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Chapter 2 considers the issue of the possibility of objective and truthful educational research in more detail. The chapter will develop the claim that there can be a criterial understanding of truth which allows us to make objective claims about educational practices without submitting to a dogmatically realist account of truth, drawing principally on the work Ellenbogen (2003). Such an account will also do justice to the conception-dependent nature of educational practice and the fact of multiple perspectives on educational practices. An objective account of an educational practice can take account of the multiple perspectives in play and the conceptions of education that inform them, together with the possible conceptual distinctiveness of certain conceptions.¹¹

The argument stresses the hermeneutic or interpretive tasks of EER. It is very often not possible to provide any explanation of an educational state of affairs or process until the conception and associated perspectives on the practice have themselves been adequately explained. Interpretation is a key, if neglected part of EER. In this sense, EER as one of the social sciences is, as Peter Winch (1958) argued, a philosophical enterprise. One of its main, although by no means the only one of its tasks, is an empirical investigation of educational and related concepts. In order to understand an educational phenomenon, there is no avoiding of the consideration of how its participants understand it.

This brings us on to a discussion of how the concept of rationality can inform our understanding of the great diversity of practices in education. Some distinctions are made which strengthen our view that we are not dealing with ‘multiple realities’ in the face of such diversity, while at the same time taking account of the reality of that diversity and the imaginative challenge involved in comprehending it.

Chapter 3 takes up the issue of the very possibility of EER and the various sceptical arguments that have been advanced against it. Scepticism concerning whether there really are such things as educational practices will be considered first. Such claims usually rely on a strong form of perspectivalism which denies the existence of a single educational reality. Another form of such perspectivalism maintains that, since educational practices are always value laden, there can be no investigation of such practices that does not involve some form of identification with those values. The confusions in these approaches will be set out.

Next, the claim it is not possible to know as opposed to believe any educational facts through EER will be considered. It will be argued that this claim is, in the end incoherent. Claims that educational phenomena can be considered through a faculty called ‘common sense’ will also be considered and rejected as incoherent. Finally the claim that EER is inherently unreliable and unable to fulfil its promise will be considered. This is the most serious objection to EER and will need to be considered with great care, paying due regard to the scope and limitations of EER. However, the conclusion will be a qualified positive one, albeit one which more positivistically inclined philosophers of EER may find difficult to accept.

Chapter 4 broaches the issue of what kinds of explanation are available for educational phenomena and is also concerned with the scope of educational explanations. There are a number of issues to be dealt with in a chapter on educational explanations. The first is what an educational explanation actually is. In order to deal with this, we need to remember the focus that most educational research has in trying to improve educational practices. Generally speaking, that purposive feature of EER shapes the kinds of explanations that are offered. But here we need to remind ourselves that explanation is closely tied to interpretation (see von Wright 1971, Ch. 4), not only in the sense that interpretation often has to precede explanation, but also in the sense that explanation sometimes involves interpretation. Explanations in EER tend to be focused on a practical issue, so they concentrate on why certain phenomena occur, in the sense of what causes and reasons are operative in bringing them about, but also on how they occur, in the sense of looking at the unfolding of processes in and around educational practices. In this sense, explanations are closely related to descriptions.The object (Achinstein 1975 in Körner ed. 1975) of an educational explanation is usually an educational phenomenon, but the origin of such an explanation arises from a question arising from a need for explanation.

This chapter will argue that the kinds of explanation appropriate to EER cannot be confined to one type, and that both what might be called causal and reason-based explanations will be deployed, sometimes in relation to the same phenomenon. We should be wary of making too strict a distinction between these two types of explanation and in particular should be aware of the Aristotelian distinction between efficient causes, which are primarily what causal explanation nowadays involve and formal causes. The distinction is well explained by Mulder (2016): ‘The formal cause determines what can happen, the efficient cause determines that something happens’ (p. 165). Another way of putting the distinction is that the formal cause concerns the structural properties of something that produces a cause: an object or process for example, while the efficient cause usually relates two events to each other in such a way that one is said to give rise to the other.¹²

Explanations which relate to the functional role of institutions and practices will be very important for educational explanations, together with the closely related concept of a teleological explanation which relies on goals and purposes as an organising principle (see also von Wright 1971 for more on this). We will also be looking at the concept of a good explanation, making use of some of the insights of Lipton (2004). Although Lipton is primarily concerned with explanations which involve efficient causation his work has wider applicability. Finally, we will also be looking at the important role that context plays in both shaping and limiting the scope of educational explanations.

