Читать книгу The Astonishing General - Wesley B. Turner - Страница 10

CHAPTER FOUR

Brock in Upper Canada, 1810–11

The colony of Upper Canada that Brock entered in September 1810 was a forested land with settlements that merely dotted the landscape from Cornwall in the east to Amherstburg in the west. The population numbered approximately 77,000, mostly clustered along the shores of lakes or banks of rivers. (By contrast, bordering New York State had over 959,000 inhabitants.) Kingston, with about 150 houses and 600 to 1,000 inhabitants, was regarded as the largest town as well as the main naval and shipbuilding centre on Lake Ontario.[1] York, the capital, had about 600 residents and, thirty miles across the lake, Niagara had perhaps 500 inhabitants. Inland, there was only Chatham and a few settlements along the Thames River.

Economically, the upper province was weak. It had practically no industry, only limited capital resources, and depended on lumbering and agriculture for most of its employment. The farms, however, could not be depended on to supply the need for food once the men were taken for military service. Moreover, the vital problem of providing for the many needs of the province from Lower Canada was made even greater by the poor and insecure communications.

In summer, travel was principally by schooner on the lakes and the upper St. Lawrence, bateaux on the St. Lawrence from Montreal to Prescott where the rapids ended, and canoes on smaller rivers.[2] Although water provided the fastest and cheapest means of transportation and communication, it was not without its problems, such as rapids in the St. Lawrence, the barrier of Niagara Falls, storms, and unmarked harbours. Roads in Upper Canada connected the main settlements along the St. Lawrence River and Lake Ontario, but spring thaw or rainfall turned them into almost impassible muddy tracks. They were little better when they dried, for travellers had to deal with ruts, holes, dust, tree stumps, and unbridged rivers. Travel during the winter, on snowy roads and frozen rivers, was somewhat easier but far from good. In February 1811, Brock wrote to his brothers that on his trip from York to Niagara he had travelled over the worst roads he had ever met. In December, Brock intended to send John Lane, the assistant commissary general, to Quebec, but, he wrote, “The roads are in so bad a state, that he cannot possibly travel for some weeks.”[3]

Transportation difficulties made for slow and uncertain communications. A voyage across the Atlantic could take a month if all went well, but more likely six to eight weeks because of contrary winds or calms or fog or ice. Letters from England, by way of Halifax and Quebec, took from four to eight months to reach York; by way of New York City, the time was about two months. In 1810, the mail required about a month to go from Montreal to York, a direct distance of 350 miles. This time improved slightly before the war (e.g., Brock’s letter of December 11, 1811, to the military secretary was answered from Quebec on January 7, 1812). In this same month, Captain Gray made the trip in only eleven days, taking six days from Montreal to Kingston and five from Kingston to York. During 1812, the speed of communications increased by the use of couriers and a post system along the St. Lawrence, so that letters between Montreal and York reached their destination in only a few days. A letter from Brock at Fort George, dated July 3, 1812, was answered on July 7th by Prevost.[4] From York to Amherstburg dispatches usually took six days and from York to St. Joseph’s they ordinarily required two weeks since they had to go by the roundabout route of the lakes. [5]

Bringing people or goods from Europe or from Lower Canada was expensive, time-consuming, and subject to accidents. In wartime this supply route was vulnerable to attacks at sea, but the greatest exposure to enemy action was the section along the St. Lawrence from Montreal to Kingston. If the Americans attacked here they would “cut off the Communication by Water between the two Provinces,” wrote Gore in February 1809,[6] and everything to the westward would be lost.

Brock tried to make the best of living in Upper Canada, although it lacked the refinements and luxuries of Lower Canada. He was happiest when he was busy, as he told his brothers in September, “Here I am [Fort George] stationed for some time, unless I succeed in the application I mean to make shortly for permission to visit England. At present, Vincent, Glegg, and Williams, 49th, enliven this lonesome place. They are here as members of a general court martial, and are soon to depart, when I shall be left to my own reflections.”[7] They did depart and, according to a correspondent who knew him well, although Brock “often sees ten or a dozen friends” at Government House, “unfortunately he is quite alone not an officer with him.”[8] The writer, William Claus, mentions the absence of Captain Frederick Heriot, Colonel John Vincent, and Captain John Glegg. All these officers had long been in the 49th Foot and so shared experiences with their commanding officer — no doubt over a few bottles of wine.

