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1  1 Willem Frederik Hermans, Beyond Sleep (New York: The Overlook Press, 2007), 306‒7.

2  2 Alice Munro, “Dolly,” in Dear Life: Stories (New York: Vintage International, 2013), 233.

3  3 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 394.

4  4 Robert B. Pippin, Henry James and Modern Moral Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 172. I return to this idea in chapter 3 on the meaning of life.

5  5 For a pre-Kantian history of individual autonomy, cf. J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

6  6 Cf. Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Thomas E. Hill, Jr, Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

7  7 Cf. Christoph Menke, “Autonomy and Liberation: The Historicity of Freedom,” in Rachel Zuckert and James Kreines (eds), Hegel on Philosophy in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 159‒76. Axel Honneth has developed a highly sophisticated ideal of autonomy comprising the ability to disclose one’s needs creatively, present one’s entire life in an ethically reflected way, and apply universalist norms in a context-sensitive manner. Cf. Honneth, “Decentered Autonomy: The Subject after the Fall,” Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 181‒93. See also Maeve Cooke, “Habermas, Autonomy, and the Identity of the Self,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 18 (1992): 268‒91, and Amy Allen, The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 96‒123. On the supposed paradox of autonomy, see Thomas Khurana, “Paradoxes of Autonomy: On the Dialectics of Freedom and Normativity,” Symposium 17(1) (2013): 50‒74.

8  8 Cf. Joel Feinberg, “Autonomy,” in John Christman (ed.), The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 27‒53, along with other relevant contributions in the same volume; John Christman and Joel Anderson (eds), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and James Stacey Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). On the concept of individuality in Mill, cf. Dale E. Miller, J. S. Mill (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 113‒54, as well as Henry Richardson, “Autonomy’s Many Normative Presuppositions,” American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001): 287‒303.

9  9 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 210, my emphasis. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, “Moral Autonomy and Personal Autonomy,” in John Christman and Joel Anderson (eds), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, 312‒16.

10 10 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in Stefan Collini (ed.), ‘On Liberty’ and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 16. See also Thomas Nys, “The Tacit Concept of Competence in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty,” South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2006): 305‒28.

11 11 Ibid., 59, 60f.

12 12 On the relationship between liberty, autonomy, and individuality, cf. Miller, J. S. Mill, 113‒53.

13 13 Cf. the helpful discussions in Katrin Flikschuh, Freedom: Contemporary Liberal Perspectives (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).

14 14 F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 57.

15 15 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in Donald A. Cress (ed. and trans.), The Basic Political Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 162‒5. Cf. Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 118‒72, especially 126f.

16 16 Charles Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?,” Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 211‒29.

17 17 This concerns both the variety of options and the importance of choice. I will return to both in greater detail in chapter 6.

18 18 Gerald MacCallum, “Negative and Positive Freedom,” in David Miller (ed.), Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 100‒22.

19 19 Ibid., 102.

20 20 Cf. Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New York: Penguin Books, 2008). For a critical view, see Joel Anderson, “Autonomy Gaps as a Social Pathology: Ideologiekritik Beyond Paternalism,” https://www.phil.uu.nl/~joel/research/publications/Anderson-AutonomyGapsasSocialPathology.pdf; as well as Thomas Nys and Bart Engelen, “Judging Nudging: Answering the Manipulation Objection,” Political Studies (2016): 1‒16.

21 21 Of the numerous anthologies available on the problem of individual autonomy, I particularly recommend John Christman (ed.), The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); James Stacy Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Andrea Veltman and Mark Piper (eds), Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

22 22 Ernst Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, trans. Paul Stern (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 265.

23 23 On the different respects in which and degrees to which we can be more or less autonomous, cf. Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 81‒115, as well as Diana Tietjens Meyers, “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self? Opposites Attract!,” in Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (eds), Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 151‒80. I analyze this complex of problems more closely in chapter 8 on the social preconditions of autonomy.

