Читать книгу Emergency Incident Management Systems - Mark Warnick S., Louis N. Molino Sr - Страница 53

The Oklahoma City Fire Department was one of the key players in preparedness prior to the bombing. They knew about, trained on, and used the ICS system, and they encouraged others within their city to do the same. A year prior to the bombing, senior staff and senior management from Oklahoma City government attended a weeklong (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] sponsored) training course on disaster management. This course helped to forge strong interpersonal relationships between city officials and the tabletop exercise that was the culmination of the course. This training helped to open the eyes of many city officials. Long before the bomb was ever detonated, the city determined that everyone in city government would need to be on the same page, and they would need to integrate resources in a disaster (Manzi et al. 2002). This led to training and exercises that helped pave the way for a more unified response.

At the very second that the explosion occurred, many of the senior staff for the Oklahoma City Fire Department were having a meeting. After hearing the explosion and seeing the debris cloud, Oklahoma City Fire Station No. 1 self‐deployed to the incident. Their response was initiated before the Oklahoma City Communications Center dispatched any units. While self‐deploying is typically frowned upon, this was not the only fire station that self‐deployed after hearing the explosion. Considering that Station No. 1 was only five blocks away from the Murrah Building, it was surmised that they probably arrived on scene in the first two minutes (ODCEM, n.d.).

The first arriving fire officer, a District Fire Chief, implemented the ICS system as soon as he arrived on scene. He immediately ordered that two triage areas be set up in strategic yet safe areas so that the influx of patients could be evaluated and prioritized for transport based on the severity of their injuries. Shortly after setting up ICS and triage areas, the Oklahoma City Fire Chief (the District Fire Chief's superior) arrived at the incident only moments later.

Upon arriving on scene, the Oklahoma City Fire Chief left his subordinate the District Chief in Command as the Incident Commander (IC). The Fire Chief supported the District Chief by performing intelligence gathering and reporting back to the District Chief. After observing the Murrah Building from all sides, the Oklahoma City Fire Chief made the suggestion to the Incident Commander (IC) that a Unified Command ([UC], discussed in detail in Chapter 7) be initiated. The initiation of a Unified Command (UC) would allow all responding agencies to provide direct input on the resources they possessed, the capabilities of their agency and personnel, other resources that were available, and any agency that was part of a Unified Command (UC) would have a seat at the proverbial table. It would also help to somewhat overcome communications barrier (Final Report, 1996).

After completing a quick evaluation of the damage to the area, the needs for initial response were reported to the Incident Commander (IC), and the Oklahoma City Fire Chief determined that all off‐duty personnel should be called in and that reserve apparatus should be pressed into service. He made that recommendation to the Incident Commander (IC), the Deputy Fire Chief. Additionally, he suggested organizing mutual aid resources from nearby cities to help backfill stations. In doing so, daily emergency calls could still be answered in a timely manner while the Oklahoma City Fire Department was still dealing with the major disaster at‐hand (Final Report, 1996).

Four minutes into the incident, the Incident Commander (IC) requested that the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) be activated. This was important to the overall mission because it gave the Incident Commander (IC) one point of contact that could find and request additional resources. Once established, and at the Incident Commanders (IC's) request, they requested that the National Guard be requested and activated, that resources should be requested from Tinker Air Force Base, and that the American Red Cross and other voluntary organizations should be activated. There was also a request made to contact FEMA for support and to activate several Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams to assist with the response. Other requests were made, but these were the first round of requests, and they were made within minutes of arriving on scene (ODCEM, n.d.).

Like the self‐deployed response by the Oklahoma City Fire Department, many ambulance crews from the Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA) self‐deployed to the bombing incident. While they did not know it at the time, the explosion knocked out all incoming lines to the EMSA switchboard, and all emergency lines except for 911 were rendered useless by the explosion. Within minutes, cell phones were unable to make connections. The high call volume jammed the networks just from the sheer number of calls being placed (ODCEM, n.d.).

Prior to the incident, EMSA had integrated and worked with other agencies in the preparedness phase, so they were already aware of what their roles and responsibilities were. The first EMSA personnel that arrived began treating the walking wounded after arriving on scene. They set up at the designated triage areas and began sorting patients according to the seriousness of their injuries. Less than 15 minutes into the incident, they declared a Level Three mass casualty incident and called for EMS resources from mutual aid agencies from across the state (Nordberg, 2010).

