Читать книгу The Nature of Conspiracy Theories - Michael Butter - Страница 8

Conspiracy theories assert the existence of a covertly operating group of people – the conspirators – who seek, from base motives and by underhand means, to achieve a certain end. The word ‘conspiracy’ comes from the Latin verb conspirare, meaning to be in harmony or act in concert. A conspiracy, whether real or imagined, is therefore never the work of one individual, but always of a group, whether large or small. But conspiracy theories have other typical characteristics, too, which I discuss in the first part of this chapter, once again using the example of Winston Churchill’s text ‘Zionism versus Bolshevism’. I then go on to consider some typologies that have been proposed for the classification of conspiracy theories. In particular, I distinguish between top-down, bottom-up, internal and external varieties, as well as between scenarios centring on a specific event, a specific group of conspirators or a combination of the above. Next, I address the question of what distinguishes the plots alleged by conspiracy theorists from actual conspiracies. I show that conspiracy theories usually imagine far more comprehensive and ambitious – and hence impracticable – plots than actual conspiracies, which are very limited in terms of their scope and objectives. Above all, conspiracy theories assume a false view of people and history in claiming that history can be planned and controlled over any length of time. This leads me to the observation that the term ‘conspiracy theory’, both in everyday parlance and in academic discourse, is nearly always an evaluative concept that is used to discredit the ideas of others – even if they do not display the typical characteristics of conspiracy theories. That said, it is in my view nevertheless possible to use the term neutrally, as I argue in the fourth part of this chapter. Finally, I examine calls to replace the term ‘conspiracy theory’ with ‘conspiracy ideology’. This discussion is limited to German-speaking countries; elsewhere, scholars seem either to have no problem with it or to accept that the term ‘conspiracy theory’ is already so well established that an alternative would fail to catch on anyway. The debate is, notwithstanding, of general interest, since it highlights the question of how far conspiracy theories are in fact theories, and what distinguishes them from scientific theories.