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It has long been the fashion in certain quarters to allege, or to insinuate, that American consuls and naval officers promised the Insurgent leaders that the independence of the Philippines would be recognized by the United States. It has been claimed by some that the coöperation of the Insurgents in the military operations against Manila was sought for and secured. Others say that they were at least de facto allies of the United States, and that they were in the end shamelessly betrayed and wantonly attacked.

These are very serious charges. I shall prove, chiefly by the Insurgent records, that each of them is false. I ask the forbearance of my readers if, in the three chapters which I devote to these matters, I quote documentary evidence at length. When original documents or extracts from them tell a clear and reasonably concise story, I sometimes insert them bodily in the text. In other cases I give my own version of the facts which they set forth, but give the full text in foot-notes. In nearly all instances references are given to sources of documentary information. I greatly regret that Taylor’s narrative, with its very numerous supporting documents, is not readily accessible to the student of history. It ought to have been published, but never got beyond the galley-proof stage. In referring to it, I am therefore obliged to use the word Taylor followed by the letters and figures designating the page of this galley proof on which the passage referred to is found. Whenever possible I give the War Department numbers1 of Insurgent documents, but in a few cases can give only the exhibit numbers assigned by Taylor in printing the documents.

As his exhibits are serially arranged it is easy to find any one of them. Copies of his work may be found in the War Department and in the office of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary.

Referring to the charge that the Insurgents were deceived, even had deceit been practised as claimed, Aguinaldo would have had no just ground for complaint, for he himself not only frankly advocated its use, but deliberately employed it in his dealings with the Americans, as clearly appears in records hereinafter cited.2 However, most Americans hold to a standard very different from his. Was it departed from in this instance?

Aguinaldo has specifically and repeatedly charged that Pratt and Dewey promised him the recognition of the independence of the Philippines by the United States.3

Judge Blount has referred to the “de facto alliance between the Americans and Aguinaldo,” and has dwelt at length on “promises, both expressed and implied,” which were subsequently repudiated by Consul Pratt, Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and Merritt, constantly suggesting, even when he does not specifically charge, bad faith on the part of these officers of the United States.4

The San Juan Bridge

This bridge is the one near which the first shot was fired when hostilities began between Americans and Filipinos.

On analyzing his statements we find that he is discreetly non-committal as to exactly what were the expressed promises, nor does he make it so plain as might be desired what legitimate inferences were deducible from the acts of the Americans in question. He quotes an alleged statement of General Anderson to the effect that:—

“Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman,5 and Williams6 did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Philippino government would be recognized, the Phillippinos certainly thought so, judging from their acts rather than from their words. Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently at his request.”7

Before discussing these charges I will briefly review certain historical facts, knowledge of which will be useful in considering them.

In August, 1896, an insurrection against Spain had broken out in the Philippines under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, a resident of Cavite Viejo, who had been a school teacher, and was, at that time, gobernadorcillo8 of his town.

It had been terminated by the so-called “Treaty of Biacnabató,” signed in Manila on December 15, 1897.

This document provided for the surrender of “Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Supreme Chief of the Insurgents in arms,” and Don Marciano Llanera and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo, his subordinates, together with their soldiers and arms.

“The Excellent Señor General in Chief” of the Spanish forces was to “provide the necessary means for supporting the lives” of those who surrendered before a certain fixed date.

In actual practice what was done was to agree to pay them $800,0009 in three instalments, the first of $400,000, the second and third of $200,000 each.

Aguinaldo and certain other leaders were to take up their residence outside the islands. Their deportation was duly provided for, and Aguinaldo and twenty-six of his companions were taken to Hongkong, on the Spanish steamer Uranus; arriving there on December 31, 1897.

On January 2, 1898, $400,000 were deposited in the Hongkong Bank, to the credit of Aguinaldo and Co.

The Insurgent leaders remaining at Biacnabató had a meeting under the presidency of Isabelo Artacho, an Ilocano10 who was the ranking officer in the absence of Aguinaldo, and requested that the second instalment, of $200,000, be paid to them. The Spanish governor-general, Primo de Rivera, acceded to their request, and they divided the money, although Aguinaldo denied their right to do so, claiming that it should have been sent to Hongkong.