As winter closed in, Brock’s sense of isolation increased. He wrote to brother Irving in January 1811, “You, who have passed all your days in the bustle of London, can scarcely conceive the uninteresting and insipid life I am doomed to lead in this retirement.” He passed much of his time alone in the evenings; “I read much, but good books are scarce, and I hate borrowing. I like to read a book quickly, and afterwards revert to such passages as have made the deepest impression and which appear to me the most important to remember....” He asked his brother to send him books of history, preferably with maps and translations of ancient authors, “As I grow old, I acquire a taste for study.” For the first time Brock mentions his health, “I feel at this moment infinitely better, but am not quite the thing, without knowing what ails me.” He thought about “directing my steps … to Ballstown, a medicinal water of great celebrity, about twenty miles north of Albany [New York].” But a month later he cancelled the journey because his health was restored and, besides, he did “not admire the manners of the American people.”[9]

He was an amazing man. Despite all the responsibilities on his shoulders and the increasing possibility of war with the United States, he remained a student of history and literature. And, although he wrote in January, “At present I live very abstemiously, and scarcely ever touch wine,” he was not reclusive for he had a reputation for generous hospitality. He enjoyed the company of Colonel and Mrs. Murray, among others, and during the winter he held a ball. Another friend, Colonel James Kempt (the quartermaster-general 1807–11)[10] wrote that he had just received a letter from Mrs. Murray, “Giving me an account of a splendid ball given by you to the beau monde of Niagara and its vicinity, and the manner in which she speaks of your liberality and hospitality reminds me of the many pleasant hours I have passed under your roof.”[11] (He also enjoyed the hospitality of others. At York, Lieutenant Governor Gore provided “an entertainment … to Brig. General Brock, the Members of the Legislative Council, and the House of Assembly, the Officers of the Garrison and the principal gentlemen of the Town and neighbourhood.”)[12]

Brock’s ambition and discontent were known by his friends. One of these, Colonel J.A. Vesey, wrote in April from London, “It is a pity that the 49th should be detained there so long, as it will interfere materially with the promotion of your officers. I fear you will have passed a lonely winter at Fort George, notwithstanding the addition of my friend Murray and his nice little wife to your society.” Perhaps thinking of a cure for Brock’s loneliness, Vesey, who had six children, wished one of them was a daughter old enough for Brock to marry. A month later, the colonel commiserated with Brock for the “stupid and uninteresting time” that he had spent in the colony.[13] His fellow officers’ opinions of Upper Canada undoubtedly reflected Brock’s thoughts.

Brock asked permission to return to England “on account of urgent private affairs requiring my presence,” by which he meant financial affairs. On behalf of the commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens wrote directly to Brock, as well as to Governor General Prevost, giving permission as long as Brock could be immediately replaced by another officer, meaning one of equal rank. His command could be taken by Sheaffe because he was on the spot and had “strong claims to employment on the staff.”[14] Brock’s 1804 judgment of Sheaffe was being vindicated. The letter giving Brock permission to return to England arrived in Upper Canada in January 1812, but, to anticipate slightly, Brock turned down the proffered leave because he believed there was the strong possibility of war with the United States. If that occurred, his place was in Canada.

In the Ohio Valley and upper lakes, the aboriginal nations — angered by continued American encroachment on their lands — were drawing closer to war. At a very large gathering at Amherstburg in November 1810, Tecumseh spoke of their determination to defend their lands and their expectation of receiving aid from the Indian Department. Those officials, headed by Matthew Elliot (superintendent at Amherstburg), feared that the tribes “were on the eve of an Indian War,” and the British would have to strive hard to restrain them.[15] No general conflict broke out, but native bands began sporadic raids against American settlements on the Wabash River.

Imaginary portrait of Tecumseh, artist unknown.

LAC, C319

When Tecumseh departed for the southern states to try to persuade tribes there to join his confederacy, Governor Harrison of Indiana determined to undertake a campaign to destroy that confederacy’s base of Prophetstown. He expected this action would finish Tecumseh’s efforts to create a strong aboriginal union and would also safeguard advancing American settlement. Harrison gathered a mixed force about 900-strong of regulars and militiamen, including experienced frontier fighters from Kentucky. During September and October he led a force up the Wabash toward the Tippecanoe River. On November 6th, they camped near Prophetstown. The tribes gathered there feared they would be attacked and, with Tecumseh absent, no leader was strong enough to restrain the most belligerent warriors. Before dawn on November 7th, 600 to 700 warriors did attack, but after a brief, fierce fight the natives were repulsed and Harrison burned the deserted village.