Chapter 5 takes these concerns further, focussing on what a good educational explanation might look like. The importance of plausible methodological assumptions constituting a research tradition is emphasised, along with the purposive nature of research which entails the posing of questions that need to be answered by the research. Further issues dealt with include the following:

Explanatory adequacy. How can we tell whether an explanation does actually address the question posed which gave rise to it? An example would include Bernsteinian educational sociolinguistics, discussed in Chapter 9.

Coherence. To what extent is an explanation not only internally consistent, but also whether it is well-articulated through sound inference and appropriate transition from evidence to conclusion. We will also be concerned with the extent to which explanations can be externally consistent, with those offered for the same or related phenomena. Closely related to this is the property of economy – is the explanation overly complicated and does it contain features that do not really add to understanding of the phenomenon? See the discussion of dyslexia research in Chapter 12.

Methodological probity. To what extent is there a strategy for answering a research question or line of inquiry and the appropriateness of the techniques used for answering it and the explanatory concepts deployed to do so? See the discussion of School Effectiveness Research in Chapter 11.

Appropriateness of methods. Closely related to this is the question of whether the array of techniques of data gathering and analysis employed actually work together effectively to produce explanations that can cohere. Some of the problems encountered by school effectiveness research illustrate this need.

Evaluability and comparability. A very current concern is the extent to which the explanations offered can be properly evaluated for their quality and whether or not meaningful comparisons can be made between explanations of different but related phenomena. Questions of methodology, technique, purpose and context are all relevant here. Comparative research on vocational education, discussed in Chapter 10, is a useful example.

Knowledge cumulation. How well does educational research fare in building up knowledge? This vital issue needs to be addressed in an honest way which avoids the Scylla of excessive scepticism about the ability to build up a corpus of educational knowledge and the Charybdis of excessive optimism and careless overgeneralisation that has been the bane of much EER. Both Chapters 11 and 12 provide case studies relevant to this issue.

Chapter 6 takes up the issue of knowledge cumulation and seeks to make a measured response. Issues taken up include the fact that different paradigms – in Kuhn’s sense (1962) – are often used, sometimes relating to the same phenomena. Here we need to consider both the possible incommensurability and incompatibility of different paradigms. The chapter also addresses the question as to whether there can ever be a common conceptual framework for the conduct of systematic educational enquiry. I go on to consider what makes particular research programmes progressive or degenerating – in Lakatos’ sense (1970) – and the relevance of Lakatos’ account for EER. This leads on to questions of the replication of research and the cumulation of findings within metasurveys and metaevaluations, together with the extent to which it is safe to recommend policy and practice arising directly from the research. In this context we also have to take into account Kuhnian-style revolutions in which large-scale conceptual revision and change become a feature of the educational research landscape and the extent to which such changes compromise cumulation.

Chapter 7 broaches the broad divide so often made in EER between quantitative and qualitative methods in data gathering and analysis. The distinction is often made wrongly in terms of two different paradigms in the Kuhnian sense, but it is argued in this chapter that this is a misleading way of framing the issue. It would be more helpful to say that ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ refer to two more or less contrasting families of techniques used in hypothesis formation, data gathering and data analysis. It is important to see them both as primarily belonging in the ‘methods’ category rather than the paradigmatic or even the methodological category. Some paradigms will favour quantitative methods, particularly those that seek a close identification of the aims and approaches of EER with those of the physical sciences.

