Читать книгу Congo Diary - Ernesto Che Guevara - Страница 20

A DEFEAT

Mitoudidi’s replacements embarked for Kigoma, and some, like Compañero Muteba, the bearer of my letter to Kabila, we never saw again for the duration of the war.

The base was again overcome by chaos with an almost conscious frenzy, as if to make up for time lost during Mitoudidi’s intervention. Orders and requests succeeded one another without the slightest trace of rationality. We Cubans were asked to staff machine guns spread along the lakeside, thereby condemning a number of compañeros to inactivity. Given the prevailing lack of discipline, it would have been impossible to use Congolese machine-gunners to defend the base from air attack as they didn’t know how to use those weapons and didn’t want to learn; with a few honorable exceptions, they never operated machine guns during our entire time in the Congo. They ran away from aircraft, instead of methodically doing something about them, even though machine guns played a role in driving away enemy aircraft. The crews were mainly mercenaries, and after one or two skirmishes, they lost interest in fighting against ground-based weapons and turned to the strafing and bombing of areas where there was no antiaircraft defense. Nevertheless, I think the fact that the men at the Lake [Base] were inactive was a pointless waste of our combat strength as the enemy was unable to mount an effective attack; four T-28s and two B-26s were the only force the enemy had.

We continued to face the same difficulties at the Upper Base, only with many compañeros suffering from Congo fever and with no trainees as those promised by Mitoudidi never arrived. We saw representatives of distant guerrilla units show up to take away arms and ammunition, which they would squander, waste or break for no purpose. Compañero Mundandi arrived around the middle of June, bringing some letters from Kabila. One, dated June 16, stated the following:

Comrade,

I have read and reread the report you sent with Brother Muteba for my attention. As I said before, comrade, I want to begin some ambushes; Comrade Mundandi will talk to you about this. Please allow a good 50 Cubans with the rank of combatant to take part in the attack of June 25 under the leadership of Mundandi.

You are a revolutionary and I ask you to put up with all the difficulties you find there as I will arrive very soon. You can also send a good dozen men to Kabimba.

Intimate greetings,

Kabila

P.S. I appreciated your plan concerning Bendera that Nando showed me. It is almost identical to what we had been thinking. Courage and patience. I know that you are suffering because of the poor organization, but we are doing everything to improve it. It’s the fault of our lack of leaders.

Hasta la vista,

Kabila

As Kabila said he agreed with the plan I had sent, we began discussing an attack with Mundandi, not on Bendera, but on Katenga a few kilometers away. Mundandi proved hard to pin down; he had no definite plan himself, just an order to attack on June 25. I asked him why on that date and again he had no answer. We discussed our plan for attacking, not Bendera directly, but the village of Katenga, in order to draw reinforcements that we could destroy on the road, but he would not respond yes or no. He seemed to be a simple soul, entrusted with a task beyond his capabilities; but there was also a large dose of dissembling.

Evidently, Mundandi and Kabila had decided between themselves to attack Front de Force, perhaps trusting that a surprise attack might lead to a large-scale victory over the enemy army. I feared for the safety of the Cubans and Rwandan compañeros, who were supposed to take part in the action, if they staged a direct attack on unknown positions in which there were trenches, natural defenses and heavy weapons. My first reaction was to participate personally in the operation. Kabila had specified that the men should put themselves under Mundandi’s orders, thus subtly rejecting my proposal that Cubans should lead the tactical actions involving mixed troops. I decided that this was not the most important aspect, thinking that with my authority I would be able to push through correct solutions in the course of discussions. Mundandi knew who I was and seemed to respect me. I therefore wrote Kabila a short note as follows:

Dear comrade,

Thank you for your letter. You can rest assured that my impatience is that of a man of action; it implies no criticism. I am able to understand things because I myself have lived through similar conditions.

I also eagerly await your arrival because I consider you an old friend and I owe you an explanation. At the same time, it is my duty to place myself unconditionally under your orders.

As you instructed, the Cubans will leave tomorrow for Front de Force. Unfortunately, many are sick and the total number will be a little lower (40). There are four comrades in Kabimba. We will send the others as they arrive.

