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1 1. For a synthesis, see Lilas Demmou, “La désindustrialisation en France,” working document, Direction Générale du Trésor, nos. 2010–11 (June 2010).

2 2. Vincent Hecquet, “Emploi et territoires de 1975 à 2009: tertiarisation et rétrécissement de la sphère productive,” Économie et statistique, nos. 462–3 (2013): 25–68.

3 3. Martin Fortes, “Spécialisation à l’exportation de la France et de quatre grands pays de l’Union européenne entre 1990 et 2009,” Trésor-Éco, no. 98 (February 2012).

4 4. See Alain Touraine, The Post-Industrial Society: Tomorrow’s Social History, Classes, Conflicts and Culture in the Programmed Society (New York: Random House, [1969] 1971), and Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 1973). For a critique of the relevance of the notion of post-industrial society for characterizing contemporary European societies, see Aurélien Berlan, La fabrique des derniers hommes: retour sur Tönnies, Simmel et Weber (Paris: La Découverte, 2012), pp. 317–22.

5 5. Demmou, “La désindustrialisation en France.”

6 6. See Robert Brenner, The Boom and the Bubble: The US in the World Economy (London: Verso, 2003).

7 7. Hecquet, “Emploi et territoires.”

8 8. Laurent Davezies, La crise qui vient: la nouvelle fracture territoriale (Paris: Seuil, 2012).

9 9. Laurent Davezies, La République et ses territoires: la circulation invisible des richesses (Paris: Seuil, 2008), p. 50.

10 10. Ibid., pp. 58–9.

11 11. In one-third of French households, the head of the household is retired. For a statistical analysis of the distribution of retirees, see Jean-François Léger, “La répartition géographique des retraités: les six France,” Population & Avenir, no. 716 (January–February 2014): 4–7. In France, the greatest proportion of retired workers or salaried employees with low incomes is found in the former industrial regions in the northeast. As for retired white-collar workers, found in particularly high numbers in the large urban centers, they are also increasingly numerous in the less urbanized territories in the coastal and southern regions owing to “very selective migratory and economic population flows (retirees with high incomes)”; see also Jean-Marc Zaninetti, “Les retraités en France: des migrations pas comme les autres,” Population & Avenir, no. 703 (May–June 2011): 4–20.

12 12. Gwendoline Volat, “L’habitat rural entre 1999 et 2009: des évolutions contrastées,” Le Point sur, Commissariat général au développement durable, no. 179 (December 2013).

13 13. Davezies, La République et ses territoires, p. 68.

14 14. This horizon of integral capitalism in which everyone is expected to become a merchant contrasts with that of merchants doing business abroad; see in the eighteenth century, as described by Francesca Trivellato in The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009). Trivellato depicts merchants as a distinct category (focusing here on Sephardic Jews from Livorno in Tuscany) and connects them with their merchandise (especially coral and diamonds). See also Fernand Braudel, Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).

15 15. For literature in French, see especially Nathalie Heinich, De la visibilité: excellence et singularité en régime médiatique (Paris: Gallimard, 2012).

16 16. See Alain Desrosières and Laurent Thévenot, Les catégories socio-professionnelles (Paris: La Découverte, 1988), and, for a recent update, Thomas Amossé, “La nomenclature socio-professionnelle: une histoire revisitée,” Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 68/4 (2013): 1039–75. The population that interests us can be sought here by relying on surveys by INSEE (the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies). But, given the structure of the surveys and the nomenclatures they use, it is hard to come up with reliable figures, and the findings can always be challenged.

17 17. In L’esthétisation du monde: vivre à l’âge du capitalisme artiste (Paris: Gallimard, 2013), Gilles Lipovetsky and Jean Serroy propose to approach different things from the perspective of aestheticization as a “systematic incorporation of the creative and imaginary dimension in the sectors of commodity consumption.” Considered especially in terms of its current development, the “aestheticization of the world triggered by capitalism was to appear,” according to the authors, “starting in the second half of the nineteenth century” (p. 39). The idea of “aesthetic capitalism” is also defended by Gernot Böhme, Ästhetischer Kapitalismus (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2016).