It is important to note, however, that a refusal to abide by the canons of natural scientific research does not imply rejection of quantitative methods. By the same token, paradigms that reject close identification of EER with natural science cannot be taken to automatically reject quantitative techniques. The argument of Chapter 7 will be that research questions should generate a research strategy or methodology that in turn prescribes appropriate methods, without prejudice as to whether or not these fall into the ‘quantitative’ or the ‘qualitative’ camp. The role of both families of methods in the context of hermeneutic inquiries will be discussed there.

Chapter 8 focuses on a currently influential paradigm with a close relationship to approaches in natural science. This paradigm, which valorises intervention studies as a way of understanding educational practices, consists of a family of approaches, including natural experiments, quasi experiments and RCTs (Smith, H.W. 1975). Because the RCT has become so influential and has been held up as the gold standard of scientific probity in educational policymaking circles, it is appropriate to pay particular attention to its use, appropriateness and strengths and limitations. Particular attention will be paid to the structure of inference that underpins RCTs, to the causal mechanisms that can be assumed to underlie them, to the types of explanation that they sanction and to the relationship between significance testing for an intervention variable and a claim for the causal efficacy of that variable. Mackie’s (1965) introduction of the concept of a causal field will be introduced as a way of understanding some of the problematic features of the use of RCTs and will be discussed with some examples. Conclusions about the advantages and limitations of the use of RCTs and associated methods will be drawn, together with a reflection on the use of these in metasurveys and metaevaluations.

Chapter 9 is the first substantial case study chapter and examines the rise and fall of the Bernsteinian sociolinguistic research programme (Bernstein 1973a, 1973b). This research programme has been chosen to illustrate the ambitions of EER in a time of considerable optimism about its potential to change educational practice, its relatively innovative approach to empirical research and the way in which it appeared to tie together various factors involved in educational achievement in a convincing looking explanatory framework. At the same time, the weaknesses of the programme, which eventually led to its abandonment, will be looked at. The included: inadequate conceptualisation of the key organising concept of linguistic code; ignoring of factors such as acquaintance with literacy; inappropriate intervention methods of data collection and a weak empirical basis for large-scale generalisations. The case also illustrates how a research programme which is getting into difficulties tries to solve its problems through semantic redefinition rather than data collection, following predictions made by Lakatos. Some key lessons about future research in the area are drawn.

Chapter 10 takes up research in comparative vocational education. Much has been achieved over the last quarter of a century in understanding how vocational education and training systems differ from country to country. Economists and comparative educators have co-operated in trying to show how VET systems are embedded in their societies and national economies and how they are expressive of different forms of capitalism (Ashton and Green 1996; Brockmann et al. 2011). The case study shows how these primarily descriptive studies manage to do this within limits. Descriptive accounts of differing VET systems and their embedding within their societies are not always accompanied by adequate interpretation and explanation of the phenomena described. In particular, interpretative work can show how practices which may look superficially similar from society to society are very often very different when subjected to closer scrutiny. Comparative VET research poses methodological challenges if it is to advance further in explanatory force. Among these is the need for empirical investigation of conceptual variation in different, albeit quite similar societies. The ways in which different national VET systems are to be understood have important implications both for policy borrowing in VET and for the attempt to develop transnational policy tools. This will be discussed in relationship to VET policy in the EU over the last quarter of a century.

Chapter 11 takes up the case of School Effectiveness Research (SER). From the 1970s onwards, dissatisfaction with the paradigmatic view that ‘Education cannot compensate for Society’ grew and the search was on for ways of distinguishing effective from ineffective schools. I will examine the choices available for investigating this issue and explain those that were eventually made in the dominant research programme in this area. Key methodological decisions and conceptual approaches are examined and the course of SER and its achievements and limitations are described and discussed. A number of critical issues are identified. These include the definition of ‘school effectiveness’ adopted; the limitations of the regression-based methods for measuring effectiveness, including measurement error, the problem of missing values and the problem of unstable results. Problems to do with generalisation of findings will also be broached. These include the difficulties of putting SER research into viable school improvement strategies, the interpretation of the regression-based findings for the identification of features of effective schools and the relativistic nature of the data. The chapter will include an estimation of the achievements as well as the setbacks of the SER programme.

