Читать книгу Meltdown - Yoichi Funabashi - Страница 18

5:40 P.M. NHK broadcast that the cooling system for two reactors at Fukushima Daiichi Station had stopped.

“This is a report on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Due to the earthquake, none of the emergency diesel generators needed to safely cool the two reactors in a shutdown can be used, and it is deemed that there is no sufficient cooling capacity.”²²

This was the first television report of the station blackout.

5:42 P.M. Kaieda came running into the prime minister’s office. His face was drained of color.²³ If they had an article 15 event, the prime minister had to declare a state of nuclear emergency and set up a nuclear emergency response headquarters (headed by the prime minister). It was the job of the economy, trade, and industry minister to make such a request in order to receive the prime minister’s acknowledgment. Kaieda made the request.

Kan and Edano, however, were fixated on the question of how they would know if “all power had been lost” or not.

“Why aren’t the emergency diesel generators working?”

“They must have some backup power.”

“They say the emergency generators have had it, but can’t they draw water up by pumps and use that?”

Kan was throwing out questions to no one in particular.

“Do you all know what it means to lose power?”

“It’s extremely serious. It’s the same thing as Chernobyl!”

“It’ll be just like Chernobyl.”

He kept repeating these phrases over and over. Shimomura wrote in the margin of his memo, “It’s Kan who needs cooling down.”²⁴

Haruki Madarame, head of the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC), was called in. When Madarame was heading toward the prime minister’s office, Eiji Hiraoka, deputy director general of NISA, offered to act as guide and walk him there. Hiraoka pleaded with Madarame.

“Please help me.”

“What are you talking about?”

Madarame did not know what he meant at the time, but later speculated that it was related to the dressing-down Terasaka had received from Kan, and the fact that NISA had lost the confidence of the political members of the Kantei.²⁵

Hard-pressed to fathom his reasoning, Kan gazed at Madarame and said, “You’re the head of NISA, right?” It was true that among the politicians, Kan was the most knowledgeable about nuclear power, but Terada thought it strange that he could not tell the difference between the NSC and NISA.²⁶

Kan questioned Kaieda and the others about the fuel meltdown, the possibility of an explosion, and even the output of each reactor. No convincing response was forthcoming. Kan got the feeling that Kaieda knew nothing about nuclear power. He became increasingly frustrated, thinking, I can’t possibly leave it up to METI. I’ll have to do it myself. NISA was a regulatory and oversight special entity of METI.

It was just after six p.m. The crucial establishment of a nuclear emergency response headquarters (NERHQ) based on an article 15 event was still undetermined. The article in question reads as follows:

“When acknowledging the occurrence of a nuclear emergency, the competent minister will immediately provide the prime minister with the necessary information concerning the event.”

Furthermore, “The prime minister will immediately make public the occurrence of a nuclear emergency and the following matters (hereafter, referred to as ‘a declaration of a state of nuclear emergency’).”

This can be found in the Six Law Codes. However, what were the requirements for acknowledging a “state of nuclear emergency”? This was the point that Kan was stuck on.

“Article 15 events are unheard of. Does it really correspond to article 15?”

Even if all power had been lost, had the “cooling system stopped”? Was that not unconfirmed at the current juncture?

“I want to know what I can do as prime minister.”

“I’m the one who has to make the judgment.”

After these words, Kan, together with Katsuya Okada, secretary-general of the Democratic Party, left for a meeting with the opposition party leaders on the fourth floor of the Kantei. The request to set up a NERHQ was left up in the air for the time being. A declaration of a state of nuclear emergency could not be issued without the prime minister’s approval.

Kaieda was waiting on the fifth floor during the party leaders’ meeting. While he waited, the prime ministerial aides dragged out a copy of the State of Emergency Related Statutes Book from their office and were rifling through the pages with officials from NISA, looking for the provisions that would act as a legal basis. They finally found what they were looking for in the section on enforcement rules (ministerial ordinances) under the enforcement orders (government ordinances) of NEPA.

“Inability to pump water into the reactor by all emergency cooling systems in the case of a complete loss of water supply to a boiling light-water reactor during operation” (article 21, item 1b of the Enforcement Regulations)

After the party leaders’ meeting, Kan agreed to the issuance of a “declaration of a state of nuclear emergency.” Kaieda was feeling very down in the dumps.

“We’re heading for trouble if the prime minister is going to get hung up on these kinds of details.”²⁷