Читать книгу Battlefields - Michael Rayner - Страница 12

The allied staff had also noted the risk Napoleon was running, concluding, wrongly, that the French were in an increasingly weak position. In fact, of course, Napoleon was planning the concentration necessary for the coming battle. To help assess the enemy strength he sent General Savary to the allied camp with the offer of negotiations. This reinforced the belief of the younger staff in French weakness, although the experienced Kutuzov advised further withdrawal, suggesting that Napoleon would not dare to extend his line of communication even more.

The weather was foul and, unlike the French, whose men were well fed and enthusiastic, the Allies were suffering from the cold and lack of supplies. Having overruled Kutuzov’s advice, Alexander and Francis had no alternative but to advance, with a view to cutting Napoleon’s communication with Vienna. On 28 November Marshal Soult’s advance guard was attacked just east of the village of Austerlitz and, following Napoleon’s orders, fell back to a position west of the Goldbach (golden brook). This withdrawal finally convinced the inexperienced allied staff that the French were trying to avoid a battle, and the Tsar ordered the occupation of the high ground around the village of Pratzen. In fact, Napoleon’s preparations were going smoothly. The Santon hill was fortified with trenches and a battery of eight guns, and orders had been despatched to Bernadotte and Davout to join the rest of the army by forced marching. Appreciating the allied intention, Napoleon relied on Davout’s III Corps to hold the right at all costs.

Allied staff work was very poor, resulting in a chaotic attempt to deploy during the night of 1 December. It is said that the allied commanders took a very casual attitude to the situation, only a few of them bothering to review the plan on the map. Written orders were despatched very late, some not arriving until after the battle began shortly before dawn on 2 December.