EMSA also called for buses to transport those that were considered walking wounded, meaning they had nonlife‐threatening wounds (Nordberg, 2010). Those that suffered more critical injuries would be transported by ambulance. Within the first hour after the incident, over 100 people were transported to one of 12 local hospitals in the area. Prior to sending patients to any hospital (or clinic), the vast majority of EMS crews checked with hospitals to identify that they were available and had the resources to treat the patient being transported. This allowed a more equal distribution of patients and it helped to prevent overwhelming only one or two hospitals. In total, over 670 patients were seen on the first day of the incident (Nordberg, 2010).

A few of the local hospitals were having communications issues in the first 20–30 minutes. The radio frequency used for disasters was turned off, or down, in most of these cases. This is a common practice when there is no disaster because interference, radio waves from distant areas bouncing off the earth's atmosphere (skip), and other similar issues can cause radios to crackle and make a lot of noise. Often, if that frequency or radio is not being used, the radio will be turned down to avoid this annoying noise, and then it is forgotten about. To help mitigate this issue of no disaster communications with hospitals, law enforcement officers were initially sent to the hospitals to advise them to turn the frequency on, or up, whatever the case might be. Additionally, these officers were ready to provide the needed communications by relaying information if needed (Nordberg, 2010).

Less than 10 minutes after the explosion took place, the American Red Cross arrived on scene. Not long thereafter, the Salvation Army arrived on scene to assist as well. The quick response of these two organizations suggest that they were in the process of self‐deploying when the official request was sent. Both organizations were utilized immediately (ODCEM, n.d.).

While still within the first hour of the incident, numerous response agencies and volunteers arrived. In order to better organize them while keeping resources nearby, at least three staging areas were created. Individuals, equipment, and goods were kept separate in an effort to organize these resources while reducing confusion.

Operational response agencies and personnel were placed in the Personnel Staging Area. This was located just outside of the disaster zone. These were the people that would go into the active disaster zone and crawl through the rubble or treat patients as needed. They were staged close enough that they could quickly deploy (within minutes), but far enough away that they could not interfere with ongoing operations (ODCEM, n.d.).

The resources that arrived at the Personnel Staging area included local, state, and federal law enforcement officers, fire, and rescue crews, EMS personnel, the first of many federal government resources from Tinker Air Force Base, the first contingency of the Oklahoma National Guard, and other resources too numerous to list. They continued to arrive throughout the day, and staged resources were put into service as they were needed (ODCEM, n.d.).

An additional staging area was set up to receive donations that began coming in within the first hour. These donations included just about everything you can imagine (ODCEM, n.d.). From tools, to toilet paper, to work clothes, the community began to bring what they thought might help. At this staging area, the donated items were sorted and categorized. This allowed agencies to ask if there was the availability of a specific item, and this donation staging area could identify and provide the item if it was available. This would later be moved and turn into a donation's management warehouse.

Not long after the explosion, at least three different heavy equipment companies arrived at the Incident Command Post (ICP) offering all of their resources (ODCEM, n.d.). The Incident Commander (IC) tasked one company with setting up a staging area for heavy equipment and shoring materials, and then organizing the construction/demolition staging area. A liaison was placed in this staging area to ensure effective communication. These companies cooperated and collaborated together and with public safety. In one instance, a police escort was provided to one company that was bringing an extremely large crane from 15 miles north of the bombing site. This escort was given to provide a quicker response (Final Report, 1996). The After‐Action Report (AAR) identified that there were some issues with staging, but Incident Command knew where their resources were and could check availability of a resources within seconds (ODCEM, n.d.).

The Oklahoma City Fire Department had already set up a Command Post on a street corner, and they had initiated ICS from the beginning of the incident. The fire department had put the key people in place to fill General Staff, and Command Staff positions. Because of the size of the incident, there were not enough law enforcement officers on scene to control the multitude of untrained people that came to help. An area of 48‐blocks was affected, and it was determined that it would be a monumental task to try to keep people out. When it was thought that a secondary explosive device was found (90 minutes into the response), the entire 48‐block area was evacuated (ODCEM, n.d.).

