Читать книгу Recollections of a Military Life - Sir John Adye - Страница 18

Table of Contents

BOMBARDMENT OF APRIL

On April 9 the second bombardment, for which such incessant preparations had been made during the winter, at length commenced, and was vigorously maintained for the following ten days; and although the Russians carried out numerous sorties, and were also unceasing each night in repairing their shattered batteries, still it became evident that the allies had achieved a virtual mastery and had laid open paths for a general assault. It was a momentous crisis. As regards the condition of Sebastopol at that time, Todleben, writing of the Bastion du Mât, said[20] 'that after having undergone a constant and violent bombardment, the work was in a desperate plight. Its artillery had been dismounted, its embrasures and its merlons almost entirely demolished, and a part of its salient had fallen in,' … 'that they were constantly expecting to see the enemy take advantage of the critical state to which the bastion was reduced, and advance to the assault of the work.' He adds, that the French might have advanced to the assault of the bastion with an absolute certainty of success … and that would have carried with it the fall of Sebastopol.' …

The allied armies were indeed in full expectation of being at length led to the assault, and the result was almost a foregone conclusion, but no order was issued and no decisive action taken. The real history of the case was not known at the time, but the accounts published by De Bazancourt in 1856, and confirmed long afterwards by Kinglake's account, have cleared up the mystery. De Bazancourt[21] said: 'La pensée d'une opération à l'extérieur planait toujours, on le voit, sur les décisions, et empêchait de tenter contre la place une action décisive. Les instructions secrètes du général Canrobert lui liaient les mains, à moins de force majeure.' Again, he quotes a despatch of Canrobert of April 24 as follows: 'Les officiers généraux des armes spéciales des deux armées, les chefs de nos deux corps d'armée, ont été unanimes pour céder dans cette circonstance aux cris de nos soldats français et anglais, demandant l'assaut. Lord Raglan partage fermement leur avis. J'ai pensé que mon devoir était de m'y joindre. … ' It seems remarkable, considering the unanimity which prevailed amongst the allied generals, and that the French Commander-in-Chief himself said he felt it his duty to join them, that no assault took place. Kinglake,[22] however, by means of French official documents brought to light after the fall of the Empire, proves that General Canrobert was in reality held back by instructions from Paris and by the influence of General Niel, and, in view of the expected arrival of the Emperor, would not join in a general assault.

Lord Raglan had apparently been informed of the expected arrival of the Emperor Napoleon, which he considered ill-advised, but both he and the English Government were kept for some time in the dark as to the special instructions which fettered the action of General Canrobert. Various interviews took place towards the end of April between the two Commanders-in-Chief, and in my journal I find a remark as follows: 'Met Lord Raglan out riding; he invited me to dinner, but added: "Canrobert is coming to a Council of War at half-past six, so we shall be late." The Council did not break up till ten P.M.'

Days thus passed away, and the allies were gradually losing the opportunity for which they had so long waited. In fact, the second bombardment of Sebastopol failed, from causes, however, very different from those which prevailed in the first. In October, 1854, our failure was due to want of power; in April, 1855, it was from want of will. Events, however, were hurrying on, and the crisis soon came.

Towards the end of April the Emperor Napoleon[23] relinquished his intention of coming to the Crimea, but sent out his proposed plan of an external campaign, to which, however, Lord Raglan strongly objected.[24] Whilst matters thus drifted, and whilst the batteries of the allies were again becoming weak and their ammunition exhausted, a new actor appeared on the scene in the person of General Pélissier, who was commanding the French corps d'armée on the left. Amongst other matters, he pointed out to Canrobert in clear and forcible language[25] that the Russians were establishing counter approaches in his front, and that he, and those under him, were fully convinced that the enemy's new position must be taken by a coup de main. He concluded: 'S'il m'était donner de décider, je n'hésiterais pas.' General Canrobert wavered, but at length accepted the responsibility, and the order for the attack was given for May 1. In my journal is a record as follows: 'Returned from Balaclava about 10 o'clock P.M. on the 1st of May and had an interview with Lord Raglan. Lord Stratford was there, when a message came that a severe battle was going on in front of the French trenches near the sea. We went off to a post of observation. The scene was striking. The sky was lit up with constant flashes—shells whizzing through the air; and amidst the incessant rattle of musketry could be heard the cheers of the troops as they stormed the works. It lasted four hours. Canrobert was with us, walking up and down, flourishing his stick and greatly excited. The result was that the French captured an outwork, and took eight mortars, and also five officers prisoners.'

