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1 1. Michael Thompson, Rubbish Theory: The Creation and Destruction of Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).

2 2. See Michel Melot, Mirabilia: essai sur l’inventaire général du patrimoine culturel (Paris: Gallimard, 2012), and, for an ethnography of the selection processes, Nathalie Heinich, La fabrique du patrimoine (Paris: Éditions de la MSH, 2009).

3 3. Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: Penguin Books, [1899] 1979).

4 4. See Marie-France Garcia-Parpet, Le marché de l’excellence: les grands crus à l’épreuve de la mondialisation (Paris: Seuil, 2009).

5 5. Jean-Pierre Cometti ignores this problem when he addresses the question: see Jean-Pierre Cometti, Conserver/restaurer: l’oeuvre d’art à l’époque de sa préservation technique (Paris: Gallimard, 2016).

6 6. This theme has been developed in American sociology; see especially Paul DiMaggio, “Classification in Art,” American Sociological Review, 52/4 (1987): 440–55; Sharon Zukin, The Culture of Cities (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 79–108; on the notion of “symbolic goods,” see Michèle Lamont and Marcel Fournier, Cultivating Differences: Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of Inequality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

7 7. Pierre Bourdieu, “Le marché des biens symboliques,” L’Année sociologique 22 (1971): 49–126.

8 8. Jean Baudrillard, The System of Objects, trans. James Benedict (London: Verso, [1968] 1996).

9 9. Here we follow Cornelius Castoriadis in The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, [1975] 1987): “Everything that is presented to us in the social–historical world is inextricably tied to the symbolic. … the innumerable material products without which no society could live even an instant, are not (not always, not directly) symbols. All of these, however, would be impossible outside of a symbolic network” (p. 117). According to Castoriadis, the “symbolic” can neither be treated (as it often is) as a mere neutral cloak nor as stemming from a “logic” properly speaking that would be superimposed on another kind of order known as “rational” (pp. 117–27).

10 10. Howard S. Becker, Art Worlds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 34.

11 11. A nineteenth-century elevated railroad track converted in the early twenty-first century to a space for strolling enhanced by contemporary art works, the High Line is in a former industrial district that has become a center for art galleries and luxury shops. See David Halle and Elisabeth Tiso, New York’s New Edge: Contemporary Art, the High Line, and Urban Megaprojects on the Far West Side (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).

12 12. See Edward Anthony Wrigley, Continuity, Chance & Change: The Character of the Industrial Revolution in England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), and Energy and the English Industrial Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

13 13. See Dominique Poulot, Une histoire des musées en France (Paris: La Découverte, 2008).

14 14. On the constitution of the French national patrimony, see Alexandra Kowalski, “The Nation, Rescaled: Theorizing the Decentralization of Memory in Contemporary France,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 54/2 (2012): 308–31; and “State Power as Field Work: Culture and Practice in the French Survey of Historic Landmarks,” in Richard Sennett and Craig Calhoun, eds, Practicing Culture (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 82–104.

15 15. Bénédicte Savoy, Patrimoine annexé: les biens culturels saisis par la France en Allemagne autour de 1800, 2 vols (Paris: Éditions de la MSH, 2003).

16 16 Guido Guerzoni, Apollo and Vulcan: The Art Markets in Italy, 1400–1700, trans. Amanda George (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, [2006] 2011).

17 17. Cissie Fairchilds, “The Production and Marketing of Populuxe Goods in Eighteenth-Century Paris,” in John Brewer and Roy Porter, eds, Consumption and the World of Goods (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 228–48.

18 18. Louis Bergeron, Les industries du luxe en France (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1998).

19 19. See Eric Zuelow, ed., Touring Beyond the Nation: A Transnational Approach to European Tourism History (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011).

20 20. Alain Croix, ed., Initiateurs et entrepreneurs culturels du tourisme (1850–1950), Actes du colloque de Saint-Brieuc, June 2–4, 2010 (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2011).

21 21. See Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski, La production de l’idéologie dominante (Paris: Demopolis, [1976] 2008).