18 18. The Comité Colbert, created in 1954, brings together representatives from the luxury industry and French cultural institutions. See Christian Blanckaert, Les 100 mots du luxe (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2010). (Blanckaert has served as director of Hermès international and as presiding delegate of the Colbert Committee.)

19 19. Romain Sautard, Valérie Duchateau, and Jeannot Rasolofoarison, “Les biens haut de gamme, un avantage comparatif européen,” Trésor Éco, no. 118 (September 2013). Of 270 prestigious brands surveyed in the world, 130 are French (Benjamin Leperchey, “Le Comité stratégique de filière (CSF) des industries de la mode et du luxe,” Annales des Mines –Réalités industrielles, no. 4 (2013): 14–19.

20 20. According to the Ministry of Economy, the “luxury industries” (including fashion, the culinary arts, and outstanding food products, especially wines and spirits, but excluding tourism) employ 170,000 people in France, for a bottom line of 43 billion euros.

21 21. Sautard et al., “Les biens haut de gamme.”

22 22. In France, the thirty leading brands in the fashion sector have cumulative sales amounting to 15 billion euros, of which 85 percent come from exports; see Leperchey, “Le Comité stratégique.”

23 23. Kenzo and Givenchy moved part of their operations to Poland, Vuitton to Romania; Hermès relied on Nigerian or Madagascan subcontractors. Italian brands did similar things: Prada moved part of its leather goods production to Turkey; Dolce & Gabbana outsourced some of its ready-to-wear apparel to Egypt; and so on. When the product is assembled in the brand’s home country, the components subcontracted to a country with low wages are those requiring the most hours of work – for example, in the case of a handbag, the handle. See Maxime Koromyslov, “Le ‘Made in France’ en question: pratiques et opinions des professionnels français du luxe,” Revue française de gestion, nos. 218–19 (2011): 107–22.

24 24. There is no universal legal framework requiring that a product’s country of origin be identified. Unlike the American context, for example, the European context is permissive. “The choice in branding at the point of importation and commercialization on national territory is left to the discretion of the manufacturer and thus remains optional” (ibid., p. 111).

25 25. Ibid., p. 120.

26 26. See chapter 8, pp. 206–7.

27 27. Roxana Azimi, “L’élite prend l’art,” M le magazine du Monde (April 5, 2014).

28 28. Vincent Marcilhac, Le luxe alimentaire: une singularité française (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2012), p. 27.

29 29. See Alessandro Stanziani, Histoire de la qualité alimentaire, XIXe–XXe siècle (Paris: Seuil, 2005).

30 30. On the importance of authenticity in gastronomy, see Josée Johnston and Shyon Baumann, “Democracy versus Distinction: A Study of Omnivorousness in Gourmet Food Writing,” American Journal of Sociology, 113/1 (2007): 165–204.

31 31. Marie-France Garcia-Parpet, Le marché de l’excellence: les grands crus à l’épreuve de la mondialisation (Paris: Seuil, 2009).

32 32. Marcilhac, Le luxe alimentaire, p. 34; and on the growing ascendancy of the big multinational groups over the prestigious vineyards, see Garcia-Parpet, Marché de l’excellence, pp. 140–5.

33 33. Michaela DeSoucey, “Food Traditions and Authenticity Politics in the European Union,” American Sociological Review, 75/3 (2010): 432–55.

34 34. Garcia-Parpet, Marché de l’excellence, pp. 172–3.