When he returned, Tecumseh had even more reason to seek British support against the Americans. While Americans rejoiced at their success in the battle of Tippecanoe (and Harrison would use this glorious victory to gain the presidency in 1840), their anger against the British was further inflamed by claims that “the whole of the Indians on this frontier, have been completely armed and equipped out of the king’s stores at Amherstburg.”[16]

Brock recognized that because of the government’s policy of providing native tribes with weapons and other supplies, it had put itself in a very awkward position in urging restraint. As he wrote to Governor Craig, “Our cold attempt to dissuade that much injured people from engaging in such a rash enterprise could scarcely be expected to prevail,” particularly as the Indian Department had provided them a “liberal quantity of military stores.”[17] While muskets could be used for hunting, “military stores” contains a suggestion of other uses. Nevertheless, Brock’s duty was to support Craig’s policy. Hence, in March 1811, he ordered Major Taylor, officer commanding at Amherstburg, to dissuade the native warriors from launching war but to do so carefully in order not to create resentment that might threaten future alliance. Little did Brock know that in a few months he would be responsible for maintaining the alliance without provoking conflict with the Americans.

The summer of 1811 saw many changes of command in the Canadas. Sir James Craig, because of his worsening health as well as his political difficulties, obtained approval to return to England[18] (see Appendix D). On June 19, 1811, he embarked from Quebec City, leaving Thomas Dunn in charge of the government of Lower Canada and Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond in command of the forces in the Canadas.[19] Drummond moved to Quebec and Brock — a major-general as of June fourth — was given command of Montreal.

On September 14th, Sir George Prevost, the new governor-in-chief of British North America and commander of all His Majesty’s Forces, arrived at Quebec.[20] The arrival of such an important personage required a good deal of ceremony, including the firing of salutes by guns on two ships and a reply by the “grand battery” on shore. He landed with “his lady, family and suite” at the king’s wharf, where he was greeted by officers of the garrison and by the 8th Regiment, whose band played “God Save the King.” He mounted his horse and, accompanied by officers, rode to the Château Saint Louis to be received there by the colours and band of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment. (Each regiment had a regimental flag with the colour of the cuffs and collars of the soldiers’ coats and a union flag in the upper canton. The regimental colour and the king’s colour — the Union Jack — had the regimental name or number enclosed in a wreath of roses, and thistles in the centre of the colour. They were carried into battle by ensigns guarded by two sergeants, the whole group known as the regiment’s colour party. The colours provided a rallying point for the regiment amidst the smoke of battle but, naturally, drew enemy fire. It was an honour to carry and defend the colours and a great disgrace to have them captured.) Prevost had joined the British Army in 1779, and from 1794 saw active service in the West Indies. In 1795, his successful defence of Dominica against the French gained him promotion to the rank of major general and a baronetcy. He had political experience as lieutenant governor of St. Lucia, governor of Dominica, and since 1808 lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia. There he had proven to be a pragmatic and conciliatory governor who avoided any serious quarrel with the elected assembly. The political crisis in Lower Canada raised the possibility of undermining popular support for the government in case of war with the United States. Prevost’s political skill, along with his fluent bilingualism, help explain why he was chosen.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Governor Gore of Upper Canada obtained leave to return to England and he departed in October 1811. Prevost’s instructions from the British government were to combine the civil and military roles in Upper Canada, probably because it was the most threatened area of the colony in the event of war with the United States. Prevost decided to send Brock to Upper Canada as both military commander and civil administrator. The government’s instinct was sound and no more a capable officer than Brock could have been sent. Brock’s residence of about three months in Montreal ended as he departed for Upper Canada.

On September 30th, he met the members of the executive council, presented his appointment as commander of the forces in the province, and the orders of the Prince Regent “appointing the Officer Commanding the forces in Upper Canada to be a Member of the Executive Council.”[21] The necessary oaths were then given in the presence of Gore, Chief Justice Thomas Scott, John McGill, the inspector general of public provincial accounts, Justice William Dummer Powell, and Prideaux Selby, the receiver general. On October 9th, the day after Gore departed for England, Brock began his term as president of the council that was to last just over a year. As administrator of Upper Canada, he headed the civil government and one of his most important tasks was to convene the Legislature, use his influence to have measures passed, and end a session by proroguing the Parliament.

