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Operation Eclipse

The idea to disarm, demobilize, and demilitarize Germany was first enunciated in the Atlantic Charter of 14 August 1941, and began to take concrete form in May of 1943 when the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate; COSSAC), under Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan, were charged by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) to plan, among other things, for the occupation of Germany in the event of a sudden German collapse.¹

This plan, originally called Operation Rankin and then Operation Talisman before it became Operation Eclipse, was two years in the making, and this chapter, which relates its history, also serves to establish a starting point from which to view the underlying theme of this book—the rearming of the Federal Republic of Germany—and the problems encountered by the United States as a result of reversing a long-standing policy to keep the Germans disarmed for decades. This chapter also speaks to the lack of government guidance given to US military forces as they prepared to occupy Germany and, to a lesser extent, the belated and misguided plans and preparations the government had for the occupation without a full understanding of what the occupation would entail.

The total demilitarization of Germany became a major undertaking requiring the development of agreed-upon guidance, policy directives, manpower, and time. Plans were developed at various levels and in various agencies on both sides of the Atlantic, which were embroiled in interdepartmental rivalries and tensions. Furthermore, they had also been left to act in the absence of authoritative guidance and, in the case of the United States, presidential decisiveness. During the Roosevelt administration, for example, decision-making was unstructured and interdepartmental coordination was both informal and haphazard. Additionally, the State Department had lost the president’s confidence and its influence waned while the military assumed considerable prestige.²

Two months later, in July 1943, the British War Cabinet revised its 1942 organization to create a posthostilities subcommittee under COSSAC to tackle the question of how Germany was to be treated after victory was achieved. The purpose of this new committee was “confined to the consideration of drafts for instruments to conclude hostilities and to enforce compliance with armistice or surrender terms.”³ It assigned Colonel T. N. Grazebrook to head the subcommittee and tasked it to “prepare drafts of documents . . . required in connection with the formal suspension of hostilities . . . and to submit plans for the enforcement of such instruments by armistice and disarmament commissions.”⁴

In December 1943, a British government report entitled Occupation of Germany outlined the cases for and against total occupation and asked whether it was necessary. The report specified that one of the United Nations’ (UN) objectives upon cessation of hostilities should be the “rapid and total disarmament of Germany and the breakup of the German military machine.” It made the case that the situation that existed following World War I should not again be tolerated and that sufficient armed forces should be distributed throughout Germany to prevent the delay in and difficulty enforcing the terms of surrender in the Versailles Treaty. The point was further made that the sooner Germany was disarmed, the sooner the work of reconstruction could begin. The authors believed it would take two years after the war ended to complete the total disarmament of Germany and the destruction of its armaments industries.

To ensure that the post–World War I scenario would not be repeated, the British proposed that eleven divisions of land forces, seven regiments of armored cars plus the necessary nondivisional units—a total of 310,000 personnel—supervise the first two years of the posthostilities period. To back this force up, twenty-eight air force squadrons, to include light and fighter-bombers as well as reconnaissance aircraft, would be needed.⁵ The assumptions made in the report show the level of distrust the British had for Germany, as well as British fears that a resurgent Germany would somehow find a way to circumvent the disarmament regime that would be imposed upon it.

The British also believed that once the Allies entered Germany they would find a significant amount of civil disorder as well as large numbers of German troops who would need to be disarmed, hence the need for the large number of ground forces. The report also indicates that the presence of a large Allied air force as well as occasional mass formation flights would have a considerable effect on German morale by reminding the Germans that they had been defeated.⁶

It was not until 1944, however, that the broader concepts of occupation began to be reflected in Allied planning. With the establishment of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) under General Dwight D. Eisenhower in January 1944, the disarmament and demilitarization issue became the responsibility of the deputy chief of staff for operations (G-3), Major General Harold R. Bull (US), and, following the cessation of hostilities, the deputy chief of staff for civil affairs (G-5, Civil Affairs Division), Lieutenant General A. E. Grasset (UK).⁷ What little direction SHAEF could get came from the US War Department, the British War Office, and the joint European Advisory Commission (EAC) established by the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943.⁸ It was, however, in the posthostilities subcommittee under Colonel Grazebrook, now part of SHAEF’s Operations Division (G-3), that many of the most important demilitarization staff studies and memoranda were developed.

Among the various agencies responsible for formulating presurrender and postwar policy for Germany, those in Washington were slowest to recognize the need for postwar planning and most severely plagued by serious divisions and fundamental differences in outlook. The Working Security Committee (WSC), composed of war, navy, and state department representatives, was created in December 1943, but agreement on the function of the committee was never really reached. In addition, the perspectives of the state and war departments regarding the tasks to be performed by Allied military forces during the occupation were greatly at odds with one another and began long before the war in Europe ended. In fact, until 1948, the State Department maintained liaison with the War Department on German issues through an “Occupied Areas” office, as it did not have a German division.⁹

As an example, when the EAC held its first meeting in January 1944, three months after it was formed, Ambassador John G. Winant, the US representative, had yet to receive any guidance from Washington concerning the main task of the meeting (i.e., preparing surrender terms for Germany). Furthermore, according to Winant’s biographer, the ambassador received only one policy directive with authoritative clearances between March and October 1944. During this period, Winant sent his political advisor, George F. Kennan, to Washington to seek guidance, to no avail, and in July 1944, Winant’s military advisor, Brigadier General Cornelius W. Wickersham, also personally appealed to the WSC for policy guidance with little apparent success. Washington’s failure to provide guidance was also felt by Eisenhower, who, following the entry of US combat forces into Germany in September 1944, urgently requested guidance from Washington regarding the control and occupation of Germany.¹⁰ The infighting within the WSC precluded any effective communication or coordination until early March 1944.¹¹

It appears that the multiplicity of agencies, both military and civilian, in the United States and Great Britain made the posthostilities planning process thorough and extremely broad in its coverage, but also overly bureaucratic, cumbersome and, to some degree, duplicative. From the end of the war in Europe until the USSR walked out of the Allied Control Council (ACC) in 1948, the disarmament and demilitarization process was increasingly encumbered by political obstacles that left many tasks unresolved. Thus, as will be seen, it was left to SHAEF to formulate the plans that would permit Eisenhower to carry out the tasks required to disarm German soldiers, disband and demobilize Germany’s armed forces, dispose of German war matériel, and begin the process of demilitarizing Germany.

Initial Thoughts on Disarming Germany

In late November 1943, using the initial posthostilities plan Operation Rankin Case C,¹² COSSAC drafted an initial study that provided suggestions for the composition of the disarmament detachments that would supervise the process to be effected by the German High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres, or OKH). This was, of course, predicated on the belief that German troops remained subject to the discipline of the OKH. The proposed disarmament detachments were to be small and consist only of the personnel needed to communicate the orders of the Allied High Command and supervise their observance. A follow-up study highlighted several areas of concern, such as the guarding of dumps and the responsibility for disarming the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) and Navy (Kriegsmarine). It was also brought up that as the naval ports and facilities were on land, creating points of contact with land forces, they should not be the unilateral responsibility of the Admiralty.¹³

On 23 December 1943, the first full draft of COSSAC’s disarmament study was forwarded to general staff officers (GSOs 1) for review. Its objective outlined the steps to be taken by the supreme commander to enforce disarmament of the German Army in his area of responsibility (AOR) between the time of the envisioned armistice and the transfer of responsibility to a disarmament commission. The scope of this paper covered German forces outside Germany, German forces in transit over the frontiers of Germany, and German forces in Germany. Contrary to the initial study, it stated that naval disarmament was an Admiralty responsibility and thus would not be considered in the paper.¹⁴

The draft disarmament study also indicated that the posthostilities subcommittee was drafting a paper on the composition and functions of a European disarmament commission for consideration by the COSSAC and, upon approval by the British government, submission to the EAC. That said, the study postulated that the supreme commander, Allied Forces (SCAF) would be responsible for the complete disarmament of the German armed forces until the transfer of responsibility to the disarmament commission took place—a period expected to be approximately two months. It absolved the SCAF of any responsibility for the disbanding of the German armed forces or the dismantling and destruction of German fortifications and similar works.

Among the several main considerations in this paper was the admonition that disarmament was to be immediate and that no German should be allowed to enter Germany bearing arms. Citing the circumstances that followed World War I, the paper stated that “after the last war it was possible for the Germans to pretend that the German Army had never been beaten in the field because it returned to Germany still bearing its arms. This is another mistake which must not be repeated.”¹⁵ It also reminded its readers that the German Army had been able to hinder the effectiveness of the Military Control Commission after the last war, which was why total disarmament needed to be carried out immediately after the armistice, without exceptions. By 1 January 1944, the second draft of this study had grown in size and detail, adding sections for action by the air commander in chief as well as ground and air force commanders.