This provided an opportunity to regroup and move the initial Incident Command Post (ICP) to a safer location two blocks away. The new location was a small parking lot. Because it was still early in the incident, the only Mobile Command Centers that were present at that time were the Oklahoma City Fire and separately Oklahoma City Police command centers (Final Report, 1996).

As part of this regrouping and because of an earlier request for more law enforcement and the Oklahoma State National Guard, it was determined that enough resources were on hand to secure entry to the main site. This was based on the number of military personnel, National Guard personnel, and law enforcement that were staged, or who were already working top secure part of the perimeter. When it was determined that there was not a secondary device, rescuers were let back into the area, but access was restricted, and each individual trying to enter the area had to provide security personnel a valid reason of why they should be let in the area. This action substantially increased accountability throughout the disaster area (ODCEM, n.d.).

By 10:55 a.m., less than two hours after the explosion, the Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams from Phoenix Arizona and Sacramento California were activated by FEMA (ODCEM, n.d.). Nine additional Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams were alerted that they may be soon deployed to the incident. A total of teams would eventually assist in the response and recovery. The Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams that worked at the Oklahoma City bombing site included teams from New York City, NY, Montgomery County, MD, Virginia Beach, VA, Los Angeles, CA, Fairfax County, VA, Dade County, FL, Puget Sound, WA, Menlo Park, CA, and Orange County, CA (Oklahoma City National Memorial and Museum, n.d.).

Additionally, FEMA's Regional Director and his staff were deployed from Denton, TX, to Oklahoma City at approximately 11:00 a.m., so they could support what would be an ongoing operation. FEMA arrived in Oklahoma City within four hours of the bombing, and they offered the full cooperation of the federal government. This is important to note because they did not try to take over the response, they were there to support it (ODCEM, n.d.).

Around 11:00, the National Weather Service notified the Incident Command Post (ICP) that harsh weather was moving into the area. It was initially thought that a tent could be erected by the National Guard so that workers could get under cover in inclement weather; however, the lot in which the Incident Command Post (ICP) was located did not have sufficient room for it. This was due to the lot had begun to fill with other mobile command centers, and it became a problem that needed to be solved. The additional command centers that arrived were manned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), with each taking a fair amount of space (ODCEM, n.d.).

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company was also represented at this location. They set up a truck, so they could loan cell phones to all legitimate first responder's. This integration of a nongovernmental agency was voluntary. The company wanted to ensure that all personnel that responded to this disaster had working and valid communications. Any time these phones were used, they would take priority over all calls, including that of private citizens. While it took a few hours to erect, the phone company also erected a mobile cell tower to facilitate better communications (ODCEM, n.d.).

Due to the room constraints of this parking lot, it was decided to move the Incident Command Post (ICP) to the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (headquarters) parking lot. The use of this parking lot was personally offered to the Incident Commander (IC) by the CEO of Southwestern Bell. The Southwestern Bell parking lot presented substantially more accommodations than the previous area. It provided a much larger parking area and a sheltered parking garage where volunteer organizations and private businesses could distribute food, and it provided a place that would protect and store the multitude of donations that were already arriving. The adjacent office building also met the sanitary needs of the emergency and relief personnel (ODCEM, n.d.).

Shortly after changing Incident Command Post positions, additional mobile command units began arriving. Additional mobile command units that arrived included two vehicles from the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety and one command center from the US Marshals Service (ODCEM, n.d.). This Command Post provided an area where all agencies meet and\or liaison with other agencies in an effort to have a more integrated response. If in the event one agency needed to coordinate with another, they only had to walk a short distance to their command center.

After the move to the new location, the Oklahoma National Guard and the Oklahoma City Public Works worked together to set up the National Guard's tent. The tent was used as an Incident Command Post for the National Guard operations. This tent was used for the forward operations for the National Guard until the end of the incident (ODCEM, n.d.).

