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THE FLANK MARCH

On the morning of, September 23 the allied armies left their position on the Alma, and after a march of about seven miles arrived at the Katcha, meeting with no opposition, and on the following day reached the Belbec, a small stream within a short distance of Sebastopol. From our pickets on the heights we could see the harbour and their line-of-battle ships at anchor.

Hitherto the intention of the allies had been to attack the forts on the north side, but the plans were suddenly altered, chiefly in consequence of the recommendation of Sir John Burgoyne. In a very able memorandum, written the day after the Alma, he pointed out in the first place, that the city of Sebastopol, with its docks, wharves, reserve armaments and stores—in fact, its chief resources—were on the south side of the harbour, and that the land defences there were imperfect and incomplete. In the second place, that the harbours of Kameisch and Balaclava would give the allied forces a safe base of operations, and free communication with the fleet, whereas on the north they had only the sea shore to rely on. Under these circumstances he recommended the abandonment of the north altogether, and establishing ourselves to the south of the city. The strategical advantages of this course were apparent, and the plan was adopted, and on September 25 the flank march began, the English army leading off, and proceeding for some miles in a south easterly direction through the woods. I remember when the Duke of Cambridge received the order to march south-east through the forest, he remarked that he had received many orders in his day, but that was the first time he had ever marched by compass.

It so happened that on the same morning Prince Menschikoff, ignorant of our sudden change of plan, was moving a considerable force inland from Sebastopol, in order to take the allies in flank, and as we emerged from the woods on the open ground at Mackenzie's farm, our advanced troops suddenly ran into the rear guard of the Russians. In fact, both the opposing armies were making a flank march at the same time, and the head of one came into collision with the tail of the other. Both sides were taken unawares, but some of our cavalry and Maude's troop of Horse Artillery at once pursued and captured a few prisoners and a considerable number of waggons, with ammunition, supplies, and baggage. This unexpected encounter must have rather mystified the enemy; but Lord Raglan, knowing that his forces were scattered for some miles on a long thin line, pushed on, and towards sunset the Light and First Divisions reached the bridge over the Chernaya on the road leading to Balaclava, and bivouacked for the night.[6]

The following morning the march was resumed across the plain for two or three miles to Balaclava, that small fishing village, with its land-locked harbour scarcely larger than a dock, which was destined to be the British base throughout the war. As the staff and leading troops approached the village, a deputation of the inhabitants came out bearing bread and salt as a token of submission. Almost at the same time a gun was suddenly fired from the ruins of the old castle on the heights, and a shell splashed into the marshes close by, followed by another. Lord Raglan, through an interpreter, asked the deputation the reason of this unexpected demonstration, as bread and salt and bursting shells seemed inconsistent with each other; but the only explanation they could give was that the small garrison had not been formally summoned to surrender. The troops of the Light Division at once swarmed up the heights, and half of C troop of Horse Artillery, under Brandling, came into action; the other half I took, by Lord Raglan's orders, up the steep hill overlooking the castle. Just as we got into action, the 'Agamemnon,' with Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, arrived off the harbour, and the small garrison, finding themselves under a converging fire from three sides, hoisted a white handkerchief on a pole in token of surrender. Their armament consisted of four antiquated brass mortars. The commandant, an old Greek colonel, had been wounded in the foot, and was carried down to Balaclava, where he met the staff who had just ridden in. The commandant's wife, on seeing her husband's condition, rushed out of her house in a flood of tears, fell on his neck, and kissed him repeatedly. Lord Raglan, however, spoke kindly and reassured her. In the meantime some Russian ladies who had left Sebastopol and taken refuge in Balaclava, terrified by our sudden arrival, crossed the harbour in a small boat in the vain hope of escape. Accompanied by another officer I followed them across, and we tried to reassure them. Knowing nothing of their language this was a difficulty. We tried 'Buono, Russ buono,' but it was not sufficient. Fortunately, at length we found one who spoke a little French, and then they became comforted and returned with us to the village, and were taken care of. Such was the capture of Balaclava.

Many years after, in 1872, on re-visiting the Crimea with the late Colonel Charles Gordon of Khartoum, we found that the old commandant (Colonel Mammoo) was still alive, being over eighty, and we called on him. He was much pleased to see us and to talk over old days, and said that he should never forget the kindness he had received from the English when a prisoner of war. The officers and men of the navy in the man-of-war which took him to Constantinople treated him, he said, like a prince.

In the meantime the condition of Marshal Saint-Arnaud had become critical, and on September 25 he resigned the command of the French army, and was succeeded by General Canrobert, who was then forty-five years of age. Saint-Arnaud embarked at Balaclava on board the 'Berthollet,' and was visited by Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons. He was then almost at the point of death, and his last words to Lord Raglan were: 'Je vous suivrai toujours par la pensée.'[7] He died on board on September 29.

At the end of September the allied armies took up their position on the plateau in front of Sebastopol, the French on the left with their base at Kameisch; Lord Raglan establishing his head quarters at a farm house.

Legend: Russian Names.

T. Malakoff Tower Kornileff Bas. M. Mamelon. Gordon's Hill R. Great Redan Bastion No. 3 D. Barrack Batteries G. Garden Batteries B. Bastion du mât Bastion No. 4 C. Bastion Centrale Bastion No. 5 L. Lancaster Battery X. Left Attack. Chapman's Batteries Y. Right Attack. Gordon's Batteries S. Sand bag Battery at Inkerman. English French.

