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The Diplomatic Path to 12 September 1950

Heinrich August Winkler wrote that the successful Allied invasions and aerial bombardments that took place during World War II brought Germany to its knees. The bombs, the expulsions, and the internal collapse changed German society far more than the first ten years of the Reich had.¹ Still, despite the advent of the Cold War and the increasing hostility of the Soviet Union, the United States (and the State Department in particular) was slow to recognize the significant transformation that had taken place among the war-weary Germans in the western zone and continued to view them with distrust.

Nonetheless, US policy toward Western Europe underwent a major alteration beginning in early 1949. It was a change that precluded the United States from returning to its prewar isolationism and pushed it, by necessity, into a deep and lasting involvement in Western Europe. It resulted, furthermore, in vigorous debates within the Department of State and between it and the Department of Defense over the direction of US–West European and West German policy. This change, in the middle of President Truman’s second term, caused several senior State Department officials (including Secretary of State Acheson) to revise their long-held opposition to German rearmament, leading the United States to reverse its European policy completely and formally demand on 12 September 1950 that West Germany be armed.

Throughout this period, the “German problem” remained at the forefront of US policy deliberations regarding Western Europe. The Department of State’s position regarding the possibility of German rearmament was contained in the answer to a question posed by the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee in June 1949. When asked “What will be the relationship of Germany . . . to the problem of increasing the defensive military strength of the Western European countries?” the State Department responded thus: “The United States Government does not envisage that Germany will be in a position to undertake cooperative military efforts with other Western European Governments, as we are fully committed to the complete and absolute disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. She will not have military forces of her own. She will not have industrial capacity for the production of armaments.”² In Europe, however, the question of German rearmament was on the table during the formation of the Brussels Treaty Organization in 1948 and influenced decisions regarding the duration of the occupation and the need to keep US forces in Germany. Nonetheless, the focus of the Department of State remained on West Germany’s political and economic integration and continued disarmament.

Beginning in 1946, relations with the Soviet Union began to deteriorate and the United States increasingly saw the Soviet Union as a real military threat to both European and US security.³ These perceptions, fortified by Stalin’s election speech of 9 February 1946 and by George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” two weeks later, as well as Soviet actions in Iran and toward Turkey, led, in part, to the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, the merging of the US and British zones of occupation in May, and the initiation of the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan) in June of that year.⁴ This perception of the Soviet threat was voiced in mid-February 1947 by John D. Hickerson, the deputy director of the Office of European Affairs, in a memo written to his boss, H. Freeman Matthews. Hickerson wrote that Soviet actions in foreign affairs left them “no alternative other than to assume that the USSR [had] aggressive intentions.” Hickerson stated further that the United States must be determined to resist that aggression by force of arms if necessary because “there could be no deals or arrangements” with the USSR.⁵

By early 1948, the Communist-led coup d’état in Czechoslovakia deepened the perception that the Soviet Union was bent on dominating Europe.⁶ Following discussions between Great Britain and the United States in which the British sought US participation in an Atlantic defense pact, the British were given to understand that they and the West European nations would first have to organize themselves. Britain’s foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, took the lead and on 17 March 1948 the Brussels Treaty was signed by the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. While outwardly directed against a resurgent Germany, the possibility of German participation in the pact was supported by all the signatories except France.⁷ Three days later, on 20 March, the Soviet military delegation to the ACC in Berlin walked out, and on 1 April, the Soviets initiated restrictions on travel to Berlin followed in mid-June by a total blockade of the city that lasted until 12 May 1949. The blockade and resulting Berlin crisis ended any thought or desire for accommodating the Soviet Union.⁸

In early 1949, Truman transferred responsibility for German policy from the US Army to the Department of State.⁹ The United States also departed from its age-old policy of nonentanglement and became a major force behind the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), joining with the five Brussels Treaty nations, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, Italy, and Norway, in a defensive alliance designed to deter Soviet aggression but also to contain, if necessary, a resurgent and expansionist Germany.¹⁰ The major policy of keeping Germany disarmed and demilitarized still remained front and center, but the State Department’s focus shifted to ending the occupation, returning some degree of sovereignty to Western Germany, and tying it closely to the other West European states in some form of federal entity or union.¹¹ The unexpected outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula on 25 June 1950, however, resulted in a major reversal of US policy, which would strain relations between the United States and its European allies, especially the French, and would lead to West German rearmament.