Shortly after moving to the Southwestern Bell parking lot, the Fire Chief of the Oklahoma City Fire Department assumed command of the incident. Soon thereafter, the FBI and the new Incident Commander ([IC] the Fire Chief) met. Because this incident was a federal building, as well as other reasons, it was determined that the FBI would be the lead investigative agency. The FBI discussed the need for securing the scene to preserve evidence with the Incident Commander (IC). It was determined that a chain link fence was needed to keep unauthorized personnel out of the area. This job was tasked to the Oklahoma City Street Department, who would erect the barrier fence around the scene and the Command Post. While the street department was its own agency, it would work under the direction of the FBI. It was also determined that traffic would be stopped at certain areas, so the Oklahoma City Traffic Management Department was given this task, also under the direction of the FBI, to blockade certain streets (Final Report, 1996).

Everything that has been described about this incident to this point occurred in the first two hours of the incident. While the remainder of the Oklahoma City Bombing incident could be reviewed in similar detail, we will only discuss key points about the remainder of the incident from the details found in the Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management (ODCEM) After Action Report, ([AAR] n.d.) and interviews provided by the Fire Chief, Gary Marrs (Fire Engineering, 1995). Some key cooperation and collaborations that occurred after the first two to three hours included the following:

Day 1

 With the help of the City of Oklahoma elected officials, a vacant building was used to house the investigative arm of the incident, including the FBI, ATF, and the DEA.

 Ongoing liaison relationships were sustained with the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, the National Guard, and the American Red Cross, in an effort to facilitate a more unified effort.

 The Oklahoma Medical Examiner's office and temporary morgue were set up in a nearby Methodist Church.

 Public events personnel set up facilities for housing and feeding rescue workers.

 A roped‐off media area was set up to accommodate the influx of local, national, and international media. The media was updated regularly on the first day. After the first day, there were assigned times for press conferences throughout the duration of the incident.

 Public events personnel set up accommodations for press briefings.

 The Oklahoma Restaurant Association established a 24‐hour food service operation to feed first responders at the Myriad Convention Center.

 Public works provided on‐site sanitary facilities, lighting for nighttime work, and trash cans, plus developed a trash schedule for the duration of the incident.

 The FBI developed and issued a photo ID so that individuals not involved in the incident could be restricted from entering.

 Donation centers were set up to receive donated food, clothing, and other items. Eventually, three donation centers would be opened.

 Street cleaning crews began cleaning streets outside of the perimeter, so traffic could resume in the nearby area.

 A Forward Command Post for the Operations Section of search and rescue was set up in the loading dock of the Murrah Building.

 FEMA Incident Support Team arrived early in the afternoon of the first day and supported the Forward Command Post with electrical power, telephones, copiers, tables, chairs, and other necessary items.

 A Family Assistance Center was set up for immediate family members. Family received two briefings per day from the State Medical Examiner's Office. Along with being updated about those deceased or feared dead, there was counseling, and comfort provided. Organizations included in providing comfort were the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Oklahoma Funeral Directors Association, clergy members, and mental health professionals.

 Security for the Family Assistance Center was provided by the Oklahoma County Sheriff's Office and the Oklahoma National Guard.

 The American Red Cross set up temporary shelters to provide for the needs of those who had been displaced by the explosion.

 A nonprofit organization based in Oklahoma, Feed the Children, provided food and disaster supplies for first responders. They also set up in the disaster area to distribute food and equipment to first responders. Feed the Children managed volunteers, and if they found a need not being filled, they would contact corporate donors to facilitate what was needed.

 The Myriad Convention Center became a central part of ensuring first responder needs were met. The convention center was set up on the first day, and services expanded over the next few days. Services provided to first responders included donated food, donated clothing, medicines, personal care items, optometry services, chiropractic services, podiatry care, massage therapy, and more.

 Perimeter security was initially provided by Oklahoma City Police and the Oklahoma County Sheriff's Office. A planning meeting for perimeter security was held with Oklahoma City Police, Oklahoma County Sheriff's Office, Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, Oklahoma Military Department, and Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management to divide up perimeter security obligations. A permanent perimeter was decided, and a specific number of personnel to provide this security (from each agency) were assigned.

 An inner perimeter (for areas that may contain evidence) was secured by FBI personnel until the buildings inside the (overall) perimeter were cleared of evidence.

Subsequent Days

 At the Myriad Convention Center, special programs were set up for Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Teams. This included free calls home from AT&T, free mail and parcel delivery from UPS, and other similar amenities. These amenities were managed, and it was decided who should be allowed to use these services under the ICS system.