References to Balaclava.

A. BC D. E. F. {English Batteries. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. {Redoubts manned by Turks.

The land defences of the city at the time were incomplete and not continuous. On the east stood a round tower with four guns (the Malakoff), and on the west a crenelated wall, with another tower overlooking Quarantine bay, and between these were some earthworks (called afterwards the Redan, Bastion du Mât, &c.), unfinished and unarmed. These defences were not formidable, and the idea of an immediate assault suggested itself and was advocated by some officers of high rank. On the other hand, the garrison was almost equal in number to the allies; the approaches were commanded by guns, although few, of heavy calibre; and the enemy had so placed their line-of-battle ships in the harbour as to sweep the ravines leading down to the city. On the whole it was considered more prudent to land the French and English siege trains, with a view to a bombardment, to be followed by a general assault.

As to the general plan of attack, Sir John Burgoyne, having, with Lord Raglan, surveyed the position, drew up a memorandum in which he indicated the Malakoff as the chief point for consideration. He said: 'On the right, the great tower appears to be the key of the whole position, and the only work to prevent an assault at any time; a good site, or sites for not less than eight guns … must be sought for to demolish that tower.' The French, however, demurred to this view, and it was finally decided that the main attack should be made by them on the Bastion du Mât, an earthwork in their immediate front on the left. When we remember that at the end of the siege, which lasted nearly a twelve-month, the city fell chiefly by an assault on the very position originally indicated by Sir John Burgoyne, we have a striking proof of the clear insight and great ability of that distinguished soldier.

During the first fortnight of October the allied armies were incessantly occupied in landing and moving up heavy guns and ammunition from Kameisch and Balaclava, and in constructing batteries and trenches in front of Sebastopol, and it was arranged that the bombardment should open on the 17th, to be followed by a general assault, the combined fleets simultaneously attacking the forts at the mouth of the harbour. Lord Raglan's order was as follows: 'The fire upon Sebastopol to commence at 6.30 A.M. from the French and English batteries, in co-operation with the allied fleets—the signal to be the discharge of three mortars by the French. The troops off duty to be ready to fall in at a moment's notice. Horses of the field batteries to be harnessed.' A thousand seamen with heavy guns were landed from the British fleet, and formed a naval brigade to act in co-operation with the Royal Artillery in the trenches.

The enemy, however, were equally energetic in developing and completing their earthworks, and, having an almost unlimited supply of heavy ordnance and munitions close at hand, they were in reality, as the event proved, able to strengthen their defensive position faster than the allies could concentrate their powers of attack.

The bombardment commenced at daylight on October 17, the infantry and field artillery being held in readiness for a general assault during the day. Our hopes and expectations were, however, destined to a great and speedy disappointment. The French siege batteries in front of the Bastion du Mât were soon seen to be in difficulties, being over-matched by those of the enemy; and early in the morning one of their magazines exploded, followed by a second, resulting in great loss of life, and practically putting an end for the time to their fire. The Russians, having thus gained a considerable advantage in one direction, turned their attention more immediately towards the English position, and a vigorous bombardment was maintained on both sides. Lord Raglan, in his despatch of October 18, alluding to the British batteries, speaks in high terms of the conduct of the sailors and of the Royal Artillery. He says that they kept up their fire with unremitting energy throughout the day, to his own and the general satisfaction, and to the admiration of the French army.

About three o'clock in the afternoon, a magazine blew up in the Redan, and for a time the Russian guns were silent. Lord Raglan said that, under other circumstances, this explosion would have been the proper moment for assault. The combined fleets during the day also engaged the sea forts and suffered considerably, but from our inability to take advantage of their action no decisive results were achieved. In short, the great bombardment of October 17 was a coup manqué, and although the conflict was still vigorously maintained, and although the French in a few days partially re-opened fire, it began to be apparent that the allies were growing weaker by the wearing out of their guns and carriages and the exhaustion of their ammunition, whilst the Russian defences were becoming consolidated and their armaments augmented.

General Canrobert did not at first take so gloomy a view of the position. Writing a few days after, he stated that his means of attack were concentrated on the Bastion du Mât, and that, assisted by the English, he hoped soon to gain possession of it. Lord Raglan, however, writing on the 23rd, said that the fire of the enemy was not seriously diminished; that, with plenty of men and unlimited resources, they were able to repair their works, remount guns, and re-open fire from batteries which had been silenced, and that consequently, he was unable to say when ulterior measures could be undertaken. The situation was growing serious.

In the meantime the enemy were also beginning to appear in strength on the Chernaya, in the direction of Balaclava. Since our arrival, at the end of September, considerable attention had been given to the defence of this important base of our operations. Defensive entrenchments were constructed on the heights immediately surrounding and overlooking the harbour, armed with guns of position, and held by a force of marines; whilst the 93rd Highlanders and a battery of artillery were in front of Kadikoi, the whole under the command of Sir Colin Campbell. In the plain beyond, and about a mile in advance, a girdle of small detached hills extended in a curve across the valley, and upon these, several battalions of Turks were distributed and began to entrench themselves. As they had no ordnance suitable, some cast-iron howitzers were by Lord Raglan's direction lent to them for the purpose. Such were the main outlines of the precautions taken for the defence of Balaclava. They were by no means too strong; but what with the incessant duties before Sebastopol and the great extent of ground to be covered, our troops were overworked, and no more were available for the defence of this flank of the position, covering, indeed, the sole base of our supplies of food and munitions.