Читать книгу The Secret Life of the Mind: How Our Brain Thinks, Feels and Decides - Mariano Sigman - Страница 25

On the local 5-a-side football pitch, the owner of the ball is, to a certain extent, also the owner of the game. It gives them privileges like deciding the teams, and declaring when the game ends. These advantages can also be used to negotiate. The philosopher Gustavo Faigenbaum, in Entre Ríos, Argentina, and the psychologist Philippe Rochat, in Atlanta, in the USA, set out to understand this world: basically, how the concept of owning and sharing is established in children, among intuitions, praxis and rules. Thus they invented the sociology of the playground. Faigenbaum and Rochat, in their voyage to the land of childhood,^fn15 researched swapping, gifts and other transactions that took place in a primary school playground. Studying the exchange of little figurines, they found that even in the supposedly naïve world of the playground, the economy is formalized. As children grow up, lending and the assignment of vague, future values give way to more precise exchanges, the notion of money, usefulness and the prices of things.

As in the adult world, not all transactions in the country of childhood are licit. There are thefts, scams and betrayals. Rousseau’s conjecture is that the rules of citizenship are learned in discord. And it is the playground, which is more innocuous than real life, that becomes the breeding ground in which to play at the game of law.

The contrasting observations of Wynn and her colleagues suggest that very young children should already be able to sketch out moral reasoning. On the other hand, the work of Piaget, who is an heir to Rousseau’s tradition, indicates that moral reasoning only begins at around six or seven years old. Gustavo Faigenbaum and I set out to reconcile these different great thinkers in the history of psychology. And, along the way, to understand how children become citizens.

We showed to a group of children between four and eight years of age a video with three characters: one had chocolates, the other asked to borrow them and the third stole them. Then we asked a series of questions to measure varying degrees of depth of moral comprehension; if they preferred to be friends with the one who stole or the one who borrowed^fn16 (and why), and what the thief had to do to make things right with the victim. In this way we were able to investigate the notion of justice in playground transactions.

Our hypothesis was that the preference for the borrower over the thief, an implicit manifestation of moral preferences – as in Wynn’s experiments – should already be established even for the younger kids. And, to the contrary, the justification of these options and the understanding of what had to be done to compensate for the damage caused – as in Piaget’s experiments – should develop at a later stage. That is exactly what we proved. In the room with the four-year-olds, the children preferred to play with the borrower rather than with the thief. We also discovered that they preferred to play with someone who stole under extenuating circumstances than with aggravating ones.

But our most interesting finding was this: when we asked four-year-old children why they chose the borrower over the thief or the one who robbed in extenuating circumstances over the one who did so in aggravating ones, they gave responses like ‘Because he’s blond’ or ‘Because I want her to be my friend.’ Their moral criteria seemed completely blind to causes and reasons.

Here we find again an idea which has appeared several times in this chapter. Children have very early (often innate) intuitions – what the developmental psychologists Liz Spelke and Susan Carey refer to as core knowledge. These intuitions are revealed in very specific experimental circumstances, in which children direct their gaze or are asked to choose between two alternatives. But core knowledge is not accessible on demand in most real-life situations where it may be needed. This is because at a younger age core knowledge cannot be accessed explicitly and represented in words or concrete symbols.

Specifically, in the domain of morality, our results show that children have from a very young age intuitions about ownership which allow them to understand whether a transaction is licit or not. They understand the notion of theft, and they even comprehend subtle considerations which extenuate or aggravate it. These intuitions serve as a scaffold to forge, later in development, a formal and explicit understanding of justice.

But every experiment comes with its own surprises, revealing unexpected aspects of reality. This one was no exception. Gustavo and I came up with the experiment to study the price of theft. Our intuition was that the children would respond that the chocolate thief should give back the two they stole plus a few more as compensation for the damages. But that didn’t happen. The vast majority of the children felt that the thief had to return exactly the two chocolates that had been stolen. What’s more, the older the kids, the higher the fraction of those who advocated an exact restitution. Our hypothesis was mistaken. Children are much more morally dignified than we had imagined. They understood that the thieves had done wrong, that they would have to make up for it by returning what they’d stolen along with an apology. But the moral cost of the theft could not be resolved in kind, with the stolen merchandise. In the children’s justice, there was no reparation that absolved the crime.

If we think about the children’s transactions as a toy model of international law, this result, in hindsight, is extraordinary. An implicit, though not always respected, norm of international conflict resolution is that there should be no escalation in reprisal. And the reason is simple. If someone steals two and, in order to settle a peace, the victim demands four, the exponential growth of reprisals would be harmful for everyone. Children seem to understand that even in war there ought to be rules.