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1 P. 39.

2 For J. M. Basa.

3 P.I.R., 507–7.

4 P.I.R., 477. 1.

5 “Until the Philippine question is finally decided, you would do well in not having any controversy with the Americans. After having secured the extinction of Spanish control for good, you may then liquidate accounts with the United States in the event that they wish to control in the interior; but in the meantime, let what will occur, do not allow yourself to have any controversy with them. Matters are in a very delicate state at the present time.”—P.I.R., 398. 3.

In a postscript to the same letter Bray says:—

“America is a great nation and does not wish that conditions be dictated to her. I am more than ever convinced that you must be patient and await what they propose, without opposing their wishes and insanities, before the questions before the Paris Congress are definitely settled and the islands ceded by Spain; then there would still be time to show your teeth if they try to govern the country. I would not object at present to them taking up their residence there and acting in the capacity of guard for good government, placing our trust for the future in Providence which will never abandon the Philippines.”—P.I.R.

6 Blount, p. 283.

7 Ibid., p. 283.

8 See p. 74.

9 “Both Spanish fleets had been destroyed and Spain had but one left to protect her own coast cities. The death knell of her once proud colonial empire had sounded. Decrepit as she was, she could not possibly have sent any reinforcements to the Philippines. Besides, the Filipinos would have ‘eaten them up.’ ”—Blount, p. 127.

10 P.I.R., 471.4.

11 Ibid., 471.4.

12 Ibid., 450. 2.

13 P.I.R., 471.4.

14 “You should not forget what I have stated at the beginning of this letter; because I am of the opinion that those questions should be well considered by all of you. If our people desire independence under the American protectorate, it is necessary that our representatives to the United States be given instructions as to the conditions which we should grant to the United States. The peace negotiations are in full blast, and it is probable that we will be rather late in sending our representatives. Therefore, if you agree to independence under a protectorate, you should recommend it at once. I leave it, however, to your care, as you are better qualified than myself concerning the conditions of our country.”—P.I.R., 471.4.

15 “My Dear Friend: … The last telegrams from Europe which Felipe will send you by this mail are alarming for our future. The preliminaries of peace are announced. The demand of America is, annexation of Porto Rico and the Ladrone Islands, independence of Cuba under an American protectorate and an American coaling station in the Philippines. That is, they will again deliver us into the hands of Spain. On the other hand, all the powers will unite to prevent the annexation of the Philippines, according to the telegrams of Regidor; the American cabinet hesitates about including us in the negotiations for peace from fear of a conflict with us and the Filipinos in Europe advise us to send a message to America giving our unconditional adhesion. If events will be what these telegrams indicate, we have a dark and bloody future before us. To be again in the hands of Spain will mean a long and bloody war, and it is doubtful whether the end will be favourable to us. The treaty of peace sanctioned by the other powers will assure the dominion of Spain. Spain free from Cuba and her other colonies will employ all her energy to crush us and will send here the 150,000 men she has in Cuba. I do not think that the Filipinos will again submit to their tyrants and there will be a long and bloody war. And on account of the treaty the other powers will aid Spain to completely dominate us and place all possible obstacles in our way to prevent shipment of arms and all kinds of revolutionary labours. In view of all this and bearing in mind the present urgency of the matter, it is necessary for that government to establish and publish its policy. We believe that the best for us and the only feasible one, if we want to establish negotiations with America, is independence under an American protectorate.”—P.I.R., 453.3.

16 “The policy which you will pursue in the United States is the following one:—

“Make them understand that whatever may be their intention towards us, it is not possible for them to overrule the sentiments of the people represented by the government, and they must first recognize it if we are to come to an agreement. Still do not accept any contracts or give any promises respecting protection or annexation, because we will see first if we can obtain independence. This is what we shall endeavour to secure; meanwhile, if it should be possible to do so, still give them to understand in a way that you are unable to bind yourself but that once we are independent, we will be able to make arrangements with them.”—P.I.R., Books C-1.