US Thinking on Disarmament

Memories of German troops marching home following the 1918 armistice and of the expansion of the Wehrmacht following Germany’s withdrawal from the Geneva Disarmament Conference in October 1933 led to a decision that the mistakes made in the armistice agreement and Treaty of Versailles would not be repeated.¹² Even before World War II ended, it became the seemingly unalterable policy of the United States that Germany would be completely and totally disarmed and demilitarized following its surrender. This policy was made very clear on numerous occasions following the war, the last of which ironically came only weeks before Acheson presented the US demand that West Germany be armed to the foreign ministers of Great Britain and France on 12 September 1950.¹³

Perhaps the first and most definitive enunciation of US policy toward the defeated Germany came at the 1946 Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris on 30 April when Secretary of State James F. Byrnes presented the text of a draft treaty on the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. In the preamble, which indirectly referred to the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany of 5 June 1945, the four Allied Powers “declared their intention to effect the total disarmament and demobilization of Germany” and promised that this total disarmament and demilitarization would “be enforced as long as the peace and security of the world may require.”¹⁴

The body of the draft treaty reflected and expanded upon that declaration by stating that all German forces “shall be and shall remain completely disarmed, demobilized and disbanded” and it specifically included the German General Staff Corps. The final article, Article V, specified that this proposed treaty was to remain in force for a period of twenty-five years and be renewable, if deemed necessary. It was meant to be incorporated in a future peace treaty with Germany, thereby making it the law of the land and binding Germany to it.¹⁵

Byrnes subsequently addressed keeping Germany disarmed and demilitarized for a generation in an address delivered in Stuttgart, Germany, on 6 September and again in a speech he gave to the American Club in Paris in October.¹⁶ In that latter speech, he repeatedly cited the proposed draft treaty and stressed that there should be no doubt as to American foreign policy toward Germany. He emphasized the US government’s firm opposition to any revival of German militarism and proposed that the occupation of Germany not end until a German government accepted the disarmament and demilitarization clauses of the Four-Power Treaty he had proposed. Byrnes then underscored the need to maintain “limited but adequate Allied armed forces” to ensure compliance, and suggested the use of Allied bombers “from France, Britain, the United States or the Soviet Union” to enforce immediate compliance should the German government fail to do so. While the United States initially proposed to continue the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany for forty years after the peace settlement, Byrnes asked only that the Allies agree to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized for at least a generation. This, he indicated, would assuage the fears of France and the other European nations as Germany rebuilt its powerful industrial economy.¹⁷

Byrnes’s replacement as secretary of state, retired US Army general George C. Marshall, also proposed Brynes’s treaty in Moscow in 1947. Although it was rejected by the USSR on both occasions, US policy remained unchanged. This continuity is evident in the summary of the February–March 1948 London Tripartite Conference, which refers to several agreements made by the Allies that the occupation of Germany and the prohibition on the German armed forces and general staff would continue for a long time. Further, it was agreed that the military governors should continue to exercise control pertaining to disarmament and demilitarization, and that a working party should be established to decide which industries should remain prohibited and set production levels for those that were no longer prohibited. The summary also stated that a military security board would be established in the western zones of Germany whose function would be to cover the entire spectrum of disarmament and demilitarization. The summary concluded that even after the occupation ended, Germany would not be allowed to become a military threat and that an inspection mechanism should be created to ensure that it remained disarmed and demilitarized.¹⁸

By 1947, the United States had decided it had to move forward on Germany without agreement from the USSR. The idea then developed in higher policymaking circles that Western Europe should develop a political personality of its own and that Western Germany could be integrated into that community, which might in time develop into a third force able to stand up to the Soviets without direct US involvement.¹⁹ It was believed that so integrated, West German freedom of action would be sufficiently constrained and no longer pose a threat.²⁰ In discussions regarding what became the Brussels Treaty Organization and its relation to Germany, Hickerson told Lord Inverchapel that the US envisioned the creation of a European organization capable of standing up to both the United States and USSR.

President Truman and his advisors were ambivalent about the emergence of Soviet power. On the one hand, they saw a need for cooperation; on the other hand, they saw that Soviet actions could endanger US security. These officials did not fear a Soviet attack on the United States—at the time, the Soviet Union lacked both long-range strategic bombers and atomic weapons. What were causes for concern were the increase in Communist party membership in some nations of Western Europe such as France and Italy and the possible takeover of key Western industrial power centers, which would end US hopes for Western Europe’s political and economic integration and the continuation of democratic forms of government.²¹ Soviet actions in Berlin and Czechoslovakia led Robert Lovett, then undersecretary of state, to opine that “all the Russians [needed] to get to the Channel were shoes.”²²

Western Europe’s Search for Security—The Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties

As the gulf between East and West became both wider and sharper, West Europeans began to acquire a ‘European’ consciousness.²³ What was initially a political struggle, however, increasingly came to be seen in military terms. The military situation in Europe by this time was not what it had been at war’s end.²⁴ Several proposals and discussions between Europe’s leading statesmen had taken place during the war concerning Europe’s future and the possibilities of some form of Western European Union (WEU).²⁵ One of the key topics was how to contain a resurgent Germany in the future and the 1947 Franco-British Dunkirk Treaty was an attempt to do just that.