24 24 On this debate, see above all John Christman (ed.), The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), including Christman’s “Introduction,” as well as his The Politics of Persons: Individual Autonomy and Socio-historical Selves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). See also Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5‒20; and Paul Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth,” Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994): 650‒68.

25 25 Cf. David Velleman, “Identification and Identity,” in Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002): 91‒123; and Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 134‒44. See also Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” Journal of Philosophy 72(8) (1975): 205‒20. On the discourse around Frankfurt, see also the other contributions in Buss and Overton (eds), Contours of Agency.

26 26 Cf. Harry G. Frankfurt, “The Importance of What We Care About,” The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 80‒94; Harry G. Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” ibid., 159‒76; Harry G. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Harry G. Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).

27 27 Cf. Richard Moran, “Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental Life,” in Buss and Overton (eds), Contours of Agency, 189‒217. On this critique of Frankfurt, see also Thomas Scanlon, “Reasons and Passions,” in Buss and Overton (eds), Contours of Agency, 165‒83.

28 28 John Christman, “Autonomy and Personal History,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21(1) (1991): 1‒24.

29 29 The idea that authenticity should be understood as the opposite of alienation and not of autonomy is the subject of chapter 6.

30 30 Cf. Michael Bratman, “Planning Agency, Autonomous Agency” and “Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency,” in Bratman, Structures of Agency: Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 195‒221 and 21‒46. See also Bratman, “Three Theories of Self-Governance,” Philosophical Topics 32 (2004): 21‒46. Also on this problem, see Peter Goldie, The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotions, and the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 76‒97.

31 31 Cf. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar’s detailed and informative “Introduction: Autonomy Refigured,” in Mackenzie and Stoljar (eds), Relational Autonomy, 3‒34. Here again we can see parallels between the philosophical traditions as the idea of relational autonomy can also be found (if not in these words) in Habermas. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, “Individuation Through Socialization: An Essay on George Herbert Mead’s Theory of Subjectivity,” Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 149‒204; and Seyla Benhabib, “The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg‒Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory,” Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992), 148‒77; as well as the passage in Hobbes in which he compares men to mushrooms springing up out of the earth “without all kind of engagement to each other.”

32 32 Marilyn Friedman clearly points to this in her critique of attempts to reduce autonomy to social conditions. Cf. Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, 81‒115. Friedman, like Diana Meyers, argues that autonomy is relational, weakly substantial, gradually attributable, and not dependent on a completely harmonious and uniform self. I return to all of these – plausible – aspects of autonomy below. Cf. Diana Tietjen Meyers, “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self? Opposites Attract!,” in Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (eds), Relational Autonomy, 151‒80.

33 33 Cf. Paul Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth,” Journal of Philosophy 91(12) (1994): 650‒68 (660f.). John Rawls, although not an avowed theorist of autonomy, declares self-respect to be “perhaps the most important primary good” for individual liberty, without which nothing seems worth the effort. Cf. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999 [1971]), 348. See also Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth, “Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice,” in John Christman and Joel Anderson (eds), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, 127‒49.

34 34 Cf. Catriona Mackenzie, “Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectionism,” Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (2008): 512‒33.

35 35 Marina Oshana, Personal Autonomy in Society (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). See also chapter 8 below on the question of whether (or in what ways) autonomy is also possible under non-liberal political conditions. Cf. also Martha Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism,” Political Theory 20(2) (1992): 202‒46.

36 36 Axel Honneth argues that individuals must be intersubjectively connected in order to be autonomous. Cf. Honneth, “Decentered Autonomy,” 192. See also Christoph Menke, “Autonomy and Liberation,” as well as chapter 8 below.

37 37 These two elements figure prominently in Christman’s The Politics of Persons and have also been adopted by other authors including Mackenzie, Stoljar, and Betzler.

38 38 As Rawls, for example, describes in A Theory of Justice, 358‒65.

39 39 Ian McEwan, Solar (New York: Anchor Books, 2010), 261f.