As if the major general did not have enough on his mind, during that summer the Brock family was hit by a financial crisis. In 1810 and 1811, English trade and industry entered a period of depression that was part of a wider pattern of a severe shortage of credit in Europe and the United States.[22] William Brock was the senior partner of a London firm of bankers and merchants that declared bankruptcy in June 1811, partly owing to French seizures of ships in the Baltic Sea. William had advanced to Isaac about £3,000 for the purchase of his commissions and, being childless, had never intended to ask for repayment. Unfortunately, Isaac’s name appeared in the company’s books with the sum charged against him. But the family also suffered because William had been supporting his brother Daniel’s business and, late in 1810, was forced to cut off those funds. There was a greater shock for Isaac. He learned that Savery had suffered financially and that he and William, both brothers connected with the firm, had quarrelled and become estranged because of the bankruptcy. In light of Isaac’s strong affection for his family, it is not hard to imagine the sorrow he felt, and he expressed it in his letters. He wrote to Savery,

I have this instance finished a letter to Irving. I attempted to write composedly, but found it impossible. The newspapers gave me the first intimation of the heavy misfortune we have all sustained … I want to be at once apprized of the full extent of our misery. Why keep me in this horrid suspense?

I write merely to say, for really my poor head cannot allow me to say more, that tomorrow I enter into the official duties of the president of this province. The salary attached to the situation is £1,000, the whole of which, I trust, I shall be able to save, and, after a year or two, even more.

Yesterday was my first truly gloomy birthday I have ever passed. May you be happy.[23]

Weeks would pass before Brock could receive the latest news from his family. He wrote with uncertainty but he was prepared to act decisively. He asked Irving what was the size of the debt and whether or not he (Isaac) would have to sell his commissions. He intended to sign over his salary, urging Irving to “pay over as fast as you receive it, unless indeed want among any of you calls for aid; in that case make use of the money, and let the worst come. I leave everything to your sober discretion.” As a major-general, Brock was supposed to receive an annual salary of £456/5/0. It was not easy for Brock to give up this money, for he explained that he had spent £300 or £400 on “outfits” and so could not send any sums that year. As president of the council — in effect, lieutenant governor of the province — he had to maintain a certain image, which meant: “Much shew and feasting are indispensable to attract the multitude, especially in a colony like this, where equality prevails to such a degree that men judge of your disposition, of your frankness, by your frequency of the invitations they receive. At present, all classes profess great regard and esteem for me; but although I hope they may, I cannot expect such sentiments will continue long.” He was too critical of both Upper Canadians and of himself. It is not clear if Brock did drastically curtail his expenditures; no complaints have come to light in the records. All evidence indicates that he was regarded with respect and even affection by most of the population.

That Isaac had many true friends is clear from a letter written to him by William:

You have received, or will receive shortly, a letter from our assignees, desiring to be informed in what manner the debt, which appears in our books as owing by you, is to be liquidated … it amounts to something over £3000 … Some reports had, but very erroneously, been circulated that they [the assignees] had already commenced legal steps against you; and upon this report a young gentleman lately arrived from Canada, a Mr. Ellice, called upon Charles Bell to enquire if it were so, and told Bell that rather than anything unpleasant should happen to you, he would contrive to pay the debt himself, so great was his esteem and friendship for you.[24]

William had just learned of Brock’s appointment and hoped his brother would not quit “his enviable situation, for a mere major-general’s appointment in Europe.” The family had lost heavily. William, Savery, and Irving became dependent upon small incomes while a brother-in-law, John Tupper, lost between £12,000 and £13,000, enormous sums for the time, but at least, he escaped total ruin. No further correspondence about this family crisis has been found, but the brothers would become reconciled. On October 13, 1812, William wrote to Savery that Isaac wished William and Irving to become reconciled, and so William “went up to day on seeing him and shook hands. He then showed me two lines which he had just received from Isaac. It is satisfactory to me that we shook hands before I was aware of the contents.” [25]

The fact that Edward Ellice was willing to take on the Brock family debt out of esteem and friendship for Isaac tells a good deal about the regard for the general in English-Canadian civilian society. Born in 1783, Ellice was still a young man when he took over leadership of his father’s widespread business enterprises upon his death in 1805. Edward is described as “a prominent merchant-banker and shipowner in the City [London], trading in furs, fish, sugar, cotton, and general merchandise in North and South America, the East and West Indies, and Europe.” He was well educated (he had received his Master of Arts in 1800), well connected socially and politically in Britain, for he had married Lady Hannah, daughter of Charles, 1st Earl Grey, a leading figure in the Whig aristocracy, and wealthy — he inherited his father’s Scottish estate as well as the large seigneury of Beauharnois. One indication of his financial strength is the fact that in 1813, despite the financial strains of years of warfare, he was able to borrow £150,000 from the Bank of England to aid his business. Until his death in 1863, Ellice played important roles in Canadian and British politics and business. Brock would have met him in Lower Canada and obviously impressed him, for bailing out a financially distressed army officer was probably something rarely done by a shrewd businessman.

