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CHAPTER TWO

Early Years in the Canadas, 1802–07: From Regimental Commander to Commander of the Forces

A small fleet docked at Quebec, the capital of the Canadas and residence of the governor, on August 20, 1802, with the first part of the 49th on board two ships. On September 7, the second division under Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Hale Sheaffe arrived, and on September 11, the third division under Captain Charles Plenderleath. In that same month, Brock was in Montreal and concerned about the state of the barracks and of the hospital. He pushed for repairs to be made before the cold of winter descended.[1] Many military facilities were in disrepair because in peacetime soldiers were not required to perform fatigue duties (such as building repairs) unless paid extra. Whether or not Brock achieved some improvement is not clear, but the incident shows his concern that the men under his command be properly housed and looked after.

In February 1803, the commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-General Peter Hunter, ordered the 49th to the upper province in order to replace the Queen’s Rangers, which was being disbanded.[2] York, the capital of Upper Canada, with a population between 300 and 400, had sixty to seventy wooden houses, surrounded by a few farms and large expanses of forest. Situated at the eastern edge of town, Government House served for the assembly and courts of justice. Near it was a blockhouse situated by a large marsh at the mouth of the Don River. Some two miles to the west were barracks, known as the “Garrison,” situated on “a dry bank.”[3] In midsummer, Brock wrote to Hunter’s civil secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel James Green, about the large number of soldiers quartered in the eastern blockhouse and falling ill. If this continued he intended to move them all “to the Garrison,” which so far was a much healthier situation.

Brock was soon to become acquainted with the great difficulties facing British troops in distant outposts, particularly close to the United States border. Early in August, eight men deserted from Fort George, where Sheaffe was in command, crossing the Niagara River to the American side. According to Sheaffe’s official account, they were captured by native warriors and brought back to the fort. A different story was told by James FitzGibbon, in a letter dated September 27, 1845.[4] In 1803, FitzGibbon was a sergeant-major in the 49th at York and according to him the men deserted from York and crossed the lake to the American shore. He informed Brock and they took a party of men across the lake by bateau to Fort George. The deserters were caught the next day by a different party from the fort. Many biographers have repeated FitzGibbon’s account, but its details may not be entirely accurate.

James FitzGibbon was born in Ireland in 1780, the son of a farmer and weaver. At age fifteen he joined a Yeomanry Corps (volunteers for local defence) and two years later was appointed to the rank of sergeant. In 1798 he was inducted into the Tarbert Fencibles, an Irish regiment raised for home service only, with the promise of appointment as pay-sergeant. His regiment was sent to England for garrison duty, and in August 1799 he was drafted into the 49th Regiment with the rank of sergeant. He served at Egmont-op-Zee as well as in the expedition against Copenhagen. At Egmont-op-Zee he was taken prisoner by the French and until he was exchanged in January 1800, he tried to learn the language.[5] Arriving in Canada with the regiment in 1802, he was already a confirmed admirer of Brock, who encouraged him to improve his education and loaned him books for that purpose. The colonel also obtained promotions for him without the purchase of commissions.[6] FitzGibbon admitted that he wrote the 1845 letter from memory so it is possible — indeed, probable — that he embellished the event, perhaps having in mind Brock’s quick removal to Fort George when he learned of the mutiny there.[7] Whatever the truth about this action, what is clear is Brock’s attitude toward desertion: it was a major crime and he would act against it as quickly and decisively as possible.

Scarcely had the deserters been captured when Brock learned of a conspiracy being plotted at the fort that if carried out would have been very serious indeed. Some twelve disaffected soldiers plotted to seize their officers, confine them to their quarters and perhaps even harm Sheaffe, plunder ammunition, and then desert to the American shore. Again, Brock rushed over from York, took command at the fort, arrested the conspirators, and sent them, as well as earlier deserters, to Quebec for trial. This conspiracy, he learned, had spread to troops at Chippawa, a small post above Niagara Falls, and at Fort Erie. All he could do in response was reduce the garrisons at those places. (Where he sent the men is unclear.)