35 35. Thus, for instance, the association “Bienvenue à la ferme,” supported by the Chamber of Agriculture of the Loiret (a region with a significant architectural heritage), describes itself as the “first French network for direct sales and for welcoming [visitors] to farms”; in its annual brochure, local winemakers and producers offer recipes to a cosmopolitan audience, but they nevertheless specify the use of traditional local products: “sauerkraut with fish from the Loire in a baking dish, sauce with butter from Nantes,” is presented by two Loire fishermen, a “lamb tagine” is described by locals who raise sheep, and a “stew with ancient vegetables” is proposed by fruit and vegetable growers.

36 36. Françoise Bonnal traces the notion of “nation branding” back to the publication of Philip Kotler’s book, Marketing Places: Attracting Investment, Industry and Tourism to Cities, States, and Nations (New York: Free Press, 1993); the notion was first put to work in marketing tourism. See Françoise Bonnal, “Comprendre et gérer la marque France: mode d’emploi pour les acteurs de la marque France,” Revue française de gestion, nos. 218–19 (2001): 27–43. Currently, many agencies, mostly based in London, specialize in the construction and diffusion of markers of identity and national narratives designed to highlight nations, regions, and cities, associating them with products in order to promote their commercialization; see Melissa Aronczyk, Branding the Nation: The Global Business of National Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

37 37. Bonnal, “Comprendre et gérer.”

38 38. On the way traditions are invented, see the classic work by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); see also Anne-Marie Thiesse, La création des identités nationales (Paris: Seuil, 1999).

39 39. Bonnal, “Comprendre et gérer.”

40 40. On the generalization of benchmarking, see especially Isabelle Bruno and Emmanuel Didier, Benchmarking: l’État sous pression statistique (Paris: Zone Books, 2013); see also Christian Laval, Francis Vergne, Pierre Clément, and Guy Dreux, La nouvelle école capitaliste (Paris: La Découverte, 2011).

41 41. The processes of heritage creation are currently receiving a great deal of attention, especially from historians and anthropologists but also from sociologists, geographers, and economists; the literature on the subject is increasing day by day. One of the most notable editorial projects in this area is a collection edited by Pierre Nora and published by Gallimard: Pierre Nora, ed., Rethinking France=Lieux de mémoire, trans. David Jordan, 4 vols (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1984–92] 2001). See also Xavier Greffe, La valeur économique du patrimoine (Paris: Anthropos, 1990); Alain Berger, Pascal Chevalier, Geneviève Cortes, and Marc Dedeire, eds, Patrimoines, héritages et développement rural en Europe (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010). We should also mention the analysis by an anthropologist who studies the processes of heritage creation in Palma de Mallorca. The author shows that these are twofold processes. On one side, they put up barriers to the growth of gentrification; on the other, they promote the commodification of the zones surrounding sites of heritage creation. See Jaume Franquesa, “On Keeping and Selling: The Political Economy of Heritage Making in Contemporary Spain,” Current Anthropology, 54/3 (2013): 346–69.

42 42. See Sharon Zukin, The Culture of Cities (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 79–108.

43 43. See, for example, the brochures “Nantes, le voyage,” and “Nantes, les adresses CHIK.”

44 44. See Berger et al., Patrimoines, pp. 5–10.

45 45. Stéphane Gerson, “Le patrimoine local impossible: Nostradamus à Salon-de-Provence (1890–1999),” Genèses, no. 92 (2013): 52–75.

46 46. In recent years most households that have changed residences in France have moved to a rural or peri-urban commune, and they justify that choice by their quest for “life in the country.” Between 1999 and 2006, rural communes have experienced a net population growth of 0.8 percent, whereas the population in urban centers has remained stable; see Jean Laganier and Dalila Vienne, “Recensement de la population en 2006: la croissance retrouvée des espaces ruraux et des grandes villes,” Insee première, no. 1218 (2009).

47 47. On policies of public heritage creation and their expression over the last forty years, see François Hartog, Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time (New York: Columbia University Press, [2003] 2015), pp. 180–6. Thus, for example, whereas the Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historical Monuments focused on isolated single monuments, the Venice charter, thirty years later, included in the notion of historical monument “not only the single architectural work but also the urban or rural setting in which is found evidence of a particular civilization, a significant development or a historic event” (p. 183).