An unofficial assessment of this disarmament issue by the land forces subcommittee estimated that the British alone would need to provide 270 officers and 1,300 other ranks to man the necessary disarmament detachments, both fixed and mobile. Aside from the security of dumps, depots, and stores of war matériel, two key concerns were that it would prove difficult for Allied forces to enter Germany fast enough to ensure the rapid disarmament of the German forces already inside Germany, and that their ability to supervise the expected millions of disarmed German soldiers found in barracks and camps both inside and outside Germany would be insufficient.¹⁶ That said, the British appear to have believed that creating new staff for disarmament at this time was a waste of already scarce manpower. Instead, it was decided that a number of personnel from the Staff Duties Section would form the nucleus of a disarmament staff until Rankin C conditions were obtained. Colonel Grazebrook was named to undertake this task.¹⁷

German evasions of the terms of the Versailles Treaty and their protestations that the war had not been lost were themes repeated both in Washington and London. According to the terms of the World War I armistice, the Germans were required to evacuate German-occupied territories on the Western Front within two weeks. Any troops remaining in these areas were to be interned or taken as prisoners of war (POWs). Allied forces were to occupy the left bank of the Rhine within a month, and a neutral zone was to be established on the right bank. In terms of military equipment, the Germans were to turn over to the Allies 5,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 machine guns, 3,000 trench mortars, 2,000 aircraft, 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 railway wagons, 5,000 trucks and its entire submarine fleet. The majority of Germany’s surface naval fleet was interned; the remainder was to be disbanded.¹⁸

A memo by a prominent German lawyer who had fled to the United States and joined the US Army, prepared for Major General John H. Hilldring, chief of the newly formed Civil Affairs Division in the War Department, and written from personal knowledge, stated that when the armistice was signed in 1918, it was signed “at Compiegne at a time when the German armies were holding in Russia, Turkey, the Balkans, Belgium and France. The German soldier did not realize he was defeated. . . . After the proclamation of the Armistice the German troops going back through France and Belgium gave the appearance of well-organized fighting units. They had observed good marching discipline, and were fully equipped with rifles, machine guns and cannons. Their flags were flying and their bands were playing.”¹⁹

On 14 January 1944, Major General C. A. West (UK), deputy chief of staff (G-3), highlighted in a COSSAC memo the fact that there was a complete lack of UN policy to help deal with problems arising from Operation Rankin. General West specifically addressed the issue of armistice terms and disarmament, stating that there had been considerable guidance from British sources but that they dealt exclusively with long-term policy after the initial occupation of Germany. It was essential now, he wrote, that papers on all these problems be prepared with some urgency. This would allow the SCAF to lay down policy for the first ninety days following the armistice. He then outlined ten issue areas that needed addressing to include armistice terms and disarmament, and assigned both G-3 and G-4 (Logistics) divisions the responsibility for developing these papers. He also addressed both the navy and air staffs and invited them to nominate officers to work on issues of interest to them.²⁰

By 25 January, the draft COSSAC disarmament paper had become a SHAEF paper and been sent to SHAEF’s head planners, indicating that significant amendments from the previous meeting had been incorporated and that unless controversial points arose during the coordination process there would be no further meetings on that paper. Among the various changes incorporated was a war establishment / table of organization (WE/TO) for the disarmament mission that now included manning for separate US and British units.²¹

The paper was released under the signature of Colonel Grazebrook, then Deputy Chief Staff Duties Section (G-3). The fifteen-page paper contained four appendices and a map. Extremely detailed, it included suggested sizes and compositions for mobile missions as well as disarmament detachments to be set up in German military districts (Wehrkreisen), and outlined the responsibilities of SHAEF and the German commanders who were to be used to implement disarmament under Allied supervision. In April, the study, now titled Primary Disarmament of the German Armed Forces, was forwarded to the SHAEF chief of staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, for approval. The cover letter stated that the total personnel requirement for the necessary disarmament missions would be 272 officers and 165 enlisted men and other ranks. This study, which was the second of four such studies, was approved on 29 April 1944 and issued as PS-SHAEF (44)10.²²

There was one aspect of this study to which the British Foreign Office objected. The offending paragraphs stated that German forces would be used to guard German arms and supply depots in liberated territories to prevent them from being raided by Allied nations. The Foreign Office suggested that Allied governments would be offended to learn that after their liberation from the Germans, German troops were being retained on their territory to do a job the Allies could do. Furthermore, the Foreign Office believed the Allies would be none too pleased that Germans were needed to protect the dumps from Allied nations. The Foreign Office expressed its hope that these paragraphs would be thoroughly reconsidered.²³

Several days later, the Allied naval staff sent a memo to the Admiralty asking for guidance on naval objectives that still needed to be occupied and on additional naval operations that were to be carried out. It suggested that naval disarmament requirements could be met by including naval representation in the disarmament missions then being prepared by SHAEF. The memo also included an enclosure with a timetable establishing when various ports were to be occupied under the present plan as well as under an accelerated, modified plan. The timetable indicated that none of the German ports could be occupied sooner than seventeen days after the armistice was signed.²⁴

In early February, the War Office asked SHAEF for estimates of manpower needs for the control and disarmament commission. The War Office said that the bulk of the requested technical personnel would come at the expense of the 21st Army Group and forces in the United Kingdom that were needed for reinforcement or maintenance, and asked that requirements be kept as small as possible until the war was over.²⁵

Responsibilities of the Supreme Commander

Concurrent with the planning taking place in SHAEF during 1944, questions concerning the postsurrender responsibilities of the supreme commander continued to be raised. In May, General Eisenhower received his first directive on military government in Germany. Known as CCS 551, Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, the directive vested in him supreme legislative, executive, and judicial powers but contained nothing regarding disarmament or demilitarization.²⁶ The receipt of CCS 551, and its guidance for military government in those areas of Germany captured by the Allies before the war was terminated made the lack of definitive guidance regarding Eisenhower’s responsibilities following Germany’s surrender even more urgent. Accordingly, and shortly before planning for Operation Talisman began, two additional documents, a staff study (titled Preparations for the Armistice and Post Hostilities Middle Period) and a memorandum (titled Short Term Post-Hostilities Responsibilities and Planning), addressed the responsibilities of the supreme commander and his powers during the “middle” or “military period.”²⁷

The key feature of the staff study was its recommendation that the German Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW) should be used to impose the will of the Allies upon a defeated Germany. Acknowledging that the EAC was still working on the Instrument of Surrender and that directives to complement the surrender document were still required from CCS, the study went on to consider the kinds of problems the supreme commander would confront during the middle period before an Allied control authority was established. These issues included control of the OKW, which was expected to remain in existence to ensure the terms of surrender were met; the disposal of enemy war matériel and captured arms; the destruction of enemy fortifications; the disbandment of the German armed forces, including their discipline, provisions, and use as labor before being demobilized; and lastly, the disposal of the German secret police, the Gestapo, and the denazification of those police forces that would be retained to impose law and order.²⁸

The memorandum, written by General Bull, reflected the contents of a memo written by Colonel Grazebrook one month earlier. General Bull bemoaned the still-confused state of postwar planning and preparation and the fact that the CCS had yet to send any guidance relating to the supreme commander’s responsibilities. Many different bodies, he continued, primarily in the United Kingdom, were studying the problem but there was no real coordination between them or within SHAEF, despite the great deal of planning that had been carried out by the various divisions.

Attached to Bull’s memorandum was a second memorandum, designed to be sent to the CCS by Eisenhower, outlining actions that needed to be taken by SHAEF to provide Eisenhower with the necessary special staffs he would require to initiate plans for the immediate postsurrender period. Most importantly, it recommended that the SHAEF planning staff be placed at the disposal of the EAC for “consultation and exploratory work.”²⁹ The attached memorandum recognized that it was not possible to predict when Germany would surrender but that, though the EAC was working on establishing the necessary postdefeat machinery to be set up in Germany (and Austria), it was likely the actual surrender could come about before the Allies had agreed on what to do. Therefore, the memorandum continued, it stood to reason that Eisenhower, as the supreme commander, needed to be prepared to initiate the occupation and control of Germany immediately following the cessation of hostilities, and that his responsibilities in that respect would continue for some indeterminate period.

The second memorandum also highlighted the fact that the British Chiefs of Staff had already established the Control Commission Military Staff (CCMS) and that extensive planning had been accomplished on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff. It also recognized that the British Foreign Office and other ministries had established various working committees but that apart from the work done by military staffs of each nation in the EAC and that already done within SHAEF, General Eisenhower was unaware of any comparable posthostilities planning by either the Soviet Union or the United States.

The memorandum ended with a series of conclusions and recommendations regarding General Eisenhower’s need to cope with the fact that there might not be enough time before the war ended for the EAC to complete its work or to select and train the specialist staffs he needed for the occupation. These specialist staffs needed to be assembled to fit the final British and US organization for control in Germany.