Among the studies and proposals regarding Europe’s postwar future was a study by Sir Nigel Ronald, an undersecretary in the Foreign Office, written in 1945. Ronald suggested that a Franco-British alliance, to include Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, and Spain, would be the keystone of a European defense system. He believed this system would both contain Germany and protect the smaller Allies from falling under Soviet influence.²⁶ The British Foreign Office was skeptical because it felt that without US assistance, defense against the Soviet Union was unrealistic. Alfred Duff Cooper, British ambassador to France, however, contended that US interference would prevent the United Kingdom from achieving a position of equality between the two new superpowers. A federation of western European seaboard states plus the major Mediterranean powers could become “an alliance so mighty that no power on earth would . . . dare to challenge it.”²⁷

The Anglo-French alliance idea was not followed up, however. Churchill did not believe that France—or any other West European country—would be of value to British security. Current Franco-British relations, moreover, were less than ideal. French and British troops had narrowly avoided a clash in Syria, and Charles DeGaulle, chairman of the provisional government of France, incensed over his wartime treatment by the Allies, was demanding the resolution of several Franco-German border disputes before discussions about an alliance could take place.²⁸

The 1946 election of a Socialist caretaker government in France under Léon Blum allowed much Franco-British hostility to be put aside and on New Year’s Day 1946, Blum wrote Foreign Minister Bevin that he was willing to sign a Franco-British treaty. The problems that exercised DeGaulle remained, but Blum assured Bevin that they would not present a barrier. Accordingly, negotiations on a fifty-year treaty began that month.²⁹

When this treaty, the Dunkirk Treaty, was signed on 4 March 1947, it became the first specifically European postwar security arrangement. Although designed specifically to prevent the reoccurrence of German aggression, it also became the first of several attempts to develop both an Anglo–Western European defense group and a North Atlantic security system.³⁰

The collapse of the London foreign ministers meeting in December 1947 gave Bevin the necessary incentive to launch his plans for a western union. The London conference broke down over the question of reparations and the Allied refusal to acquiesce to Soviet demands. It was the last attempt to obtain a major East-West agreement on Germany.³¹ On 17 December, Bevin spoke in turn to French foreign minister Georges Bidault, Secretary of State George Marshall, and Norman Robertson, the Canadian high commissioner in London. The gist of these conversations was that the time had come to create “some sort of federation” in Western Europe.³²

The first step toward such an arrangement would involve Britain and France signing bilateral treaties—modeled after the Dunkirk Treaty—with Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Bevin publicly outlined his plan in a speech to the House of Commons on 22 January 1948, saying that Britain could no longer stand outside Europe nor could it “be diverted, by threats, propaganda, or fifth column methods, from [its] aim of uniting by trade, social, cultural and all other contacts those nations of Europe . . . who [were] ready and able to cooperate.”³³

Bevin was also clearly attempting to get the United States to commit to the defense of Europe. Without an American security guarantee, the British were not sure they could make the Western Union work. Until the union was successful, however, the United States would not discuss participation.³⁴

The Benelux countries also put pressure on the United Kingdom.³⁵ They did not like the Dunkirk model because they believed it was directed solely against Germany and did not reflect current realities. This view was strongly advocated by Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian foreign minister, who also urged that the collective arrangement be economic, cultural, and social as well as military.³⁶ Paris, however, held to the Dunkirk model because of French sensitivity concerning Germany. Any pact directed against the Soviets that did not deal with the possibility of a rearmed Germany was unacceptable to France, a view Britain also shared.³⁷ In fact, France had previously approached the United States and asked, in light of the fact that the treaty on German demilitarization was dead, whether the United States would be interested in entering a three-power treaty that contained similar stipulations.³⁸