I would ask you one favor: Give me permission to go to Front de Force, with no other title than that of my compañeros’ “political commissar,” fully under the orders of Comrade Mundandi. I have just talked to him and he is in agreement. I think this might prove useful. I would report back within three or four days of receiving your call.

Greetings,

Tatu

I had actually discussed with Mundandi the possibility of my going along, and—on the face of it, at least—he had been in agreement. But he stressed that he would have to send the men without waiting for Kabila’s reply, and this made me suspect that it would be negative.

The reply arrived a few days later and was not negative but evasive as usual. Still I had time to write a second letter, urging him to give me a frank “yes” or “no.” This allowed for no beating around the bush, and he simply did not answer it. So I didn’t go to Front de Force.

The men left on the appointed day, numbering 36 rather than the 40 I had mentioned. But shortly afterwards we sent another seven, making a total of 43. We received reports that all were well, but that the attack had been delayed. Mundandi had not yet showed up. The men sent a request to have a doctor on hand, and we were able to grant this because just then a group of 39 more compañeros had arrived, including three doctors (a surgeon, an orthopedist and a general practitioner).

The first battle report stated:

Tatu or Kumi, the attack began at 5:00 a.m. today, June 29, 1965. We are doing well. Apparently Katenga is under attack. Five of our compañeros, Nane as group leader and two Rwandan compañeros are there.

Patria o Muerte! [Homeland or death!]

Moja

And later:

It’s 7:30 [a.m.]. Things are going well. The men are very content and conducting themselves well. Everything started at the appointed time. We opened fire with a cannon shell and a mortar round. I’ll send more information later.

At the same time as this note, however, there was alarming news of scores of dead, Cubans killed, men wounded, which made me think that all was not well. Shortly before they set out, I had received a note:

On the 29th we will do it at Front de Force. It was not possible to convince the man. We’ll report after the event.

Compañeros Mbili and Moja had long discussions trying to persuade Commander Mundandi not to attack in the way he had planned, but he did not shift his position, claiming to have orders from Kabila. Later, Kabila would say he had given no such orders.

At Front de Force or Front Bendera, there is a hydroelectric power station on the banks of the Kimbi River; its water source is almost in the mountains controlled by the Rwandans, while the electricity lines pass across level ground (as the mountains fall sharply down to the high plain of the Congo Basin). The village is divided in two: an old part, before one reaches the power station, and a newer part close to the turbines, where there is a military quarter with more than 80 houses. The Kimbi River, one of its natural defenses, was suitably reinforced with trenches that had been very superficially reconnoitered before the attack. There was also a landing field for light aircraft. It was thought that an enemy battalion of 500 to 700 men might be there, plus a concentration of special troops four kilometers away, at the junction with the Albertville road where there was said to be a cadet school or a military training college.

All we were able to achieve with Mundandi was that Cubans were put as commanders in charge of the main combat zones. The attached diagram¹ gives a rough idea of the disposition of forces only on the northern side, with ambushes on both sides of the Lulimba to Albertville road. The plan was as follows:

A small group led by Ishirini would attack the so-called chariot, the source supplying water to the hydro-electric turbine; below, across the Kimbi River, a group of men under Lieutenant Azi would attack the fortified positions closest to the mountain; and in the center, Lieutenant Azima and a group of Rwandans would capture the airfield and advance to link up with Azi; meanwhile Lieutenant Maffu would have another group preventing movement from Lulimba and Lieutenant Nne, who was in the strongest position with a 75 mm. cannon and other heavy weapons, would lay ambushes on the road from Albertville. The command post, where Moja and Mundandi would remain, would be on the other side of the Kimbi River at the base of the mountain foothills. Mundandi originally proposed having two command posts, but he was persuaded that it would be best for them to be united.

This plan had some serious drawbacks. Nne had to march to an unfamiliar area that had not been reconnoitered. Maffu knew something about the area, as did Azi, and Azima had made a superficial examination with binoculars from the mountains. But as we were expecting reinforcements to be sent from Albertville, we should have had a very well-laid ambush; instead we were setting one up blindly. There was a lot of discussion with Mundandi for the main effort to be directed at Katenga, and in the end he agreed to send an order to Captain Salumu to attack there. But, as became clear later, the order was given for the 30th, whereas Mundandi went ahead on the 29th.