He proposed other solutions such as removing the 49th from Fort George because troops there were tempted by the proximity to the United States to escape from the harshness of army life. However, since most posts in Upper Canada were near the American border, Brock turned to other proposals. He suggested strengthening the law against those who encouraged desertion, which was done by the Upper Canadian Legislature in 1804.[8] While he was on leave in England (1805–06), Brock proposed the creation of a veteran’s battalion whose soldiers should be stationed at frontier posts. The British Army already had nine battalions of veterans and, possibly because of Brock’s suggestion, in December 1806 a 10th Royal Veteran Battalion would be created to serve in North America.[9] Its members had served with other regiments but were still fit for garrison duty. The regiment would arrive at Quebec in the summer of 1807. Brock was an officer who gave some thought to the lives that soldiers led, often brutal, harsh, and lonely, and who tried to find ways of improving their lot.

An early example of his helping young soldiers was his encouraging FitzGibbon to get an education. Another example, out of many, is shown in a letter he wrote to his brothers on November 19, 1808. In it he explained that he had prevailed on Sir James Craig, the commander of the troops in the Canadas, to appoint Sergeant Robinson “to a situation in the commissariat at Sorel, worth 3s. 6d. a day with subaltern’s lodging money and other allowances. He married a Jersey lass, whose relatives may inquire for him.”[10]

Meanwhile, Brock had to deal with the deserters and mutinous plotters in accordance with normal practice of the period (i.e., by court martial).[11] The trials were held at Quebec and after being found guilty, seven men were shot in March 1804, one was pardoned, and the remainder transported to Barbados. When Brock received the news of the executions he ordered the garrison of Fort George under arms and read them the letter. Then he spoke to the men, “Since I have had the honour to wear the British uniform, I have never felt grief like this, as it pains me to think that any members of my regiment should have engaged in a conspiracy which has led to their being shot like so many dogs!” [12] His evident concern for his men, while still maintaining discipline, suggests one of his great gifts as a commander. It is likely that the men and officers of the 49th would long remember that emotional scene.

“Desertion from the British Army in North America was a problem of major proportions and incalculable costs. Nowhere else in the empire did so many men flee the colours so easily.”[13] Along the Niagara River, British soldiers could be enticed by the apparent opportunities for land and employment in the United States as well as the apparent ease of crossing both above and below the Falls. Colonel John Graves Simcoe (first lieutenant governor of Upper Canada) had written about this problem in 1793 and it continued during the War of 1812.[14] In fact, forces on both sides of the border would be plagued by desertion (see the Underhill incident).

Whatever the general situation, the problems in the Fort George garrison had arisen under Sheaffe’s command and so, inevitably, questions of his responsibility were raised. The prisoners complained about his “harsh and severe treatment” of them when on duty. Brock, refusing to put the major blame on Sheaffe, wrote to Lieutenant-Colonel Green that Sheaffe’s “manner of addressing the men on the least irritation, must be allowed to be unfortunate, and to that failing must be attributed, in a great measure, the ill will which some men have expressed toward him. There is also another cause which ought not to be omitted,” Brock went on, “whenever the command of the Regiment devolved by my absence on Colonel Sheaffe, he unquestionably required more from the non-Commissioned Officers than I knew was useless to expect from them. He did not sufficiently study the character of the men and his ardent zeal made him seek … after perfection where it is not to be found — Serjeants, for trifling errors, were too often reduced … He likewise perhaps was frequently tiresome in the exercise in the field by which the men became disgusted with what they should have taken delight to practice.”[15] Brock mainly blamed “the temptations which are perpetually offered to the unwary soldier” by the proximity of the United States, but he also sought to save Sheaffe’s career. General Hunter thought of showing open disapproval of Sheaffe’s conduct, an action that would have checked the lieutenant-colonel’s career or even have ended it. Brock disagreed and urged Hunter to act frankly: either tell Sheaffe he was unworthy of command and let him resign or treat him with confidence and hope he would change his behaviour. Brock accepted his junior officer’s imperfections, which arose from zeal rather than from malice or incompetence. His argument saved Sheaffe’s career, for Hunter wrote in the margin of Brock’s letter that Sheaffe was “to proceed to York to take command there.”[16] It would be interesting to know how Sheaffe felt toward Brock.[17]

There is anecdotal evidence of the contrast between Sheaffe’s treatment of soldiers under his command and Brock’s treatment. Here is how Tupper presents the contrast:

