed nuclear reactor in the process of being completed. Similar to the one at Yongbyon, it was intended for the manufacture of weapon-grade plutonium that could be used to make a nuclear weapon. In 2009, two years later, the IAEA had still not obtained elements that would allow the Syrian authorities to deny the military vocation of this site [CHE 10].