48 48. To take just one example, Vincent Biot analyzes the way the plateaus known as the Grands Causses, carved out between the gorges of the Tarn and Jonte rivers, have been highlighted. In the nineteenth century these regions still benefited from flourishing economic activities based on livestock farming, especially tanneries, millinery, and trading in wool and silk; during the first third of the twentieth century, these activities all declined, with the exception of glove-making in Millau. Learned local authors undertook to call attention to the aesthetic value of the landscape, following the nineteenth-century writers Charles Nodier, Louis de Malafosse, and especially, a little later, Édouard-Alfred Martel; these authors achieved what Vincent Biot calls the “territorial construction” of this region. See Vincent Biot, “Valorisation patrimoniale et développement touristique des Grands Causses: l’empreinte d’Édouard-Alfred Martel (1859–1938),” in Jean-Yves Andrieux and Patrick Harismendy, eds, Initiateurs et entrepreneurs culturels du tourisme (1850–1950) (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2011), pp. 35–46.

49 49. See Jacqueline Candau and Ludovic Ginelli, “L’engagement des agriculteurs dans un service environnemental: l’exemple du paysage,” Revue française de sociologie, 52/4 (2011): 691–718. Candau and Ginelli carried out their investigation among farmers in the Morvan and the Saint-Nectaire regions.

50 50. The proportion of lodgings in hotels as compared to those in campgrounds and other recognized “tourist accommodations” (holiday cottages, temporary rentals, vacation villages, and so on) can serve as a rough indicator for a first estimate of the proportion of high-end tourism: it is about 45 percent in France, where so-called open-air hotels play an important role. See “Le tourisme en Europe en 2015,” Insee première, no. 1610 (2016).

51 51. Tourism is one of the elements that allow geographers to understand the connection between the phenomena of globalization and the processes of reinforcing collective identities: see Peter Burns, “Brief Encounters: Culture, Tourism, and the Local–Global Nexus,” in Salah Wahab and Chris Cooper, eds, Tourism in the Age of Globalization (Abingdon: Routledge, 2001), pp. 290–305.

52 52. International tourism represents a market of 1,200 billion dollars and contributes 9 percent to the world economy; see Frédéric Pierret, “Le tourisme est-il devenu un enjeu stratégique?” Annales des Mines – Réalités industrielles, no. 3 (2015): 9–13.

53 53. Veille info tourisme, Ministère de l’Artisanat, du Commerce et du Tourisme (www.veilleinfotourisme.fr/).

54 54. According to the assistant director of tourism in the office of tourism, commerce, arts and crafts, and services, Direction Générale des Entreprises (DGE), Ministère de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et du Numérique (interviewed by the authors, February 18, 2016).

55 55. Davezies, La République et ses territoires, p. 38.

56 56. DGE, available at www.veilleinfotourisme.fr/.

57 57. Pierret, “Le tourisme.”

58 58. In the European Union, the leading clientele is from Asia (39 percent of overnight stays), closely followed by the North American contingent (37 percent). The United Kingdom is the primary Asian destination; it attracts tourists especially from English-speaking countries and the Commonwealth; France and Italy come next. France draws more tourists from China and Japan than the other European countries: the rapidly growing Chinese clientele overtook the Japanese in 2012. See “Le tourisme en France,” Insee première.

59 59. Saskia Cousin and Bertrand Réau, Sociologie du tourisme (Paris: La Découverte, 2009), pp. 59–67.

60 60. Georges Panayotis, “Le tourisme français: un secteur économique majeur au fort potentiel,” Annales des Mines – Réalités industrielles, no. 3 (2015): 15–19.

61 61. On “experience management,” see B. Joseph Pine II and James H. Gilmore, The Experience Economy: Work is Theatre & Every Business a Stage (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999), esp. pp. 15–17.