At Front de Force, things did not go remotely as well as the first indications had led us to expect.

Ishirini, along with two other Cubans and seven Rwandans armed with rocket launchers and rifles, had the task of attacking the chariot to silence a machine-gun nest and to cause some damage to the plant; but all that happened was that the lights went out for a few minutes. The Rwandan combatants remained a couple of kilometers away from the scene of the action, which was carried out by the Cubans alone. To give some idea of the confusion, I will transcribe in full the report by Lieutenant Azi, whose mission was to attack across the Kimbi River:

When I set off on the mission, I positioned the mortar, the cannon, the antiaircraft and terrestrial machine guns so they had a direct line of fire at the enemy from a distance of 300 meters, except for the mortar that was at 500 meters, and followed up with 49 Rwandans and five Cubans. We crossed the river that was 150 to 200 meters from the enemy mortars. Then, at 100 meters from the enemy position, one of the Rwandans accidentally fired a shot; the troop became disorganized and we lost five, leaving 44. I organized the men into three groups, with two Cubans in mine and one in each of the others. By 3:00 a.m. on the 29th we had occupied the positions, some at 25 meters from the enemy, others further away. We could hear several bursts of enemy machine-gun fire. At 5:00 a.m. as planned, the cannon, the mortars, the antiaircraft and other machine guns opened fire and we continued shooting at the infantry. All the weapons hit the mark; firing went on uninterrupted until 6:00, by which time I had three wounded men on my front. At 7:00, I couldn’t hear firing to my left from our troops. I moved around a little and saw that many Rwandans were missing. Then I armed three Cubans with machine guns instead of FALs: these were Achali, Angalia and myself, plus a Rwandan captain. At 8:45 two Rwandans were killed; I went off to the left to look for Tano to send a message to Moja; the men in the center and the group on the left, including the Rwandan officers, had withdrawn on their own initiative. I was left with 14 Rwandans, and I had one Cuban missing (Tano, in the center group). I sent Angalia with the first message to Moja. By 10:00 I had four Rwandans left, including one officer. I held out until 12:00 and then withdrew 25 meters with two dead and three wounded. I sent another message to Moja, held on there until 12:30, and then withdrew to the mortar and cannon position, passing the river. Before withdrawing, I looked for the position where Tano and Sita were, but I could see neither. Sita turned up later. At the mortar position, I received orders from Moja to withdraw the mortar, the machine guns and the cannon and to leave an ambush in case the enemy guardsmen crossed the river. I maintained this position until 6:00 a.m. on June 30, when I received an order to withdraw from that place completely. Only Cubans were left at the ambush: Anzali, Achali, Ahiri, Abdallah, Almari and Azi; there was not one Rwandan. The Rwandans were ordered by the command post to occupy the positions, and they went over the mountain to the camp. The Rwandans abandoned their weapons and ammunition, and did not collect their dead. Compañero Azima was under my orders, carrying out the mission of occupying the other side (right bank of the river, some 500 meters from our positions) along with Alakre, Arobo and 40 Rwandans. On the night when they moved to occupy the positions, the Rwandans heard a noise and said it was a tembo (elephant), and then left the two Cubans alone on the mountain; thus the Cubans had to return to the command post at 7:00 on the 29th.

This was more or less the theme of the whole operation. It began with a lot of bravado—even though men were missing at many of the positions even before the fighting started—and then turned into a complete rout.

Compañero Tano appeared seven days later. He had been wounded and abandoned by his compañeros. He then dragged himself toward the mountain, where he was found by Rwandan soldiers on patrol. His wound healed and he was able to rejoin the struggle.

To complete the picture, here is another report [from Moja] from the same day:

We can report that the Rwandan compañeros retreated in disorder from the front, leaving behind weapons, ammunition, dead and wounded. These were collected by our compañeros, as the compañero Commander Mundandi witnessed.