On 24 February 1948, a Soviet-backed coup d’état toppled the Beneš government in Czechoslovakia. This event sent a shiver of fear throughout Western European governments, magnified by the weakened state of the almost totally demobilized Allied forces. The coup prompted France to take a much broader view of European security and Britain now also accepted the need for a multilateral pact. Bevin was convinced that the Soviet Union was preparing to extend its grip over the rest of Europe; there were fears of a coup in Italy and the Soviets were pressuring Finland and Norway to sign treaties of friendship and mutual assistance.³⁹ As a result, on 4 March, negotiations between Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg began in earnest and on 17 March, in an atmosphere of pessimism and crisis, the Brussels Treaty was signed.⁴⁰

The Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) was more than a response to the apparent Soviet threat. It contained a consultative council, a permanent commission, and a permanent military committee comprised of the five defense ministers, meeting as the Western Union Military Committee. It was envisioned by Bevin as a basis for the organization of all of Western Europe, and as a vehicle to convince the United States that Europe could stand on its own. The immediate US response was a speech by President Truman supporting the new European organization as well as a request to Congress to complete its action on the Marshall Plan. Unknown to the Europeans, however, studies were initiated within both the Department of Defense and the National Security Council to determine how best to support the Western Union, including whether to associate with it at all (see chapter 3, this book).⁴¹

The French government, however, remained unsatisfied with the US response to the Brussels Pact. In May, France’s ambassador to the United States, Henri Bonnet, told Theodore Achilles of the State Department’s Bureau of European Affairs that Europe was disappointed that the United States had not acted faster in support of the Brussels Treaty. Achilles said that the United States had made it abundantly clear that the Brussels Treaty countries needed to first formulate and carry out their own plans for an integrated defense before asking the United States for help. Bonnet’s response was that United States needed to understand the “French psychological difficulties” and need for reassurance on security in general. Achilles replied that France needed to understand US psychology as well, and gave the following US response to the Europeans: “You made a start, but it’s still a small start. Put some military ‘bones’ on that Treaty, preferably some collective ones.”⁴²

The existence of the BTO as a viable, independent entity was short-lived, however.⁴³ Concerned by events in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, which followed in June 1948, the five Brussels Treaty members joined the United States, Canada, and five other West European nations (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy) to sign the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949, creating NATO. Two defense organizations—one spanning the Atlantic and the other containing the germ of a future integrated Europe—now existed in Western Europe where a year earlier there had been none.

Beginning in Truman’s second term as president, US foreign policy fell into the hands of a small group of individuals, later known collectively as the wise men.⁴⁴ Two of them, Acheson and John J. McCloy, the US high commissioner for Germany, played extremely important roles. A third, lesser-known individual, Henry A. Byroade, a US Army colonel on loan to the Department of State as the director of the Office of German Affairs, was just as instrumental to developing the State Department’s German policy during this very volatile period. The fact that Byroade, as an army officer, could discuss key German issues informally with Pentagon staff officers during a period when Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, a foe of Acheson’s, forbade Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) staffers to speak to the State Department without his express permission, proved to be of crucial importance.⁴⁵

Published State Department Policy Planning Staff (PPS) papers shed little additional light on State Department thinking about German rearmament and those that do appear to duplicate thoughts in JCS documents.⁴⁶ For example, in March 1948, the PPS recommended that the Western Union should be encouraged to “include eventually . . . Germany . . . and to deepen its cooperation in all aspects foreseen in its charter . . . as well as military.” Both George F. Kennan, then head of the PPS, and Hickerson opposed the focus on Germany, conceding, however, that it must eventually “have its place” in that union. Both felt that the union should become more than just a defensive entity, at which point there would be no question of US support.⁴⁷

In June of that year, another PPS paper concluded that the United States should undertake the Washington Conversations (prelude to the NATO treaty) as requested by Bevin and Bidault (then foreign minister). It was also noted that the Department of State should explore with the Western Union the problem of increasing the security of several European countries through integration or some form of association with the BTO, to include a recommendation that “when circumstances permitted,” the adherence of Germany (or the western zones) be explored. France’s minister in Washington, Armand Bérard, had cautioned earlier in February, however, that his government believed that any German participation in European security measures meant the reestablishment of a German army, which his government would not favor unless the British were full participants.⁴⁸

During this same period, Bevin had conveyed his thoughts to the State Department on an Atlantic defense system and the future inclusion of Germany “without whom no Western system can be complete.” In State Department discussions with or about the Western Union, the issue of Western Germany often arose, but the State Department’s position remained constant: Germany’s participation in Europe’s defense was premature. In addition, the United States remained adamant that it could not and would not offer any security guarantees.⁴⁹