62 62. The proportion of overnight stays by the sea in relation to the overall number of nights can serve as an indicator to distinguish, among the European countries that have the highest percentage of tourists (the proportion of overnight stays in relation to the resident population), those whose potential for tourism rests not only on their “cultural” assets but also on the prominence of their coastal regions and on favorable climates that allow for a longer tourist season. This is the case for Spain, which benefits both from cultural tourism and “sea-and-sun” tourism; the proportion of overnight stays on the coast (80 percent) is more than double the proportion in France (around 35 percent). Spain, where the number of nights increased by 3.3 percent between 2012 and 2015 (compared to 0.4 percent in France), attracts a large number of Northern Europeans, especially to its seaside resorts, and it has benefited from “reports detrimental to countries outside of Europe deemed ‘risky.’” More generally, the southern coasts attract most of the foreign tourists coming from Europe: see “Le tourisme en Europe,” Insee première.

63 63. Saskia Cousin, “L’Unesco et la doctrine du tourisme culturel: généalogie d’un ‘bon’ tourisme,” Civilisations, no. 57 (2008): 41–56.

64 64. For examples of the use of “the symbolics of travel” – an area in which writers such as Nicolas Bouvier and Bruce Chatwin are the current heroes – as instruments for critiquing the “tourism industry,” see among others Rodolphe Christin, L’usure du monde: critique de la déraison touristique (Montreuil: L’Échappée, 2014).

65 65. Cousin, “L’Unesco,” pp. 47–8.

66 66. The Malaga Chamber of Commerce, Le tourisme culturel en Méditerranée: quelques opportunités pour l’Espagne, la France, le Maroc, la Tunisie, in Invest in Med (Marseille: Etinet, Euromediterranean Tourist Network, 2011): 11.

67 67. See www.entrepriseetdecouverte.fr/.

68 68. Jonathan Friedman has analyzed the role played by tourism in the processes of identity affirmation that accompany globalization. For example, in the case of the Ainu people in northern Japan, the rearrangement of living spaces to make them conform better to the expectations of tourists seeking exoticism and the increased production of “traditional” objects for sale to tourists constitute “conscious strategies of identity reconstruction,” strategies that accompany calls for autonomy stressing ethnic specificity: see Jonathan Friedman, Cultural Identities and Global Process (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 109–13.

69 69. See Nelson Graburn, ed., Ethnic and Tourist Arts (Oakland: University of California Press, 1979); Paul van der Grijp, Art and Exoticism: An Anthropology of the Yearning for Authenticity (London: Transaction, 2009); and on authenticity as an argument for tourism, see Dennison Nash, Anthropology of Tourism (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1996).

70 70. More generally, for countries that draw a significant portion of their revenues from tourism, the demand for security plays a central role; it lies at the heart of professional preoccupations, as we have seen for example in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, where heritage sites and museums have been targeted in particular.

71 71. See Gérôme Truc, Shellshocked: The Social Response to Terrorist Attacks, trans. Andrew Brown (Cambridge: Polity, 2017).

72 72. On the filming of television dramas in castles, see Sabine Chalvon-Demersay, “La saison des châteaux: une ethnographie des tournages en ‘décors réels’ pour la télévision,” Réseaux, no. 172 (2012): 175–213.

73 73. As is very often the case in this type of quantitative study, the figures obtained are approximate and thus debatable, in the sense that they depend on the nomenclatures used and the methods adopted – for example, in this case, the decision to include “indirect activities” in the count.

74 74. Serge Kancel, Jérôme Itty, Morgane Weill, and Bruno Durieux, L’apport de la culture à l’économie de la France (Paris: Inspection générale des finances, 2013).

75 75. Yves Jauneau and Xavier Niel, “Le poids économique direct de la culture en 2013,” Culture Chiffres, no. 5 (2014): 1–18.