An old pensioner, who served many years in the 49th, and was at Fort George during the conspiracy, tells us that the men were displeased at objections being made to their visiting the town of Niagara; at their being allowed to fish only in their white trowsers; and at other petty sources of annoyance — moreover, that the four black holes were constantly full. He adds that Colonel Brock, on assuming the command, allowed the men, in proper uniform, to visit the town freely; to fish in their fatigue dresses; and even to use their muskets to shoot the wild pigeons, which flew over in countless numbers, on condition that they provided their own powder and shot.[18]

This recollection suggests that while Brock was willing to allow the men a degree of latitude in their activities, he maintained rules so that the troops could be in no doubt that they were still subject to army discipline. Whatever the source of his leadership qualities, he demonstrated early in his army career that he was a very good leader of men. He also enjoyed Sheaffe’s company, for when Sheaffe was at York and Brock at Fort George, Brock wrote that his absence, “deprives me of a favourite guest.”[19]

Fortunately, Brock was able to enjoy some of the pleasures and social activities of Upper Canada. He engaged in what might be loosely described as horticultural activity when some fruit trees sent by General Hunter arrived at Fort George and Brock wrote to Green that he would take care of them and send them to York. In July 1803, he wrote to Green, “The house and garden and farm get on in the usual quiet and improving style,” which raises the question of whose house, garden, and farm. Perhaps it was Green’s. He sent gifts to Hunter of quails and, in February 1804, a saddle of venison and some fish. In January, Brock wrote about a large dinner party he had held “and in the evening there was a ball which was numerously attended.” He invited officers of Fort Niagara’s garrison to a dinner on January 18 but the invitation was declined. In February, he thanked Green for sending drawing paper, for “painting and drawing would help to pass the remaining weeks of winter.”[20] No examples of drawings or paintings by Brock have been found, but there is frequent evidence that he enjoyed a good table and a well-attended ball.

During the summer of 1804, Brock sailed several times to Kingston, taking detachments of the 49th regiment there. In September he was in command of the garrison of Quebec City. He dealt with the usual minor garrison matters (e.g., quarters for prisoners, supply of gunpowder, and the need for more recruits). But what he really wanted was to return home, and by the summer of 1805 his request became an urgent demand because of “the confused state in which my private affairs are thrown in consequence of my absence and the likelihood of my suffering materially in a pecuniary way …” What he meant by this is not clear in his correspondence or biographical writings. His wish was granted; he departed in October, leaving Sheaffe in command of the 49th regiment.[21]

Brock was well aware of events in Europe, where Napoleon continued to expand his conquests. In the month of Brock’s departure for home, Horatio Nelson gained his great victory at Trafalgar at the cost of his life. Brock’s world would feature British predominance on the oceans and Napoleon’s expansion of his rule on the continent.

Brock also kept an eye on events in the United States. Early in 1806, resolutions were introduced in the House of Representatives to restrict British trade to the United States. During the debates, threats were made of confiscation, retaliation, and even invasion of Canada.[22] In April, Congress passed a non-importation act to exclude a list of British manufactures but held off its implementation until November. However, Anglo-American relations received a shock when a British frigate, Leander, cruising off New York City, fired across the bows of a merchant vessel to bring her to (perhaps to check for British deserters) and in doing so hit another ship, killing a man on board. The body was taken to New York for a public funeral, which was accompanied by anti-British popular demonstrations. President Jefferson ordered federal officials to arrest the Leander’s captain if they found him within their jurisdiction. The threat to Canada, where his regiment was stationed, seemed real to Brock, for he cut short his leave in June and by August was back in Quebec.

In September 1806, holding the brevet rank of colonel, Brock became the senior officer in the Canadas and, in consequence, commander of all the forces there. He exercised this role until Sir James Craig arrived in October 1807 and took over as both governor of British North America and commander of the forces.[23] (Robert Milnes had served as governor until 1805 when he was succeeded by Thomas Dunn, not as governor but as civilian administrator of Lower Canada.)[24] With Craig were Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Baynes, as adjutant general — and a frequent correspondent with Brock — and Major William Thornton as secretary and aide-de-camp.[25]

Craig had joined the army in 1763, when he was fifteen — the same age as Brock when he had joined. Craig had a wide range of experience of combat in North America, Europe, India, and South Africa, where he was governor of Cape Colony for a time. His health had been poor for years and he was frequently ill during his term as governor and commander, which lasted until 1811. He would make great efforts to improve the defences of Lower Canada, but his political views and actions would cause serious problems. We need to look briefly at political developments during his term.