Rumors of Remilitarization

Throughout 1948, the Department of State and its ambassadors in Western Europe reiterated that the fundamental US policy objective toward Germany was “to insure that Germany [did] not again menace the peace of the world and [that it made] a vital contribution to the economic rehabilitation and political security of Europe.” Specifically, “disarmament, demilitarization and reduction and lasting control over Germany’s capacity to make war, including security against renewed German or other aggression” were some of the several major US policies that would be sought through a closer US–West European association.⁵⁰ On 31 December 1948, an article in the New York Herald Tribune by Marguerite Higgens stated that the United States, Britain, and France had appointed a “three-man Military Security Board which [would] send inspection teams throughout West Germany to insure continued disarmament.” The three appointees were Major General James P. Hodges (US), Major General Victor J. E. Westropp (UK), and General Etienne Paskiewicz (France).⁵¹

US-Soviet and US–West European diplomatic encounters in this period, however, raised press speculation about German rearmament. For example, on 21 February 1948, a New York Times article reported that the French foreign ministry learned the United States had dropped the Byrnes treaty objective of keeping Germany disarmed for forty years. The article stated further that an assumption being “freely discussed in some quarters” was that the Soviets would “enlist German rearmament in its service,” leading to the idea that the United States had better not remain committed “to keeping Germany down in the matter of armaments.”⁵² Although rumors continued, the topic of German rearmament dropped from the American public’s view for the most part until late 1949 when it picked up again following the formation of the FRG.

Toward the end of 1948, the consulates in Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Bremen were reporting on additional rumors and active discussions among West Germans regarding plans to remilitarize Germany. In November, a report from the consulate in Bremen mentioned that rumors pertaining to the creation of a strong police force as the nucleus for a future Germany army had begun to circulate.⁵³ In December, the consulates in Frankfurt and Stuttgart were reporting on statements made by (former Nazi) Lieutenant General Franz Halder, who had been until 1942 the Wehrmacht’s chief of general staff, Dr. Rudolph Vogel, a member of the Land Executive Committee of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and Eugen Kogon, publisher of the Frankfurter Heft and a prominent person in Württemberg-Baden, calling for the rearmament of West Germany. Dr. Vogel’s articles, several of which appeared in the Schwäbische Post, were allegedly inspired by a 24 October article written by Walter Lippman in the New York Herald Tribune.⁵⁴

In essence, the German discussions were in favor of a voluntary German contribution to an Allied force in the event of an East German or Soviet attack. These rumors and discussions were abetted by rumors stemming from Moscow and East Berlin that the British were not only recruiting Germans and putting them in British uniforms, but that they were forming German artillery, cavalry, and engineer units as well as establishing special flying and armored schools. While these discussions appear to have run their course by January 1949, one effect was to force the West German political parties to take positions on this issue, which they did by rejecting it.⁵⁵

As 1949 unfolded, the issue of arming West Germany remained unsettled, particularly in France. On 3 January, for example, Bérard was given instructions from Paris to query the State Department about information the French had received that the United States was contemplating the establishment of a German Army. The French government, he was told to say, would view such a step with “extreme seriousness.” Samuel Reber of the European Division replied that the position of the US government regarding the demilitarization and disarmament of Germany, which had been set forth repeatedly, had not changed, nor was there any intention to change that policy.⁵⁶

Then, in mid-January, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall wrote President Truman strongly recommending that all nonmilitary functions of the occupation be taken over by the Department of State and that a high commissioner for Germany be appointed. This shift had originally been proposed in early 1948 but the Berlin Blockade and fears what it might lead to found everyone in agreement that the army should continue its total control of West Germany. Royall went on to say that the problems now being confronted in the administration of Germany were primarily political and economic and, as a result, problems that arose between the army and the Department of State were often difficult to reconcile.⁵⁷ Subsequent interdepartmental correspondence within the State Department on the role of the high commissioner recommended that its responsibilities be taken on simultaneously with the establishment of the new West German government. Former World War II assistant secretary of war and president of the World Bank John J. McCloy was first put forward as the appointee for high commissioner in this correspondence, and the suggestion was made that the office of high commissioner be occupied no earlier than 1 July.⁵⁸

Two months later, in March 1949, the Department of State undertook a review of its Germany policy and reaffirmed that the primary interest of the United States with respect to Germany was to guard against any renewal of German aggression. Regardless of what form Germany would take in the foreseeable future—divided or whole—an essential element of US \policy had to be security. It was therefore in the interest of the United States “to prevent the Germans, or any part of them, from developing military forces until any security threat inherent in them is obviated by European union or other collective safeguards against aggression.” The review stated further that the United States would look with favor upon the creation of such a union but that it could only assist in whatever initiative the Europeans themselves took. This latter statement was significant because it reflected the core of what would become Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s key policy issue (i.e., that the inclusion of West Germany in such an undertaking must be as an equal).⁵⁹