The third payment of $200,000 was apparently never made. Primo de Rivera says that he turned over a check for $200,000 to his successor, General Augustin, in April, 1898; giving as his reason for refusing to pay it to the Insurgents that there seemed to him to be no prospect of its being equitably divided among those who were entitled to receive it under the agreement.

Aguinaldo and his associates claimed that certain reforms were promised by the Spanish government at the time the treaty of Biacnabató was negotiated, and as these measures were not put into effect, they organized a junta or revolutionary committee at Hongkong. It included in its membership a number of Filipino political exiles, then residing at that place.

The men who composed this organization soon fell to quarrelling and it became necessary to come to a definite understanding as to its aims. Under the arrangement finally reached, the junta, as a whole, was charged with the work of propaganda outside of the archipelago; with all diplomatic negotiations with foreign governments; and with the preparation and shipment of such articles as were needed to carry on the revolution in the Philippines. It was to be allowed voice by Aguinaldo’s government in any serious question which might arise abroad, and would aid that government in bringing the civil administration of the Philippines to the level of that of the most advanced nations.

Trouble soon arose among the former Insurgent leaders over the division of the funds deposited at Hongkong.

Taylor gives a trustworthy and concise account of the events of this period, and as it is of historic interest, and makes clear just how Aguinaldo came to go to Singapore, meet Pratt, and enter into negotiations with him, I quote extensive extracts from it.11

“From January 4 to April 4, Aguinaldo withdrew from the banks 5786.46 pesos in part interest on the money he had deposited. This was used to pay the expenses of himself and his companions in Hongkong. These expenses were kept at a minimum; the money was drawn and spent by him. If one of the men with him needed a new pair of shoes, Aguinaldo paid for them; if another wanted a new coat, Aguinaldo bought it. Minute accounts were kept, which are on file among his papers, and it is seen from them that his expenses were exceeding his income, which could only be 12,000 pesos a year, while he was living at the rate of 22,000, with constant demands being made upon him by men who came from the Philippines. Life was not easy under these conditions. Aguinaldo’s companions were entirely dependent upon him. Their most trivial expenses had to be approved by him, and he held them down with a strong hand. They were men living in a strange land, among a people whose language they did not speak, having nothing to do but quarrel among themselves, exiles waiting for a chance to return to their own country, which they watched with weary eyes while they guarded the embers by which they hoped to light the fires of a new insurrection.

“The men who had accompanied Aguinaldo to Hongkong were not the only Filipinos domiciled there; a number of men had taken refuge in that British colony after the events of 1872, and some of them at least had prospered. Some of them, like the members of the Cortes family, seem to have had almost no relations with the followers of Aguinaldo; some, like J. M. Basa, knew them and took part in some of the meetings of the governing groups, but were probably not admitted to their full confidence, as Aguinaldo and his immediate following wanted and were working for independence and independence alone, while the Filipinos who had long lived in Hongkong wanted to see the archipelago lost to Spain, but had no confidence in the ability of the country to stand alone or in the fitness of Aguinaldo and his following to direct the councils of a state. The character of the new refugees did not inspire confidence in these older men, who hoped for a protectorate by or annexation to the United States.

“On May 6, 1898, the consul-general of the United States there informed the State Department that D. Cortés, M. Cortés, A. Rosario, Gracio Gonzaga, and José Maria Basa (50), all very wealthy land-owners, bankers, and lawyers of Manila, desired to tender their allegiance and the allegiance of their powerful families in Manila to the United States, and that they had instructed all their connections to render every aid to the United States forces in Manila. On May 14 he forwarded statements of other Filipinos domiciled in Hongkong, not members of the junta, that they desired to submit their allegiance and the allegiance of their families in the Philippine Islands to the United States. One of Aguinaldo’s followers, writing somewhat later, spoke with bitterness of the rich old men who went about calling their companions ‘beggarly rebels,’ but these men were rich, and their names and their apparent adhesion to the cause represented by Aguinaldo would inspire confidence in him among men of property in the Philippines. They were, accordingly, not to be lightly alienated; therefore, at first, at least, no open break took place with them, but their attitude toward the leaders of the insurrection is shown by the fact that after the early summer of 1898 they took no, or very little, part in the insurgent movement, although they were living in Hongkong, the seat of the junta, which conducted the propaganda for the insurgent government of the Philippines.