The recommendations included steps to ensure that SHAEF would have the necessary US and British personnel to implement the planning and man the executive staff, as well as sufficient authority to approve directives to these staffs and subordinate field commanders to occupy and seize administrative and political control of West Germany and disarm the German forces in Western Europe.³⁰ The memorandum was never sent because a cable arrived from the CCS that gave “the Supreme Commander the responsibility to act for a period after the signing of the Armistice.”³¹

At approximately the same time, and for the reason outlined in Bull’s memorandum, Eisenhower requested the establishment of the nucleus of an American control council to prepare for the postsurrender period. In a memo hand-carried to the JCS by General Wickersham, Eisenhower cited the existence of the British Control Council element while bemoaning the lack of any parallel US or Soviet group in the United Kingdom aside from those assigned to the EAC. He also indicated that he was not aware of any such planning staffs in either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Eisenhower related further that SHAEF had begun a great deal of posthostility planning and that American and British specialist personnel had been earmarked for training. A basic manual for military government had also been drafted based on previously received presurrender guidance. The problem, however, was the lack of top-down planning: nothing had been done to provide senior leadership for Allied control staffs, policy guidance, or key personnel. The stage had now been reached, Eisenhower continued, where the appointment of a nuclear group had become an urgent necessity. Eisenhower then recommended that immediate appointments be made for deputies to the yet-to-be-named chiefs of the control council, for a US equivalent of the British element in the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Demilitarization Group, and for key personnel in the Military Government Group.³²

On 4 August, the JCS approved Eisenhower’s requests and agreed that US personnel should be so assigned. The JCS further concurred on the appointment of a general officer to be the acting deputy to the chief US representative to the control council and named Wickersham, still the US military representative to Ambassador Winant on the EAC, to fill the position. Ten days later, the JCS authorized the assignment of 289 officers, 32 warrant officers, and 356 enlisted personnel—some of whom were to come from the European theater as well as the war and navy departments—to the US element Eisenhower had requested.³³

What is interesting and underscores the lack of coordination between the EAC, the JCS, and SHAEF is that eight months earlier, in mid-December 1943, Major General Ray W. Barker (US), deputy chief of COSSAC, had written to Major General Hilldring to ask about the status of the plan for German disarmament following the cessation of hostilities. He reminded Hilldring that the EAC had been tasked with creating the Terms of Surrender, of which disarmament was an important element. Given the broad guidance that was expected from the EAC, Barker wrote that a number of questions—some which would have political as well as military and technical ramifications—would arise and that answers would need to be found. Barker suggested coordinating the US-British position on these issues in order to have a common position upon which to base discussions in the EAC, formulate Allied policies, and prepare operational plans to implement EAC decisions. To this end, he suggested that the United States send a cadre of knowledgeable officers, headed by an officer of “suitable background and attainment,” to London to join with a similar group created by the British War Office. Barker closed by requesting that this cadre come with an agenda and firm guidance from both the War Department and the Department of State.³⁴

While no record of General Hilldring’s response to Barker has been found, Hilldring obviously took the opportunity to fill what appeared to be an organizational vacuum and advance the interests of his Civil Affairs Division. He drafted and forwarded to the JCS a proposal that, in effect, duplicated General Barker’s suggestion to develop a cadre to deal with disarmament issues and even included several of Barker’s paragraphs verbatim as justification. Hilldring’s proposal stated at the outset that no agency had been designated to prepare policy recommendations for the JCS covering problems arising from this issue. Hilldring concluded that an agency was required to oversee the development of said policies for JCS approval and transmission to the US delegate on the EAC. However, instead of recommending that a cadre of qualified officers be sent to London, as Barker had suggested, Hilldring recommended that his Civil Affairs Division become that new agency, stating that the creation of a new entity, such as the proposed disarmament committee, was “unnecessary and undesirable.”³⁵ Hilldring sent a copy of his proposal to General Wickersham in London, apparently in reply to a letter from Wickersham that addressed the same topic.³⁶ Based upon Eisenhower’s memoranda to the CCS and the JCS, it appears that nothing became of Hilldring’s proposal.

The failure to provide guidance to Eisenhower, however, remained unresolved as late as fall 1944.³⁷ In mid-October 1944, Grazebrook submitted a number of papers to SHAEF’s deputy chief of staff outlining the need for a senior officer to be in charge of posthostilities planning, as the EAC had still failed to devise any such policies and the three Allied powers had not come to an agreement on any final policy as of that date. This vacuum meant that the supreme commander would not be afforded the luxury of guidance regarding the occupation of Germany, unless a senior officer was appointed. Grazebrook felt that a senior officer could direct a survey of all the tasks and responsibilities that would face the supreme commander to ensure that the plans, now coming to fruition in SHAEF, represented a sound policy for him to follow under any of the conditions he might face.³⁸

Once Grazebrook learned that his memo had been approved, he submitted a second paper with recommendations for executing his proposal, a list of agencies with whom coordination would be essential, and the suggestion that, due to its familiarity with the issues to be confronted, his posthostilities subsection become the staff of the new senior officer or co-coordinator for planning. Grazebrook then appended a list of important papers that had been or were being prepared by SHAEF or outside agencies, as well as a list of matters that required further attention, many of which were incorporated into subsequent studies, occupation directives, and laws.³⁹

This planning coordination was undertaken by the deputy chief of staff and the first meeting to coordinate plans and policies was called for 8 November 1944.⁴⁰ This initial meeting had far-reaching results in that it highlighted a number of issues that needed review, revision, or initiation, and a progress report issued a few weeks later showed that various SHAEF staffs were rapidly working to resolve these issues.⁴¹

An April 1944 SHAEF staff study, Preparation for the Surrender and Post Hostilities Middle Period, laid out the conditions and defined the responsibilities that would confront General Eisenhower upon the cessation of hostilities in Europe.⁴² In terms of the need to disarm and demilitarize German forces on the continent, the study initially envisioned retaining the OKW intact in order to control the German armed forces. While SHAEF was to remain temporarily in Great Britain, it was considered important for propaganda and psychological reasons to locate US and British officers at the OKW headquarters to establish appropriate control and to transmit necessary directives from SHAEF to the German military.

Additionally, the OKW was to remain responsible for the provisioning, maintenance, and housing of the German forces under its command. The study further stated that the terms of surrender would prohibit all forms of military training and that demobilization might be delayed for a considerable time as there might be a need to use the German forces for labor, either in Germany or in the liberated countries.

In early July 1944, SHAEF notified the naval, air force, and major SHAEF staffs that a CCS message gave the supreme commander the responsibility to act for an indeterminate period of time after Germany surrendered. The addressees were told that, as a result, SHAEF now had to decide on the scope and limitations of that power. Two appendices were attached to the notice. The first was a draft that outlined the basis for planning Operation Talisman, which only covered the movement of Allied forces into the liberated countries and Germany and not what was required in order to enforce the terms of surrender. This latter issue was covered in the second appendix, Outline of Post-Hostilities Functions, which was meant to cover the period between the surrender of Germany and the assumption of responsibility for Germany by the Allied Control Commission (ACC).

The several objectives for the postsurrender occupation of Germany, as stated in this appendix, were derived from an EAC document of 31 May 1944 and were as follows: to complete the disarmament of Germany and destroy the German war machine, convince the German people they had suffered a total military defeat, destroy the National Socialist Party and system, and prevent German militarism and National Socialism from going underground. In addition, the objectives directed the Allies to lay the foundation for the rule of law in Germany, and to encourage individual and collective responsibility in the German population.⁴³

According to this latter appendix, the documents and proclamations being drafted by the EAC lacked the detail necessary to issue the required orders to the Germans pertaining to the occupation and the German Armed Forces. It was determined that SHAEF would therefore have to prepare these orders. The appendix also addressed the fact that as the disarmament of German forces was an essential prerequisite of occupation, SHAEF would also have to provide special disarmament personnel with the technical knowledge to assist in the disarmament and control of German bases and supply depots. In this vein, the outline recommended that planning be restricted only to the “immediate disposal” of surrendered war matériel and that the control of Germany’s armaments industry was not considered a priority.

The appendix also addressed the issue of the control of German forces, which it considered essential. It suggested that control staffs placed at various German military headquarters would suffice and that the provision of previously trained personnel would also fall upon SHAEF but that they could be found in the several existing SHAEF headquarters and staffs.

The SHAEF staff erroneously assumed that the demobilization and disbandment of German forces would not take place during this period and thus should not be included in this postsurrender planning document without further instructions. As will be seen below, within six weeks of Germany’s surrender, members of the German armed forces, with the exception of those cited as “war criminals,” security suspects, or members of the Schutzstaffel (the infamous SS), were being disbanded and demobilized.