Brock’s complaint about the high level of expenditure that was expected of him and the resultant strain on his income was not an unusual situation. Officers were expected to maintain an expensive style of living that could, a times, strain their income. They were required to maintain a mess and that expense required a substantial private income of £200 to £300 above his pay. According to one historian, officers’ pay was low compared to professionals of similar social status and even with some extra payments, officers were “abysmally paid.”[26] An extra allowance was given for taking command of a garrison but there were deductions that sometimes surprised the officer. In February 1812, Major Donald Macpherson, commander of the garrison of Kingston, wrote that he understood in taking on the command he would receive a daily allowance of five shillings, which would be reduced by deductions to four shillings and nine pence. To his surprise he found that that amount would be reduced even further because it was subject to income tax. From an endorsement on the letter, it appears that the deductions remained.[27] Brock, too, watched his expenses carefully. In February he wrote to the military secretary (Noah Freer) that he had learned he was being charged £20 for his “portion of the expense of a canoe employed in taking Governor Gore and myself to York.” He asked that Prevost “may consider this sum a fair public charge.”[28]

While trying to cope with the family’s financial problems, Brock had to deal with administrative matters of the Upper Canadian government. After assuming both civil and military command, one of his first concerns was the management of the Indian Department. The accounts of that department had fallen into arrears and Craig had appointed a deputy commissary general to bring the accounts up to date. But this officer, John Lane, was stationed at Fort George and the deputy storekeepers at different posts were required to send their accounts to the storekeeper general at Lachine in Lower Canada before they were sent to Lane at Fort George. Clearly, the system was seriously inefficient and Brock, typically, suggested that it be simplified. Either the storekeeper general should move to Upper Canada or his role in dealing with the accounts should be taken on by Lane. Prevost preferred to keep control in Quebec by ordering Lane to move there, where all future Indian Department accounts were to be sent. Brock disagreed with this change on the grounds that their examination in Upper Canada would be easier and quicker because that was where the accounts originated. His concern for efficiency was in this instance not shared by Governor Prevost.[29]

Prevost may have been influenced in his decision to post Brock to Upper Canada by reports about the poor condition of the forts along the Niagara frontier and of their supplies. Lieutenant-Colonel R.H. Bruyeres (commanding the Royal Engineers) reported in August 1811 on forts George, Chippawa, and Erie.[30] Fort George was “very much out of repair,” Fort Chippawa contained only a blockhouse and storeroom “enclosed with a line of picketing very much decayed,” and Fort Erie was to a great extent “unfinished and weak.” None of these forts could provide effective defence. This gloomy analysis was confirmed by a report in September from Major-General George Glasgow (commanding Royal Artillery) to Prevost. Fort George, the principal fortress for the frontier, had only twenty-one gunners and three artillery officers, and Glasgow wrote about the lack of horses and drivers for the artillery and powder magazines unfinished and unprotected. He concluded that no post in Upper Canada was safe or strong.[31] This information would have been provided to Brock.

The threat of American hostilities continued to grow. President Madison, in his annual address to Congress, appealed for an increase in the country’s military forces (see Chapter Three). In January 1812, the House of Representatives voted to increase the regular force by 10,000 men and authorized the president to raise up to 50,000 volunteers and to repair all naval ships.[32] The men in charge of the defence of the Canadas could not disregard these ominous actions. Brock undertook to gather information and to plan for the defence of his province. In December 1811, he sent a sweeping review to Prevost suggesting “precautionary measures … to meet all future exigencies.”[33]

He believed there had existed “a general opinion … that, in the event of hostilities, no opposition was intended,” but that view was changing because a strong regiment and military stores had been sent to Upper Canada and “a military person” had been appointed to administer the government. The regiment referred to was the 41st, which had been sent to Upper Canada in the summer to relieve the 100th (it was to go to Bermuda, but Prevost kept it in Lower Canada). Brock had recently visited Niagara and had found “the principal inhabitants” determined to defend “their property and support … the government.” But Brock also pointed out that Prevost needed to act for those people: “Look with confidence to your excellency, for such additional aid as may be necessary, in conjunction with the militia, to repel any hostile attempt against this province.” He went on to general observations and for a military commander with no experience as a political leader they demonstrate a remarkable grasp of political realities. He knew there were many “improper characters who have obtained extensive possessions, and whose principles diffuse a spirit of insubordination very adverse to all military institutions … It is certain that the best policy to be pursued … [if war came] will be to act with the utmost liberality, and as if no mistrust existed; for, unless the inhabitants give an active and efficient aid, it will be utterly impossible for the very limited number of the military … to preserve the province.” He had perhaps learned from the example of Craig’s mistakes in Lower Canada not to act as a high-handed martinet but to understand public opinion and work to change it.

