Читать книгу The Power of Freedom - Mart Laar - Страница 5

The first time that Emperor Charles IV entered the eastern capital of his empire, Prague, in 1355, he was so impressed by what he saw that he established a permanent court there. According to the Emperor, Prague had the ‘most beautiful women and the best beer in the world.’ Today, the experience of foreign visitors on their initial trips to the ‘new’ European countries is similar. Before their arrival, visitors expect to see onion-shaped domes, Russian matrjoshkas and orthodox icons. But to their surprise, they are greeted by Gothic castles, Renaissance palaces and baroque churches. Old cities such as Prague or Tallinn appear more ‘European’ than some of the capitals of Western Europe. This is no miracle – Prague is actually farther West than Vienna.

In order to understand the history of Europe, we must remember that Europe is a cultural rather than a geographical entity derived from common historical experience and a shared system of values. Countries in both Western and Eastern Europe have faced the same historical challenges: Christianity, feudalism and rivalry, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, the Enlightenment, the birth of the nation-state and democracy. Despite this shared historical legacy, national and cultural diversity run deep within Europe. Indeed, no area of the world of comparable size has so many fully developed national cultures and languages. Europe has never been a ‘melting pot of nations’ and has, in fact, resisted attempts throughout history to blur its separate ethnic identities.

Central and Eastern Europe, as we now know it, started to develop during the collapse of the Roman Empire when successive waves of migrating warrior peoples – the Vandals, Goths, Huns and Avars among others – made their way from the Eurasian steppes to the Atlantic. Over the next few centuries, parts of these tribes converted to Christianity and Polish, Hungarian, Lithuanian and other states were created. The people of Central and Eastern Europe were divided not only in terms of language and culture but also by different forms of Christianity. Central Europe and the Baltics remained loyal to Western Christianity, while Eastern and South-Eastern Europe adopted Eastern Christianity.1

Soon after the beginning of their modern history, the Central and Eastern European nations served as a barrier by opposing onslaughts from the East. The history of Central and Eastern Europe is replete with battles against invading forces trying to march to the West. Estonian and Finnish tribes halted attempts by Kievan Rus to move farther west in the 11th and 12th centuries. During the 13th and 14th centuries, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania played a major role in the fight against a Mongol-Tatar invasion. Finally, in the 16th century, Hungarians fought to the death against the Turkish Ottoman Empire, the same role that was played by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, ‘Rzeczpospolita’, in the 17th century. Jan Sobieski, one of the most outstanding kings of Poland, was forced to choose an enemy against which to marshal Polish forces. It would have been in the Polish national interest for him to choose to fight Poland’s main enemy, namely, the emergent Russia. However, fighting the Turks served European interests better and Sobieski made his choice for Europe. On 12 September 1683, he led his cavalry in a decisive attack against a powerful Ottoman army of 200,000 men during the siege of Vienna, achieving a crushing victory. The Ottoman retreat, which began that day in Vienna, continued in stages for the next 200 years.

Map 1

Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the 19th century

While Central and Eastern European nations successfully protected Europe from Mongolian, Ottoman and Russian invasions, they were weakened in this fight. One after another, the independent states of Central and Eastern Europe disappeared from the map, were divided up among their neighbours or, indeed, both. The Czechs lost their independence after the Hussite wars and the Hungarians, in the 16th century. Poland was conquered by and then divided among its bigger neighbours during the 18th century. The loss of political independence was followed by cultural and linguistic takeovers. German culture and language were especially significant in assimilating the local nobility and intelligentsia in many Central and Eastern European countries. The more successful and educated segments of local societies were Germanised and consequently lost to their nation. The elite in most Central European states was destroyed and the countries themselves started to resemble ‘peasant nations’. At the end of the 18th century, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe seemed to have disappeared from the map.