17 P.I.R., 5. 7.

18 In a letter written on that date to Agoncillo he says:—

“Notwithstanding, I enclose you the credentials as requested; thereby you will see that in addition to your representing us at Washington, you may assist the commission they have formed for the purpose of determining the future condition of the Philippines.

“But you must act in such manner that they may not be able to say that we have accepted the said commission, because it is my wish to protect [protest? D. C. W.] at all times against their being charged with determining our destiny. You must bear in mind that the policy of the government is to obtain absolute independence, and if perchance we should know by the course of events that such cannot be the case, we will then think of protection or annexation.”—P.I.R., Books C-1.

19 On August 30, 1898, Aguinaldo wrote Agoncillo:—

“It is said that General Merritt is going away to take part in the work of the Commission. On this account it is important that you proceed as quickly as possible to America, in order to know what takes place. If perchance we should go back to Spanish control, ask them to help us as the French helped them during their own revolution and ask also the terms.”—P.I.R., Books C—1.

20 Taylor, 18 AJ.

21 See p. 61.

22 Ibid.

23 Some time during August, 1898, Sandico wrote a letter to Aguinaldo of which the postscript reads as follows:—

“P.S.—If you think of appointing me as Delegate to Manila, please send me my credentials. There are also annexationists here [i.e., in Manila.—D. C. W.].”—P.I.R., 416. 3.

24 Now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. He is a man of excellent character, high attainments and great ability. He held important legal positions under the Spanish government. In October, 1898, he was appointed Secretary of Foreign Relations of the “Philippine Republic,” but never served as such officer. He was given the degree of Doctor of Law by Yale University in 1904.

25 Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, one of the most brilliant living Filipinos. He had spent many years in Paris, was a talented physician, and under American rule served for more than seven years as a member of the Philippine Commission.

26 Taylor, 55 AJ.

27 Taylor, 26 AJ.

28 Senate Documents, Vol. 25, Fifty-seventh Congress, First Session, p. 2969.

29 Senate Documents, Vol. 25, pp. 2931–2932.

30 Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2956.

31 Ibid., p. 2966.

32 Ibid., p. 2966.

33 Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2955.

34 Ibid., p. 2952.

35 The following passage is an extract from an unsigned order dated July 22, 1898:—

“For the preservation of peace and good order in the community and to put an end to the acts of those who within and without the city of Manila and in the neighboring provinces not under the control of the Spanish Government, are evading the orders issued by these Headquarters, and in view of the large number of those who are storing and monopolizing food and other most necessary articles, under the pretence of desiring to sell them to the Americans, but whose real intention is to ship them secretly to Manila where they receive higher prices for their merchandise, without regard for the injury they are doing the cause of our independence, I have seen fit to decree the following: …” P.I.R., 45.5 and 125.3.

Relative to this matter, Taylor says:—

“The defection of Buencamino and Pilar had opened the road to Aguinaldo, but at first the blockade was not effective. There were too many natives there with friends and relations in Aguinaldo’s camp to make him desire to subject the city to the hardships of an effective siege. And, furthermore, he did not have the force, nor did his men have the necessary discipline, to prevent the ingress of supplies. It was not until the first part of July that the price of provisions increased. It was at no time found necessary by the authorities to take over all the stores of provisions in the city. Indeed, there seems to have been a fairly steady traffic in supplies between Manila and the country to the north. It was a traffic in which it has been charged that certain Spanish officers of rank made large sums. Aguinaldo permitted it, and on July 26, 1898, signed an order directing that food should be sent into Manila from the north to prevent starvation in the city, and ordered the heads of the towns in the vicinity not to interfere with this traffic (P.I.R., 1087–4). The entrance of food supplies was confined to the northern line, for then it would not be known to the Americans who, after July 30, occupied the entrenchments in front of San Antonio Abad. It was not expedient for them to see too much of Aguinaldo’s methods.”—Taylor, 14 AJ.