“But, in fact, Aguinaldo had no just conception of the conditions and of the opportunities which were about to open before the Hongkong junta, for although war between Spain and the United States was imminent and a United States squadron was in Hongkong threatening Manila, Aguinaldo was chiefly concerned in finding how to avoid losing the money which had been received from the Spanish government as the price of his surrender. The importance of his presence near the Philippines in case of war did not occur to him, or if it did occur to him anything which he could obtain there from the aid of the United States probably seemed for the moment of little consequence compared with escaping from his wrangling companions with enough money to live on in Paris.

“Artacho, who had received 5000 pesos as his share of the second payment, arrived in Hongkong and on April 5 demanded 200,000 pesos of the insurgent funds, probably under the agreement that he should establish a company in Hongkong for the benefit of the former leaders and not merely of those who had accompanied Aguinaldo. But the leaders in Hongkong had denounced that agreement, and refused to pay. He then entered suit before the supreme court of Hongkong, calling upon Aguinaldo for an accounting of the trust funds deposited in his hands for the benefit of Artacho and others, and asked for an injunction restraining Aguinaldo or any member of the junta from handling or disposing of any part of said funds. He filed as evidence copies of the Biacnabató agreement and of the agreement made by the leaders on December 19. This suit was brought not merely in the name of Artacho, but in that of all the exiles who were described as living in exile in Hongkong in accordance with an agreement made with the Spanish Government. Artacho probably had adherents among these men, some at least of whom were utterly weary of waiting in Hongkong and of living upon what was doled out to them. Some at least saw no chance of any other fate than indefinite exile spent in dependence upon the inner group for even the means of existence.

“The suit was in equity, and called for an accounting for the trust funds which the complainant recognized were legally in the hands of Aguinaldo. It could be carried on only with great difficulty without his presence and without his account books. Meetings were held, and Artacho was denounced as attempting to extort blackmail, but he refused to yield, and Aguinaldo, rather than explain the inner workings of the Hongkong junta before a British court, prepared for flight. A summons was issued for his appearance before the supreme court of Hongkong on April 13, 1898, but he was by that time beyond its jurisdiction.

“He drew out the 50,000 pesos from the Chartered Bank, which had become due according to the terms of the deposit, and perhaps such other sums as could be drawn upon by check, engaged passage for Europe by way of Singapore for G. H. del Pilar, J. M. Leyba, and himself under assumed names, appointed V. Belarmino to succeed to his functions, and gave him checks signed in blank to draw the interest of the sums on deposit to provide for the support of the exiles. He gave as his reason for departure that he was going to remain under cover until Artacho could be bought off, but he intended to go far afield for this purpose, as he gave his destination as Europe and the United States.

“Aguinaldo and his companions probably sailed from Hongkong on April 8, 1898, and arrived in Singapore on April 21, after stopping in Saigon. War between the United States and Spain had been rendered inevitable by the resolution of Congress demanding that Spain should withdraw her forces from Cuba, and was declared on April 21. Although Aguinaldo and his followers did not appreciate the influence which conditions on the other side of the world might have upon the future of the Philippines, it happened that in Singapore at that time there was an Englishman named Bray who did. He had been a member of the civil service in India, and had lived for some years in the Philippines, but he had fallen upon evil days and was engaged in writing letters to the Singapore Free Press upon the Philippines, and in retailing such information as was in his possession concerning them to the United States consul-general in Singapore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, for transmittal to Commodore Dewey. Bray heard of the arrival of Aguinaldo and realized what could be done with him, and that if the matter were well handled it might be to his own advantage. He went at once to see Aguinaldo and informed him that the United States consul-general was anxious to see him. He went to the consul-general and informed him of the importance of Aguinaldo, and that he was in Singapore. Aguinaldo had to be persuaded to agree to a meeting. The consul-general was anxious for it, and it took place, according to Aguinaldo, on the night of April 22 (according to Pratt, on the morning of April 24). The statement made by Aguinaldo is probably correct. According to his account book, he paid $11 on April 23, 1898, for a telegram to the Hongkong junta concerning the negotiations ‘with America.’