22 22. A good indicator is the work Le partage des bénéfices, published under the collective name of Darras, which brings together the contributions to a colloquium organized by Pierre Bourdieu in 1965 by sociologists and anthropologists (P. Bourdieu, J.-C. Chamboredon, C. Durand, R. Sainsaulieu, J. Lautman, J. Cuisenier), economists (J.-P. Pagé, C. Gruson, M. Praderie), and statisticians from INSEE (A. Darbel, C. Seibel, J.-P. Ruault). Prefaced by Claude Gruson, a Keynesian economist influenced by social Christianity, then director of INSEE, the work dealt with the fact that “expansion” had not managed to reduce inequality envisaged on several levels: employment, agriculture, schooling, and so on. The papers tended to stress the need for “social mobility.” See Darras, Le partage des bénéfices, expansion et inégalités en France (Paris: Minuit, 1966).

23 23. After the first report of the Club of Rome, in 1972, titled “The Limits to Growth.” See Peter Wagner, Modernity: Understanding the Present (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), pp. 49–52.

24 24. See for example La Gueule ouverte, a successful periodical similar to Charlie Hebdo, published by Pierre Fournier with contributions by Cavanna, Wolinski, Reiser, and Cabu; and also Alain Hervé’s Le Sauvage, similar to Le Nouvel Observateur, where André Gorz was a journalist.

25 25. The number of students grew sixfold between the early 1960s and the first decade of the twenty-first century, from 215,000 to 1.3 million. In 1982, among French people between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-four who were working or actively seeking employment, 2.1 million – that is, 13 percent of this age group – had degrees attesting to post-secondary education. In 2010, the number with similar degrees reached 8 million, or four times as many, and they represented more than a third (36 percent) of people in the workforce between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-four. See Jean-François Léger, “Plus de diplômés, plus d’inégalités territoriales?” Population & Avenir, no. 718 (2014): 4.

26 26. For a detailed description of the reorganization of companies and changes in working conditions, see Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, [1999] 2005).

27 27. This devaluation of diplomas, which began in the 1980s, became particularly significant starting in the 1990s, and it has only been accentuated since then. In 1982, as we have seen, 2.1 million members of the workforce had higher degrees, while there were 1.6 million workers at the managerial level (cadres); thus there were thirteen members of the workforce with higher degrees for every ten cadres. In 2010, 8 million members of the workforce held higher degrees, while there were 3.6 million cadres, or twenty-two members of the workforce with higher degrees for every ten cadres. In 1990, 45 percent of people with higher degrees were cadres. Twenty years later, the proportion had fallen to 37 percent. At the same time, the territorial distribution of opportunities to get a position as a cadre became more and more unequal: cadres with higher degrees were concentrated in the Paris region and to a lesser extent in the major regional metropolitan centers such as Lyon, Marseille, and Toulouse. See Léger, “Plus de diplômés,” pp. 4–7.

28 28. Here we can speak of the “finite world,” as Zygmunt Bauman does in Globalization: The Human Consequences (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) and in Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).

29 29. This conception of culture in terms of “art for art’s sake,” exempt from financial considerations, penetrates even into galleries of contemporary art (despite their orientation toward commerce), which proliferated in the postwar years and sought to break with the compromises of the art market during the occupation (after the Jewish-owned galleries had already been eliminated) by turning toward artists whose work embodied both the rejection of “capitalism” and aesthetic research in its most elitist dimensions. The same phenomenon is found in the domain of publishing. See Julie Verlaine, Les galeries d’art contemporain à Paris: une histoire culturelle du marché de l’art, 1944–1970 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2012), pp. 23–45.

30 30. Maryvonne de Saint-Pulgent, Jack Lang: batailles pour la culture (Paris: La Documentation française, 2013), p. 56.

31 31. On the shift from ethnographic museums to ecomuseums, see Martine Segalen, La vie d’un musée, 1937–2005 (Paris: Stock, 2005).