A major problem at that time, however, was that despite the desire to integrate Germany into Europe, there was no body—no European union—within which Germany could be integrated. As one State Department official put it, “Plainly, Germany cannot be fitted into the European community in a satisfactory manner until there is an adequate framework of general European union into which Germany can be absorbed. The other countries cannot be expected to cope with the problem of Germany until there is a closer relationship among them than the existing one.”⁶⁰

That same month, however, a policy paper written by Kennan indicated that there was still considerable belief among US policy elites that even the advent of a West German government would not solve the “problem of Germany.” The new West German government, the paper stated, would become “the spokesman of a resentful and defiant nationalism,” and the “dominant force in Germany [would] become one not oriented to the integration of Germany into Europe but the re-emergence of that unilateral German strength which has proven so impossible for Western Europe to digest in the past. A Western German government will thus be neither friendly nor frank nor trustworthy from the standpoint of the western occupiers.”⁶¹ For his part, Kennan only wanted a provisional German administration, leaving the ultimate authority over security and other matters in the hands of the three high commissioners. The US ambassador to the United Kingdom, Lewis Douglas, appears to have believed, like Kennan, that once a West German government was established, US freedom of action would be gone.⁶²

Thus, by 1949, the United States was forced to recognize that until a decision was made on Germany it would be necessary, both for its own and Germany’s security, to maintain occupation forces in the West German zones until the peace of Europe was secured. The Department of State, however, recognized that as the German people, or a large part of them, might become part of a structure of free European nations, their contribution to the armed security would be a rational expectation. This was further emphasized on the eve of the signing of the NATO treaty during a meeting between Truman, the secretaries of state and defense, and the foreign ministers of the NATO nations.

The purpose of this meeting was to outline a policy toward both Germany and the USSR that would focus on orienting Germany to the West by encouraging economic revival, accelerating the development of democratic institutions, and combating Soviet subversion. The United States had come to believe that the earlier proposals for the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, such as those first enunciated by former Secretary of State Byrnes and then by his successor, Marshall, no longer corresponded to the current situation. Other means to provide security against a revival of German aggression had to be found. Therefore, this policy did not plan for the continued enforcement of security controls (e.g., prohibition of key industries or armed forces). The overall goal was to make Germany a full-fledged partner in an increasingly unified Western Europe and combine “any future German armed forces into a unified Western defense.”⁶³

Two momentous events took place in 1949 that changed the face of European security. The first took place on 4 April when the United States ended 162 years of steering clear “of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world”⁶⁴ by signing the North Atlantic Treaty along with eleven West European nations and Canada, committing itself to participating in the security of Western Europe.⁶⁵ The second event took place on 23 May when the three merged zones of occupied West Germany became the FRG, albeit with limited sovereignty. Although military government ended and the military governors were replaced with civilian high commissioners, the occupation status remained and certain powers were reserved by the Allies. Chief among them was to guarantee security against a revival of German military power and to ensure that all agreed disarmament and demilitarization measures remained in force. To this end, the Military Security Board was created.⁶⁶

These events, particularly the US entry into NATO, caused the State Department to again reiterate its position on Germany and to dissemble somewhat regarding the stationing of US troops in Europe. During Senate hearings on the NATO Treaty, Secretary of State Acheson was asked by Senator Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA) whether Article 3 of the NATO Treaty meant that the United States would be expected to send “substantial numbers of troops” to Europe as a “more or less permanent contribution.” Acheson replied by saying that the answer was “a clear and absolute ‘No.’” While Acheson had not intended to deceive—he subsequently recognized his answer was “deplorably wrong”—it was clear that the United States had committed itself to a permanent presence in Europe, and although the troop numbers at the time were relatively small, they were to increase rapidly over the next several years.⁶⁷

According to a joint Department of State and Department of Army memorandum to the president on German policy, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom were involved in a process of enabling West Germany to participate in the West European economic program and become self-supporting. Germany’s economic and industrial potential, however, led the United States to recognize that were Germany to be taken over by a hostile power for purposes of aggression, it would pose a danger to the security of the United States and Germany’s neighbors.