At this point, their future looked bleak. But then an era of nationalism began in Europe. England is considered to have been the first modern nation in Europe, dating back to the 16th and 17th centuries. In the 17th and 18th centuries, France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal and the Netherlands became the next countries to establish nationhood founded on political independence. The Italians and Germans had also acquired a remarkable cultural homogeneity by that time but had not been able to develop a nation-state. The emerging nation-states served as examples for at least twenty other European nations that had not achieved or restored independence but which desired comparable levels of political development and modernisation. In this way, national movements began in most of Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the 18th century. These movements were influenced by the ideas of Rousseau and Herder, which embodied a faith that smaller nations could be reborn with identities of their own. Neither had those nations with earlier traditions of statehood forgotten their lost independence. The Poles defended the Polish cause on battlefields across Europe at the same time helping to promote the independence of other nations. Both uprisings in Poland – in 1830-1831 and 1863-1864 – failed, however. A wave of uprisings spread over Central Europe in 1848, culminating in the Hungarian revolution (1848–1849) that was thwarted with the help of Russian forces.

Victims of Red Terror in Valga, Estonia 1919

Despite these failures, new, modern nations emerged in Central and Eastern Europe that successfully resisted all attempts at denationalisation. Common losses and sacrifices united nations, sometimes more so than victories. New social structures developed as societies were modernised and energised. Within a short period of time, political parties were organised with clear goals for the national movement: initially, mostly striving for autonomy, finally demanding full independence. These dreams long appeared unrealistic. But then World War I broke out and the realities of the situation breathed life into these dreams. Soon after the war began, both sides in the conflict realised that the support of local nations was essential for victory. Thus, ideas about greater autonomy were floated and there were suggestions of some kind of independence. In many cases, Central and Eastern European countries allied themselves with both sides in the conflict, trying to ensure the best outcome for their nations. For example, various Polish politicians worked with Russia, Great Britain and France, as well as Germany and the Habsburg monarchy. National units were raised in the Central and Eastern European nations. For many of these nations, such military units provided a foundation for national armies afterwards and also helped to garner international support for their independence movements.

With the collapse of Austro-Hungary and Czarist Russia at the end of the war, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe seized the opportunity to declare their independence in 1917-1918, often relying on autonomous structures – mostly regional councils – created by different rulers during the war. These developments were consistent with the Wilsonian ideal of national self-determination which, unfortunately, was not applied either uniformly or fairly. Nations fighting for the ‘wrong side’ were punished by the winners. For example, as a result of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, Hungary lost two-thirds of its former territory and nearly half of its population. At the same time, Czech territorial claims on Austria and Hungary were fully supported. Polish demands for the restoration of its old frontiers were incompatible with the idea of the restoration of the White Russian Empire – which actually never materialised – and were condemned by France and Great Britain as ‘extreme nationalism’.

At the same time, a new threat arose from the East. From the ruins of Czarist Russia grew a real totalitarian power – Communist Russia. This totalitarian power threatened the very foundations of European society, including Christianity, individualism and private property. It was natural that the Communists liked to be called the ‘new Huns’. The leaders of the Communist takeover wanted to rule not only Russia but the entire world, a goal they planned to achieve by means of world revolution.2 In the beginning, Western Europe clearly underestimated the threat of Communism. Although it provided some support to the nations fighting against the Reds and supplied provisions to the White Russian army, decisive steps were not taken to destroy Communism. The warnings made by Winston Churchill, probably the first leading Western politician to understand the Communist threat, were ignored.3 In 1918, the Communists believed that the time was ripe for the invasion of Western Europe. After the collapse of Germany at the end of the First World War, Lenin ordered the Red Army to move to the West and ignite the fire of worldwide revolution. Exporting the Communist revolution to Germany meant that the Red Army first had to conquer the newly independent Baltic States and to reach East Prussia. By December 1918, the Red Army had captured most of Latvia and Lithuania and was advancing on Tallinn, the capital of Estonia. Confident of victory, the Red Army did not deploy many forces against the Estonians. Consequently, the Estonian forces – mostly young schoolboys, students and other volunteers–stopped the Red Army’s advance 30 kilometres from the capital and thereafter pushed it out of Estonia, much to the surprise of both groups of combatants. Most Estonians were not sure that their tiny country could win a war against Russia. Nevertheless, those young volunteers threw the Red Army back. Supported by British naval units and Finnish volunteers, the Estonian forces successfully breached the Red Army’s western flank. The Communist leaders panicked: the holy city of the revolution – St Petersburg – appeared to be threatened. On Lenin’s orders, elite Red Army units that had been moving towards the borders of Germany were stopped and redeployed against Estonia. This did not help. The increasingly confident Estonians destroyed one Red Army unit after another and even forced the Communists out of Northern Latvia. Crucially, Lenin’s first attempt to export the revolution to Europe was defeated.4