Chapter 12 examines the history of research on learning to read, with particular references to difficulties that some children have in learning to read. Despite vigorous controversies concerning effective ways of teaching reading, which have raged over the past century, the field has also shown positive gains in understanding, albeit ones which may be more limited than some of their proponents have been willing to admit. However, by and large, the more serious empirical researchers in this field have been cautious, while research which incorporated some doubtful metaphysical assumption has declined in influence. Within the field, conceptual challenges abound and these have not always been addressed with the seriousness that they deserve. These include both what is understood by ‘reading’ and different levels of reading ability and critically, the concept of a reading difficulty and the associated diagnosis of dyslexia. It will be shown that the understanding of what dyslexia is involves considerable conceptual work and that the issue as to whether there is such a phenomenon is by no means resolved. This chapter will also examine the ways in which research on reading has affected policy and will look at a case study which plausibly shows how such research can be used effectively.

Chapter 13 takes us to an issue which has always plagued EER and its application. This issue, which involves the uncritical and enthusiastic acceptance of the deliverances of EER, usually followed by disappointment and the entry of a new challenger in the lists, I call educational faddism. Educational faddism is the shared responsibility of governments and policymakers, teachers and educational researchers. I will describe the pressures which make educational faddism based on EER so irresistible and also show how it has also undermined faith in EER. Ironically, this point applies to recent attempts to transcend it through the use of metasurveys which seem to provide clear deliverance of the implications of any such research. Failure to attend to Mackie’s point about causal fields, described in Chapter 8, exacerbates the difficulties in making productive use of EER in policy initiatives. However, it is also the case that failure to attend to basic canons of probity in EER can be avoided and a lot of consequent mistakes avoided if policymakers and researchers are self-disciplined enough to do so.

In Chapter 14, I look at the ways in which philosophy and the more overtly empirical disciplines involved in educational research can work more fruitfully together. One consequence of the argument so far is the need for an interpretive or hermeneutic sensibility to be present in research from inception, through execution to the drawing of conclusions. This involves being sensitive to the subjects of the research’s own understanding of educational practices and the values and aims that inform them. The need for a hermeneutic approach in EER is stressed. The role of empirical investigations of conceptual variation is also emphasised (comparative VET studies). More traditional conceptual analysis also has an important role to play (Bernstein sociolinguistics and the dyslexia debate are relevant examples) and also philosophy of science (more awareness of paradigms, research programmes, causal analysis all have a role to play). We need to be aware, however, that the various possible contributions that philosophy can make to EER do not exist in separate non-interacting boxes.

Hermeneutics can be used judiciously with a more synchronously inclined form of conceptual analysis (for example in the study of conceptual variations in know-how concepts – Chapter 10) and a reflective element in the philosophical analysis of educational issues is always required to ensure that inquiries into the requirements of particular conceptions of education do not masquerade as categorial investigations. It can be particularly difficult for analysts personally committed to a particular conception of education to refrain from importing elements of their own preferred conception into categorial assertions.

Chapter 15 takes an extended look at the relevance of the discussion of EER to teachers’ own practice. It has been argued that it is impossible, if not incoherent to ignore the findings of EER. It has also been pointed out that it is difficult to draw practical conclusions from such findings. What does this mean for teachers? It will be argued that teachers do need to be able to distinguish between good and poor quality research on the one hand and relevant and less relevant research on the other. Except in relatively uncommon circumstances, however, all findings need to be considered in the light of teachers’ own objectives and circumstances before their relevance to their own work can be properly assessed. This means that teachers need to have a critical sensibility vis-à-vis EER, and this needs to be developed within both initial and continuing teacher education. The claim that teachers can and should themselves be educational researchers is critically assessed and a form of partnership between teachers and researchers is argued for.