The economy of Lower Canada was experiencing great and rapid changes. Traditional agriculture was stagnating, while cutting and shipping of timber, shipbuilding, and commerce were expanding rapidly, largely because of the European war. The French-Canadian members who dominated the assembly represented farmers (habitants) as well as French-speaking professionals, small merchants, and shopkeepers. By 1810, this group was spoken of as the Canadian party with its newspaper, Le Canadien, and opposed was the British (or English) party with its newspaper, the Quebec Mercury. The English party consisted largely of wealthier merchants, bureaucrats, and seigneurs; it predominated in the appointed executive and legislative councils whereby it exercised great influence over governors. Disputes between the two parties arose over taxation (on land or on trade), whether to continue or to change the land system, the role of the Anglican Church versus the Catholic Church, who was eligible to sit in the assembly, and the freedom of the press to criticize the government.[26]

For all of his adult life, Craig was a military man who had risen to high commands and, consequently, was accustomed to receiving obedience. Ouellet argues that it was “Craig’s authoritarian nature, revealing the military disciplinarian with little understanding of civilian life … [that caused] the behaviour which earned him his reputation as a dictator.” Napoleon’s Continental System was straining Britain’s economy and the United States seemed very threatening.

Finding political disharmony in the territory under his jurisdiction, and interpreting political opposition as a threat to the security of the state, he committed the error of identifying the French Canadians and their aspirations with the French and their revolution. The military situation being what it was, with his highly developed sense of order and authority he determined that the power of the executive must be strengthened and social stability and political harmony imposed, by force if necessary.[27]

Instead of remaining aloof from political conflicts between the Canadian and English parties, Craig involved himself directly by supporting the latter against the former. He cancelled the militia commissions of the proprietors of Le Canadien and, denouncing it as “a seditious and libelous publication,” seized its press and jailed its editors without trial. He dissolved the assembly in 1809, and again in February 1810, hoping to weaken the Canadian party, but an election later that year returned it to a majority — including the members still in jail. It was a clear defeat for the English party and, indeed, for Craig and his supporters. There followed a quiet session of the Legislature while Craig finished his term.

Brock was present in Lower Canada during most of this turmoil but there is no evidence that he got involved with politics. However, he did work closely with Craig on military matters and agreed with Craig’s political views and actions. On occasion, in correspondence Brock expressed his sympathy for Craig. His clearest statement is found in a letter of February 19, 1811, to his brother Irving:

Sir James Craig has triumphed completely over the French faction in the Lower Province. By their conduct they have fully exemplified the character of their ancestors. The moment they found they could not intimidate by threats, they became as obsequious as they had been violent. The house of assembly passed every bill required of them; among others, one authorizing the governor-general and three councillors to imprison any one without assigning a cause. The state of the country makes such a measure highly necessary. Sir James has been very ill, and it is supposed that he cannot long survive the fierce and frequent attacks of his disorder. His death, whenever it comes, will be bewailed by all who possess the feelings of Englishmen in this country. He appears determined to keep me near his person, and I hardly know how to accomplish my grand object of visiting England in opposition to his wishes.[28]

Let us return to the year 1807.

Britain’s impressment policy continued to produce conflict. The most serious incident occurred on June 21, 1807, when HMS Leopard fired upon the United States frigate Chesapeake before boarding it to remove suspected deserters. The gunfire badly damaged the frigate as well as killing some of its crew. In Norfolk, Virginia, where the battered Chesapeake lay, mobs rioted. Further north, public meetings denounced the “outrage” and pledged their support for strong government action. Jefferson swiftly issued a proclamation requiring all British armed vessels to leave American waters and forbidding all contact with them. He demanded satisfaction from Britain and ordered gunboats to prepare for action; in April 1808, Congress authorized an increase in the army of eight regiments.[29] Although at the time Jefferson talked about seizing Canada,[30] he relied mainly on economic pressure to bring about change in British policy. Thus, he imposed the Non-Importation Act, followed by the Embargo Act that closed American ports to foreign trade. Those measures proved ineffective.