Map 2

Central and Eastern Europe after the First World War

But the Communists refused to abandon their goal of dominating Europe. They tried to encourage the Germans to revolt against the ‘capitalists’ but this ploy failed after some attempts. The Communist Republic of Hungary was destroyed by rebelling Hungarians and neighbouring nations. After these failures, Communist Russia decided to mass its forces and launch a long-postponed offensive against Poland and then Europe. To interrupt the enemy’s preparations, Pilsudski decided to attack first. His surprise attack in the spring of 1920 captured a large part of Ukraine and in doing so, won time for Poland. In July, the Red Army launched its counter-offensive with the order ‘to the West! Over the corpse of White Poland lies the road to world-wide conflagration!’ The commanders of the Red Army boasted of ‘clattering through the streets of Paris before the summer is over.’ The Poles were pushed back, fighting for their lives. Western governments watched the Red Army’s march on Berlin with considerable interest but did not send reinforcements or any real help. A young adviser to the French military mission in Warsaw, Colonel Charles de Gaulle, observed these events with great interest.5 Poland and Europe were saved by the ‘Miracle on the Vistula’, a furious Polish counter-attack on 15–16 August 1920. Remembered as the last great cavalry battle in European history, the Red Cavalry was defeated and Lenin asked for peace. The British ambassador to Berlin, who had watched the battles near Warsaw from his Rolls-Royce coupé, wrote: ‘If Charles Martell had not checked the Saracen conquest at Tours, the Koran would now be taught at the schools of Oxford. Had Pilsudski and Weygand failed to arrest the triumphant march of the Soviet Army at the Battle of Warsaw, not only Christianity would have experienced a dangerous reverse, but the very existence of Western civilisation would have been imperilled.’ In reality, the Poles had not won more than breathing space: the Soviets’ advance into Europe had been repulsed, but not abandoned. Unfortunately, in 1920 this was not understood.6

The first decade of independence was not easy at all for Central and Eastern Europe. While struggling to establish stable political regimes, Central and Eastern European countries were also forced to bear the economic consequences of the collapse of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. Their largely agrarian economies were burdened by the loss of former markets, hyperinflation and post-war recession. Consequently, nearly all of the Central and Eastern European states experienced economic collapse during the first years of independence. Lodz, the largest textile city in the region, suffered a 75 % drop in production when it lost its traditional Russian market. Losses in the Baltic countries were even greater as Russia had been the natural market for their industrial and agricultural products. Subsequent to their independence, they had to make inroads into hostile European markets that were themselves in recession.7 Nevertheless, significant reforms were introduced in all of the Central and Eastern European countries. Land reforms were passed, some of which were quite extensive, resulting in the break-up of large estates and the redistribution of their property. The first difficult years were followed by a decade of rapid growth in the economy, especially agricultural production, in terms of both quantity and quality. Monetary reforms were introduced in the 1920s and inflation was suppressed. Although Hungary and Poland experienced hyperinflation, other Central European countries stabilised their economies with less economic disruption. The pace of economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe gathered speed chiefly during the latter half of the 1930s.

Table 1

* Figure for 1937 is for undivided German Third Reich.

Source: Eva Ehrlich: Országok versenye 1937–1986. Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Kiadó, 1991, 69.

