Читать книгу Autonomy - Beate Roessler - Страница 13

What, then, is the connection between freedom and autonomy? Philosophical usage of these two terms is not always clear, and the relation between them is disputed. Some authors identify liberty with autonomy, while others maintain that there is an important difference. As I would now like to show, autonomy should be conceived of as the concretization of a properly understood concept of freedom.¹³

The conceptual distinction between negative and positive freedom is famously found in an extraordinarily influential essay by Isaiah Berlin, though the idea of such a distinction is actually much older, appearing in a similar form, for example, in Benjamin Constant. Negative freedom as Berlin defines it refers to conceptions of freedom as essentially the absence of obstacles and restrictions, as seen in classic liberal approaches by the likes of Hobbes, Locke, and Mill. Purely negative conceptions can also be found in contemporary theories of freedom, as when Hayek describes freedom as “that condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as is possible in society.”¹⁴ In contrast to such purely formal, negative concepts of freedom as the absence of coercion, positive conceptions view freedom as the ability to pursue certain options, realize certain abilities, or lead a self-determined life. In any event, then, positive freedom prima facie means that individuals have control over their ability to choose what they themselves consider to be meaningful options for themselves, to do what they believe expresses their true self or the kind of person they wish to be.

Berlin, however, precisely wants to show what problems may be linked with such a notion of freedom, arguing, for example, that it might lead to the question of what represents a “meaningful option” being decided in terms of collective self-determination, with this collective decision then overriding the will and the negative liberty of the individual person. This would imply that the collective knows what is best for the individual, and not individuals themselves. Positive liberty, in this case, rests not on the autonomy of the acting subject but on a collective autonomy such as that developed by Rousseau, and on the idea that others may know better what makes me free than I do myself.¹⁵ For Berlin, all positive conceptions that see freedom exclusively in the realization of certain options potentially end in paternalistic or even dictatorial theories (and societies). Hence he clearly sees the negative concept of freedom as superior to the positive. Only negative freedom represents the kind of liberal freedom that allows individuals themselves to decide how they want to live their freedom.

Charles Taylor, however, demonstrated early on that these two concepts of freedom need not be mutually exclusive, arguing that we can speak about the absence of obstacles – Which are more important? Why do we not want precisely these restrictions? – only if we also have some idea of what we actually want with our freedom. Thus it is neither sensible nor possible to draw a clear boundary between negative and positive freedom. The former always points to the latter (and vice versa) or, in Taylor’s terminology, negative opportunity-concepts always point to positive concepts of self-realization.¹⁶

We value negative freedom because we want to be free to do certain things, to be a certain person, to lead our lives, as Mill says, in our own way. A negative concept of freedom is not sufficient to explain this, however. If we now consider positive liberty, we will see that, in order to be called free, we also need good or in any case desirable options, worthwhile opportunities to live our negative liberty. Freedom from obstacles, being able to decide between five equally bad or banal and undesirable options, may suffice for a value-neutral definition of liberty and choice, but it does not adequately explain what we mean when we talk about freedom, its meaning, and its value for us.¹⁷

Hence, in order to take a further step in the direction of autonomy, it will be helpful to look at a second critique of Berlin, this one from Gerald MacCallum, who argues that every concept of freedom necessarily incorporates three elements that different conceptions interpret differently only in terms of their relation to each other.¹⁸ Thus even negative and positive liberty remain incomplete if they do not take these three elements into account in equal measure. MacCallum illustrates this with the formula “x is free from y to do z.”¹⁹ While element y negatively refers to the absence of obstacles, z shows that we always conceive of freedom positively because we want to have certain courses of action available to us. A complete concept of liberty, however, also includes a third element, x, the free, determining subject, which can also be variously defined. MacCallum argues that these three elements are always implicitly or explicitly assumed in every notion of freedom, and only together do they constitute a full concept of freedom, its meaning, and its value for us.