Another serious incident occurred in May 1811. HMS Guerriere had seized an alleged deserter from an American brig and Captain John Rodgers was ordered to take his frigate, President, to cruise off the east coast. He spotted a warship, thought it was the frigate Guerriere, and proceeded to prepare for action. It turned out to be a much inferior sloop, the Little Belt, and after exchanging broadsides for some forty-five minutes, the Little Belt had suffered eleven dead and twenty-one wounded to one wounded on the President. The badly damaged British ship proceeded to Halifax. A court of inquiry in the United States concluded that the Little Belt began the fight by firing first. In his annual address to Congress, the president criticized British policy, “With this evidence of inflexibility, in trampling on the rights which no independent nation can relinquish; congress will feel the duty of putting the U. States into an armor and an attitude demanded by the crisis, and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations.”[31] That belligerent talk reflected the feelings of many Americans while in Britain newspapers expressed outrage.[32] Even a settlement of the Chesapeake affair could not cool tempers. The two countries were moving ever closer to open war.

Back in June 1807, the Leopard and Chesapeake crisis brought on the real danger of an Anglo-American war that could mean invasion of the Canadas. Thomas Dunn and Brock were well aware of these developments, but it seems that only the colonel was worried about the state of Lower Canada’s defences.[33] Brock told Dunn there were only 300 militia armed and instructed, while the walls of Quebec were so old and decayed that they were useless for defence. He asked for 600 to 1,000 men to be hired to work on the city’s defences and a large call out of militiamen. He wanted the work and training of militia done before spring, when he expected the first American attacks might come.[34] Dunn and his executive council felt much less alarm and raised many objections — such as possible resistance to a call up of militia, the cost of paying the men, and the lack of arms — to Brock’s requests. Brock attended a council meeting and then wrote a strongly worded letter (July 23) about the weaknesses of Quebec’s defences and his surprise at the government’s reluctance to call out the militia. The councillors may have had some concern about the loyalty of Lower Canada’s population in case of an American invasion. Brock had no doubt that the people would resist vigorously but he was less certain of this if the invaders included French troops.[35] Although Dunn balloted one-fifth of the militia, Brock saw this as inadequate, so he kept his regulars concentrated at Quebec. He did achieve the completion of works enclosing the upper town and raised a battery of eight 36-pounders in the centre of the citadel to command the river and its opposite banks. All this made a small improvement to the defences.

Another indication of Brock’s concern about defending the Canadas was his reaction to a proposal he received early in 1807 from the lieutenant of the County of Glengarry in Upper Canada. This proposal was made in the previous year when it seemed unnecessary, but now the threat of war appeared greater.[36] John McDonell suggested raising a corps of Highland Fencible Infantry from local inhabitants. (Fencible meant a regiment raised for service only in North America and the men were trained as regulars.)[37] That county was settled by Scots as early as 1784, with the 1803 addition of a large influx of Roman Catholic highlanders led by their priest, Alexander MacDonnell. He had been chaplain of a corps of Glengarry Fencibles in Scotland and when that regiment was disbanded in 1802, rather than struggle in poverty in the old country, many men and families emigrated to Upper Canada. In light of the shortage of troops in Lower Canada, it is not surprising that Brock heartily supported the proposal. Glengarry County is just over the Lower Canadian border from Montreal and Brock saw the corps as strengthening the defences of that city and even of Quebec. He also hoped that the corps “would hereafter become a nursery, from which the army might draw a number of hardy recruits.”[38] The following year, Craig would order Brock to contact “the Glengarry people” but the governor, seeing too many difficulties to recruiting, cancelled the scheme. It would, however, be revived in 1811 and with support from Sir George Prevost as well as Brock, the regiment would be established.