36 P.I.R., 398. 2.

37 Senate Document 331, p. 2976, 1902.

38 P.I.R., 102–10.

39 P.I.R., Books C-1.

40 P.I.R., 102–10.

41 Ibid.

42 P.I.R., 102. 10.

43 Ibid., Books C-1.

44 Ibid., 102–10.

45 P.I.R., 102–10.

46 Now a major-general.

47 P.I.R., 102–10.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 “Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the favors we have received through Admiral Dewey and (being) more desirous than any other person of preventing any conflict which would have as a result foreign intervention, which must be extremely prejudicial, not alone to my nation, but also to that of Your Excellency, I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the places conquered by tho Filipinos from the Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights.

“I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Because of this I take the liberty of indicating to Your Excellency the necessity that before disembarking, you should communicate in writing to this government the places that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form and (thus) prevent the commission of any transgression against friendship.”—P.I.R., Books C-1.

51 Blount, p. 59.

52 On July 15 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Urgent. Received a telegram from the captain adjutant, who is in Parañaque, of the following tenor: ‘I inform your excellency that two cascos of armed Americans have arrived at this point. I await orders from Your Excellency.’ Which I hasten to communicate to Your Excellency for the proper action.”—P.I.R., 849.

Later on the same day Arevalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce with three hundred men waiting for more troops from Cavite, and also orders, but not to attack.”—P.I.R., 849.

53 Captain Torres telegraphed Aguinaldo on July 15 as follows:—

“I have read all your telegrams and carried out the same, and I incidentally questioned them about their purposes, [they] replying that they will aid; let time demonstrate it. They also intend to encamp over here at Parañaque. I will report to you any occurrence.”—P.I.R., 69.6.

54 P.I.R., 69. 5.

55 Ibid., 849.

56 “Admiral Dewey’s Aide was here to-day. I told him I was ignorant of your whereabouts and, if he had no objection, he might talk with me as I am your representative; but he said that he could not do so, as he had orders to speak with you personally, about something very important. He then departed.”—P.I.R., 1179. 5.

57 The following telegram was addressed to the President or the Secretary of War by Sulpicio at Bacoor, on August 8, 1898:—

“Last night I received a telegram from General Noriel, asking for 100 cavanes of rice which he needs immediately, since he has ordered to send him all the troops here on account of the landing of Americans in Parañaque. General Mascardo will send him the troops which are here. There are 56 bundles [of rice.—TR.] deposited in this storehouse.”—P.I.R., 1179. 5.

58 This man’s record is not known to me. Apparently he was an officer in the Spanish army, for he is later reported as surrendering to the Insurgents at Santa Ana on August 13, 1898. See footnote 4, p. 104.

59 Taylor, 33 AJ.

60 Artemio Ricarte was one of the ranking Insurgent generals directing operations against Manila.

61 P.I.R., 1087. 5.

62 Taylor, 30 AJ.

63 Taylor, 30 AJ.

64 P.I.R., 849.

65 On August 2, 1899, Agoncillo wrote Mabini:—

“I send Don Emilio the information I have been able to obtain here, in order that in view thereof you [plural] may consider the best solution of our present political problem, which is an exceptional case in history. In my opinion, the most critical moment, which I call agonizing, whether correctly or not I know not, is the capture of Manila, where General Merritt will constitute a provisional government, in compliance with the instructions from his Government. It is unnecessary to recommend that you observe great tact, great prudence, when this event occurs. Ascertain the real wishes of the people in this conflict and the war resources at our disposal and those which you may count on during the struggle until its termination.”

—P.I.R., 451.3.

In his document entitled “Means for Attaining Filipino Independence” Aguinaldo had written:—

“VIII. Exterior attack. Above everything the Revolutionists must occupy all Manila including the Walled City with the object and purpose that the nation possessing the Philippines according to the decision of the Powers will be forced to come to an understanding with the Filipinos to avoid the shedding of blood.”—P.I.R., 457. 5.

66 Taylor, 29 AJ.

67 That is, the surrender of Manila.

68 Fort San Antonio A′bad.

69 Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2943.

70 “I must tell you that I feel as you should feel in regard to our government not having officially participated in the capitulation of Manila. Accordingly the war must be continued with Spain, because, if we attack to-night, the Americans, acting upon the request of the Spaniards and foreigners in addition to those who took part in the capitulation, will have to ask us to suspend operations; hence we shall be included in the negotiations and this will work to our advantage.