Lastly, to provide guidance to subordinate commanders, the appendix recommended that a postsurrender handbook be prepared to obviate the necessity of preparing and issuing innumerable additional directives.⁴⁴

Operation Rankin/Talisman/Eclipse

The complaint that the military planners were left without policy by their governments was the most prominent complaint in papers relating to planning for the occupation. The fact that SHAEF had to undertake these coordination meetings underscores this lack of guidance, and the reports written as a result further illuminate the extremely broad and complex nature of the problems the SHAEF staff was forced to solve on their own. A clear example of this lack of guidance is voiced by Morgan in the transmittal letter to Operation Rankin, in which he addressed “the essential difficulty in planning operations before the clear establishment of the political policy whence those operations derive their necessity.”⁴⁵

When COSSAC, under the direction of General Morgan, was established following the Casablanca Conference in early 1943, it was charged with three tasks by the British Chiefs of Staff. The first and third tasks were pure combat operations: plan deceptive operations to keep German divisions in Western Europe, thereby relieving the pressure on the Soviet Union, and plan for the invasion of the continent (i.e., what became Operation Overlord).⁴⁶ Behind this directive was the idea, based on experience derived from the end of World War I, that Germany might suddenly collapse. It was also supported by naïve and wishful thinking that stemmed from recent German defeats in North Africa and Stalingrad and the planned Allied invasion of Sicily. The idea that Germany would simply “disintegrate” was voiced by Morgan. In the directive for the plan that began on 22 May 1943 and was given the code name Rankin, Morgan said that the expected German “disintegration” would not necessarily take the form of a complete collapse but could be a partial withdrawal from occupied territory or the result of an Allied breakthrough.⁴⁷

This belief in a German disintegration was still held by Morgan in the summer of 1943 and by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) following its review of the German situation, as is reflected in the Rankin plan published in August of that year:

The general situation as it exists today must appear to the German military leaders as verging on the desperate. . . . They are now faced with a serious situation on the Russian front and with the urgent problem of stopping the breach developing in Italy and the Balkans. Their U-boat campaign has met with a serious set-back. Finally, the ever-increasing Allied air offensive, to which there is no serious likelihood of a reply being possible, must be making the planning of the production increasingly difficult and must be causing serious doubts as to how long the home front can stand up to the combined strain of Allied bombing, the blockade, and military reverses.⁴⁸

Planning for the occupation and demilitarization of Germany was a complex matter. Planners were asked to envision the situation as it would be when the time came. Thus planners were given an “intellectual exercise of unusual difficulty,” one much broader than what military planners are normally given.⁴⁹ In other words, since the plan they were asked to develop would cover the period following Germany’s surrender, Germany’s defeat was not the objective. Instead, the plan would have to cover a myriad of problems ranging from displaced persons and Allied POWs to the disposal of captured German war matériel, the disbandment of the German Armed Forces, and the destruction of Germany’s industrial warmaking potential.⁵⁰

Planning for Operation Rankin continued slowly despite the fact that the first Quebec conference provided no guidance to COSSAC regarding posthostilities planning. It did, however, provide support for a continued planning effort.⁵¹ On 23 August 1943, the plan, which contained three scenarios that were envisioned as signaling the end of hostilities, was approved by COSSAC. The first scenario, named Rankin Case A, simply foresaw a rapid collapse or substantial weakening of German strength and morale, allowing Allied forces to land on the continent earlier than planned. The second scenario, Rankin Case B, saw a German pullback to its prewar borders, also allowing Allied forces an early entry on the continent. Rankin Case C, the third and final contingency, foresaw an unconditional surrender, thereby allowing an unopposed Allied entry into Germany with a force of approximately twenty-five divisions. It was the only case that had anything to do with the occupation of Germany and therefore became the primary plan.⁵²

Rankin Case C did not, however, consider much beyond the immediate disarmament of the German armed forces. The plan only provided guidance for stationing troops in certain strategic areas, not all the locations that eventually came under SHAEF’s purview. It did not address what to do with German military forces once they were disarmed or how to treat German police or paramilitary forces. Furthermore, it failed to address how Allied forces would take up their positions with sufficient speed to disarm the German troops before they were able to retreat into Germany. In addition, it also failed to address the question of Germany’s military-industrial complex, due in part to the lack of comprehensive postwar planning at the most senior levels of government.⁵³

Nonetheless, with support for continued planning from the Quebec Conference, General Morgan gave priority to Rankin Case C and a final draft was prepared in October 1943 and issued as a planning directive to both the British 21st and American 1st Army groups. A revision of the plan covered occupation areas deep in Germany and included Berlin. It also specified the involvement of US forces. There remained, however, no additional guidance regarding the disarming of German forces. Operation Rankin—whose target date was set for 1 January—never went into effect. Despite the great effort and time that went into its planning, Rankin continued to be based on what proved to be false assumptions. As late as July 1944, the senior officer of the British CCMS stated his opinion that “the German surrender probably would take place with our forces still well outside the German frontier” and that planning in the CCMS was being conducted on that basis.⁵⁴ Rankin’s significance according to McCreedy, however, was that it began a “process of thinking and preparing for postconflict operations that would continue through the rest of the war.”⁵⁵

This process of “thinking and preparing” was supported by General West, who underscored the importance of not waiting for policy to be laid down by the Allied powers. It was essential, he wrote in January 1944, “that [they] . . . prepare now, as a matter of urgency, papers on all these problems” (armistice terms, disarmament, and the disposal of captured war matériel among other issues).⁵⁶ Thus, as D-Day approached, there was an explosion of planning activity and as early as April 1944, two postconflict staff studies were underway and the subjects listed by General West as needing urgent attention eventually became Operation Eclipse memoranda or administrative memoranda.⁵⁷ Thinking shifted from anticipation of the sudden military collapse envisioned by Rankin to the realization that the war would only be brought to an end by military operations.

Following a directive to all chiefs in the G-3 division from General Bull, a weekly progress report covering the activities they had completed or taken under study during the previous week began to arrive. On 26 April, the posthostilities planners indicated that two papers—Primary Disarmament of German Forces and Preparation for the Armistice and Post-Hostilities (Military) Period—had been approved by the chief of staff. Another report, issued on 31 May, stated that Operation Rankin C, continental operations, had been redesignated Operation Talisman.⁵⁸

By mid-June, Colonel Grazebrook’s posthostilities subsection appeared to be fully engaged on several drafts dealing with the control and disposal of German forces, and on 9 July, planning for Operation Talisman formally began.⁵⁹ The objectives of Talisman were, inter alia, to disarm the Germans in the West to prevent a resurgence of hostilities and to occupy strategic areas on the continent to enforce the terms of surrender, which was to be accomplished in three stages. A supplement to the outline plan concluded that the supreme commander’s first three responsibilities would be (1) disarming the German forces, (2) disposing of surrendered war materials in the short term, and (3) controlling the German forces through subordinate headquarters but not through the OKW.⁶⁰

The plan encompassed a very narrow view of occupation and thus rejected responsibility for control of the German munitions industries, the disposal of enemy war matériel, and the disbandment of German forces.⁶¹ The planning directive condensed the scope of the operation and made several technical changes to the three stages of the operation. Additional functions and tasks were also added, including the partial demobilization of the German armed forces for use as labor. The directive also defined Talisman as “plans and preparations for operations in Europe (excluding Norway and the Channel Islands) in the event of German surrender. Operations in Europe will include the liberated countries until their indigenous governments are firmly established and in complete and independent control, and will include Germany until it is taken over by the Tripartite Military Government.”⁶²

The Talisman outline plan was distributed as a planning directive on 13 August 1944 and had a number of significant changes, including the assignment of responsibilities to the major commands. It also redefined surrender as a “formal surrender signed by properly constituted German authorities, or the capitulation of the major portion of the German forces opposing the Allied Expeditionary Force.”⁶³ In this latter case, the supreme commander would designate a date, to be known as A-Day, signifying the beginning of Talisman. Thus, the plan allowed more flexibility in that it could be implemented not only upon Germany’s official surrender, but at the discretion of the supreme commander should a significant portion of Germany’s forces surrender. In addition, the definition of German forces was expanded to include both paramilitary forces and the police, and a distinction was made between primary and complete disarmament and control of German forces.⁶⁴

On 16 August 1944, Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group, and Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, commander of the 21st Army Group, were directed to initiate plans and preparations in the event of a German surrender, which was not expected before 1 September 1944.⁶⁵ The main objectives of this operation were to (1) completely disarm and control all German forces within SCAEF’s area of responsibility, (2) enforce the terms of surrender, and (3) establish law and order.

To this end, both army groups were expected to plan and execute the operation in their AOR and to collaborate closely with one another. Appendices to the outline plan provided the estimated number of troops available to both commands between 1 August 1944 and 1 January 1945 as well as the number of troops required. General Bradley was informed that his army group would have a large surplus of forces that might be required by the British 21st Army Group. One week later, both commanders were given drafts of the Directive for Military Government of Germany for their concurrence.