But even this conception is not yet sufficient for determining the relationship between autonomy and freedom. For if I am persuaded – or, even more strongly, subtly manipulated – into making a certain decision, this might not necessarily be described as restricting my negative liberty, and perhaps the option I was persuaded to choose is even quite reasonable and attractive. Maybe I even would have wanted to make the same choice without having been manipulated at all. But is it my freedom that I’m living in this case? Is it an autonomous choice and decision? Only now can we see that autonomy is not an alternative to but a concretization of the concept of freedom. For only now can we see that we are free in our choices only when it is we ourselves who are doing the choosing. This also explains why we value being able to make our own choices. It is not only what we choose that is valuable to us, and not only the fact that we are unimpeded in making our choices, but also the possibility and the act of choosing itself, the fact that I am the one who can make a decision for myself. The significance that the act of choosing has for us is part of the value and meaning of autonomy.

Now one could of course say that the idea of autonomy I have elaborated up to this point is too simple and must be confronted with a whole complex of critical questions if it is to be a viable concept. Such questions will frequently play a role in the coming chapters. Here, however, I would like to mention three fundamental objections, which I will address more fully later. The first comes from theories of perfectionism, which maintains that subjects are only autonomous when they decide in favor of certain good and reasonable options. Autonomous subjects are thus only truly free when they make the right choice. On the one hand, this means that a life chosen and lived autonomously can only be a good, well-lived life if subjects pursue the right, sensible, and (morally) good aims. And, on the other hand, it also affords a special role to the state, namely assuring that subjects are presented with not only sufficiently different options but also the right options. Hence the state is no longer entirely neutral, and both – the non-neutral state and the idea of “right” options – are naturally problematic for liberal theories. Even the question of whether the state should be able to help by nudging individuals in the direction of a good, proper, healthy life is controversial.²⁰ I will discuss these problems of perfectionism in greater detail in chapter 6.

With this, I come to the second objection: How transparent are subjects to themselves in their own reflections when they believe that they are choosing and living autonomously and authentically, i.e. when they believe that they are acting according to their own reasons for their own reasons? Following Freud, one could argue that just because subjects claim to do what they want, it does not follow that they are free and autonomous and actually do what they want. There could always be driving forces and motivations that are unconscious and inaccessible to us and that impede us from certain actions or intentions, as we know, for example, from studies of the widespread phenomenon of self-deception. Hence it is naive to simply proceed from a concept of autonomy based on the idea of a self that sees through or is at least potentially transparent to itself. Here, however, we will see that autonomy is defensible on the basis of the idea that even autonomous decisions must remain open to criticism – not because others necessarily always know better what is good for us, but precisely because as reflexive beings, we are aware that in every individual case, our reflections may be skewed or distorted and must be examined more closely. With my conception of autonomy, I precisely do not presume agents who are entirely transparent to themselves, but rather realistic conditions and agents. I will return to this in chapter 4.

The third objection points to the danger arising from the fact that there exist not only distortive individual structures but also social structures that can prevent subjects from acting freely and autonomously in their choices and opportunities. This goes beyond direct impediments to our freedom. In a consumer society, are we not manipulated at least to such an extent that we want to consume as much as possible? Are we still able to define the value that consumption has for us? Are men and women in a patriarchal society capable of undermining discriminatory and stereotypical gender roles? Can autonomy and authenticity be defined at all independently of distortive constitutive social conditions? Such questions were posed in the tradition of the early Frankfurt School, which analyzed and answered them using the concepts of ideology and “false consciousness.” Today, they are often debated in terms of other concepts such as adaptive preferences. Autonomy and freedom are always determined by social, cultural, and political contexts, both positively (in terms of how autonomy is enabled or facilitated) and negatively (in terms of how autonomy is restricted or threatened). It is this very complex of problems that I address in chapter 8, on autonomy and its social preconditions. For the concept of autonomy that I am developing here makes it possible and even necessary not only to attribute autonomy under certain conditions to individuals in non-liberal-democratic societies but also precisely not to ascribe it – at least under certain circumstances and in certain respects – to individuals in liberal-democratic societies.