Meanwhile, Upper Canada’s lieutenant governor, Francis Gore, was concerned about apparent American threats to his colony, particularly what looked like warlike preparations at Detroit. He asked Brock to send weapons for the militia. Instead, Brock sent Lieutenant-Colonel Pye, deputy quartermaster general, to convey the commander’s views to Gore, advise him on the defence of Upper Canada, and collect information for Brock. Brock made it clear that because of Lower Canada’s defence needs, he was unable to send arms or men to the upper province. Dissatisfied with Brock’s response, Gore travelled to Montreal for a face-to-face meeting. Brock continued his refusal to send troops and weapons, pointing out that he had sent 4,000 muskets to Upper Canada leaving only 7,000 for distribution in Lower Canada. He also made it clear that future responsibility for the defence of his province would rest with Gore, a burden that the lieutenant governor took on reluctantly.[39]

Francis Gore, lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada, 1806–11 and 1815–17, painted by George Theodore Berthon.

Archives of Ontario, 693125

The British government had made it clear to Craig that its strategy for the defence of the Canadas was based upon the preservation of Quebec City because of its fortifications and its accessibility to the Royal Navy. Brock would have been aware of this focus on Quebec and that Craig had informed Gore of the government’s strategic priorities, which meant that Upper Canada could expect little aid in the form of British troops. However, Craig suggested that Gore summon aboriginal leaders to a meeting to renew the traditional bond of friendship with the Crown. Gore, after making some changes in the Indian Department personnel, would organize meetings in 1808 for various native delegations at Amherstburg. At a public council in July, one of these leaders was the Prophet Tenskwatawa’s brother, Tecumseh. These concerns and developments might seem remote from Brock’s life, but in a few years they would become some of his most vital concerns.

Perhaps another reason that Brock could give little attention to Upper Canadian concerns was that he was distracted by a financial mess in the Commissary Department. A good deal of money flowed through this department because, while it was the army’s financial office, it also handled buying, storing, and distributing the army’s provisions and other supplies. John Craigie had been appointed deputy commissary general in 1781 and commissary general in 1784, but he had a lot of other business and political interests.[40] For whatever reasons, his accounts for 1806 contained many unexplained expenditures. When Brock raised questions about them, he was met with obstruction by Craigie, who claimed that he acted under a special arrangement agreed to by Brock’s predecessor and even had to the nerve to suggest that Brock lacked the authority to inquire into the commissary’s affairs. That was certainly not the way to respond to Isaac Brock. He continued to probe only to find an even worse situation. Craigie had received authority to draw £90,000 from the Treasury in Britain but had only paid a little more than half of this amount into the army’s fund. (The army’s bank in Canada was called the Military Chest.) Craigie refused, or was unable, to explain the discrepancy. While Craigie continued his obstruction, Brock reported to the British Treasury authorities that “no examination has occurred in his store account since the 24th of December, 1788. The account of fuel is likewise in arrear since the 24th of December, 1796, and the account of provisions since the 24th of June, 1800.”[41] Brock drew up regulations for the commissary but Craigie refused to implement them or to provide full information on his accounts to the government. It turned out that he was using army funds for his own uses. As a result, he was dismissed as commissary general in 1808 and sentenced to repay the missing money to the government. This had not been done by the time of his death, shortly after.

The mismanagement of government funds and dissimulation by government officials appeared in other instances. Upon learning of these problems, Brock liked to act quickly and decisively. For example, in 1807, when he learned that the pay of the men in the Marine Department at Kingston was seven months in arrears, he sent an officer there to conduct an inquiry. In the same year, he ordered all commissaries at posts in Upper Canada to send their accounts in proper form to Quebec or face dismissal.[42]

He was also involved in another controversy in 1807. He was concerned that the troops, numbering almost 1,000 men, in quarters known as the Jesuit Barracks had no suitable area nearby for exercise or parade. He pointed out to President Dunn that due to the lack of such facilities, soldiers spent their time in taverns and often got into trouble. He wanted to use some empty adjacent land for a new officers’ quarters as well as space for soldiers’ recreation and parades, which officers could easily supervise. Previously, Dunn had agreed with Brock’s suggestion, but in May refused to allow it. Brock was convinced that private interests (who had other plans for the vacant land) had produced Dunn’s change of mind. He continued to refuse even though Brock made suggestions to accommodate other interests, but the colonel wisely kept his troops off the disputed land. This problem continued, for in 1811 Sir George Prevost sought the same improvement that Brock had suggested. In 1812, Prevost was given permission to proceed with barrack improvements.[43]

Another problem facing the garrison that Brock tried to solve was lack of proper hospital facilities in Quebec. His suggested plan for the construction of a hospital was not approved and the problem continued.[44] Brock had encountered difficulties upon his first arrival in Lower Canada. His persistent attempts to improve conditions for his soldiers was certainly laudable.