In addition to the many difficulties of Lord Raglan's position at this time, he was also much worried by receiving a notification that Lord Panmure was about to abolish the Master-General and Board of Ordnance, and to absorb their duties in the newly constructed War Department. Speaking to me one day, he deplored the change, and said that the Ordnance was one of the most efficient and economical departments of the State, and that a much greater man than himself, the late Duke of Wellington, was of the same opinion.[26]

In the meantime, Lord Raglan, backed by the opinions of Admirals Bruat and Sir Edmund Lyons, strongly advocated a naval and military force being sent to Kertch at the entrance to the Sea of Azov, with a view of cutting the Russian communications and stopping their supplies; and the expedition, consisting of about 12,000 troops (one-fourth being English) started at the beginning of May. Hardly had it got out to sea than General Canrobert received an order by telegraph from Paris to concentrate all his troops for an external attack, and in consequence recalled the Kertch expedition, to the dismay, not only of Lord Raglan, but of the admirals and generals, and indeed of the officers and men of the allied fleets and armies.[27] Matters were evidently coming to a deadlock.

On May 14 Lord Raglan, Canrobert, and Omar Pasha had a long and final consultation as to the proposal of the Emperor Napoleon, which was in effect to separate the allied forces into three armies acting independently—one to blockade Sebastopol, the second to storm the Mackenzie Heights, and the third to march to the centre of the Crimea. The scheme was rejected on the broad ground that it would render each separate force liable to attack and defeat in detail.[28] This decision brought affairs to a crisis, and on May 16 General Canrobert telegraphed to the Emperor resigning his command, partly on the plea of ill health, but chiefly because his recall of the Kertch expedition and the rejection of the Emperor's scheme had placed him in a false position.[29] General Canrobert's resignation was accepted, and by his own wish he resumed command of his old division.

On May 19 General Pélissier was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the French army, and the situation was at once completely altered. Writing to Marshal Vaillant, Minister for War at Paris, he said: 'I have already seen Lord Raglan, and we are in complete accord; please ask the Emperor to give me liberty of action indispensable under the actual conditions of the war, and especially in view of the preservation of the intimate alliance of the two countries.' Efforts, however, were still made from Paris to regulate the strategy of the campaign, but they were virtually disregarded, and General Pélissier, acting with Lord Raglan, in the course of a few days carried out a series of important movements which put an end not only to the delays and disappointments that had so long trammelled the actions of the allies, but entirely altered the conditions of the campaign. The strength of the allies towards the end of May was approximately as follows:

French	100,000
English	25,000
Sardinians	15,000
Turks	45,000

May 18.—Accompanied Lord Raglan and La Marmora round the English trenches.

The first movement by Pélissier was a renewed attack on the Russian counter approaches in front of the French left, on the night of May 23; and as, owing to the desperate nature of the fighting, the object was not fully accomplished he refused an armistice to bury the dead, and followed it up the following evening with complete success, and his troops then entrenched themselves in the captured cemetery. I accompanied Lord Raglan and Omar Pasha on the second night to the French post of observation. The losses on both sides were very severe, being computed at 2,303 on the part of the French, and at 3,081 of the Russians.[30]

On May 25 General Canrobert was ordered to take up the line of the Chernaya, which he accomplished with ease and almost without loss. In this operation he was assisted by the Sardinians under La Marmora, who had arrived some days previously. I remember riding in the morning down to the Chernaya with Lord Raglan and his staff on the occasion. General Canrobert galloped up to meet him, in the highest spirits, and speaking in French said: 'My Lord, when I was a great man and Commander-in-Chief you used to come and visit me, and now when I am only commanding a division you again come to see me.' Lord Raglan, in reply, expressed his pleasure that Canrobert had gained so extended a position, and with such trifling loss. He afterwards joined General La Marmora, and made a reconnoissance towards Baidar, being altogether ten hours in the saddle. This movement in advance was of the greatest benefit to the allies, who, instead of being cooped up in a corner, had now ample space in a fertile valley, with plenty of grass, fuel, and fresh water at their disposal.

On May 24 the expedition to Kertch re-embarked, and sailed the following day. It consisted of 7,000 French, 3,000 English, and 5,000 Turks, with 5 batteries of artillery, and was attended with complete success. Kertch and Yenikale were captured without loss, the Russians retreating, after destroying large depots of supplies, &c. A considerable number of guns were taken, the Sea of Azov was opened to our fleets, and the enemy's communications interrupted. Sir Edmund Lyons reported that in four days the squadron had destroyed 241 vessels employed in transporting provisions to the Crimea, besides four war steamers and six million rations of flour and corn.[31]