 A military explosive ordinance disposal unit was requested. The unit does a sweep of the Murrah Building and finds no additional explosives.

 A Disaster Field Office (DFO) was established. In the Disaster Field Office (DFO), the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), the State Coordinating Officer, and emergency response teams worked together to meet the needs of the response and recovery.

 A Multi‐Agency Coordination Center (MACC) comprised of federal and state representatives (who had the authority to commit resources) was created at the Myriad Convention Center. It is staffed by the Oklahoma County Emergency Management Agency, Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, FEMA advisors and specialists, the National Weather Service, the American Red Cross, and technical advisors from the US Forestry Service.

 A Joint Information Center (JIC) was set up at the Myriad Convention Center to provide for the organized release of any public information. All information would be vetted and cleared for release by all major agencies involved.

 Mental health services and Critical Incident Stress Debriefings (CISDs) were offered to first responders. These services were provided by the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services, the FBI, the American Red Cross, as well as volunteer private specialists. Additionally, crisis hotlines.

 A Congressional Liaison Office is established at the Disaster Field Office (DFO) to coordinate inquiries from US Senators and Representatives. By assigning this task to an individual, or individuals, it reduces interruptions that might slow operations.

 Crisis lines were created, and operated 24‐7, to meet the needs of the general public.

 The Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) activates numerous Emergency Support Function (ESF) from the federal government to assist with the incident. They include– ESF 2 Communications– ESF 3 Public Works and Engineering– ESF 4 Firefighting– ESF 5 Information and Planning– ESF 6 Mass Care– ESF 7 Resource Support– ESF 8 Health and Medical Services– ESF 9 Urban Search and Rescue

 Requests were made to the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to provide six C‐141 military aircraft to be used to transport the needed supplies and equipment. That request was approved almost instantly.

 A Disaster Mortuary Team (DMORT) from FEMA arrives to provide support for the coroner's office. Medical support for the Disaster Mortuary Team (DMORT) comes from US Public Health Service, with logistical support being provided by Oklahoma City Veterans Administration (hospital). They are assisted by 30 members of the Oklahoma Funeral Director Association and a military Graves Registration Unit.

 The Oklahoma Health Department is assisted by the Center for Disease Control in starting the Emergency Survivor Injury Registry. The registry allows the responsible agencies to identify victims, as well as document any injuries or continuing medical needs.

 An In‐Kind Donations Coordination Team is created at the Disaster Field Office. One of the tasks they undertake is to create an “unmet needs” registry.

 A specialized Risk Assessment Team is requested and received. They evaluate the site for biological and chemical hazards. Instructions are given to rescuers on how to better protect themselves from environmental factors and decontamination procedures are developed. Four firefighters from a mutual aid fire department and six firefighters from Tinker Air Force Base will be responsible for decontamination.

 A joint Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) of the affected area is undertaken and completed by FEMA and Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management.

 U.S Army Corps of Engineers sends requested specialists to provide input concerning structural integrity and blast damage distribution. They provide substantial input in the safest way to proceed with rescue and recovery missions.

 In an effort to restore federal services housed in the Murrah Building, the General Services Administration (GSA) conducts surveys to find temporary and permanent office space nearby.

 AmeriCorps is activated to assist with donations management. Their primary task is to keep inventory of all donations.

 A Recovery Service Center (RSC) is opened where applicants can personally meet with representatives of various aid programs. The Oklahoma Baptists provide daycare for those who come to the Recovery Service Center (RSC) to discuss aid assistance. Agencies involved include the following:– FEMA Disaster Housing– FEMA/State Individual and Family Grants– Oklahoma Division of Civil Emergency Management– Oklahoma Employment Security Commission– American Red Cross– Oklahoma Department of Human Services/Aging– Salvation Army– Department of Area‐wide Aging– Small Business Administration– Federal Employees Education and Assistance Fund– Social Security Administration– Veterans Administration– Internal Revenue Service– Oklahoma County– FEMA/State Public Affairs– Oklahoma State Insurance Commission

It is important to note that this is a brief synopsis of the overall effort. Through utilizing an IMS method, more specifically the ICS method, those managing the incident helped to assure that everyone was on the same page and were effectively working toward the same end goal.