“To-night at 2 A.m. you will attack without fail in order that we may be included in the capitulation which the Americans made to-day. You must not stop the attacks because they do, and this is also the opinion of our partisans among the foreigners.”—P.I.R., 1179. 5 & 427. 5.

71 “Our Rule in the Philippines,” The North American Review, 1900, No. 170.

72 General Ricarte to Aguinaldo, August 12, 1898, 11.15 P.m.:

“Have received the telegram from your honourable person regarding attack at four o’clock in the morning, although we will make the attack anyway. I have directed Gen. Pío Del Pilar begin firing cannon at the hour set. At the present time we are making preparations and will also give orders to the chiefs of the columns.”—P.I.R., 849.

73

“August 13, 1898.

“Dated. Camp Dewey 13. To General Aguinaldo. Commanding Philippine Forces, Bacoor: Do not let your troops enter Manila without the permission of the American commander on this side of Pasig river. You will be under our fire.

“Anderson, Brig. General.”

—P.I.R., 102–10.

74 “Copy: Gen. Riego, Cavite: Have just received a note from Gen. Anderson saying to me he does not permit my troops to enter Manila without permission from the American commander on this side of the Pasig River. They will be under his fire. Go with Señor Buencamino and ask for an explanation, in writing if possible, as to the motive for said note, without losing a moment. August 13, ’98. E.A.”

—P.I.R., 849.

75 “I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite. In consequence of this I have not answered until now. My troops are forced by yours, by means of threats of violence, to retire from positions taken. It is necessary to avoid conflict, which I should lament, that you order your troops that they avoid difficulty with mine, as until now they have conducted themselves as brothers to take Manila. I have given strict orders to my chiefs that they preserve strict respect to American forces and to aid them in ease they are attacked by a common enemy.”

76 Gregorio Araneta, later a member of the Philippine Commission and Secretary of Finance and Justice. He was Secretary of Justice under the Malolos government, and was also secretary of the Insurgent Congress. He was at this time a bright young lawyer of good ability and character.

77 P.I.R., 849.

78 Ibid.

79 P.I.R., 849.

80 Ibid., 849.

81 Ibid., 1179. 5.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 Report of War Dept., 1898, Vol. I, part 2, p. 69.

85 Taylor, Exhibit 739.

86 The following two telegrams were sent by General Pio del Pilar to Aguinaldo at 9.30 P.m.:—

“I inform you that the Bayambang troops who have presented themselves before me when we entered Santa Ana this afternoon, are: 4 lieutenants, 171 soldiers with their respective rifles and ammunitions, Major Fernando Acevedo, Captain Licerio Geronimo, 1 Spanish lieutenant, and 1 prisoner by the name of Enrique Flores. All of them I put under your orders.”—P.I.R., 1179.5.

“Very urgent. I inform you of the capture made by my soldiers: 2 lieutenants of the Marine Corps, 2 lieutenants of the Spanish Infantry, 52 soldiers. Rifles about 400. I put them under your orders and await your instructions.”—P.I.R., 1179. 5.

87 The Spanish Governor-General.

88 P.I.R., 1300. 2.

89 Taylor, 58 HJ.

90 Ibid., 59.

91 See footnote 2, p. 108.

92 P.I.R., Books C-1.

93 Taylor, 15 AJ.

94 The word Indios, here translated “Indians,” means Malayan Filipinos of pure blood as distinguished from mestizos or people of mixed blood.

95 P.I.R., 918. 2.

96 The following telegram was sent by Colonel José to Aguinaldo:—

“Urgent. August 20, 1898: Colonel López reports that our troops are still sacking and committing outrages in Malate, Paco and Ermita, even menacing people with their arms. Urge you to take proper measures to stop these abuses.”—P.I.R., 1167. 3.

97 Extract from a letter of August 20, 1899, from Mabini to Aguinaldo:

“Señor López, your adjutant, arrived and told me of many complaints regarding the behaviour of the soldiers. He says that our officers carry off many horses, some of them belonging to foreigners. If the foreigners should enter a protest against such doings, I do not know what will be thought of our government.