“Aguinaldo knew but little English, Pratt knew no Spanish, so in their interview Bray acted as interpreter. An interpreter who is interested in the subject of the discussion may be a dangerous man. It is impossible to say what he told Aguinaldo. Certainly Pratt did not know; but whatever was said during these conversations it is within the limits of possibility that Pratt may have been made to say by the interpreter more than he intended, and that his statements of what would probably be granted by the United States Government and his expression of good wishes for the cause of Filipino independence may have been translated as assurances and as promises. Bray, who, according to his Filipino former friends, was apt to talk too much, may have talked too much on this occasion, and so the myth of the formal agreement between Aguinaldo on behalf of the Filipino insurgents and Pratt on behalf of the United States grew up, a fiction which Bray himself, with a natural desire to add to his own importance, did his best to circulate.

“Bray did not ask for his reward at the time, but probably reckoned upon making himself indispensable as an adviser, so that later he could make his own terms. For a time he wrote letters of advice to Aguinaldo, which may have had some influence upon the line of conduct which he adopted, and later was employed in furnishing from Hongkong news to various newspapers of events and conditions in the Philippines. His cablegrams shortly before the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and the insurgents were more picturesque than veracious, but they were apparently considered effective, as Aguinaldo ordered that he should be given $5000. He wanted more, but the Hongkong junta did not trust him, and he ceased to be in their employment.”12

As we shall see, Bray did not do all of the interpreting at Singapore, and we shall be able to determine with some accuracy what actually transpired there.

We can now consider understandingly the charges made against Pratt and Dewey.

It has been claimed over and over again, that Pratt promised Aguinaldo recognition of tile independence of the Philippines if he and his people would cooperate with the United States forces against Spain.

Aguinaldo himself made the charge in his “Reseña Verídica”13 in the following words:—

“In this interview Consul Pratt told me that because the Spaniards had not complied with the agreement of Biac-na-bató, the Filipinos had a right to renew their interrupted revolution and advised me to take up arms anew against Spain, assuring me that America would give the Filipinos the greatest advantages (mayores ventajas). Then I asked the Consul what advantages the United States would concede to the Philippines, suggesting, when I had the proper opening, the propriety of making an agreement in writing, to which the Consul answered that he would report, by telegraph, on the subject to Mr. Dewey, who was the chief of the expedition against the Philippines, and who had ample powers from President McKinley.

“On the following day, between 10 and 12 in the morning, we again took up the matter, Consul Pratt saying that the admiral had answered my inquiry by saying that the United States would at least recognize the independence of the Philippine government under a naval protectorate, but that there was no necessity to put it in writing, as the words of the admiral and the American consul were sacred and would be fulfilled, not being like those of the Spaniards, and finally, that the Government of North America was a very honourable Government, a very just and very powerful one.”14

On April 27, 1908, Pratt telegraphed the Secretary of State as follows:—

“General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey coöperation insurgents Manila.

“Pratt.”

On the 28th he wrote the Secretary, explaining how he had come to meet Aguinaldo, and stating just what he had done. He said:—

“At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the state of an object sought to be obtained by the present insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself, whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the Government, to point out the danger of continuing independent action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the expediency of cooperating with our fleet, then at Hongkong, and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same day as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:—

Insurgent Prisoners

On the day of the Polo fight in provinces of Bulacan these Insurgent soldiers lay in a trench and fired into a charging company of American troops until the latter came in on top of them. They were taken prisoners, sent to Manila and humanely treated there. This photograph was taken as they were being marched down the railroad track to the Manila train.

“ ‘Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph.

“ ‘Pratt.’ ”

The Commodore’s reply read thus:—

“ ‘Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.

“ ‘Dewey.’ ”

Pratt adds:—

“I received it late at night, and at once communicated to General Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by the British Steamer Malacca, which left here on Tuesday the 26th.

“Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last interview with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of which I shall give you by next mail.

“The general impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability, and courage, and worthy the confidence that had been placed in him.

“I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with the commander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.

“If this course of mine meets with the Government’s approval, as I trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray, however, I consider there is due some special recognition for most valuable services rendered.

“How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to decide.

