The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Volume 07
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Коллектив авторов. The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Volume 07
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL
THE LIFE OF GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1832)
THE CONSTITUTION
THE POWER OF THE PRINCE
THE EXECUTIVE
THE LEGISLATURE
PUBLIC OPINION
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
MEANING OF WAR
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART (1820-21)
THE CONTENT AND IDEAL OF ART
SYMBOLIC ART
CLASSICAL ART
ROMANTIC ART
THE PARTICULAR ARTS
ARCHITECTURE
SCULPTURE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMANTIC ARTS
PAINTING
MUSIC
POETRY
SUMMARY
BETTINA VON ARNIM
THE LIFE OF BETTINA VON ARNIM
GOETHE'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH A CHILD (1835)
KARL LEBRECHT IMMERMANN
IMMERMANN AND HIS DRAMA "MERLIN"
MERLIN: A MYTH
IMMERMANN'S "MÜNCHHAUSEN"
THE OBERHOF (1839) TRANSLATED BY PAUL BERNARD THOMAS
CHAPTER I
CHAPTER II
CHAPTER III
CHAPTER IV
CHAPTER V
CHAPTER VI
CHAPTER VII
CHAPTER VIII
CHAPTER IX
CHAPTER X
CHAPTER XI
CHAPTER XII
KARL FERDINAND GUTZKOW
GUTZKOW AND YOUNG GERMANY
KARL FERDINAND GUTZKOW
SWORD AND QUEUE. DRAMATIS PERSONAE
SWORD AND QUEUE
ACT I
SCENE I
SCENE II
SCENE III
SCENE IV
SCENE V
SCENE VI
SCENE VII
ACT II
SCENE I
SCENE II
SCENE III
SCENE IV
SCENE V
SCENE VI
SCENE VII
SCENE VIII
SCENE IX
ACT III
SCENE I
SCENE II
SCENE III
SCENE IV
SCENE V
SCENE VI
SCENE VII
ACT IV
SCENE I
SCENE II
SCENE III
SCENE IV
SCENE V
SCENE VI
ACT V
SCENE I
SCENE II
SCENE III
SCENE IV
SCENE V
GERMAN LYRIC POETRY FROM 1830 to 1848
ANASTASIUS GRÜN
A SALON SCENE14 (1831)
NIKOLAUS LENAU
PRAYER15 (1832)
SEDGE SONGS16 (1832)
SONGS BY THE LAKE17 (1832)
THE POSTILION18 (1833)
TO THE BELOVED FROM AFAR19 (1838)
THE THREE GIPSIES20
MY HEART21 (1844)
EDUARD MÖRIKE
AN ERROR CHANCED22 (1824)
A SONG FOR TWO IN THE NIGHT23 (1825)
EARLY AWAY24 (1828)
THE FORSAKEN MAIDEN25 (1829)
WEYLA'S SONG26 (1831)
SECLUSION27 (1832)
THE SOLDIER'S BETROTHED28 (1837)
THE OLD WEATHERCOCK: AN IDYLL29 (1840, 1852)
THINK OF IT, MY SOUL!30 (1852)
ERINNA TO SAPPHO31 (1863)
MOZART'S JOURNEY FROM VIENNA TO PRAGUE (about 1850)
ANNETTE ELIZABETH VON DROSTE-HÜLSHOFF
PENTECOST34 (1839)
THE HOUSE IN THE HEATH35 (1841)
THE BOY ON THE MOOR36 (1841)
ON THE TOWER37 (1842)
THE DESOLATE HOUSE38 (1842)
THE JEW'S BEECH-TREE (1841)
FERDINAND FREILIGRATH
THE DURATION OF LOVE39 (1831)
THE EMIGRANTS40 (1832)
THE LION'S RIDE 41 (1834)
THE SPECTRE-CARAVAN42 (1835)
HAD I AT MECCA'S GATE BEEN NOURISHED43 (1836)
WILD FLOWERS44 (1840)
THE DEAD TO THE LIVING45 (July, 1848)
HURRAH, GERMANIA!46 (July 25, 1870)
THE TRUMPET OF GRAVELOTTE47 (Aug. 16, 1870)
MORITZ GRAF VON STRACHWITZ
DOUGLAS OF THE BLEEDING HEART48 (1842)
GEORG HERWEGH
THE STIRRUP-CUP49 (1840)
EMANUEL GEIBEL
THE WATCHMAN'S SONG50 (1840)
THE CALL OF THE ROAD51 (1841)
AUTUMN DAYS52 (1845)
THE DEATH OF TIBERIUS53 (1856?)
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Among students of philosophy the mention of Hegel's name arouses at once a definite emotion. Few thinkers indeed have ever so completely fascinated the minds of their sympathetic readers, or have so violently repulsed their unwilling listeners, as Hegel has. To his followers Hegel is the true prophet of the only true philosophic creed, to his opponents, he has, in Professor James's words, "like Byron's corsair, left a name 'to other times, linked with one virtue and a thousand crimes.'"