The memorandum concluded that the economic and industrial recovery of West Germany and its neighbors, which included a “satisfactory military posture” in those nations, would diminish the possibility of aggression throughout all of Europe, including Germany. Nonetheless, security considerations had to be taken into account and for that reason, the United States recommitted its occupation forces until the peace of Europe was established.⁶⁸

In this same memorandum, the United States further recognized that as Germany became firmly embedded in a free European structure, a German military contribution to the security of that structure would be possible, but only if the other free nations of Europe deemed it necessary. That said, in talking points prepared for Acheson, dated 17 May 1949, just six days before West Germany became the FRG, Acheson was advised to reply to questions regarding German entry into NATO with the following: “No consideration has been given to the inclusion of Western Germany for a number of reasons. These include the fact that Western Germany is under the military occupation of several North Atlantic countries, that it has no government, that all Germany will presumably one day be reunited, and that the German people have yet to prove their attachment to the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty.”⁶⁹

One month later, on 21 June, the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee was told that although US policy was fully committed to the complete and absolute disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, “Germany [was and could] to an increasing extent contribute to the general economic strength of the Western European Countries, which is the essential foundation of military strength.”⁷⁰ This answer allowed Germany to export matériel that could be used by other countries for the production of armaments.

The birth of NATO and the Federal Republic inevitably led to discussions about the role West Germany would play in the defense of Western Europe. For example, in July, the US Embassy in The Hague reported on the contents of a memo presented to the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Powers at Luxembourg by Netherlands foreign minister Dirk Stikker. Stikker’s memo essentially stated that West Germany should be integrated as closely as possible but warned that such integration carried a risk. If allowed to remain independent, the FRG could turn to the East and upset the existing balance; therefore Stikker concluded that the occupation needed to continue until Western Europe was stronger than at present, both politically and militarily, that the FRG was not to have an armed force, and that it would not be allowed to manufacture war matériel. Many council members believed that West Germany should be at least an associate member (because of its lack of full sovereignty) but in the end, no action was taken.⁷¹

On 10 October, an office memorandum was sent to Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George W. Perkins in which the author, Wayne G. Jackson, a State Department officer, wrote that he had learned from an unnamed individual who would be speaking with the president on 11 October that US military authorities in Germany were in favor of the “prompt rearmament of Germany,” and that twenty-five divisions was the goal. This individual understood further that the Department of Defense, specifically Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins, was in favor of arming the Germans.⁷²

Perkins subsequently wrote Acheson a memorandum the following day stating that these rumors of German rearmament were “much exaggerated and substantially without foundation.” Perkins went on to write that it was “true that Pentagon thinking [envisaged] use of German manpower in the defense of Western Europe at some time in the future.” It was not true, however, that the prompt rearmament of Germany, the raising of twenty-five divisions, or the inclusion of Germany in either the Military Assistance Program (MAP) or NATO was being considered or favored. Perkins concluded, “We have no reason whatever to believe, and compelling reasons not to believe, that the military are acting in anyway in this field without our knowledge.”⁷³ Nonetheless, high-ranking military officers were, in fact, making statements that led many to believe that the United States favored German rearmament of some type.⁷⁴

Many newspaper articles and editorials, both in the United States and Europe, dealt with this issue throughout the remainder of the year. The gist of these articles was simply that even with NATO, there was a significant force imbalance between the military forces of the Allies and those of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, with French troops fighting in Indochina and the belief that US occupation forces would be unable to hold off a Soviet attack until additional forces from the West were able to join the battle, the rearming of West Germany seemed inevitable.⁷⁵ Adenauer also expressed growing concern about the creation of paramilitary police forces in the Soviet zone, the so-called kasernierte Bereitschaftspolizei (the “barracked” riot or readiness police).⁷⁶

Despite denials by Perkins, Schuman, and Acheson of any interest in rearming Germany, a cable from Paris reveals that French deputies continued to speculate about German rearmament and felt that is was coming “nearer and nearer.”⁷⁷ Schuman’s denial came in the form of a statement made by him before the French National Assembly on 24 November in which he said that it was a “a strange paradox” that despite confirmation by the Allies that the demilitarization of Germany would be completed, the idea of a rearmed Germany had “been able to spring up and persist in spite of the denials and in spite of all that is being done to the contrary.” Schuman concluded with a pledge, apparently given to him by Adenauer: “The Federal Government asserts its firm determination to maintain the demilitarization of the federal territory and to endeavor, by all means in its power, to prevent the reconstitution of armed forces of any nature whatsoever. To this effect the Federal Government will cooperate fully with the High commission and in the activity of the Military Security Board.”⁷⁸

The US position was further muddled by Secretary of Defense Johnson and JCS Chairman Bradley, who, upon arriving in France for a NATO Defense Ministers meeting and despite initially emphasizing that the US had no intention of ever rearming Germany and that there was no hedging or dodging about the American position on that point, subsequently stated that German rearmament was not favored “at this time.”⁷⁹

