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CHAPTER 6

Pragmatic

Truce, Treaty and Debate,

July–December 1921

Hardly was the Truce declared on 11 July when Brugha and Mulcahy began squabbling once again. The particular reason was a relatively trivial one. During the war, an ex-British army officer by the name of W.G. Robbie owned a typewriter sales company and he had in his possession eleven American manufactured Yost typewriters. These typewriters were once the property of the British army. The IRA unceremoniously removed them from his premises. Robbie was convinced that his secretary had informed Sinn Féin on him, so he got rid of her. The IRA then forced him to leave the country. However, with the coming of peace, he applied for permission to be allowed home.1

Next day, 12 July, Mulcahy contacted Collins and asked him to deal with the case, ‘a very bad one’.2 Tom Cullen, one of Collins’ men, duly became involved. Brugha was informed of this on 27 July.3 He immediately made an angry complaint to O’Sullivan, as AG, about Collins, who, two days later, had been in contact with Tom Cullen on the matter:4 ‘The handling of this case from start to finish … displays an amateurishness that I thought we had long ago outgrown.’ Also, he hoped that Mulcahy would take action against Collins: ‘I intend to see about putting our Department of Information [Intelligence] on such a footing that things of this kind cannot occur in future.’5

At any rate, by September, as far as Mulcahy was concerned, the case had been adequately dealt with by Collins and was therefore closed. Even so, he expressed annoyance with Brugha’s criticisms: ‘I consider the tone of your letter of 30th July is very unfortunate.’6 But, of course, this remark merely served to provoke yet another angry reaction from Brugha:

The latter’s [Collins’] memo of July 29th. was not the result of your note of the 12th. but of mine of July 28th. – 16 days later … What good purpose was served by your writing 5 weeks after the event is probably best known to yourself. To me it seems a further development of that presumption on your part that prompted you to ignore for some months past the duly appointed Deputy Chief of Staff [Stack]. However, before you are very much older, my friend, I shall show you that I have … little intention of taking dictation from you as to how I should reprove inefficiency or negligence on the part of yourself or the D/I [Collins], as I have of allowing you to appoint a Deputy Chief of Staff of your own choosing.7

Mulcahy immediately handed the problem over to de Valera, thereby implicating him in a controversy which had the potential to develop into a profound split at the very top of the state-building elite: ‘I cannot usefully discuss any matter with the Minister for Defence, and in view of the spirit in which the endorsement of the 7th September is written, I cannot accede to his request to preside at or be present at any meeting of the staff.’8 It would appear, therefore, that he had asked for an apology from Brugha, but, having got a begrudging one only, he opted to withdraw his labour in protest, thereby giving Brugha the perfect opportunity to suspend him sine die, which, on 12 September, he warned him he would do if he did not comply by noon the next day. Mulcahy didn’t comply, whereupon Brugha proceeded as promised: ‘You will hand over to the Deputy Chief of Staff all monies, papers, books, and any other property of the Department in your possession.’9 But de Valera must have intervened as requested because Mulcahy turned up at Sheila Humphrey’s house on the Ailesbury Road, where Brugha and Stack were already gathered. Stack left immediately and, in de Valera’s presence, Brugha wept tears of frustration as he explained to Mulcahy that he himself could do no wrong, by which he probably meant that he always acted with the best of intentions, which was about as good an apology as Mulcahy was ever likely to receive from the man.10

Mulcahy later claimed that his trouble with Brugha was a form of collateral damage emanating from Brugha’s preoccupation with Collins: ‘I was a bad contact for the transmission of these attacks, and in that way Cathal became somewhat antagonistic to myself.’11 That was never the full story because Brugha would still have been suspicious of a military-based IRB, with or without Collins. Besides, once de Valera made up his mind to take on Collins, the unsettled political context widened considerably, as the following chain of events illustrates.

On 22 June, de Valera proposed that Brugha, Mulcahy and Collins draft a military statement outlining their fidelity to the Cabinet, ‘As an attempt is being made by the British Propagandists and others to misrepresent the position of the Army of the Republic.’12 Moreover, on 9 July, Mulcahy was not appointed to the delegation which met with Macready, arguably Mulcahy’s military counterpart, in order to settle the terms of the Truce13 and, from 11 July, de Valera and Brugha opened face-to-face communication with the IRA. Mulcahy immediately became suspicious that Brugha, in particular, was paying too much attention to the IRA’s complaints about the way the war had been managed.14

Then, lo and behold, probably in late July, Stack came into prominence. Ever since March 1918 there had been an understanding that the position of DCS was his for the taking and, after his escape from Strangeways Prison, Manchester, on 25 October 1919,15 he actually did attend GHQ meetings in that capacity, though he submitted his resignation during the autumn of 1920 in order to commit himself more fully to the running of Home Affairs, for which he was also responsible.16