In early September, however, Lieutenant General Smith, SHAEF’s chief of staff, sent a letter to the chiefs of staff of the commander in chief of the Allied Naval Expeditionary Forces (ANCXF), the senior air officer of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces (AEAF), and key SHAEF staffs stating that as Allied forces would soon be entering Germany and thus facing Talisman conditions, it was essential that army groups and air forces receive early guidance. He therefore requested that the memoranda for which they were responsible be prepared for distribution as soon as possible, even if incomplete. Several days later, Colonel Grazebrook was authorized to issue several memoranda on a provisional basis.⁶⁶

Operation Talisman planning increased the size of the force required to thirty-nine and two-thirds divisions. A revised Talisman outline plan, distributed in October 1944, delineated zones of occupation as decided on by the second Quebec conference.⁶⁷ On 30 October, the 21st Army Group notified Supreme Headquarters that a captured German document indicated that the code name Talisman was compromised, so on 11 November, the new code name Eclipse was substituted and planning continued under the new name.⁶⁸

Eclipse was different than its predecessors in that its objectives were broadened to encompass not only the primary disarmament and control of the German forces, but paramilitary organizations and the police as well. It specified, for example, that operations in Europe included “operations in Germany until control there is taken over from the Supreme Commander by the Tripartite Military Government or by US and British Commanders” while retaining the definition of surrender from Talisman.⁶⁹ It further explained that operations would most likely take place in two phases. The first would involve advancing to secure “especially important strategic areas deep within Germany, including Berlin” and the second would, in part, involve deploying forces to secure additional strategic areas and “carry out the disarmament and disposal of enemy forces in Germany.”⁷⁰

The plan provided guidance to the several Allied army groups and air forces as to their respective responsibilities in both phases, among which were the primary disarmament and masking of enemy forces in contact with Allied forces; the flanking of the Allied axis of advance; the controlled concentration of enemy forces in areas selected by the Allies; the arrest and detention of individuals on the black list; and the seizure and control of German war matériel. Eclipse accepted that it was unlikely that the Nazi regime would be overthrown by internal forces and postulated that there would be neither a collapse of the German armed forces nor unconditional surrender until Germany had suffered “a further major defeat” that would enable the Allies to penetrate the homeland. The plan briefly outlined conditions expected in Germany following its collapse and indicated that while there might be some resistance and sabotage, these instances would be isolated. The possibility of civil war, however, was not discounted.⁷¹

Between 28 September and 13 December 1944, progress reports indicated that a study entitled Disposal of the German Military Caste had been circulated to planners and that Memo 9 (army disarmament) and the Operation ‘Eclipse’ Appreciation and Outline Plan had been approved and issued. They also reported that the handbook had been approved by the chief of staff and was in publication.⁷² Also in preparation was the first draft of a memo suggesting priorities for the destruction of war structures in Germany and the first draft of Eclipse Memo 17 (disbandment of the German armed forces). In addition, the final draft of Memo 10 (air force disarmament) had been approved by the planning staff. Nonetheless, and despite General Smith’s request, of the total seventeen Eclipse memoranda, only ten had been issued by late January 1945.

The Eclipse Memoranda

Operation Eclipse was spelled out in the Appreciation and Outline Plan and in seventeen memoranda, five of which speak directly to the issues of disarming, demobilizing, and disbanding the German armed forces.⁷³

Eclipse Memorandum No. 1, “Instrument of Surrender, Surrender Order and Sanctions,” was issued in November 1944 but revised in April 1945. It was a lengthy, detailed memorandum that contained a short series of opening paragraphs that laid out what would take place in the event of (1) a formal surrender, with or without an EAC-agreed Instrument of Surrender (in which case special orders to the German High Command had been prepared by SHAEF and were appended to the memo as Appendix A), or (2) no formal surrender, and the sanctions that would be imposed if resistance to either form of surrender were encountered.⁷⁴

The main elements of this memorandum were included in five additional appendices:

Appendix B: Supreme Commander Special Orders to the German High Command (OKW) of common concern to all three services or the direct concern of OKW only.

Appendix C: Special Orders to the German High Command (OKH) relating to Land Forces.

Appendix D: Special Orders to the German High Command (OKM) relating to Naval Forces.

Appendix E: Special Orders to the German High Command (OKL) relating to Air Forces.

Appendix F: Measures which may be taken to enforce the terms of surrender or in the event of no surrender to compel the enemy to comply with the Laws of War.

Part I of Appendix B was quite all-inclusive and held the OKW responsible for carrying out the orders of the Allied representatives and for ensuring that the commanding officers of all units of the German armed forces and their subordinates were notified that they would be held personally responsible for carrying out orders of the supreme commander in their areas of responsibility. It also established timelines for when the Allies were to be given information regarding the locations of the German High Command and all its departments and branches, as well as the locations of all experimental or research facilities, underground installations of all kinds, and missile launching sites.

Part II of this appendix was devoted to the control, maintenance and disarmament of the armed forces and made the OKW responsible for its immediate and total disarmament. It provided initial guidance regarding the maintenance and guarding of war matériel, specifying that none was to be destroyed without prior orders from the Allied representatives, that all land minefields were to be clearly marked, and that mines and obstacles on roads, railroads, waterways, and ports were to be removed immediately. It also ordered the removal and destruction of all booby traps, demolition charges, and concealed explosives.⁷⁵ The remaining parts dealt with Allied POWs and civilian internees, telecommunications, merchant shipping and ports, and so on and contained four annexes, one of which was a list of war matériel to be withdrawn from the Germans while a second contained a list of war matériel to be retained.

The first parts of appendices C through E mirrored Part I of Appendix B by requiring each individual German armed service to provide information as to their order of battle and the locations of their units, weapon systems, ships, and so on within a specific period of time. Part II followed a similar pattern, specific to each particular service. For example, the naval appendix stated that all ships and submarines at sea were to report their positions and head for the nearest German or Allied port, breech blocks were to be removed from all guns, and all torpedo tubes were to be unloaded. Aircraft were to be grounded and immobilized by methods described in the air force appendix and removed from runways, and their guns were to be unloaded and bombs removed. German field and home armies’ armaments were to be placed in dumps as directed by appropriate Allied representatives and various classes of war matériel (armored vehicles, artillery, small arms, ammunition, etc.) were to be laid out in stacks or parks within each dump. All other war matériel (in factories, dumps, depots, etc.) was to be maintained but remain where it was located. War matériel in transit, in the absence of orders to the contrary, would be allowed to proceed to its destination, where it would then be placed in dumps or depots.

Of the five appendices to this memorandum, only three were relevant to all German commanders, requiring them to immediately inventory all war matériel of any kind in any location within their area of responsibility. These lists were to be prepared in quadruplicate and completed within two months following the cessation of hostilities. Standardized forms were attached to the memorandum to be used for the inventory. Lastly, German authorities were responsible for handing over and delivering in good condition any war matériel that was requested by the Allies and would remain responsible until such matériel had been accepted by the Allied representatives.

Eclipse Memorandum No. 9, “Primary Disarmament of German Land Forces,” Eclipse Memorandum No. 10, “Primary Disarmament of German Air Forces,” and Eclipse Memorandum No. 11, “Primary Disarmament of German Naval Forces,” dealt specifically with the three individual services and were, for the most part, quite similar. Memorandum No. 9 was, however, the most comprehensive of the three. It began by defining war matériel as “materiel intended for war on land, at sea, or in the air,” which included:

a. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implement of war of all kinds.

b. All naval vessels of all classes, surface and submarines, auxiliary naval craft, all merchant shipping whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building.

c. All aircraft of all kinds, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices.

d. All military installations and establishments including air fields, seaplane bases, ports and naval depots, storage bases, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.⁷⁶

It continued by outlining the objectives of primary disarmament, which were to prevent a continuance or renewal of hostilities, to safeguard the deployment of the Allied Expeditionary Force during Operation Eclipse, and thereafter to facilitate the establishment of law and order in the supreme commander’s AOR.

Although this memorandum addressed the primary disarmament of German land forces, it also delineated the responsibilities of the Allied ground forces in the disarmament process by defining what made up the German land forces. Thus, the Hermann Göring Parachute Panzer Corps and German Air Force field divisions, parachute formations, and other similar Luftwaffe units attached to the German Army became an Allied ground force responsibility. Similarly, the disarmament of German naval forces ashore, Luftwaffe and naval flak organizations, and the Nazi party Flieger Korps were also determined to be Allied ground force responsibilities.

Of particular interest is the guidance given that where it was not possible to provide Allied forces to guard and control dumps containing enemy war matériel, control would be maintained by German forces under the close supervision of the Allied commander in whose AOR the enemy war matériel was located. In fact, the memorandum specified that “the fullest possible use will be made of the existing German military machine, and orders will be issued through the recognized German channels of command wherever they survive the process of occupation.”⁷⁷

In line with Eclipse Memorandum No. 1, the maintenance, classification, and inventory of enemy war matériel were made German responsibilities under strict Allied supervision. Lists of enemy war matériel that had to be surrendered and lists of matériel that would be retained so that German forces could carry out orders given to them, including limited numbers and types of weapons (e.g., rifles and pistols), were provided in two appendices.

