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This chapter will give a brief overview of important theories and key literature related to this book. Existing examinations and theories about concepts of lobbying and lobbying registration range from a variety of approaches: They include Rinus van Schendelen’s perception of a unique ‘Brussels method’ of interest insourcing; the assumption of Hix, Høyland, and Buholzer that interest procurement in the EU has to respect a specific multilevel order; Sebaldt’s concept of dominating issue networks in the United States; and the theory of Kraft that lobbyists overseas have nearly gained a shared decision-making competence. Especially with regard to the applicability of the US register to the TR and a comparison of both in particular, scientific theories remain rather rare. While some scholars have contrasted lobbying regulation in the EU with the United States,[3] comparisons often remain on a rather general and superficial level and do not examine both the registration systems in detail. The current state of information shows that little literature has focused on the TR. Few authors have dedicated research to the EU’s latest register; the latter is rather addressed in scientific reports and short essays, if at all. Especially in terms of the legal basis of this register, the first official scientific study was launched in June 2013. Thus, scientific expertise here has limited validity.

A key report among the literature analyzed for this book is the Annual Report of 2012 of the JTRS, since the latter is not only the TR’s official operator but furthermore a key institution in the context of this work. Furthermore, critical reports such as “Dodgy Data. Time to fix the EU’s Transparency Register” (2012) and “Rescue the Register! How to make EU lobby transparency credible and reliable” (2013) are considered. Both have been published by a representative Brussels-based lobby critical organization, namely the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU). The JTRS report mainly concentrates on the effect of the register after its first year of running in a self-reflective and self-critical way, and gives an overview on aspects to be possibly included into the register’s review process. In contrast, both reports of ALTER-EU mainly focus on the deficits of the register. Both reports are rather one sided.[4] However, the thesis at hand will consider both views equally.

Key literature providing a foundation for this study are the book by Eising and Kohler-Koch (2005), defining approaches and tactics of interest representatives based on the European multilevel system of governance, as well as the findings of Eising and Lehringer (2010) with a more distinct focus on interest groups. The latter are complemented by a wide-ranging analysis of EU lobbying, published by Michalowitz in 2007. Also Coen and Richardson (2011) elicit the new volume of interest representation and newly developed tactics in the EU, whereas Hix and Høyland (2011) provide a comprehensive overview of the system of the EU. Due to its focus on the EU’s latest register version, a recent study of Gentili (2013) is one of the most current resources and an inspiring work on which this research is developed. Likewise, the research by Kraft (2006), who compares previous lobbying regulation in the EU to similar structures in the United States, is an essential input. The work of Berry (1997) provides a detailed overview of interest groups on the other side of the Atlantic, which is complemented by the publication of Rosenthal (1993), who broadly defines characteristics of US lobbyists and their profession. Finally, Holman (2008, 2009) and Holman and Luneburg (2012) critically approach both concepts of disclosure and previous reforms.