This created good conditions for the overall modernisation of Central and Eastern Europe. The region was urbanised, some countries more so than others. Industrialisation assumed a more important economic role, although most countries in the region remained agricultural. Major steps were taken in the field of education: new schools were opened and the quality of teaching improved. As a result, illiteracy in Central Europe decreased rapidly. Science and culture developed in quantum leaps. Despite the number of problems to be resolved, achievements were clearly visible. Proof of these accomplishments is reflected by the fond memories of these years held by people who, during subsequent decades, were forced to live under the rule of Communism that renounced these past achievements. At the end of the 1930s, Central and Eastern European countries lagged somewhat behind Finland and Austria, on a par with Greece and Italy, but clearly ahead of Spain and Portugal on GDP per capita.8

Unfortunately, such successes could not conceal failings in other important areas. Democracies in Central Europe were weak and did not last long. Participation in politics was granted to new groups in society. Sadly, however, the political parties representing them were often weak and inexperienced. This led to perpetual political fighting, instability and growing uncertainty. Liberal democracy did not appear to be a very attractive model in this situation. People dreamed of ‘law and order’ and this was promised by different authoritarian rulers. Political liberties were restricted, while parliaments and political parties were dissolved. The first coup of this kind was organised in Poland in 1926 by J. Pilsudski. Shortly thereafter, a coup was staged in Lithuania and in the 1930s, many other countries moved from democracy to autocracy. In some Central and Eastern European countries, Western democracy was actually never founded. One shining exception to this was democratic Czechoslovakia, although it also had national problems to resolve. The authoritarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe cannot, of course, be compared with Fascism in Italy or Nazism in Germany. There were no concentration camps, there was no mass terror and society was not entirely controlled by the state. Moreover, although some political leaders used Fascist rhetoric, the masses were not influenced by it. Compared to the real totalitarian states in the East or the West, Central and Eastern Europe remained safe and stable, continuing to live under the rule of law and enjoying basic civic freedoms.9

The other failing of the Central and Eastern European countries was their inability to coordinate their defence and foreign policies. The concept of the ‘cordon sanitaire’, conceived of as a belt of states holding off Soviet Russia, was not consistently pursued. First, the danger of Communism was underestimated. The world passively looked the other way as the Communist regime waged massive campaigns of terror against its own people, annihilating most of the educated class in Russia, transporting peasants to Siberia during forced deportations, starving to death six to seven million people in the Ukraine during ‘Golodomor’ and repressing millions of people, including entire national groups, during the ‘Great Terror’ of 1937–1938.10 All this would also happen in Central and Eastern Europe. Hitler and the Nazis were similarly underestimated. The immediate consequence of this failure became apparent in the 1930s, when Eastern and Central Europe found itself in the eye of a gathering storm. With Hitler on one side and Stalin on the other, its leaders tried to find ways to protect their independence. This was particularly difficult due to Western Europe’s lack of interest in anything situated east of Germany. In the end, East European countries were considered ‘faraway countries about which we know little’ by Western leaders like Neville Chamberlain.11

Map 3

Central and Eastern Europe during the Second World War

All these misgivings and problems were not very different from the problems of the ‘old’ European states. Public opinion often tends to consider the initial period of independence in Central and Eastern European states to have been a failure. This is unfair. Western democracies also collapsed under the onslaught of totalitarian powers. Internal problems and mistakes were not the main reasons for Central and Eastern European states’ loss of independence. Rather, the tragedy of Central and Eastern Europe was the result of the establishment of totalitarian dictatorships and the inability of European nations to curtail their expansion. Thus, Central and Eastern Europe followed the path of most other European countries in the interim between the wars. During the 1930s, hardly a year passed when one country or another did not see its democratic constitution violated by a dictator or authoritarian leader. It should be remembered that prior to the Second World War, even the least democratic countries in Central and Eastern Europe were more democratic than Western European countries like Germany, Italy or Spain. So there was unity in good and in bad. Mentally and culturally, Central and Eastern Europe was a normal part of Europe. Unfortunately, the political divisions did not respect the region’s cultural roots. During the Second World War, Europe was cut to pieces and divided for the next half century.