“I have, etc.”15

It will be noted that Pratt explained to Aguinaldo that he had no authority to speak for the government; that there was no mention in the cablegrams between Pratt and Dewey of independence or indeed of any conditions on which Aguinaldo was to coöperate, these details being left for future arrangement with Dewey; and that Pratt thought that he had prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.

The particulars as to the second and last interview between Aguinaldo and Pratt were embodied in the following letter:—

“No. 213. Consulate-General of the United States.

“Singapore, April 30, 1898.

“Sir: Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th instant, I have the honor to report that in the second and last interview I had with Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo on the eve of his departure for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him the necessity, under Commodore Dewey’s direction, of exerting absolute control over his forces in the Philippines, as no excesses on their part would be tolerated by the American Government, the President having declared that the present hostilities with Spain were to be carried on in strict accord with modern principles of civilized warfare.

“To this General Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that he intended and was perfectly able, once on the field, to hold his followers, the insurgents, in check and lead them as our commander should direct.

“The general stated that he hoped the United States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their own, in the organization of which he would desire American advice and assistance.

“These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss.

“I have, etc.,

“E. Spencer Pratt,

“United States Consul-General.”

In a subsequent communication written on July 28, 1898, Pratt made the following statement:—

“I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the question of the future policy of the United States with regard to the Philippines, that I held out no hopes to him of any kind, committed the government in no way whatever, and, in the course of our confidences, never acted upon the assumption that the Government would cooperate with him—General Aguinaldo—for the furtherance of any plans of his own, nor that, in accepting his said cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put forward.”16

What reason if any is there for denying the truth of this allegation?

I will give in full Blount’s statement as to what occurred at a meeting held at Singapore, to celebrate the early successes of Dewey and Aguinaldo, as it constitutes his nearest approach to a direct claim, that any one at any time promised independence:—

“First there was music by the band. Then followed the formal reading and presentation of the address by a Dr. Santos, representing the Filipino community of Singapore. The address pledged the ‘eternal gratitude’ of the Filipino people to Admiral Dewey and the honored addressee; alluded to the glories of independence, and to how Aguinaldo had been enabled; by the arrangement so happily effected with Admiral Dewey by Consul Pratt, to arouse eight millions of Filipinos to take up arms ‘in defence of those principles of justice and liberty of which your country is the foremost champion’ and trusted ‘that the United States … will efficaciously second the programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States.’

“Mr. Pratt arose and ‘proceeded, speaking in French,’ says the newspaper—it does not say Alabama French, but that is doubtless what it was—‘to state his belief that the Filipinos would prove and were now proving themselves fit for self-government.’ The gentleman from Alabama then went on to review the mighty events and developments of the preceding six weeks, Dewey’s victory of May 1st, ‘the brilliant achievements of your own distinguished leader, General Emilio Aguinaldo, cooperating on land with the Americans at sea,’ etc. ‘You have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen under his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito in Singapore, I immediately sought him out. An hour’s interview convinced me that he was the man for the occasion; and, having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.’ ”17

Now, it happens that Dr. Santos himself forwarded his speech, and his version of Pratt’s reply thereto, in a letter to Aguinaldo, dated Singapore, June 9, 1898. As he served as interpreter, he, if any one, should know what Pratt said. After describing the change in tone of the Singapore Free Press, with which strained relations had formerly existed, and the subsequent friendliness of the editor of this paper and that of the Straits Times, he says that on the previous afternoon he went with the other Filipinos to greet Pratt. He continues:—

“This occasion was unusually opportune by reason of ours having been victorious and immediately after the cry of our worthy chief which found an echo in this colony. For this purpose 30 or more Filipinos—9 of the higher class, 15 musicians and the remainder of the middle class—went to greet Consul A., here, and on the invitation of Mr. Bray we ascended. He received us in his private office, and it was imposing to see that the only decoration was the American flag which covered the desk, and in its centre, a carved wooden frame holding the portrait of our worthy chief. He shook hands with all of us, and I introduced them all. We found there also, and were introduced to, the Editor of the Straits Times and the Free Press of here, and after being thus assembled, after a musical selection, I read the following speech in French:—

“ ‘His Excellency, The Consul General of the United States of America in Singapore:

“ ‘Your Excellency: The Filipinos of all social classes residing in this port, have come to greet Your Excellency as the genuine representative of the great and powerful American Republic in order to express to you our eternal gratitude for the moral and material support given by Admiral Dewey to our General Aguinaldo in his campaign for the liberty of eight million Filipinos. The latter and we ourselves hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humanitarian policy, will without cessation and (with) decided energy continue to support the programme agreed upon in Singapore between Your Excellency and General Aguinaldo, that is to say, the Independence of the Philippine Islands, under an American protectorate. Accept our cordial acknowledgments and congratulations on being the first one in accepting and supporting this idea which time and events have well developed to the great satisfaction of our nation. Finally, we request you, Most Excellent Sir, to express to your worthy President and the American Republic, our sincere acknowledgments and our fervent wishes for their prosperity. I have concluded.’

“The Consul replied hereto in French, in more or less the following terms:—

“ ‘You have nothing to thank me for, because I have only faithfully followed the instructions received from my Government; the fact of the sudden departure of your General will permit you to infer that I have done so. I shall in any case inform my Government of your good wishes and I thank you in its name. You know that your wishes are mine also, and for this reason at the last interview I had with Mr. Aguinaldo, I repeated to him that he should observe the greatest humanity possible in the war, in order that our army, our soldiers, our nation and all the other nations may see that you are humane and not savages, as has erroneously been believed.’

“After this there was enthusiastic applause for the Consul; he offered us all cigars, glasses of very fine sherry, and lemonade for the musicians and the majority. The toasts were offered with the sherry by your humble servant, Sres. Cannon, Enríquez, Celio, Reyes, the Consul, the editors of the Free Press, Straits Times and Mr. Bray. We drank to America and her humanitarian work of redemption; to the Philippines with America; we gave thanks to the Consul, to Mr. Bray as an important defender; we drank to the Free Press for taking such an interest in our affairs, and to the Straits Times (sarcastically); but I was very careful not to propose a toast to our general, which was done at the proper time by ‘Flaco’18 when we gave three cheers; for the sake of courtesy we cheered for England, which had been so hospitable to us, and when everybody had become quiet, the Editor of the Straits Times took his glass in his hand and cried in a loud voice, ‘The Philippine Republic,’ to which we all responded. ‘Flaco’ disappeared a moment, and when he returned he brought with him the American flag, and formally presented it to us in French, which I interpreted to all in Spanish, as follows: ‘Gentlemen: The American Consul, with his deep affection for us, presents us this flag as the greatest and most expressive remembrance which he can give us. The red stripes stand for the generous blood of her sons, shed to obtain her liberty; the white stripes stand for her virginity and purity as our country; the blue background indicates the sky and each star represents a free and independent State; this is America, and the Consul is desirous that we also should have so glorious a history as hers and that it may be as brilliant as could be wished, securing peace with respect, and may God be our help and guide in securing liberty. Viva and with it our most sincere thanks for so signal a courtesy.’ Hereupon, to the surprise of everybody as no one expected it, the Consul requested that some Filipino airs be played which seemed to please him very much. Finally, about 6.15, we left, very well satisfied with the reception accorded us and the kindness of the Consul. Mr. Bray asked me for the text of my speech, which I insert above and I secured from the Consul his French text, which I enclose in my letter to Naning. Without anything further for the present, awaiting your reply and your opinion as to the above, as also orders and instructions for the future, I am,

“Yours, etc.

(Signed) “Isidoro de los Santos.”

To this letter Major Taylor has appended the following note:—

“(Note by Compiler.—In a letter written in Tagalog to Aguinaldo on June 6 by Santos he describes the American consul general as having cried out ‘Hurrah for General Aguinaldo, hurrah for the Republic of the Philippines’ and then, having apparently taken several drinks, he passed up and down the room waving the American flag before giving it to the assembled Filipinos (P.I.R., 406.7).)”19

This final statement does not present the representative of the United States government at Singapore in a very favourable light, but I take the facts as I find them. If now we compare the speech actually made by Dr. Santos with Blount’s version of it, we shall find that with the exception of the words “eternal gratitude” the passages which he encloses in quotation marks are not in the original at all. The glories of independence are not alluded to, nor is there so much as a suggestion that Aguinaldo had been enabled to arouse eight millions of Filipinos to take up arms, which he certainly had not done.