32 32. See Nathalie Heinich and Roberta Shapiro, eds, De l’artification: enquêtes sur le passage à l’art (Paris: Éditions de l’EHESS, 2012).

33 33. The delegation for the plastic arts, established in 1982, created twenty-two positions of regional counselor for the plastic arts under the Direction régionale des affaires culturelles (Regional Office for Cultural Affairs) and the same number of Fonds régionaux d’art contemporain (FRAC, Regional Foundations for Contemporary Art).

34 34. The critique of the new cultural policies that had the most significant media impact was probably that of Marc Fumaroli, in L’État culturel: une religion moderne (Paris: De Fallois, 1991).

35 35. See Laurent Jeanpierre and Séverine Sofio, “Chronique d’une mort annoncée: les conservateurs de musée face aux commissaires d’expositions dans l’art contemporain français,” in Frédéric Poulard and Jean-Michel Tobolem, eds, Les conservateurs de musée: atouts et faiblesses d’une profession (Paris: La Documentation française, 2015), pp. 111–39.

36 36. As François Dosse points out, “Guattari va jouer auprès de Jack Lang le rôle d’une boîte à idées”; see François Dosse, Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari: biographie croisée (Paris: La Découverte, 2007), p. 450.

37 37. Félix Guattari and Suely Rolnik, Micropolitiques (Paris: Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond/Seuil, 2007), p. 33.

38 38. Philippe Urfalino, “De l’anti-impérialisme américain à la dissolution de la politique culturelle,” Revue française de science politique, 45/5 (1993): 823–49.

39 39. See Thomas Angeletti, “Le laboratoire de la nécessité: économistes, institutions et qualifications de l’économie,” Doctoral thesis in sociology, Paris, EHESS, 2013.

40 40. On the foundation of the economics of conventions, see L’économie des conventions, special issue, Revue économique, 40/2 (1989). See also Laurent Thévenot, “Les investissements de forme,” in Conventions économiques: cahiers du centre d’études de l’emploi (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985), pp. 21–72, and “Essai sur les objets usuels: propriétés, fonctions, usages,” in Bernard Conein, Nicolas Dodier, and Laurent Thévenot, eds, Les objets dans l’action (Paris: Éditions de l’EHESS, 1993), pp. 85–111. See also Philippe Batifoulier, ed., Théorie des conventions (Paris: Economica, 2001), André Orléan, Analyse économique des conventions (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004), and Robert Salais, “Conventions de travail, mondes de production et institutions,” L’Homme et la Société, nos. 170–1 (2008–9): 151–74.

41 41. For a synthesis, see Arnaldo Bagnasco and Charles Sabel, PME et développement économique en Europe (Paris: La Découverte, 1994). On the development of the “Third Italy” in opposition to the industrial triangle Milan–Turin–Genoa, see also Arnaldo Bagnasco and Carlo Trigilia, La construction sociale du marché: le défi de la troisième Italie (Cachan: Les Éditions de l’ENS de Cachan, [1988] 1993). (The “third Italy” designates a region in central and northeastern Italy where clusters of small family-run businesses developed with municipal support in the 1970s and 1980s.)

42 42. Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, “Préface,” Les chemins de la prospérité: de la production de masse à la spécialisation souple, trans. Luc Boussard (Paris: Hachette, 1989), p. 10 [preface to the French translation of The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic Books, 1984)].

43 43. Piore and Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide, p. 214; more generally, see pp. 213–16.

44 44. See Andrea Colli and Elisabetta Merlo, “Family Business and Luxury Business in Italy (1950–2000),” Entreprises et histoire, no. 46 (2007): 113–24.

45 45. Robert Salais and Michael Storper, Les mondes de production: enquête sur l’identité économique en France (Paris: Éditions de la MSH, 1993). A revised English version appeared four years later entitled Worlds of Production: The Action Frameworks of the Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, [1993] 1997).

46 46. Salais and Storper, Mondes de production, p. 39.

47 47. Ibid., p. 117.