It is perhaps understandable, therefore, that there was some antagonism when Stack decided to exercise the DCS option once again. Mulcahy, in particular, was not happy, even though, according to himself, it was he who made the DCS offer in the first place in March 1918.17 However, by 1 August 1921, he had changed his mind and opted to defy both Brugha and Stack by appointing Eoin O’Duffy instead.18 In addition, as Brugha already alleged (in the previous block quote),19 he might have decided to give Stack the cold shoulder. But significantly, on 15 September, the Cabinet minutes recorded the following:

Personnel to be asked to re-enlist. M.D. to get out necessary instructions. Volunteer Executive to be notified. 2. C.S. to preside at Staff Meetings. If the M.D. wishes to meet the Staff on a particular question, he may preside at such meeting. 3. Austin S. to attend at Staff meetings. 4. Names of Officers of H.Q. Staff & Divl. Commdts. To be submitted by C/S through M/D for ratificn. by Cabinet.20

Next, on 4 November, the minutes said: ‘The Min. for Defence to take steps immediately to give effect to a former decision for recommissioning of the Army. To begin with, commissions to be offered to all members of the old headquarter[s] staff and the divisional commanders.’21

Therefore, given the adroitness of those decisions, it is virtually certain that de Valera had at last decided to publicly lend his weight to Brugha’s enduring struggle to gain homage from Collins and Mulcahy. Indeed, similar to Brugha’s oath of allegiance initiative of 20 August 1919, their shared objective was ‘to strengthen the constitutional position by a more explicit expression of the absolute subordination of the Army to the Government’,22 as Florrie O’Donoghue so aptly put it.

Clearly, then, from Mulcahy’s perspective, there could be little or no relief in the short term. For instance, had he thought that he had at last faced Brugha down, at least in terms of day-to-day one-upmanship, he was wrong. Soon afterwards Brugha informed him that he was to have no formal role in the Treaty negotiations.23 And, on 4 October, he also informed him that the Cabinet had, four days previously,24 appointed Ginger O’Connell to chair a commission on defence.25 On the face of it, O’Connell was probably the best choice for that sort of work. His interests were military history and theory, particularly operations and training, on which topics he had already contributed notes to The Irish Volunteer and to An tÓglach.26 So, on those grounds, Mulcahy should hardly have begrudged O’Connell the honour. But other considerations made that response unlikely.

In the first instance, O’Connell also featured in Collins’ Hans Place defence team list, along with O’Duffy and Emmet Dalton. Ironically Brugha was also annoyed by those appointments, because, technically speaking, they fell within his Ministerial brief,27 and because, even after six weeks, the issue of Ministerial responsibility had still not been settled, causing de Valera, at Brugha’s request, to express the opinion at a Cabinet meeting ‘that all business should be transacted through the responsible Ministers’.28

Then, O’Duffy had just lately joined Collins and Ó Murthuile in the IRB executive as treasurer,29 thereby ipso facto making him more politically powerful than his nominal boss in GHQ, who was a prominent but less senior Brother. (Perhaps in continuation of his membership of the SC since July 1917 – as already mentioned in the context of his appointment as secretary of the WTMA during the Ashe funeral – Mulcahy was almost certainly voted on to the SC at the end of the period, March -mid-October 1921, during which time the IRB’s biennial elections were held.30) In addition, O’Duffy and Collins had of late become closer to the extent that, just prior to his death, he told Batt O’Connor that O’Duffy had the necessary ability to eventually replace him.31 He had even brought him along to share a platform with him at a republican rally in south Armagh, part of Collins’ Dáil constituency, where the two strands of the post-Treaty north-eastern policy – conciliation and coercion – were all but unveiled. Collins promised the audience of 10,000 that he would not neglect them politically and O’Duffy promised to defend them militarily.32

And, possibly because Collins had to move fast on the London appointments, Mulcahy was not kept up to date by him. For those three reasons – Brugha keeping him at home, O’Connell’s and O’Duffy’s promotions and Collins’ ignoring of him – Mulcahy reacted with apprehension. Next day, 5 October, he wanted to know from Brugha what powers O’Connell would have and how those powers would relate to GHQ.33 Brugha replied that, because O’Connell’s job was to compose memoranda on naval and aerial subjects, he, O’Connell, would have duties but no powers.34

Mulcahy continued his fightback three weeks later. On 22 October, he wrote to Brugha that he was awaiting instructions on the formation of the ‘new army’ and, despite the fact that he had already been told that he was not allowed to name his GHQ, he recommended, in particular, that O’Duffy should become DCS and that O’Connell should become Assistant Chief of Staff (ACS).35 On 1 November, he wrote to Brugha again: ‘With reference to my no. 171 of 22/10/21 and our conversation of yesterday, it is obvious that, if the Ministry decide to make an appointment to such an important Staff position [Stack’s proposed position as DCS?] against my judgment, I cannot accept responsibility attaching to any position on the Staff.’36 Then, on 16 November, he acknowledged Brugha’s offer to him of the position of CS but added that his acceptance was conditional on the proviso ‘that an appointment to a position on the General Staff should not be made against his [the CS’s] judgment and without his concurrence’.