76 76. By “audiovisual” we refer here to radio, cinema, television, video, and CDs.

77 77. Kancel et al., L’apport de la culture.

78 78. A commune is a French administrative unit corresponding to a village, city, or incorporated township.

79 79. The number of museums and monuments open to the public in France, inventoried in a guide published by the Éditions du Cherche-Midi, increased from 7,000 in the 1992 edition to 10,000 in 2001: see Josquin Barré, “L’impact de la variable prix dans le tourisme culturel,” in Jean-Michel Tobelem, ed., La culture mise à prix (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005), pp. 105–26.

80 80. See Jean-Cédric Delvainquière, François Tugores, Nicolas Laroche, and Benoît Jourdan, “Les dépenses culturelles des collectivités territoriales en 2010: 7,6 milliards d’euros pour la culture,” Culture Chiffres, no. 3 (2014):1–32.

81 81. Marie Gouyon and Frédérique Patureau, “Vingt ans d’évolution de l’emploi dans les professions culturelles,” Culture Chiffres, no. 6 (2014): 1–24.

82 82. Chantal Lacroix, “Les dépenses de consommation des ménages en biens et services culturels et télécommunications,” Culture Chiffres, no. 2 (2009): 1–7.

83 83. Olivier Donnat, Les pratiques culturelles des Français: enquête 1997 (Paris: La Documentation française, 1998), pp. 221, 279, 291.

84 84. Peter Laslett, Finnish Life and Illicit Love in Earlier Generations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 43.

85 85. Pierre Ansart, Marx et l’anarchisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969).

86 86. See for example Harry Bellet, Le marché de l’art s’écroule demain à 18 h 30 (Paris: Nil, 2001); Daniel Granet and Catherine Lamour, Grands et petits secrets du monde de l’art (Paris: Fayard, 2010); and Don Thompson, The $12 Million Stuffed Shark: The Curious Economics of Contemporary Art (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

87 87. See especially Isabelle Graw, High Price: Art between the Market and Celebrity Culture (Berlin: Sternberg, 2009); Sarah Thornton, Seven Days in the Art World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008); Pierre-Michel Menger, The Economics of Creativity: Art and Achievement under Uncertainty, trans. Stephen Rendell et al. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, [2009] 2014); Nathalie Heinich, Le paradigme de l’art contemporain: structures d’une révolution artistique (Paris: Gallimard, 2014).

88 88. See Daniel Aaron Silver and Terry Nichols Clark, Scenescapes: How Qualities Shape Social Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

89 89. See Olaf Velthuis, Talking Prices: Symbolic Meanings of Prices on the Market for Contemporary Art (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

90 90. See Alain Quemin, Les stars de l’art contemporain: notoriété et consécration artistique dans les arts visuels (Paris: CNRS, 2013); on rankings of personalities, see especially pp. 205–76.

91 91. Art collectors themselves are ranked, particularly in terms of their notoriety and their visibility, on the site Larry’s List (www.larryslist.com).

92 92. According to the highly successful model presented by Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society: Why the Few at the Top Get So Much More than the Rest of Us (New York: Free Press, 1995).

93 93. Jean-Jacques Arrighi and Marjorie Martin, “Grand Arles: des difficultés à surmonter, des atouts à exploiter,” Insee études, no. 31 (2013).

94 94. See Jean-Maurice Rouquette, ed., Arles: histoire, territoires et cultures (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 2008).

95 95. The statistics in this section come from Rouquette, Arles, and Arrighi and Martin, “Grand Arles.”

96 96. According to the magazine Bilan (November 30, 2012).

97 97. See the reports of the Boston Consulting Group (www.bcg.com) and Gabriel Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens, trans. Teresa Lavender Fagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [2013] 2015), pp. 29–30.

98 98. On the problems that this two-track consumption poses to the mass distribution sector, see Philippe Moati, L’avenir de la grande distribution (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2001) and La nouvelle révolution commerciale (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2011).