After this introduction, Brock wrote about each area of the province. Significantly, he first reported on “the district of Amherstburg.” He saw the greatest American threat there, but he thought it the place where “active operations,” if undertaken, “must defer any offensive attempt on this province, from Niagara westward.” The Americans, fearing attack from native warriors, would be compelled to send large forces to that frontier. In order for the British to obtain “an active co-operation on the part of the Indians,” they would have to show them that “we are earnestly engaged in the war,” and the way to do that was to seize Detroit and Michilimackinac.[34] In other words, if war came, act aggressively rather than wait to be attacked.

Amherstburg Shoreline, 1804. In the shipyard on the extreme left of the painting is the schooner General Hunter, with its framing in the early stages of construction. Near the ship, naval personnel can be seen, as well as a group of redcoat soldiers from the 49th Regiment near the shore. There are partially de-rigged schooners in the center and right of the painting. A small American coasting schooner can be seen navigating around the down-bound raft in this narrow stretch of the Detroit River. There are many small craft operating along the waterfront, such as a lug-rigged skiff, a sprit-rigged boat, and a native canoe.

Painting by Peter Rindlisbacher

Brock anticipated the opening moves of the war and the capture of those two American posts would have precisely the effect he expected. He put the strength of the local militia at 700 men, too few for offensive operations. If a rupture seemed imminent, he proposed to reinforce Amherstburg with 200 regulars from Fort George and York, which would clearly indicate to both natives and militia that the government would resist an attack. Another vital need was to upgrade Fort Amherstburg. He sent Captain M.C. Dixon of the Royal Engineers to Malden in spring 1812 with the task of making improvements. On July 8th, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas St. George, the commanding officer, reported to Brock, “We are hard at work at the Fort and have done a great deal since you left us … [Walls had been strengthened and twenty cannon mounted.] In short, every exertion possible is made by us.”[35]

From Amherstburg to Fort Erie, Upper Canada depended for its defence on a naval force, but it consisted of only a ship and a schooner “of bad construction, old,” and badly in need of repair. Brock reported that the Americans had two vessels “both in perfect readiness for any service.” Whatever the disparity of force, when it came to the test the British would prevail by using their vessels effectively and by capturing the American brig. However, Brock pointed out that if Fort St. Joseph’s were to be maintained and (in the event of war) Michilimackinac attacked, “many vessels” would have to be hired or purchased.

He mentioned that the Americans were already manning a warship at Sackets Harbor on Lake Ontario. Indeed, a recruiting party had come to Buffalo and “a petty officer” even had the nerve to cross the border to seek recruits. The magistrates were informed but the American escaped. It seems Brock had sources of information on the other side.

Next he dealt with the Niagara frontier, where he believed the main invasion attempt would come “with a view to conquest. All other attacks will be subordinate, or merely made to divert our attention.” He estimated that nearly 3,000 militia and 500 native fighters could be collected along this line and, together with the regulars, they would provide and effective defence against anything but a very large force. Besides urging the need for regular troops, he pleaded for gunners, drivers, and horses to complete the Car Brigade. This was a volunteer corps of farmers who employed their horses in drawing field guns for the army. He also wanted a body of cavalry and reported that he had already received offers “from many respectable young men” to form a troop. All they needed from Lower Canada were swords and pistols.

Map of the Niagara Frontier.

Used with permission of Geoffrey Matthews

Brock dealt finally with Kingston and the eastern end of Upper Canada. He believed the militia from the Bay of Quinte to Glengarry County to be the most dependable in the province. Those from the Bay could be stationed at Kingston, but from the town eastward the men would prefer to remain to protect their property against raids from the American shore. Brock expected that the Americans would likely raid across the St. Lawrence and so it would be best to have the militia watching American movements since, whenever the men were needed elsewhere, they could be moved quickly. He praised Richard Cartwright, “the senior militia colonel at Kingston,” but because of that post’s distance from York or Fort George, Brock urged the appointment of a regular officer “of high rank” to direct any operations there. Major Donald Macpherson of the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion would take command at Kingston.[36]

He concluded by assuring Sir George, “It will ever be my utmost pride to meet your views and to merit your approbation.” When it came to actual campaigns in 1812, Brock would not always conform exactly to Prevost’s wishes, for the governor preferred passive defence whereas the major-general believed the best course was to attack first. In this letter of December 2nd, before he was swamped by the necessities of warfare, Brock showed his ability to outline a strategic vision. It is clear, also, that Brock expected Upper Canada to be defended vigorously whatever difficulties that involved.