Similarly, Eclipse Memorandum No. 10 set out plans and policies for the primary disarmament of the Luftwaffe. For this task, the memorandum specifically named the commanders of the Ninth Air Force (US) and the Second Tactical Air Force (UK). This memorandum also defined what formations, units, and personnel were included in the Luftwaffe and followed Memorandum No. 9 in allocating primary disarmament responsibility for some Luftwaffe units to Allied ground forces.

This memorandum further delegated the exercise of the air commanders’ responsibilities to the US Army Air Force (USAAF) and Royal Air Force (RAF) air disarmament staffs and, given that the tactical situation on the ground did not reflect the final zones of occupation, guidance was provided regarding the coordination and operational control of the national disarmament staffs while operating in another national Allied commander’s AOR (e.g., RAF units operating in Ninth Air Force areas, etc.). The memorandum also referenced Eclipse Memorandum No. 1, Administrative Memorandum No. 5, and the occupation handbook regarding the disposition of captured enemy war matériel and “common use” items.⁷⁸

Similar to Eclipse Memorandum No. 9, the air forces’ plan recognized the possibility that sufficient Allied forces personnel might not be available to guard every Luftwaffe establishment to effect direct control over war matériel. Thus, German Air Force commanders were to be held responsible to ensure Allied orders regarding such materiel and its inventory were followed.

The memorandum expected that USAAF and RAF air disarmament staffs would be in position behind advancing Allied forces and thus ensure that Luftwaffe units located within the area of advance were properly disarmed. It also specified that a “Reconnaissance Party” provided by both the US and British control councils would be sent to the Air Ministry and that other elements would go to various Luftwaffe headquarters to compel compliance with the terms of surrender, if required. Specific tasks of these units were set out in an appendix to the memorandum and two other attachments contained organizational diagrams of the respective US and RAF disarmament organizations.

The third memorandum of this group, Eclipse Memorandum No. 11 covering naval disarmament, was the briefest, at only two pages.⁷⁹ It accepted the responsibility for disarming all German warships and merchant vessels, delegating the actual exercise of that responsibility to US, British, and Allied naval officers-in-charge in the areas under their control in accordance with instructions laid out in the SHAEF Military Occupation Handbook. In addition, it followed the line of responsibility for disarming naval forces ashore found in Eclipse Memorandum No. 9.

Section III of Eclipse Memorandum No. 9 addressed naval demolition and stated that the demolition of naval defenses in Germany, which included submarine pens, fortifications, and underground storages, to name a few, would most likely not take place during the supreme commander’s period of responsibility. Such demolitions, it indicated, would be carried out as part of a long-term policy by the ACC.

The last key disarmament memorandum, Eclipse Memorandum No. 17, “Disbandment of German Armed Forces,” was put into operation on 9 May 1945, the day after Germany surrendered.⁸⁰ This memorandum laid down the policies by which army group commanders were to carry out the disbandment of the German armed forces. Like many of the other memos, this memo began by stipulating that it was impossible to forecast conditions in Germany when the war ended. It therefore posited several assumptions upon which the plan was based, the essence of which was that Allied forces would have penetrated deep into Germany by the time hostilities ended and that those German forces not already in POW camps would have been moved into containment areas under the control of their own officers working under close Allied supervision.

Additional assumptions were that those Germans eligible for discharge would be released with as little delay as possible to avoid large-scale desertions. Furthermore, it was believed that it would take as many as six months before the occupation armies were fully deployed in their respective zones.

While various memoranda and documents dealing with the anticipated surrender maintained that the German military machine was needed to effect the terms of surrender and control the surrendered German forces, the plans of Eclipse Memorandum No. 17 were designed not to utilize German machinery in the discharge process if it could be avoided.⁸¹ The discharge of captured and surrendered German forces would begin when directed by the supreme commander but would first be subject to the manpower needs of the Allied forces to assist in the occupation and to the manpower needs of the governments of Allied or liberated territories for purposes of reconstruction.

The remainder of the memorandum outlined very specific principles and responsibilities regarding the discharge process, including a very detailed set of statistical procedures by which members of the German armed forces were to be documented and prioritized for discharge. These procedures included the transfer of personnel who had been recruited in a different zone of occupation, non-German personnel, stragglers, deserters, and members of the German National Militia (Volksturm). Part II of this memorandum dealt specifically with the discharge of members of the Waffen SS and paramilitary organizations.

Shortly after this memorandum was issued, General Barker, now assistant chief of staff (G-1, Personnel Division) for SHAEF, wrote General Morgan, SHAEF’s assistant chief of staff, that the memo lacked both a “clear definition of the object to be obtained” and “practical guidance to the recipients.” With regard to the first omission, General Barker wrote that he would have a paper prepared that would provide a foreword or opening statement to explain the purpose of the disbandment procedure. Regarding the second issue, Barker felt that disbandment had been more than adequately covered in the occupation handbook and that the Eclipse memo was merely an extension of the handbook.⁸²

Barker’s memo also stated that he did not believe SHAEF would be confronted with a shortage of guards as there were, on the US side alone, sixty divisions in the field.⁸³ He also felt that the surrendered German forces would not have to be heavily guarded, believing that “from the German point of view, the advantages of obeying orders . . . under this plan, exceeded the disadvantages.”⁸⁴

That said, Barker did think that the memo offered a “systematic and efficient procedure” for implementing the disbandment under any of the various conditions that might arise. Furthermore, he added, the statistical and documentation procedures had been thoroughly considered by commanders and appeared to meet the needs of the zone commanders and SHAEF. The only difficulty with the documentation issue, he concluded, was the vastness of its scope.

Despite promulgation of the Appreciation and Outline Plan for Operation Eclipse in November of 1944, Memorandum No. 10 (air force disarmament) had not been completed or issued as of 31 January 1945. On 1 February, Lieutenant General Morgan directed that all memoranda that had not yet been issued be completed and that those issued be revised or amended by 10 February.⁸⁵ These memoranda were subsequently completed and approved on 10 March 1945 and disseminated to the appropriate commands for action.⁸⁶ The first four months of 1945 saw accelerated progress in the development and issuance of additional Eclipse memos and directives, including memorandum nos. 10, 11, and 17, and the Interim Directive for Occupation of Germany.⁸⁷

Demobilizing and Disbanding the German Armed Forces

More than a year before the final surrender of Germany, SHAEF’s G-3 (Operations Division) gave a great deal of thought to the manner in which members of the German armed forces were to be demobilized. Many issues, such as what to do with non-German members of the German armed forces, where to send Germans for demobilization (particularly those who had been recruited in what was to become the Soviet zone of occupation), what demobilization papers would be needed and what form would they take, and other more mundane details, such as what pensions or gratuities would be provided and what articles of clothing and personal equipment would they be allowed to retain, all required decisions.⁸⁸

For example, on 15 July 1944, a draft directive titled Disposition of German Armed Forces Subsequent to Surrender that covered all these issues and more was submitted by the planning committee of the US advisor to the EAC for consideration and for forwarding to the Department of State and the secretariat of the JCS. Among other things, the draft ordered the three Allied commanders in chief to implement the surrender terms and made them responsible for the demobilization and disbandment of German forces in their respective zones and theaters of operation, and it directed the dissolution of the OKW and the service commands at the earliest possible date, but authorized temporary retention of portions of those organizations in order to effect the controlled administration of the German armed forces during the demobilization and disbandment.

It further authorized the commanders in chief to keep and use disarmed German forces or POWs as required to accomplish tasks deemed necessary, such as the destruction of fortifications, rehabilitation projects, and safeguarding surrendered German armaments and equipment. In addition (and in line with the ultimate objective of totally demilitarizing Germany), the commanders in chief were directed to impress upon the German people the complete defeat of the German armed forces. Accordingly, demobilized German personnel would be allowed to return home with only their approved personal effects and enough money and supplies to make the journey. Under no circumstances were returnees to be allowed to return home in military formation or with bands playing or flags flying as had been the case following the armistice that ended World War I.

Other paragraphs of the draft directive dealt with the return of German units outside Germany’s 31 December 1937 borders and non-German personnel in the German armed forces. Lastly, commanders in chief were cautioned to refer to as yet unwritten guidance for instructions on the treatment of war criminals before disposing of German personnel or POWs.