The feelings of attraction to Hegel or repulsion from him do not emanate from his personality. Unlike Spinoza's, his life offers nothing to stir the imagination. Briefly, some of his biographical data are as follows: He was born at Stuttgart, the capital of Würtemberg, August 27, 1770. His father was a government official, and the family belonged to the upper middle class. Hegel received his early education at the Latin School and the Gymnasium of his native town. At both these institutions, as well as at the University of Tübingen which he entered in 1788 to study theology, he distinguished himself as an eminently industrious, but not as a rarely gifted student. The certificate which he received upon leaving the University in 1793 speaks of his good character, his meritorious acquaintance with theology and languages, and his meagre knowledge of philosophy. This does not quite represent his equipment, however, for his private reading and studies carried him far beyond the limits of the regular curriculum. After leaving the University he spent seven years as family tutor in Switzerland and in Frankfurt-on-the-Main. Soon after, in 1801, we find him as Privat-Docent; then, in 1805, as professor at the University of Jena. His academic activities were interrupted by the battle of Jena. For the next two years we meet him as an editor of a political journal at Bamberg, and from 1808 to 1816 as rector of the Gymnasium at Nuremberg. He was then called to a professorship of philosophy at Heidelberg. In 1818 he was called to Berlin to fill the vacancy left by the death of Fichte. From this time on until his death in 1831, he was the recognized dictator of one of the most powerful philosophic schools in the history of thought.
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The connection of events above indicated involves also the fact that, in history, an additional result is commonly produced by human actions beyond what they aim at and obtain what they immediately recognize and desire. They gratify their own interest; but something further is thereby accomplished, latent in the actions in question, though not present to their consciousness and not included in their design. An analogous example is offered in the case of a man who, from a feeling of revenge—perhaps not an unjust one, but produced by injury on the other's part—burns that other man's house. A connection is immediately established between the deed itself, taken abstractly, and a train of circumstances not directly included in it. In itself it consisted in merely bringing a small flame into contact with a small portion of a beam. Events not involved in that simple act follow of themselves. The part of the beam which was set afire is connected with its remote portions, the beam itself is united with the woodwork of the house generally, and this with other houses, so that a wide conflagration ensues which destroys the goods and chattels of many other persons besides those belonging to the person against whom the act of revenge was first directed, perhaps even costs not a few men their lives. This lay neither in the deed intrinsically nor in the design of the man who committed it. But the action has a further general bearing. In the design of the doer it was only revenge executed against an individual in the destruction of his property, but it is, moreover, a crime, and that involves punishment also. This may not have been present to the mind of the perpetrator, still less in his intention; but his deed itself, the general principles it calls into play, its substantial content, entail it. By this example I wish only to impress on you the consideration that, in a simple act, something further may be implicated than lies in the intention and consciousness of the agent. The example before us involves, however, the additional consideration that the substance of the act, consequently, we may say, the act itself, recoils upon the perpetrator—reacts upon him with destructive tendency. This union of the two extremes—the embodiment of a general idea in the form of direct reality and the elevation of a speciality into connection with universal truth—is brought to pass, at first sight, under the conditions of an utter diversity of nature between the two and an indifference of the one extreme toward the other. The aims which the agents set before them are limited and special; but it must be remarked that the agents themselves are intelligent thinking beings. The purport of their desires is interwoven with general, essential considerations of justice, good, duty, etc.; for mere desire—volition in its rough and savage forms—falls not within the scene and sphere of universal history. Those general considerations, which form at the same time a norm for directing aims and actions, have a determinate purport; for such an abstraction as "good for its own sake," has no place in living reality. If men are to act they must not only intend the Good, but must have decided for themselves whether this or that particular thing is a good. What special course of action, however, is good or not, is determined, as regards the ordinary contingencies of private life, by the laws and customs of a State; and here no great difficulty is presented. Each individual has his position; he knows, on the whole, what a just, honorable course of conduct is. As to ordinary, private relations, the assertion that it is difficult to choose the right and good—the regarding it as the mark of an exalted morality to find difficulties and raise scruples on that score—may be set down to an evil or perverse will, which seeks to evade duties not in themselves of a perplexing nature, or, at any rate, to an idly reflective habit of mind—where a feeble will affords no sufficient exercise to the faculties—leaving them therefore to find occupation within themselves and to expand themselves on moral self-adulation.
It is quite otherwise with the comprehensive relations with which history has to do. In this sphere are presented those momentous collisions between existing, acknowledged duties, laws, and rights, and those contingencies which are adverse to this fixed system, which assail and even destroy its foundations and existence, and whose tenor may nevertheless seem good—on the large scale, advantageous—yes, even indispensable and necessary. These contingencies realize themselves in history; they involve a general principle of a different order from that on which depends the permanence of a people or a State. This principle is an essential phase in the development of the creating Idea, of Truth striving and urging toward (consciousness of) itself. Historical men—world-famous individuals—are those in whose aims such a general principle lies.
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