Читать книгу Battlefields - Michael Rayner - Страница 18

The events of Tuesday 14 October 1806 are among the most memorable and extraordinary in all the annals of military history: ‘Napoleon won a battle he could not lose, while Davout won a battle he could not win,’ to quote military historian Major General J.F.C. Fuller. The story of these battles really begins in 1805, when the French I Corps of Marshal Bernadotte had marched without permission through the Prussian province of Ansbach, on its way to take part in the Battle of Ulm, which resulted in the surrender of most of the Austrian army under General Mack. The Prussian Foreign Minister, Karl von Haugwitz, (who believed Prussia should remain neutral, and was thus not a particularly good choice of messenger with an ultimatum), was dispatched to find Napoleon and threaten retaliation. At Brnõ (Brünn) the Emperor had given him an audience, but declined to negotiate, being too busy with preparations for the crushing French victory at Austerlitz on 2 December. Von Haugwitz was invited to go on to Vienna, where he would meet his French opposite number, Talleyrand. By the time Napoleon returned to Vienna in December, all von Haugwitz could do was to offer congratulations on the victory. However, one of the terms of the Treaty of Schönbrunn, which established peace between Austria and France, was that Prussia would be mollified by the acquisition of the state of Hannover.

The bulk of the French army (except for the Imperial Guard, which had returned to Paris) remained east of the Rhine, acting as an incentive to the German princes to sign up as members of the new Confederation of the Rhine – Napoleon’s enforced replacement for the old Holy Roman Empire. But Saxony vacillated, despite warnings from France, eventually deciding to ally herself with Prussia, where the continued presence in Germany of French troops was seen by the high command as an affront. Furthermore, Napoleon was having second thoughts about the allocation of Hannover to Prussia, offering to return it to England in exchange for lasting peace. The news of this proposition infuriated the war party, led by the beautiful Queen Louise (colonel in chief of the ‘Queen’s Hussars’) and Prince Louis Ferdinand, who persuaded the King, Frederick William III, to attack Napoleon.

On 10 August 1806, Prussia began to mobilize. King Frederick William was the nominal commander in chief, but had no military experience, and thus appointed Field Marshal von Mollendorf (aged 81) as his advisor. His immediate military subordinates, the Duke of Brunswick, Prince von Hohenlohe and General Rüchel, were all sure of their own ability, and each had personal access to the King – the result was that planning for the forthcoming campaign was confused, and there was no clear and firm chain of command. Decisions were, more often than not, taken at ‘councils of war’, where everyone present thought his ideas the best. Furthermore, the Prussian generals were quite convinced of their superiority over the French. Several had served under the ‘Old Fritz’, Frederick the Great. One or two of them had actually been present, as young captains, at the Battle of Rossbach, on 5 November 1757. Only Prince Louis Ferdinand, at 34, was of comparable age to his French counterparts. The Duke of Brunswick was 71, his chief of staff, General von Scharnhorst, was 61, Field Marshal Hohenlohe was 60 and General Blücher 61. On the other hand, Napoleon was 37, and several of his Marshals about the same age.

The Prussians, and their less-than-enthusiastic Saxon allies, were organized in three army groups. The main army, with which both the King and the Queen travelled, was about 50,000 strong, and commanded by the Duke of Brunswick. The second army group was initially of similar strength, with Prince von Hohenlohe at its head, and the third was a reserve force of about 25,000 men under General Rüchel. The latter included the cavalry division of General Blücher. The Prussian plan for the campaign was confused, but eventually the armies moved to the area of Erfurt, Weimar and Jena, with a view to cutting off the French from the Rhine. After one of the many councils of war, Von Scharnhorst, one of the few Prussian officers who properly appreciated the capabilities of the French army, remarked, ‘I know very well what we should do. What we shall do only the gods know.’ What he knew they should do was to remain east of the Elbe, there to await Russian support, for Russia was still technically at war with France.

Napoleon promptly sent orders to Marshal Berthier to prepare a plan for concentration around Bamberg. Hundreds of German-speaking officers were now despatched to reconnoitre the routes to Berlin, the bridges and fortifications, especially those at Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau and Dresden. On 12 September, Napoleon wrote to the Prussian King, ‘If I am forced to take up arms to defend myself it will be with great regret. The interests of our two countries are so close.’ That same day the Prussians marched into Dresden.

On 15 September, the Emperor ordered the Imperial Guard back to Germany. The operation was a complicated one, organized by the Director General of Posts, Lavalette. The postes in France were every two leagues (four leagues in Germany). 13,000 horses and 3259 vehicles were needed; each horse was paid for at the rate of 5 francs per day. In the event, only about 4000 infantry of the Guard, together with 40 guns, arrived in time for the Battle of Jena. The advance to war continued, with the French pushing northeastward towards Leipzig in three columns. The central column was pre ceded by the light cavalry of Marshal Murat’s reserve force, and led by I Corps (Marshal Bernadotte) with III Corps (Marshal Davout) following. On the right were IV Corps (Marshal Soult) and VI Corps (Marshal Ney). On the left were V Corps (Marshal Lannes) and VII Corps (Marshal Augereau). The whole totalled about 170,000 men and over 300 guns. Napoleon’s orders were that the advance should proceed so that the entire army could concentrate on any one of its components within 48 hours. He likened the movement to that of a battalion square – and his nickname for this army formation was his Bataillon Carré.

MAIN CHARACTERS FEATURED

FRANCE

Marshal Berthier

Marshal Bernadotte, I Corps

Lavalette, Director General of Posts,

Marshal Augereau (VII Corps)

Sergeant Major Guindet (French 10th Hussars)

Auerstädt

Marshal Davout (III Corps)

General Gudin

General Friant

General Morand

Jena

Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte

Marshal Ney (VI Corps)

Marshal Lannes (V Corps)

Marshal Soult (IV Corps)

Marshal Murat (cavalry)

General St Hilaire

PRUSSIA/SAXONY

Field Marshal von Mollendorf

General Blücher (cavalry)

Prince Louis Ferdinand

General von Wartensleben

Auerstädt

King Frederick William commander in chief

Duke of Brunswick

General von Schmettau

General von Scharnhorst (Prussian chief of staff)

Jena

Prince von Hohenlohe

General von Tauentzien

General von Holtzendorf

General Grawert

General Rüchel

Marshal Davout

Duke of Brunswick

A skirmish at Schleiz, on 8 October, resulted in the Prussians falling back towards Jena, but the first major engagement came at Saalfeld, on 10 October, where the advance guard of Hohenlohe’s army under Prince Louis Ferdinand was routed by Marshal Lannes’ V Corps, and the prince himself was killed by Sergeant-Major Guindet of the French 10th Hussars. This event had a serious effect on Prussian morale, and also reduced Hohenlohe’s effective strength for the coming battle of Jena to around 40,000 men.

By 12 October, the Prussians were trying to concentrate between Jena and Weimar. From intelligence reports, Napoleon appreciated there was an opportunity to cut them off from Leipzig and ordered Davout to advance to Naumburg, while Bernadotte was to clear the main road to Leipzig. The remainder of the Bataillon Carré would swing westwards to engulf the enemy. Unknown to him, however, the Prussian high command held a council of war that evening, at which it was decided that Brunswick’s main army, reinforced by Blücher’s cavalry, would withdraw northward, covered by Hohenlohe at Jena and by Rüchel (now only 15,000 strong) at Weimar.

Joachim Murat, the Emperor’s flamboyant, brave and foolhardy brother-in-law, and one of the great cavalry officers of history, leads from the front as thousands of Napoleon’s cavalry reserve pursue the Prussians.