“It is also absolutely necessary that a stop should be put to the passes, and that the tax on merchandise entering Manila, should no longer be exacted. It is absolutely necessary, if you think well of it, for us to promote General Pío, and make him your second in command. It is necessary for him to leave the vicinity of Manila, as we cannot remove him by force; and do not reprimand him.

“If you approve, I will write a Decree, but I reflect that nothing will succeed, if our commanders are not obliged to comply.”

—P.I.R., 472. 13.

98 I.e. the Americans.

99 P.I.R., 458. 8.

100 Major J. F. Bell accompanied Sandico on this trip.

101 P.I.R., 1166. 12.

102 “I regret very much to have to inform you that as long as personal property is not respected here in Manila especially, by some of our men, as long as personal security does not exist and as long as prisoners are tortured, we cannot hope to deserve the confidence of the other governments. Murders, thefts of carriages and horses, are very frequent here, as is kidnapping, …

“Sergeant Barcena, of the Fifth Company of the Second Zone, that is the zone of General Pío del Pilar, informed me that the cruel officers of that Zone, were Major Carmona and a lieutenant who was formerly a barber.

“I know that the Government has ordered that private persons and property be respected and has withdrawn from the military the power of trying civilians; but in view of the fact that notwithstanding this restriction some of them continue to discharge powers of which they have been divested, I find it necessary to call your attention thereto, in order that more energetic measures may be adopted so that other nations may not be led to believe that our government is very weak.

“In the jurisdiction of the Americans, I have surprised small groups of officers, who devote themselves to summoning persons before them and arresting them. These groups can be found in Binondo, Tondo and Trozo. I have used all friendly measures to secure their dissolution, but if they continue their conduct, I shall be obliged to turn them over to the American authorities, although I inform you that I shall not make use of such measures, until diplomatic means are exhausted.

“I understand very well that in endeavouring to stop the abuses committed by our officers and by the Filipinos who claim to belong to us, in Manila, I expose myself to becoming a victim of their vengeance; nevertheless, this does not terrify me, because my duty to the country requires it.

“I beg of you that if you take any steps against Major Carmona and the barber lieutenant, to be very careful and call General Pío del Pilar and come to an understanding with him as to the mode of punishment of these officers. …

“I have discovered grave cases which are occurring in the Presidio of Manila, which I propose to relate to you when I shall have the honor to see you personally. The Americans are already aware of these cases, and are working in their own interest untiringly.

“I could tell you a good many other things, but I do not do so on account of lack of time, and because I wish to reserve them until I can speak to you privately. In the meantime, order me as you will, etc.”

—P.I.R., 416. 7.

103 “General Anderson received us very well, but in the proposed agreement the clauses requiring the prior permission of our commanders before American troops could pass or approach our lines displeased him very much. Gen. Anderson refuses to treat until after the withdrawal of Noriel’s troops. I think it prudent to yield. This telegram is in amplification of another which, at the request of Gen. Anderson, we sent through his telegraph station to your excellency.”—P.I.R., 849.

104 “It is impossible to order General Noriel to fall back because if we order it they will ask the same thing from General Pío and we shall get nothing ourselves. And the worst is that after we have evacuated Manila and its environs they will follow us up to our new positions to take them too without our being able to obtain from them any formal statement of the concession signed in duo form. Tho conflict is coming sooner or later and we shall gain nothing by asking as favours of them what are really our rights. We shall maintain them as long as we are able, confiding in Providence and in Justice. I confirm my last telegram. Tell General Anderson that we shall hold a meeting of the council of Government in order to decide. Please return here soon with your companions. I inclose the map which I hope you will return.”—P.I.R., 427. 1.

105 Senate Document No. 208, p. 22.

106 Ibid., p. 23.

107 Ibid., p. 26.

108 Senate Document No. 208, p. 24.

109 Pío del Pilar.

110 Report of the War Department, 1899, Vol. I, part IV, pp. 5–10.

111 See Buencamino’s letter to Jáudines, p. 108.

112 Taylor 36 AJ. et seq.