48 48. Pierre Moulinier, “Naissance et développement du partenariat contractuel dans le domaine culturel,” in Philippe Poirrier and René Rizzardo, eds, Une ambition partagée? La coopération entre le ministère de la culture et les collectivités territoriales (1959–2009) (Paris: Travaux et documents du ministère de la culture, no. 26 (2009), p. 60.

49 49. Ibid., p. 61.

50 50. In 2001, in France, one association out of five had a cultural purpose. See Valérie Deroin, “Emploi, bénévolat et financement des associations culturelles,” Culture Chiffres, no. 1 (2014): 1–12.

51 51. Ibid.

52 52. Excerpts from the documentation presented on the site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

53 53. See Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, [2013] 2014).

54 54. See www.forum-avignon.org.

55 55. Monique de Saint Martin, L’espace de la noblesse (Paris: Métailié, 1993). See also Michel Pinçon and Monique Pinçon-Charlot, Châteaux et châtelains: les siècles passent, le symbole demeure (Paris: Anne Carrière, 2005).

56 56. Vincent Eblé, Rapport d’information sur les dépenses fiscales relatives à la préservation du patrimoine historique bâti, French Senate, recorded October 7, 2015; see www.senat.fr/rap/r15-018/r15-018_mono.html.

57 57. Ibid., p. 36.

58 58. As attested by the case of Alain du Plessis de Pouzilhac, cited in Saint Martin, L’espace de la noblesse, p. 97.

59 59. Ibid., p. 99.

60 60. Ibid., p. 100. In Dominique Schnapper’s first book, devoted to the lifestyle of the elites of Bologna, the author makes similar remarks: “In the salons of the old aristocracy, the paintings remain hung in several rows, in the old style, rather than highlighted for display, because their presence is not due to the personal taste of a collector or of an amateur wanting to show off his wealth. The poor state of preservation of works that have been passed down through inheritance over many generations and their awkward presentation signifies the hereditary character of the objects owned”; see Dominique Schnapper, L’Italie rouge et noire: les modèles de la vie quotidienne à Bologne (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), pp. 103–4.

61 61. Saint Martin, L’espace de la noblesse, pp. 105–7.

62 62. Ibid., p. 111.

63 63. See the site of the French Ministry of Culture, under the heading “European Heritage Days”: http://traduction.culture.gouv.fr/url/Result.aspx?to=en&url=https%3A%2F%2Fjourneesdupatrimoine.culture.gouv.fr%2F.

64 64. Saint Martin, L’espace de la noblesse, p. 110.

65 65. See Marie-Odile Mergnac, La généalogie: une passion française (Paris: Autrement, 2003), and Jean-Louis Beaucarnot, La généalogie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997).

66 66. See Robert Brenner, The Economic Capital of Global Turbulence: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Long Boom to Long Downturn (London: Verso, 2006).

67 67. Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century (London: Verso, 2007), pp. 105–12.

68 68. We are borrowing the notion of “central capitalism” from Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, who have developed an analysis of the dynamic of capitalism in terms of competition for differential accumulation – that is, in terms of relative power. In this logic, the dynamic of capitalism is linked to shifts that, on the one hand, extend commodification and, on the other, come back to “sabotage” the industrial capacities of the competitors; see Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, Capital as Power: A Study of Order and Creorder (New York: Routledge, 2009). Nitzan and Bichler (pp. 219–27) align themselves with the analyses of Thorstein Veblen, who was the first to develop the notion of industrial “sabotage.” He stressed the tension between industrial interests, governed by the requirement to produce things, and those of “business,” governed by the prices of things: “In the business world the price of things is a more substantial fact than the things themselves” (Thorstein Veblen, Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprises in Recent Times: The Case of America (Boston: Beacon Press, [1923] 1967), p. 89; cited in Nitzan and Bichler, p. 221). For Veblen, prices are a matter of property and power, and they play a central role in the dynamics of capitalism (Nitzan and Bichler, pp. 217–27).

69 69. For a precise and perceptive analysis of these processes, see Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, [2013] 2014), esp. chapter 1, “From Legitimation Crisis to Fiscal Crisis,” pp. 1–46.