The very next day, Brock returned to the most serious problem in terms of defending Upper Canada. He wrote to Prevost, “My first care, on my arrival in this province, was to direct the officers of the Indian Department at Amherstburg to exert their whole influence with the Indians to prevent the attack which I understood a few tribes meditated against the American frontier.” He believed these efforts had failed and that the natives faced destruction. Probably he was referring to their defeat at Tippecanoe, where their casualties were fewer than those of the Americans and neither their forces nor their spirit were destroyed.[37]

What is unusual is that Prevost used Brock’s letter in an unexpected way. He sent an extract of it to the British minister in Washington, A.J. Foster, so that he could use it to counter any charges that the British government was inciting native people against the United States. As well, Prevost enclosed an extract in a dispatch to Liverpool pointing out that Brock had anticipated Liverpool’s directions, dated July 28, 1811, to officials in Canada to do everything possible to restrain the Indians.

It was obvious that one of the major considerations for the defence of Upper Canada was the role of native nations. There was no unanimity among the Six Nations on the Grand River about supporting the British should war break out with the United States. The Iroquois in New York State had no choice because they lived on reserves surrounded by American settlements. For a variety of reasons — mainly concerns about their own safety — the New York Iroquois sought to persuade the Iroquois on the Grand to adopt a neutral stance in the event of war. British abandonment of native allies in 1783 (Treaty of Paris) and 1794 (Battle of Fallen Timbers) was remembered, not least among the Six Nations. On the Grand there were pro-American, pro-British, and neutralist factions. There was also discord between followers of John Norton, also known as Teyoninhokarawen, who favoured strong links with the British Army, and Deputy Superintendent-General William Claus, who sought to uphold the Indian Department’s influence. Brock’s efforts to gain aboriginal support for the defence of Upper Canada would be complicated by these many divisions and personal animosities among the Six Nations. These difficulties and the roles of Norton and Claus will be dealt with in later chapters.[38] In effect, the British found themselves between a rock and a hard place because their influence depended largely upon supplying natives with provisions, including weapons and ammunition. To cut off those supplies would remove any chance of restraint on their warriors’ actions. At the same time, the Americans believed that the British were providing the means for frontier warfare, if not actually encouraging attacks on settlers. “From the American perspective, the reality on the ground was a degree of co-operation between Britain and Natives that was a threat. As a consequence, defeating the Natives was, in part, to the Americans a way of hitting Britain, whether or not the two powers were at war.”[39]

Major John Norton, Teyoninhokarawen. Watercolor on ivory, 1805, by Mary Ann Knight.

LAC, C128832

The distribution of “presents,” rewards, and payments to native peoples was a recurrent theme before and during the war. There were both practical and symbolic reasons for this British policy. The army gave supplies to the Six Nations to persuade them to take up arms in defence of Upper Canada, and to western nations because their warriors could not support their families when on campaigns. In June 1812, on behalf of the Grand River people, Norton requested a “regular stipend” for warriors, “otherwise want [would] oblige them to return to their usual occupations for the Support of their families.” Brock replied that “he saw clearly the propriety of my remark,” at the same time adding that he thought “Goods might answer the purpose better than money.”[40] Although the Iroquois were being influenced by “the cash economy,” gifts of goods were of greater importance. Great quantities of these were given, including thousands of guns, gun locks, pistols, brass kettles, knives of various kinds, gunpowder, lead, shot, flints, “lances” or pikes, swords, pipe tomahawks, blankets, buttons, cloth, clothing, body paint, jewellery, shoes, coats, saddles, shawls, silk handkerchiefs, shoes, coats, medals, silver gorgets, ear bobs, and vermilion dye.[41] Providing these goods, as well as large supplies of food, seriously strained — and sometimes overwhelmed — supply routes to Upper Canada. The strain on the British finances was also heavy, for the cost of presents rose “from £60,000 in 1811 to at least £125,000 in the last year of the war. During the war, £350,000 were required for presents alone.”[42] These presents and payments came from a long tradition and had symbolic importance. In Benn’s words, “Native peoples saw gifts as rewards for past assistance, as manifestations of the giver’s power, as expressions of affection towards friends in need, and as compensation for not being able to hunt, trade, or farm while on campaign.”[43] The distribution or exchange of gifts represented friendship, the sharing of what each party had. The refusal by the British or their inability to provide supplies might be interpreted as denial of friendship or the ending of an alliance. Brock would be aware of this problem but the real crises in the British-native alliance would come after his death.

