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This book introduces and explains some central issues in the philosophy of psychology. It is important to note that it is not a neutral introduction to the topic. It is an opinionated introduction to the philosophy of psychology in which we defend a particular view of human cognition and agency. The view that we defend is that human cognition and agency are imperfect, in the sense that humans fail to meet some ideal standards of cognition and agency, such as the ideal of rationality, self-knowledge, and free and responsible agency.

Imagine that Lucy wants to pass her ballet exam tomorrow and she knows that she needs to rehearse the opening routine to make sure she remembers all the steps. Passing the exam is important to her, and she would be very disappointed if she failed. Yet she sits on the sofa to watch a movie instead of practising her routine. Given Lucy’s goal (passing the ballet exam tomorrow), her behaviour (watching a movie instead of practising) may be considered irrational since she does not take the appropriate steps to fulfil her goal. Chapter 1 discusses various notions of rationality and some ways in which human agents might fall short of the standards of rationality.

Now imagine that Giorgio describes himself as an exceptionally generous child, always willing to support his friends. However, that is not how his friends describe him. On a number of occasions, they have observed that Giorgio has put his own needs before theirs and has refrained from sharing snacks or helping them with their homework. They think of him as mean and selfish. If Giorgio’s friends are right, then we can say that Giorgio lacks self-knowledge. In other words, he does not have an accurate representation of himself. In particular, he attributes to himself qualities (such as generosity) that he does not have. Chapter 2 discusses several ways in which self-knowledge can fail.

Finally, imagine that Elsa, who is a white US citizen, thinks of herself as a very egalitarian person who respects everybody and considers them all equal, independently of ethnic origin or skin colour. However, when she goes to work, she avoids sitting next to Asian passengers on the bus and, when she talks to her colleagues at work, she tends to ignore her Nigerian secretary. Elsa does not have explicit beliefs that are prejudiced against people who look different from her but behaves in ways that are inconsistent with her explicit beliefs and values. She is vulnerable to implicit biases for which she may or may not be responsible. Chapter 3 deals with the duality of states and attitudes and Chapter 6 with the question whether people are responsible for their implicit biases.

You may have experienced similar failures of rationality and self-knowledge and have encountered biases in yourselves and others – you can come up with your own examples of how human agents are imperfect. Indeed, the view that human cognition and agency are imperfect is not surprising. Not many philosophers are convinced that humans are perfect agents who are ideally rational, have complete self-knowledge, and behave in unbiased ways. However, this book does not just claim that human cognition and agency are limited; on the basis of relevant psychological studies, it also makes some potentially surprising and controversial claims about the extent to which and the reasons why human cognition and agency are limited.

In this context, ‘imperfect’ does not mean ‘stupid’ or ‘dumb’. It means that performance falls short of the ideal standards that apply to it. This book does not advocate an overly pessimistic conception of human cognition and agency. For instance, we do not endorse what John Kihlstrom (2004) calls the ‘People are Stupid’ school of psychology, which says that humans are fundamentally irrational, that their behaviour is automatic and inflexible, and that they are ignorant of what they are doing. Rather, we advocate a realistic conception that is informed by psychological findings and is defended by philosophical arguments. We resist two extreme views of human cognition and agency. On the one hand, we resist an overly optimistic view according to which human cognition and agency are perfect (or near-perfect) with respect to ideal standards such as rationality, self-knowledge, and free and responsible agency. On the other hand, we resist an overly pessimistic view according to which human cognition and agency are hopeless with respect to these ideal standards. Our cognition and agency are certainly not perfect. However, by learning about the nature of, extent of, and reasons for their limitations, human agents can improve their performance. That is one of the reasons why philosophy of psychology is important. It does not simply provide information about what human agents can or cannot do. It offers human agents the resources to enhance their performance (in reasoning, decision-making, problem-solving, etc.) so that they can get closer to the ideal standards.

There is another sense of ‘imperfection’ that is addressed in this book: human cognition and agency can be ‘imperfect’ in the sense that they are vulnerable to disorders of the mind (broadly construed, including psychiatric disorders, behavioural anomalies caused by brain damage, developmental disorders, etc.). Disorders of the mind are usually identified by behaviours that appear unusual. While it is common to be weak-willed like Lucy, blind to one’s own character flaws like Giorgio, or unconsciously biased like Elsa, endorsing wildly implausible beliefs or seeing things that other people cannot see is less common and might lead to the person being diagnosed with a mental disorder. For instance, the mathematician John Nash experienced hallucinations and delusions, coming to believe that aliens were publishing messages in newspapers (which was described in the biographical movie A Beautiful Mind). This book will discuss ‘abnormalities’ of the mind, including delusion and confabulation (in Chapter 7) and autism and psychopathy (in Chapter 8). Thinking about unusual cognitions and behaviours helps us understand how the mind works and how vulnerability to disorders of the mind relates to the failure to meet ideal standards.

Here are the central questions discussed in the following chapters:

 Rationality (Chapter 1): Are we rational or irrational? How good are we at reasoning in accordance with the rules of logic and mathematics? How do we reason or make judgments? Do we rely on unreliable heuristics or shortcuts?

 Self-Knowledge (Chapter 2): How well do we know our own mind? How do we know our mental states? Is the process of knowing our own mental states different in kind from the process of knowing somebody else’s mental states?

 Duality (Chapter 3): Is human reasoning determined by the interaction between two distinct kinds of processes? If so, how are these processes different and how do they interact? Why are there only two kinds of processes, rather than three or four?

 Moral Judgment (Chapter 4): Are moral judgments based on reasoning or emotion? Or perhaps both? How do moral reasoning and moral emotion interact with one another to produce moral judgments?

 Moral Motivation and Behaviour (Chapter 5): Can we be genuinely altruistic? Or are we inevitably selfish? Does empathy cause genuinely altruistic behaviour? Does empathy-induced behaviour have morally desirable consequences?

 Free Will and Responsibility (Chapter 6): Are we free and responsible agents? Is the idea of free will compatible with the empirical findings in psychology and neuroscience? Are we responsible for our implicit biases?

 Delusion and Confabulation (Chapter 7): How are clinical delusions and confabulations different from everyday irrational beliefs? Are delusions more irrational than everyday irrational beliefs? Is the irrationality of delusions different in kind from the irrationality of everyday beliefs?

 Autism and Psychopathy (Chapter 8): What does autism tell us about mind-reading capacity and its role in social and communicative activities? What does psychopathy tell us about empathy and its role in moral behaviour?