NOTES

1. LAC, RG8, C922, 8, Brock to Major Green, September 20, 1802. On Plenderleath see Sutherland, His Majesty’s Gentlemen, 300.

2. Hunter was also lieutenant governor of Upper Canada. DCB, 5, 439–43.

3. Firth, Town of York, 72, Brock to Green, July 29, 1803. Lord Selkirk’s description of York cited in Ibid., 253. The population in 1802 was 320 and in 1804, 432. Ibid., lxxvii. Green was also military secretary to commander of the forces at Quebec and for a time, military secretary to Colonel Isaac Brock. See DCB, 6, 298–300.

4. Turner, “Career,” 28–9; see discussion in n. 4. Taylor, Civil War of 1812, 106–10.

5. DCB, 9, 264–67. FitzGibbon, A Veteran of 1812, 16–33. He described his experiences as a prisoner of war.

6. DCB, 9, 264. He became ensign and adjutant in 1806 and a lieutenant in 1809. FitzGibbon, A Veteran of 1812, 50–1, 56–8. Enid Mallory claims that Brock also taught FitzGibbon “the manners and lifestyle of a gentleman.” The Green Tiger, 13. See also, 37. Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 14–16, 256–59.

7. Turner, “Career,” 28–9. FitzGibbon, A Veteran of 1812, 52–3.

8. Turner, “Career,” 29–32.

9. Turner, “Career,” Appendix A; DCB, 5, 111. Hitsman, Incredible War, 14–5, 19. The battalion had ten companies totaling 650 men. Sutherland, His Majesty’s Gentlemen, 6.

10. Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 72–4.

11. On courts martial see Whitfield, Tommy Atkins, 76–7, and Sutherland, His Majesty’s Gentlemen, 9–10.

12. Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 348; cited in Turner, “Career,” 31–2. Fryer, Bold, Brave, 248, asserts that the executions took place in Montreal.

13. Whitfield, Tommy Atkins, 59–71.

14. Simcoe to Major General. Clarke, July 27, 1793. AO, MS83, Simcoe Letterbook, 332–33. DCB, 6, 152, R.S. Allen writes of William Claus, in command of militia and British troops at Fort George and Queenston in June and July 1812, that “much of his time was devoted to stemming desertion.” Lieutenant Colonel Bisshopp wrote about American inducements to British troops along the Niagara frontier. From Fort Erie, March 21, 1813, Allen, “Bisshopp Papers,” 25. For further discussions of the problem see Holmes, Redcoat, 316–17; Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship!, 255–62.

15. Cited in Turner, British Generals, 86–7. The matter is fully discussed in Turner, “Career,” 282–84. The letter, dated February 8, 1804, is in Canadian Archives, RG 4, v. 923, 12–6. For a different view see Whitfield, Battle of Queenston Heights, 32, 48–9.

16. The problem of desertion from Sheaffe’s command did not completely end. See Sheaffe to Green, York, August 9, 1805, in Firth, Town of York, 73.

17. Fryer, Bold, Brave, 56–7, 87, speculates that Sheaffe, five years older than Brock, may have felt some jealousy about Brock’s rank and his easy manner as commander.

18. Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 32, Tupper’s reporting of evidence is usually carefully done. What exactly this complaint was about is uncertain. My discussions with experts on the period suggest Sheaffe may have wanted to restrict the soldiers’ leisure activities (fishing, visiting town) and “white trowsers” may have meant their work overalls, which would have been none too clean. Brock allowed the men to fish wearing fatigues which were undress uniform and as such would be neater and cleaner than overalls.

19. LAC, RG8, C923, 18–20, Brock to Lieutenant-Colonel. Green, Feruary 19, 1804.

20. This paragraph is based on Turner, “Career,” 33.

21. Turner, “Career,” 34–5. Fryer, Bold, Brave, 92, suggests that Brock was uneasy about leaving Sheaffe in command of the regiment.