This draft, circulated as US Directive No. 15 and EAC(45)1, underwent several amendments and changes but was never approved, so SHAEF was never provided with official guidance on this issue. On 6 December 1945, more than a year later, and months after the war had ended and long after most disarmed German forces and POWs had been demobilized, the ACC issued Control Council Directive 18, “For Disbandment and Dissolution of the German Armed Forces,” which contained the same basic guidance as the US draft.⁸⁹

In mid-1944, a key assumption of another draft study outlining the planning process for the disbandment of the German armed forces was that the bulk of these forces in the West would be outside Germany’s 1937 borders. Other assumptions were that some surrendered German forces would be used for labor in the liberated areas and that some arrangement would have to be made with the USSR to transfer surrendered personnel to and from the Soviet zone. What was decided at that time, however, was that disbandment during the middle period would be solely based upon the need for labor with priority given to medical personnel, agricultural workers, and workers in certain essential industries. The draft also included details as to what articles of clothing would be issued to disbanded German armed forces members based on their rank (whether their clothing had been issued or paid for by the individual) and the availability of their own clothing. Pay, initially set at 60 Reichmarks for officers and 30 Reichmarks for other ranks, was later modified to 80 and 40 Reichmarks respectively. Food allowances were also specified in this study.⁹⁰

On 28 November 1944, the SHAEF posthostilities planning staff produced yet another study, which essentially recommended that with the exception of certain categories of personnel, all surrendered German armed forces personnel should be discharged and sent home as soon as possible. It portrayed the elaborate and bureaucratic procedures that were being developed and the need for labor as the primary criterion delaying discharge for as long as eight months. It stated further that the large numbers of POWs, estimated at two and a half million, would exceed the Allies’ ability to control.⁹¹

Along with discussions of the disbandment of the German armed forces and demilitarization of Germany in general that will be discussed below, the issue of what to do with German general officers, especially the German General Staff Corps, collectively known as the “military caste,” was a major issue. On 24 September 1944, Colonel Grazebrook disseminated a staff study for comment on “The Disposal of the German Military Caste.” The staff study indicated that one of the primary objects of defeating Germany was to effect Germany’s “complete demilitarization and eradicate her traditional militarism.” It continued that although plans had been made to disarm and disband the military and destroy its warmaking potential, these plans were superficial: Germany’s militaristic spirit and military caste of highly trained, professional officers remained, and they held not only the ability to rebuild the Wehrmacht but “the burning desire” to do so.⁹²

The study continued, explaining that although the Versailles Treaty had forbidden the reestablishment of the great German General Staff, it had nonetheless been resurrected in other forms. Grazebrook expressed his fear that while the surreptitious methods used in the 1920s would most likely not succeed in the 1940s, he was convinced that other methods would be found unless steps were taken to prevent that from happening. As long as qualified officers remained in Germany, they would remain a source of danger. This danger could be prevented by the complete destruction or removal from Germany of the best brains of the military caste.⁹³

Grazebrook’s study mentioned that there were no organizations parallel to the General Staff Corps in either the German Navy or Air Force, nor were there equivalents to General Staff Corps officers among the German officer corps in general. The study specified that German generals should not be allowed to retain any of their power or be allowed to continue in office in any capacity. The study recommended that these officers be detained after their surrender and permanently exiled from Germany in order to render them “impotent.”⁹⁴

Because of the nature of the problem, which went well beyond the supreme commander’s level and was a tripartite matter, SHAEF stated that all it could do was recommend to CCS that a long-term policy statement be prepared.⁹⁵ A second draft of the study, apparently written on 12 November and designed to reach conclusions that would be incorporated in an attached cable to be sent to CCS, included policies suggested by both US and British authorities but also highlighted discrepancies between the two. The US Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander Regarding Military Government of Germany Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance that the JCS had given the CCS for consideration stated the following: “All General Staff Corps officers who are not taken into custody as prisoners of war should therefore be arrested and held pending receipt of further instructions as to their disposition. You will receive further instructions as to how to deal with other members of the German Officer Corps.” A similar British directive submitted to the EAC made no specific mention of the German officer corps or General Staff: “You will be guided in the general disposal of forces under German Command by the following considerations: (1) All sections of the OKW, OKH, OKM, OKL and staffs which are not required for essential administrative control purposes will be detained under guard or disbanded as you may direct as early as practicable.”⁹⁶

The five-page staff study, which incorporated many of Grazebrook’s earlier statements, underscored the importance of the problem by referring to the abundant historical examples of how the “German Armed Forces reduced by peace treaties to apparent impotence, reemerged in an astonishingly brief period as an effective and potentially dangerous organization.”⁹⁷ Thus, the objective (the total defeat of Germany), the study continued, was to “prevent a recurrence of this disastrous cycle by effecting the complete and permanent demilitarization of Germany.”⁹⁸

The study then divided the military caste into three categories: generals, the General Staff Corps, and the professional officer corps. After a brief section on the generals that maintained that generals who surrendered should not be allowed to retain any vestige of authority or continue in office in any capacity, the General Staff Corps received the greatest censure. Defined as the “high priesthood of the German cult of war,” the General Staff Corps was cited as “the repository of expert knowledge resulting from exhaustive study and experience, and who sought to perpetuate the teaching of von Clausewitz.”⁹⁹ The study warned that unless drastic steps were taken, the General Staff Corps would plan and develop a future Wehrmacht, going even so far as to state that “the only fully successful method [of preventing the rebuilding of the General Staff Corps] would be the extermination of the military caste,” and that if this was not acceptable, some form of permanent control over all members of the General Staff Corps was essential.¹⁰⁰

The remainder of the study dealt with the need to detain these officers and when that detention should occur. It also advised that a number of German commanders and staff officers would be required to assist in the administration and disbandment of the German armed forces and that close supervision was needed. The study also cautioned that the detention of all potentially dangerous officers was needed to demonstrate Allied determination to stamp out German militarism.

A few days after the study was distributed, Chief Operations A Subsection Colonel C. R. Kutz forwarded his comments on this second staff study. He concluded that segregating or eliminating the German General Staff Corps would be, at best, a temporary expedient as long as German military writings remained. He also felt that their physical extermination would only make martyrs out of them and give General Staff Corps officers even greater prestige. Kutz recommended that a way be found to discredit them in the eyes of the German people and that after their discharge, they be kept under strict surveillance and required to report periodically to Allied authorities. He also recommended that SHAEF’s Psychological Warfare Division study the measures that could be used to discredit General Staff Corps officers.

A draft cable was attached to this second staff study requesting guidance from the CCS regarding the ultimate disposition of German General Staff Corps officers and general officers “now being arrested” as none of the existing guidance provided an answer to that question. The draft cable suggested that “drastic steps” be taken and actually included the recommended “physical extinction” of these officers. If that was unacceptable, the draft continued, permanent exile or life imprisonment was to be considered. A policy decision was requested as soon as possible in order to coordinate plans and put them into action. Although this solution was not accepted in the long run, the staff study, signed by Major General E. W. D. Strong, assistant chief of staff (G-2, Intelligence Division), recommended approval.¹⁰¹ Toward the end of December, however, General Morgan disapproved the several recommendations regarding this issue, stating that though it had not yet been approved, the JCS directive would provide sufficient guidance.¹⁰²

While the final method for disposing of senior German commanders and staff officers had not been determined, guidance provided by SHAEF, which also included Eclipse Memorandum No. 7 and the Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany, specified that both active duty and retired General Staff Corps officers were to be arrested, not to punish them but to prevent them from making plans or preparations for future wars and to ensure that their ability to mount subversive activities against the Allies was reduced to a minimum. Additional guidance signed by the SHAEF chief of staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, indicated that they were to be segregated completely in special internment camps. Similarly, general officers not needed to administer and control German military personnel awaiting disbandment were to be deprived of all authority, not permitted to wear decorations or other symbols of military achievement, and be sent to regular concentration areas.¹⁰³ They were not to be discharged without authorization from Supreme Headquarters.¹⁰⁴ British officers in particular were convinced that General Staff officers were no good and would do everything possible to retain their power, re-create the General Staff Corps, go underground, plan new wars, and so on. As late as March 1945, the 21st Army Group wanted them to be registered and placed under counterintelligence supervision after their discharge.¹⁰⁵

The Disarmament School

In early 1944, while the planning for Operation Rankin C was underway and in anticipation of the need to implement those plans, Colonel Grazebrook wrote a memo outlining the need for cadres trained for the disarmament mission as well as a draft syllabus for that training.¹⁰⁶ Grazebrook’s suggestions were seen as a good idea by most, although the question of who would ultimately be responsible for the training and where it would be given was left unanswered at that time. Regarding the several suggestions regarding syllabus topics, Colonel Grazebrook was reminded that there were still a number of officers around who had been involved in disarmament matters in the last war and that he would be well-served by having them give “a few informal talks to the cadres.”¹⁰⁷

A month later, on 9 May, the Civil Affairs section of the British War Office indicated that they were prepared to run a disarmament course and, if so directed by either SHAEF or CCMS, could do it with three weeks’ notice.¹⁰⁸ After much discussion with headquarters, the European Theater of Operations, US Army (ETOUSA), and the British (to find a suitable location), the disarmament school was established in London with a staff of twenty under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Frank Kowalski Jr.¹⁰⁹