Brugha replied straight away. Yet he offered no compromise: ‘It is not proposed to vest the holder of the position [of CS] with the powers you describe. His advice will be sought and considered, but both himself and the whole general staff will be appointed by the cabinet on the recommendation of the M/D.’ Furthermore, he tried to trump Mulcahy’s previous suggestion regarding O’Duffy and O’Connell, by recommending that Stack would become DCS and O’Duffy would become DO.37

On 17 November, Mulcahy forwarded a copy of Brugha’s correspondence to Collins, in which he declared that ‘If the proposals of the M/Defence are accepted[,] I, at any rate, cannot continue to act in any way on the Staff.’ He closed with the comment that he ‘proposed addressing a memorandum to the President on one or two points in connection with the matter’.38 Even so, four days later, he contacted Brugha again to the effect that his ‘willingness to continue to bear the responsibilities for this position of Chief of Staff is contingent on the Cabinet’s decision regarding the rest of the personnel of the General Staff’.39 Then, next day, 22 November, he complained on GHQ’s behalf about the issue of seniority and ranking: ‘The apparent proposal to give Directors on the General staff ranks subordinate to Divisional Commandants, raises serious difficulties.’ Moreover, he requested that ‘the Cabinet will meet the old G.H.Q. Staff, in order: 1. That the Cabinet proposals may be explained to them, and 2. That the passing of the old G.H.Q. Staff[,] as such, may not be without some formality.’40

Brugha replied immediately. Amazingly, he seemed to offer a compromise: ‘I intend recommending to the cabinet that the personnel of the new Staff shall be the same as the old one that worked so well.’41 Regarding the suggested Cabinet/GHQ meeting, there was little time, he said, but he would try to facilitate him. Then, next day, having already realised, two weeks previously, that Brugha and Stack intended to ‘bust it up’,42 and having been informed of developments by Griffith, as well as, seemingly, been concerned, like Mulcahy, that there should be an acknowledgment of the work which the ‘old’ army had put in, Collins contacted Mulcahy: ‘I think we ought to have a meeting of the GHQ staff very early Friday morning [25 November]’,43 the day which was settled upon for the Cabinet/GHQ meeting, it being coincidentally the eighth anniversary of the founding of the Volunteers.

And so, on the Friday, at three o’clock, Griffith and Collins attended at the drawing room of the Mansion House for the first full Cabinet meeting since the beginning of the Treaty negotiations.44 There were two weighty topics on the agenda, namely the envisioned reference to the monarch in the Treaty document,45 and the army question. In all, the Cabinet meeting lasted seven hours. There were two parts to it. The first part lasted four hours, overrunning its allocated time by one hour, and the second part, with Mulcahy present, lasted a further three hours.46

Most of the seven-hour period was devoted to the army question and, according to the Cabinet minutes, de Valera and Brugha secured virtually all of what they had been striving for in terms of modernising the civil–military relationship, and in terms of disempowering the army-based IRB. Consider the following civil–military decisions:‘(b) The supreme body directing the Army is the Cabinet; (c) The immediate executive representative of the Govt. is the Min. for Def. who is therefore Administrative Head of the Army. The MD is [should be?] a civilian; (d) The Administrative Head of the Army is responsible to the Govt. for the well-being & efficiency of the Army.’47 And also consider the following army organisational decisions: ‘(f) All appointments in the Army must be sanctioned by the Min. for Defence; (g) The Min. for Defence has the right to nominate, or veto the nomination of any member of the Army, but he must produce a working Army.’48 Moreover, on the same subject, the minutes record that every member of GHQ accepted their commissions, Mulcahy even taking an oath of acceptance of his duties under the terms of the new dispensation.

Nonetheless, there are clues in the minutes which indicate that all was not well. In the first instance, de Valera knew that he had to sweeten the pill of change if he was to succeed: ‘The Army to be referred as the ‘‘Recommissioned Army’’ instead of the ‘‘New Army’’ henceforth.’49 Also, the act of defining the duties of the CS position was not an open-and-shut case: ‘The President to draw up a memo defining the executive powers of the Chief of Staff.’50 Then there was the difficulty that, even though Mulcahy would have three adjutants, namely O’Connell, as ACS; Stack, as DCS; and O’Duffy, as DCS, O’Duffy was in the most powerful position because: ‘Comt. E. O’Duffy to act as full representative of the Chief of Staff during the latter’s absence.’51 But the real clue that de Valera was not in a strong position is the existence of a Cabinet minute which said that everyone in GHQ had agreed to accept their commissions. The reality, of course, was that GHQ, as immediate events were to show, most certainly did not agree to accept.