Dr. Santos in his speech did resort to a stereotyped Filipino procedure so very commonly employed that those of us who have dealt much with his people have learned to meet it almost automatically. It consists in referring to one’s having said just exactly what one did not say, and then if one fails to note the trap and avoid it, in claiming that because one did not deny the allegation one has admitted its truth.

Aguinaldo himself later repeatedly resorted to this procedure in his dealings with Dewey and others.

In the present instance Santos employed it rather cleverly when he expressed the hope that the United States would “continue to support the programme agreed upon in Singapore, between your Excellency and General Aguinaldo, that is to say, the independence of the Philippine Islands under an American protectorate.”

Now if this was agreed to, Aguinaldo later constantly violated his part of the agreement, for we shall see that he stated over and over again, in correspondence with members of the junta and others, that a protectorate would be considered only if absolute independence finally proved unattainable, but there is no reason to believe that any such agreement was made.

Dr. Santos read his speech to Mr. Pratt in French. Blount implies, whether rightly or wrongly I do not know, that Pratt’s knowledge of French was poor. At all events Pratt in his reply made not the slightest reference to the hope expressed by Santos that the United States would continue to support the programme which Santos said had been agreed upon between Pratt and Aguinaldo, and claim of a promise of independence based on these speeches must obviously be abandoned. There is no doubt that Pratt personally sympathized with the ambitions of the Filipino leaders, and openly expressed his sympathy on this and other occasions, but to do this was one thing and to have attempted to compromise his government would have been another and very different one. The shrewd Filipinos with whom he was dealing understood this difference perfectly well.

It is a regrettable fact that there exists some reason to believe that his sympathy was not purely disinterested. Aguinaldo claims that Pratt wished to be appointed “representative of the Philippines in the United States to promptly secure the official recognition of our independence” and that he promised him “a high post in the customs service.”20

It will be noted that several sentences and phrases in Blount’s statement are enclosed in quotation marks. From what were they quoted? The next paragraph in his book tells us:—

“Says the newspaper clipping which has preserved the Pratt oration: At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt’s speech, refreshments were served, and as the Filipinos, being Christians, drink alcohol, there was no difficulty in arranging as to refreshments.”21

The use of this clipping from the Singapore Free Press illustrates admirably Blount’s methods. The Free Press had at first displayed a marked coldness toward the insurgent cause, but its editor, Mr. St. Clair, was opportunely “seen” by Bray, who reported that as a result of his visit, both the editor and the paper would thereafter be friendly, and they were. In other words, the Free Press became the Singapore organ of the insurrection, and its editor, according to Bray, “a true and loyal friend” of Aguinaldo.

Typical Insurgent Trenches

The Insurgents built long lines of well-constructed trenches from which they could escape without exposing themselves to the fire of the American troops.

Blount claims to have made “an exhaustive examination of the records of that period.”22 Why then did he use as evidence a newspaper clipping from an Insurgent organ, instead of Santos’s letter?

Blount endeavours to make capital out of the fact that Pratt forwarded to the State Department a proclamation which he says was gotten up by the Insurgent leaders at Hongkong and sent to the Philippines in advance of Aguinaldo’s coming. He says that it was headed “America’s Allies” and quotes from it as follows:—

“Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach. … The Americans, not from mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations of so many persecuted people, have considered it opportune, etc. [Here follows a reference to Cuba.] At the present moment an American squadron is preparing to sail for the Philippines. … The Americans will attack by sea and prevent any reënforcements coming from Spain; … we insurgents must attack by land. Probably you will have more than sufficient arms, because the Americans have arms and will find means to assist us. There where you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers!”23

The translation that he used is that given in Senate Document No. 62, L. 60, and is none too accurate. He allows it to be inferred that this proclamation was actually issued. It was not. Its history is as follows:—

On May 16, 1898, J. M. Basa, a Filipino, who had lived in Hongkong since 1872, on account of his connection with the troubles of that year, wrote letters24 to a number of friends recommending the widest possible circulation of a proclamation enclosed therewith, as an aid to the American policy in the Philippines “in the war against the tyrannical friars and the Spaniards.”

With these letters there were sent two different proclamations, each beginning with the words “Fellow Countrymen.” The first, which is the one referred to by Blount, continues:—