Grazebrook’s memo, now SHAEF/21540/1/Ops, “Training of Disarmament Missions,” proceeded on the assumption that trained disarmament cadres would be authorized before the cessation of hostilities.¹¹⁰ It suggested a four-stage course of training that would include an introductory course in which students would obtain background information, a period of study covering both general and specific problems they would face, a discussion period in which to exchange ideas and formulate policies, and lastly a period in which the newly trained cadres would, in turn, train the remaining personnel of the disarmament missions and detachments. The memo further recommended that SHAEF (G-3) be responsible for the training and that it commence as soon as possible. An appendix to the memo contained a syllabus of introductory courses that contained eleven topics ranging from the background of the terms of surrender to the plan for the occupation and control of Germany, the German evasion of disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, the various military, police, paramilitary, and armaments organizations, plans for the control and disposal of German forces and surrendered war matériel, and the imposition of sanctions and reprisals.¹¹¹

On 24 August, Grazebrook learned that General Wickersham had received a reply to a letter Grazebrook had sent him in mid-July to forward to ETOUSA regarding the provision and training of disarmament staffs required for the US zone. The reply stated that ETOUSA had assumed responsibility for training these staffs and prepared a directive ordering the theater commanders to provide the necessary personnel and proceed with training. A detailed list of the numbers, ranks, and qualifications needed by US officers for the various disarmament staffs was also attached.¹¹² This directive to theater commanders was sent on 27 September 1944 and expanded on 29 October 1944.

Thus, in early October 1944, the commanding general of the communications zone (ComZ) was directed to earmark US personnel for cadres for disarmament and control staffs and to conduct a training course for them.¹¹³ The first course started on 30 October and lasted for three weeks. According to School Memorandum No. 3, the three-week course, comprising approximately 130 hours of instruction, was divided into five phases covering six subject areas: organization for disarmament and control in Germany, policy and plans, German political organization, organization of the German armed forces, German industrial organization, and German supply and communication.¹¹⁴ The planned student capacity was 160 but more could be accommodated if sent by the army groups. Upon successful completion of the course, those officers attending were to be earmarked for duty with disarmament and control staffs upon cessation of hostilities. A second function of the school was to provide reference manuals to assist disarmament and control staffs in accomplishing their mission.

The first phase, “General Background Subjects,” took approximately one-third of the total class time, half of which was presented during the first week and the remainder divided equally between the second and third weeks of the course. The second phase, approximately twenty hours in duration, provided technical training for the students in accordance with their branch or duty assignment and special instruction for the executives and logistics officers. This training also took place during the last two weeks of instruction and included staff studies that each student had to solve on an individual basis.

Phase three consisted of lectures by British and American officers that were given throughout the course. Speakers were obtained from the armed forces division of the US Group Control Commission (US Group CC), US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, US Naval Forces in Europe, and the British CCMS. During the first course given there were a total of twenty-six lectures while the second running of the course contained sixty-five lectures.¹¹⁵

Phase four consisted of end-of-the-day “controlled” discussions in lieu of question-and-answer periods after each lecture or presentation. These discussions were led by a member of the school staff and the instructors of the previous day, and went over material presented the previous day. They were also used to underscore points made by the guest speakers.

Phase five took approximately one-fourth of the instruction time and was devoted to the development of staff studies by groups of students according to their duty assignments. It was believed that in this manner, the students would become familiar with sources of information and establish contacts with other groups with whom they would eventually need to establish working relationships.

In mid-September, staff-level discussions indicated that a second running of the disarmament course was needed. The discussions initially concerned training operations and logistics officers but they eventually expanded to include a limited number of key officers involved in the disarmament and demobilization process, some of whom would be retained and assigned to the US Group CC.¹¹⁶ On 29 October, a letter was sent to the commander of ETOUSA by SHAEF’s adjutant general, Brigadier General T. J. Davis, informing him of this necessity and requesting that action be taken to conduct a second course of instruction.

This second, and last, running of the course, which began on 26 November 1944, also ran for three weeks and saw a major expansion of the syllabus and a realignment of the subject matter into five key topics: organization for disarmament and demobilization in Germany, general policy and plans, disarmament and demobilization, Germany under the Nazis, and German armed forces. Air force and navy requirements were handled by their respective services and resulted in the attendance of fifteen naval and twenty air force officers.

In late December, Colonel William Whipple, chief of the SHAEF Logistics Plans Branch, wrote to SHAEF’s assistant chief of staff (G-4) to inform him that the second running of the disarmament school would end on 30 December and that present plans called for it to be disbanded. Whipple continued that a study undertaken by Colonel Karl F. Hausauer, chief of the Logistics Plans Branch, Post-Hostilities Section, and the 12th Army Group’s operations and logistics staffs saw a need for a third course. The 12th Army Group wanted to permanently augment their staffs with officers trained in disarming enemy armed forces and disposing of enemy war matériel, possibly train French officers of the 6th Army Group, and provide an orientation course for the 15th Army Group officers responsible for Eclipse planning and planning for the occupation of the Rhineland.¹¹⁷

However, Brigadier General R. G. Moses, assistant chief of staff (G-4) for the 12th Army Group, wrote SHAEF that he could not at that time justify diverting additional officers for training. He recommended that the present school be discontinued, with the possibility of investigating the establishment a school on the continent when the tactical situation eased (US forces were heavily engaged in the Battle of the Bulge at that time).¹¹⁸

Aftermath

Germany surrendered on 8 May 1945 (VE Day) and less than a month later, on 5 June, the ACC assumed responsibility for Germany, relieving Eisenhower of his disarmament responsibilities. At 0001 hours, 14 July 1945, SHAEF was dissolved and its US elements became part of US Forces European Theater (USFET) under Eisenhower, who became commander in chief of the US Forces of Occupation in Germany and the US representative on the ACC for Germany.¹¹⁹

The plans laid out by SHAEF and contained in the Eclipse memoranda to disarm, disband, and demobilize German forces were put into operation following VE Day. By late June, just over six million German troops had surrendered and between 15 May and 6 July, six disbandment directives were issued, giving the army groups authority to discharge both POWs and “disarmed German troops”¹²⁰ in groups according to age, sex, nationality, occupation, area of residence, and so on—except for those considered war criminals, security suspects, or certain members and ranks of the SS.¹²¹

Much remained to be done, especially regarding the disposal of enemy war matériel and the destruction and demilitarization of German fortifications and war industries. For the most part, however, these issues were recognized early on as long-term problems to be handled by the ACC. In February 1945, for example, Brigadier W. E. van Cutsem addressed a meeting of the Standing Committee on War Materiel and suggested that it needed to differentiate between disarming Germany and preventing Germany from rearming. The disposal of Germany’s war industries fell under the rearming issue, which was a long-term matter best handled at a later time when there might be a clear economic policy.¹²²

Disarming the German forces was relatively easy: most simply dropped their weapons, raised their arms, and surrendered. According to a trip report written by Lieutenant Colonel A. F. S. MacKenzie, assistant G-1 in SHAEF’s German Affairs Division, following his visit to the headquarters and units of the US 3rd Army, the disbandment process as directed by Eclipse Memo No. 17 was working relatively well. MacKenzie concluded that “Eclipse Memo 17, as written is essentially sound, operationally, and should be continued in effect ‘as is.’” He found, however, that although 3rd Army was not complying with the spirit of Eclipse Memo 17, its operating units appeared to be and that Germans were being discharged at a rate of 25,000–30,000 per day. The report highlighted several administrative and procedural problems but stated that as of 8 June, the 3rd Army had discharged approximately 550,000 Germans.¹²³

As van Cutsem stated, the remainder of the demilitarization program, which was primarily directed at preventing the remilitarization of Germany, was more involved and took longer. However, Allied forces were given little to no guidance regarding the destruction of enemy fortifications other than it was to be accomplished during the occupation period. It was not until the end of July 1945 that orders to destroy German fortifications and defensive works were issued by USFET with a completion date of 31 January 1946.

Even more remained to be done regarding the disposal of enemy war matériel, the destruction and demilitarization of German fortifications and war industries, and especially the eradication of militarism from the German psyche. The memoranda prepared for Operation Eclipse had begun that process and showed the way for its completion. By mid-1946, more than eight million prisoners had been discharged and two years later, in early 1948, the ACC reported to the Council of Foreign Ministers that the western occupation zones of Germany had been effectively disarmed and demilitarized as of mid-1947.¹²⁴ This notwithstanding, negotiations within the quadripartite commission over establishing a disarmament commission, which began in earnest in July 1946 and continued into February 1948, remained partially unresolved.¹²⁵ Ironically, while this thoroughly invasive inspection proposal to ensure that a German military potential could never be re-created was being pushed forward by the western Allies, the US Army staff was beginning to draft its first studies on rearming the western part of the soon-to-be-divided Germany.