70 70. Giovanni Arrighi, whose approach is inspired by the work of Fernand Braudel, decomposes the evolution of capitalism into a series of cycles of accumulation, each of which occupies a specific period (roughly a century) and is centered around a geographic profit center (Genoa, the Netherlands, England, the United States). One of his arguments is that, in each of these cycles, a financial phase follows a manufacturing and commercial phase and that the financial phase precedes and announces the decline of this cycle to the benefit of a new cycle centered on a different geographic pole; see Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times (new edn, London: Verso, 2010). This is why, if Arrighi agrees with David Harvey (The New Imperialism [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003]) in recognizing the importance of the financial turn operated by capitalism since the 1980s, he takes a different path by interpreting this turn as a sign of crisis and decline. One of his arguments consists in comparing the phase of financialization and optimism of the Reagan–Thatcher period and the financialization that followed the depression of 1873–96, followed by a phase of improvement (what he calls the Edwardian “belle époque”) foreshadowing, as he sees it, the crisis of 1929, which marked the end of the cycle of accumulation centered on England, to the benefit of the United States.

71 71. For a synthesis, see Thomas W. Volscho and Nathan J. Kelly, “The Rise of the Super-Rich: Power Resources, Taxes, Financial Markets, and the Dynamics of the Top 1 Percent, 1949 to 2008,” American Sociological Review, 77/5 (2012): 679–99.

72 72. It is hard to find precise information on the way the wealthy use and preserve their money, and on the share of their fortunes that is stored in objects of value rather than in stocks or bonds, as these types of goods are generally conflated under the heading of “household patrimony.” In addition, the real price negotiated for exceptional goods is often highly undervalued for tax purposes.

73 73. The French title of this section is borrowed from a celebrated book by the poet Francis Ponge, Le parti pris des choses (1942). The English translation is adapted from a recent English-language version of Ponge’s book Partisan of Things, translated by Joshua Corey and Jean-Luc Garneau (Chicago: Kenning, 2016).

74 74. Bruno Cousin and Sébastien Chauvin, “L’entre-soi élitaire à Saint-Barthélémy,” Ethnologie française, 42/2 (2012): 335–45.

75 75. We are thinking here of Michel Pinçon and Monique Pinçon-Charlot’s very informative work, especially Les ghettos du gotha: au coeur de la grande bourgeoisie (Paris: Seuil, 2010) and Sociologie de la bourgeoisie (Paris: La Découverte, 2005).

76 76. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, [1979] 1986).

77 77. See Franco Moretti, The Bourgeois: Between History and Literature (London: Verso, 2013).

78 78. The distinction between patrimony and capital is supported in the analyses of Joseph Schumpeter, even though that theorist envisaged it mainly with respect to industrial production. For Schumpeter, the goods one owns, including monetary goods, constitute capital properly speaking only on condition that they are put to work – that is, put into circulation. “Capital is nothing but the lever by which the entrepreneur subjects to his control the concrete goods which he needs, nothing but a means of diverting the factors of production to new uses, of dictating a new direction to production”; Joseph Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, trans. Redvers Opie (New York: Oxford University Press, [1911, 1926] 1961), p. 116.

79 79. The number of business schools in France grew from 76 in 1980 to around 250 in 2017.

80 80. On the notion of hipster, see Mark Greif, “What Was the Hipster?,” in Against Everything (New York: Pantheon Books, 2016), pp. 209–19.

81 81. Arjun Appadurai, ed., The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). This work marked a refoundation of anthropological work on commodities, reconnecting with an approach developed by Jean Baudrillard. The latter’s two seminal works – The System of Objects and The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures (rev. edn, London: Sage, [1970] 2017) – set forth the premises, in sociology, of a new attention to objects. The interest in things placed on the same level as humans has been developed in particular by Bruno Latour in numerous works; see most notably his Aramis, or, The Love of Technology, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, [1992] 1996).

82 82. On the use made here of the notion of test, see Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, On Justification: Economies of Worth, trans. Catherine Porter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, [1991] 2006).