Compañero Nne’s mission, which was the principal one, was to occupy the Albertville to [Front de] Force road to prevent the passage of enemy reinforcements, but according to the information we have at present, he didn’t reach the agreed place because the guide said he was lost. Compañero Nne then made a wrong decision to attack the military academy, where, according to the reports from our Rwandan compañeros who took part in the action, the only men still there when it began were our own compañeros and some Rwandan compañeros who died or, in two cases, were wounded. Right at the start of the action, Compañero Nne asked them to deploy the cannon, but the Rwandan compañeros who had been carrying it took off in the direction of the camp and left the shells and other pieces which were collected by some of our own compañeros.

When we learned of Compañero Nne’s death, we sent Compañero Mbili with 20 reinforcements to see how things really stood there, and they discovered that Compañero Maffu’s ambush included Compañeros Kasambala, Sultán, Ajili and others belonging to Nne’s group. When Compañero Mbili saw the situation, he informed me of it and asked for some more men so that, if I thought it appropriate, he could head off with them to the road. By this time it was 18:00 on the 29th.

When I discussed the problem with Commander Mundandi, he told me that the Rwandan compañeros were refusing to fight. We therefore had no more men to send for the ambush because the surviving Rwandan compañeros from Nne’s group had set out for the base, while the 20 Rwandans with Compañero Mbili also refused to fight, and the men under Maffu’s command were in the same situation. We therefore thought of sending word to Mbili that he should leave four or five of our compañeros to look for dead bodies, while the others should return on the night of 6/30/65. But at 04:00 on the 30th, only he and the other Cuban compañeros were left at Compañero Azi’s position, and their situation was raised with the compañero Commander Mundandi. The decision was then taken that they should withdraw to a nearby hill.

The other problems that Compañero Mbili encountered during this operation he will explain to you in detail.

The command post, where Commander Mundandi was also located, was some 800 meters from the front (beside the river). We had there: Moja, Mbili, Paulu, Saba and Anga.

We did not leave more at the command post as we thought that the ambushes should be strengthened because of the distances involved.

Bahasa and Ananane were too ill for combat and remained at the base camp.

Moja

Everything was against Compañero Nne. He had discussed his plan beforehand with Maffu, thinking that he would carry out the ambush and then turn to attack the enemy’s position; he had proposed this idea to the command but did not get approval; nevertheless, he went ahead with the idea. Once the battle was underway elsewhere, there was little possibility of reaching the designated place because the guide was so terrified that he would not take another step, and no one else knew the way. Nne decided to attack the position he had in front of him at the start of the fighting—that is, the military academy—but he was met with intense, well-coordinated fire from heavy weapons. According to eyewitnesses, Nne himself was soon wounded and handed over his machine gun position to Kawawa, but then Kawawa was killed by a mortar, and another two compañeros were slightly wounded and withdrew. A scout sent out shortly afterwards found Thelathini’s body; Ansurune was missing and presumed dead. They had started the engagement at a point within the enemy’s sights, at a distance of some 200 meters. In addition to the four Cuban compañeros, at least 14 Rwandans were killed—including the brother of Commander Mundandi. The exact number cannot be established as the Rwandan accounting was very poor.

In this ill-fated action, I assign much of the blame to the Cuban command. Compañero Nne, underestimating the enemy, launched an undeniably daring operation to carry out what he considered his moral duty, although not his specific task; he launched a frontal attack and perished along with other compañeros, leaving open the way from Albertville along which enemy reinforcements were expected to come.

As part of the contingency planning before the engagement, all the compañeros had been instructed to leave behind any documents or papers that might allow them to be identified. They did do this, although Nne’s group kept some documents in their packs and were meant to leave their belongings at a certain distance before joining the ambush. When the fighting started, however, they still had their packs with them, and the enemy found a diary which suggested that Cubans had participated in the attack. What they did not know was that four had been killed at that place,² as the newspapers always spoke only of two.

A very large quantity of weapons and ammunition was hastily abandoned, but we could not know exactly how much because there had been no previous records. The wounded were left to their fate, as were the dead, of course.

Meanwhile, what was happening in Katenga?

One hundred and sixty men took part in the attack, with weapons greatly inferior to those of the Rwandans. The best they had were automatic rifles and short-range rocket launchers. The surprise factor was lost because, for reasons that Mundandi never explained, the attack had been ordered for a day later (the 30th), when enemy aircraft were flying over the whole region and those in defensive positions were naturally on the alert.