In eastern Upper Canada, in the district of Johnstown, the little village of Elizabethtown perched on the north bank of the St. Lawrence River. Although by 1810 it had a courthouse and jail, the place had far less importance than Prescott, a few miles downriver. (Prescott would have a garrison and Fort Wellington erected nearby during the war.)[44] However, there is a story of a dramatic event taking place in Elizabethtown in 1811, before Isaac Brock had taken over the government or had won any victories. The account presented by Fryer has Brock proceeding up the St. Lawrence River, passing Prescott. As he approached the village of Elizabethtown, he heard the sounds of a quarrel. It was a bitter fight over changing the name of the village as a consequence of the government making it the district seat and centre for a courthouse. Two prominent families, the Buells and the Joneses, wanted different names that would honour their families. Brock, after eating a meal in the local tavern, listened to the claims of the two factions. Then he proposed the solution of naming the village after him, and so much was the townspeople’s respect for the general, that they did just that.

Brock’s monument in Queenston.

Author’s photo

The story seems to have originated in family tradition and appeared in an early history of Leeds and Grenville Townships. The author includes a cautionary footnote: “Some discrepancy exists between this and other accounts.”[45] Evidence for this account is elusive. In the Journals of the assembly and of the Legislative Council of Upper Canada, both for 1812, there are four references to Elizabethtown and none to Brockville.[46] The York Gazette of February 25, 1812, refers to Elizabethtown. Letters written in July 1812 refer to Elizabethtown, while Colonel Lethbridge, writing to Brock on August 10, mentions Brockville but on August 30 writes about an “affair at Elizabethtown.”[47] The change of name can be seen occurring in November of that year, for on the 15th Reverend William Smart delivered a homily, “Death and Victory: A Sermon Occasioned By the Death of Major Gen. Brock, Who Fell In the Battle of Queenston, Upper Canada, on the 13th Day of October, 1812: Preached at Brockville, Elizabethtown, November 15th 1812.” On the first page is a letter to Reverend Smart, requesting him to print the sermon. The letter writer was Lieutenant-Colonel Levius Sherwood (1st Leeds militia), who signed “Com. at Brockville.”[48] By December, the ambiguity over the name had been replaced by certainty, as in reports of the Alien Board the reference is to residents of Brockville.[49] Hence, from late in 1812 the usage of Brockville in place of the former Elizabethtown became popular. Another problem with the claim for the change of name in 1811 is the fact that Prescott was the transfer point for passengers and cargo when travelling up the St. Lawrence, so it would be unusual, indeed unlikely, that Brock would stop at Elizabethtown. Local lore is that some people gave the village the name of Brockville after hearing about the Battle of Queenston Heights and the next step was a petition of June 1813 to the Legislature.[50] The records of the Legislature are incomplete and the petition may be in the missing gap. What is not in doubt is that in March 1818 a bill was moved in the assembly “to establish and confirm the names of the new Towns of Brockville, Belleville and Toronto.”[51] What happened to that bill is unclear and it was not enough for the inhabitants of Brockville. They petitioned in 1819 to have the town incorporated. A bill was introduced and read, but two years later there was another petition making the same request and another bill was brought forth.[52] Brockville’s status was definitely established in January 1832, when it gained a president and board of police. Whatever the official standing of the town, before the end of 1812 its name stood for a permanent tribute to the “Hero of Upper Canada.”

NOTES

1. Stanley, War of 1812, 49. Preston, Kingston, cxii–cxiv. Information on Kingston’s population principally from Robert Gourlay. Sheppard, Plunder, 35–6 gives the population of 1,000, which may be high, other sources state it was about 600. Sheppard also claims that Upper Canada’s population declined during the war. Ibid., 195. For York see Firth, Town of York, lxxvi–lxxvii. Robinson, Life of … Robinson, 53, wrote that York had “scarcely 700 inhabitants.”

2. Bateau also spelled batteau. These were flat-bottomed boats made of planks. They were about forty feet long and six feet across at their widest part and capable of carrying 9,000 pounds. There was a lot of hard work handling cargo and navigating through rapids for a crew of only five men. See Heriot, Travels, 117–18. Stanley, War of 1812, 71.

3. Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 93, Brock to Irving, February 19, 1811; Ibid., 132, Brock to the Military Secretary, December 11.

4. Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 194–96, 198–99.

5. This paragraph is based on Turner, “Career,” 81, Appendix D.

6. LAC, RG8, C676, Gore to Craig, February 20, 1809.

7. Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 81–2, letter dated September 13, 1810. On Vincent see DCB, 7, 888–89. On Glegg see Turner, British Generals, 80 and n.102.