22. Turner, “Career,” 36–40. Hitsman, Incredible War, 21–2.

23. DCB, 5, 205–13. His civil secretary was Herman W. Ryland, who favoured an assimilationist policy towards the Canadiens. Ouellet, Lower Canada, 63–4, 92–4, and Edgar, General Brock, 91–3.

24. Dunn was administrator from 1805 to 1807. See DCB, 5, 287–93.

25. Sutherland, His Majesty’s Gentlemen, 60. Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 69, Thornton to Brock, April 7, 1808, mentions that Lieutenant-General Prevost was made second in command to Craig. There is very little information on Baynes, who is not included in the usual biographical dictionaries. He may have first joined the army in 1783. When he arrived in Canada he was a lieutenant-colonel in the Nova Scotia Fencibles. He had been ADC to Craig and would serve as adjutant general to the forces until February 1815. He returned to England as a major-general and died in 1829. On Thornton see DNB, 9, 789–90, and Sutherland, His Majesty’s Gentlemen, 355–56. He had served as ADC to Craig from 1803–06 and returned with Craig to England in 1811. Thornton later served in the Peninsula and under Major-General Robert Ross in the capture of Washington, D.C., where he was wounded and captured. He was wounded again in the attack on New Orleans.

26. This paragraph is based on Ouellet, Lower Canada, Chapters 2 and 3.

27. Ouellet, Lower Canada, 92–3; see also, Stanley, War of 1812, 54–7; Edgar, General Brock, Chapter 9. The scholarly literature dealing with this period is vast. The following quotation is from M. Wade, The French Canadians, 1760–1967, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1968), 107.

28. Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 92–4. See also, 82–3, Baynes to Brock, October 4, 1810; 85, Baynes to Brock, October 11; and 98–100, Baynes to Brock, March 4, 1811.

29. Dudley, Naval War, I, 26–36; Turner, “Career,” 39–43; Prucha, The Sword of the Republic, 97. Before the increase, the army had three regiments and a corps of engineers. Skelton, “High Army Leadership,” 254.

30. Horsman, “On To Canada,” 9: “In July 1807 … Jefferson told a visitor, ‘If the English do not give us the satisfaction we demand, we will take Canada.’”

31. Cited in Kingston Gazette, November 19, 1811. On December 10, this newspaper printed the correspondence between the British minister to Washington and James Monroe that settled the Chesapeake dispute. York Gazette, on November 20, published a special supplement containing President Madison’s message of November 5. Hickey, War of 1812, 29–32.

32. Dudley, Naval War, 1, 40–50; Adkins, War for all the Oceans, 362–65.

33. LAC, RG8, C676, 12–3, Dunn to Brock, July 29, 1807. Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 65–6, Brock to Colonel Gordon, September 6, 1807.

34. The documents are in LAC, RG8, C1214, no. 11, 332–34, and the gist is given in Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 60–1. Turner, “Career,” 39–43.

35. Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 65–6, Brock to Gordon, September 6, 1807; see Edgar, General Brock, 94–7.

36. Johnston, The Glengarry Light Infantry, 6.

37. Stanley, War of 1812, 61–3; Hitsman, Incredible War, 21–2.

38. Brock to Windham, Secretary of War in Britain, February 12, 1807, cited in Turner, “Career,” 74. Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 46–7.

39. Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 15–19; Turner, “Career,” 45–8. On Gore see DCB, 8, 336–41.

40. DCB, 6, 214–15. Turner, “Career,” 62–5. For discussion about the office and how it developed see Whitfield, Tommy Atkins, 30–6.

41. LAC, RG8, C1214, 70–1, Brock to George Harrison, November 28, 1806. Cited in Turner, “Career,” 64.

42. Turner, “Career,” 65–6, discusses and provides documentary references.

43. This paragraph is based on Turner, “Career,” 66–9, where the origin of the Jesuit Barracks is explained. See also, Holmes, Recoat, 266–70.

44. For the army’s medical services see Whitfield, Tommy Atkins, 38–9; Holmes, Redcoat, 95–7; Stanley, War of 1812, 433–44.