Of the 160 men, 60 had deserted by the time of the engagement and many others never managed to fire a shot. At the agreed hour, the Congolese opened fire on the barracks, generally shooting in the air because most of them kept their eyes shut while pressing the triggers of their automatic weapons until the ammunition ran out. The enemy answered with accurate 60 mm. mortar fire that inflicted a number of casualties and provoked an immediate rout.

The losses were four dead and 14 wounded, the latter during the disorderly retreat, in which men ran away in terror. At first they explained the defeat by saying that the medicine man was no good and had given them bad dawa. He tried to defend himself by blaming women and fear, but there were no women around and not a single man was honest enough to admit his weaknesses. The medicine man was in a tight spot and was replaced. It became the main task for Calixte, the group’s commander, to search the entire zone for a new muganga with the right qualities.

The result of this dual attack was great demoralization among the Congolese and Rwandans, but also a loss of heart among the Cubans; our combatants had morosely witnessed assault troops melt away at the moment of combat and abandon precious weapons in order to flee more quickly; each had also observed the lack of comradeship as they left their wounded to fend for themselves, the terror that gripped the soldiers and the ease with which they dispersed without following orders of any kind. Often it was the officers—including the political commissars (a blot on the Liberation Army that I will discuss later), who were often the first to run away. The heavy weapons, which had mostly been handled by Cubans, were nearly all saved; the FM and DP machine guns, handled by Rwandans, were lost in significant numbers, as were rifles and all kinds of ammunition.

In the days after the attack, a large number of soldiers either deserted or requested a discharge. Mundandi wrote me a long letter, as always full of tales of heroism. He lamented the loss of his brother, but stated that he had died after wiping out a truck full of soldiers (a complete fabrication because there were no trucks there). He regretted the loss of several of the more resolute cadres in his group, and protested at the fact that the General Staff was in Kigoma while the men were fighting and laying down their lives in the Congo. He mentioned in passing that two-thirds of the enemy troops had been killed, but he could not have had any reliable source for this and it was, of course, false. True to his inclination to fantasy, he could not refrain from making such assertions, while at the same time apologizing for his own weaknesses.

To sum up, Mundandi made a complete confession of his discouragement. I had to send him a reply replete with advice and an analysis of the situation in an attempt to lift his spirits. But his letters suggested the disintegration that would later overcome the Liberation Army and catch the Cuban troops in its mesh.

On June 30, when the engagement at Front de Force was already underway but no news of it had yet reached us, I wrote a monthly review in my diary:

This is the most pathetic review so far. When everything seemed to suggest that a new period was opening for us, Mitoudidi died and the fog became denser. The exodus to Kigoma continues. Kabila has repeatedly announced his return but never carried it out; there is total disorganization.

On the positive side is the idea of men going to the front; but on the negative side, there is the announcement of an attack that may be crazy or totally ineffective, and would alert Tshombe’s forces.

A number of questions remain to be clarified. What will be Kabila’s attitude toward us, and especially toward me? In a word, is he the right man for this situation? Will he be able to size it up and see that everything here is chaotic? It’s impossible to tell until we meet in the field, but on the first question at least, there are serious signs that he is not at all happy with my presence. It remains to be seen whether this is due to fear, envy or feelings hurt by the method.

During these days I wrote a letter to Pablo Rivalta, our ambassador to Tanzania, and among other things instructed him to inform the government of my presence here, to apologize for the way in which I had arrived, to explain the problems resulting from the fact that Kabila had not then been in the country, and to emphasize that the decision had been mine, not the Cuban government’s. The bearer of the letter was first to meet Kabila in Kigoma and to discuss his views. But when he learned of my intentions, Kabila categorically forbade anything to be said, saying he would talk to me about it when he returned to the Congo.

1. The diagram Che mentions was not in his original manuscript.

2. Those who died in this action were: Wagner Moro Pérez (Kawawa), Norberto Pío Pichardo (Nne), Víctor M. Valle Ballester (Thelathini) and Crisógenes Vinajera Hernández (Ansurune).