In November, Acheson went to Europe himself and met with Adenauer, then the new West German chancellor. During his discussions with Adenauer on 13 November, Acheson told him that from his talks in Paris, he felt that French public opinion was ready for cooperation with West Germany and that France’s premier, Robert Schuman, had the full backing of his cabinet regarding policy on Germany. As the discussion moved to the legal problems of ending the state of war with Germany, Adenauer stated that “[the German government] had no interest in the rearmament of the German nation. . . . It was just too dangerous to provide Germany with arms at this stage.”⁸⁰

Several days later, Acheson was asked whether Adenauer had addressed the establishment of a small German army of five divisions as reported in the NewYork Times. The president was asked the same question at a press conference the following day. Both Acheson and President Truman emphatically denied that report, calling it one of several rumors on this issue.⁸¹

Some members of Congress, however, appear to have felt differently. While in Berlin in late November, a four-man congressional study mission of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, led by Representative Joseph Pfeiffer (D-NY) and including representatives Jacob K. Javits (R-NY), Thomas S. Gordon (D-IL), and Clement J. Zablocki (D-WI), stated that they would recommend including West Germany in the Western Union. The group also advised against the early withdrawal of occupation forces, and Pfeiffer said that he was in favor of eventual German rearmament but within the context of a United States of Europe. Of the four representatives, only Javits stated his opposition to German rearmament “under any circumstances.” On their return, Javits said the mission’s report would “condemn rearmament whether of German soldiers to be used under German or Allied command.”⁸²

In this atmosphere of ambiguity, speculation continued, and on 1 December, the French ambassador Henri Bonnet met with Acheson to state that the “persistent rumors” of German rearmament were upsetting public opinion in Europe and particularly in France. They were, he continued, interfering with the main task of integrating Germany into the European scene, as rearmament was not part of that integration. Acheson replied that the State Department would continue to do everything it could to stop the rumors. Several days later, the State Department transmitted a cable to certain American diplomatic officers telling them to respond to any possible queries regarding the November foreign ministers meeting in Paris that there were “no rpt no agreements, discussions or conversations of any kind re: authorization Ger armed forces or any modification existing disarmament and demilitarization agreements and regs pertaining to Ger.”⁸³

Two days later, on 3 December, Adenauer gave an interview to John P. Leacacos of the Cleveland Plain Dealer that, according to Adenauer’s autobiography, was garbled when it appeared in the United States and caused “great excitement in the world press.”⁸⁴ In the interview, Adenauer reiterated his opposition to rearmament and stated that the presence of the occupying powers put the FRG under the protection of NATO: “Since the western powers have disarmed Germany, it is their duty by morals and under international law to care for the security of Germany.”⁸⁵ When asked about a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe, Adenauer responded first that the government would not allow the recruitment of Germans into other military services as that would be the same as “buying a people to have mercenaries.”⁸⁶ He then opened Pandora’s box when he told Leacacos that “Germany should contribute to the defense of Europe in a European Army under command of higher European headquarters at which time it will not only be urgent but necessary for the United States military aid program to be extended to Germany.”⁸⁷

More interesting is what Adenauer said off the record. According to Leacacos, Adenauer then said that the Germans were the only people who could stop the Russians. “However,” Adenauer continued, “with the passage of time, the trained soldiers from general to private are forgetting their military skills. Therefore, if the Allies wait too long before they begin training a German army, it may be too late to be of immediate use to defend Germany against Russia.”⁸⁸

On 8 December, Adenauer had a discussion with the three high commissioners in which he stated that his recent statements regarding German rearmament were made to allay fears in Germany that were caused by a number of issues. The recent NATO meeting in Paris, he said, had given no information on how Germany might be defended in the case of Russian aggression. Press rumors indicated that two alternatives had been discussed: a European defense on the Rhine and a defense on the Elbe. In addition, Adenauer said that he had evidence that an army was being created in East Germany and that it was no longer possible to believe that these troops were mere police formations.⁸⁹

The Allies, Adenauer said, were duty bound to maintain the security of the Federal Republic. He believed that any defense on the Rhine was a hollow phrase, as Germany was living under a serious permanent threat, and that unless the Soviet Union was stopped where it was, Western Europe would be finished. Adenauer then asked that the western Allies make a declaration to the effect that West German territory would be defended against an attack and that his views be reported to their governments, which was agreed. It was further agreed that all should refrain from public statements on this issue; it was a matter for “no comment.”⁹⁰