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Recent research in biology and ethology shows that many non-human animal species have their own complex and nuanced ways of communicating with members of their own and other species, including humans (chapter 2). Dolphins (King and Janik 2013) and parrots (Berg et al. 2011), for example, call each other by their names. African elephants use different alarm calls to distinguish between threats from bees and humans, as well as between different groups of humans (Soltis et al. 2014). Ravens use referential gestures (Pika and Bugnyar 2011). Fork-tailed drongos mimic the alarm calls of other species to scare them away so they can steal their dinner (Flower et al. 2014). We find grammatical structures, including recursion, in the songs of many species of bird (Gentner et al. 2006). The skin patterns of squid can be seen as a language built up of sentences that have a grammar (Moynihan 1991). Prairie dogs, a species of ground squirrel, describe humans in detail, including the color of their T-shirts and hair, the speed at which they are approaching, and objects they might be carrying (Slobodchikoff et al. 2009).

Humans have a long-shared history with many non-human animal species, which has influenced their capacities for understanding one another (chapter 3). Dogs and humans have, for example, co-evolved, and both species have influenced the characteristics of the other—some biologists even think that humans may have started to use language in relation to dogs (Haraway 2003). Research shows that humans can correctly interpret dog moods when they hear them bark or growl on tape or see their facial expressions; dogs can also read human sounds and faces (Hare and Woods 2013). When dogs and humans who are friends gaze into each other’s eyes they create oxytocin, the “cuddle hormone,” something that also happens between lovers, and parents and babies (ibid.).

In philosophy and biology, language has long been equated with human language. As I will discuss in more detail in chapter 1, many philosophers in the Western tradition have even seen language as a defining characteristic for humans. These empirical studies, along with the aforementioned developments in political philosophy and other fields of study that argue for the recognition of non-human animal subjectivity, challenge this view. They call for us to reconsider the cognitive, social, and linguistic capacities of other animals, and they also ask us to reconsider what language is. Humans do not know currently whether there are any non-human animal languages as complex as human language, neither do they currently understand the full meaning of many non-human animals’ expressions or the depth of form of interspecies communication. However, it is clear that the idea that only humans have language as informed by logos and that other animals do not is untenable. The insights obtained from recent studies compel us to think differently about non-human animal language, culture, and subjectivity, and perhaps more importantly, about how humans can interact with other animals to discover their attitudes to the questions that concern their lives.8

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, and in particular his concept “language games,” offers a good starting point for thinking about and studying non-human animal and interspecies languages. Wittgenstein argues that the way in which language works and its interconnection to social practices means we can never give a universal definition of language as a whole, or fixed definitions of separate concepts. If we want to study language, we should instead investigate the meaning of different language games (chapter 2) by examining how and where they are used. This method of studying language is well suited to the study of non-human animal and interspecies language games for various reasons. A focus on existing practices and the social context in which language games gain meaning allows us to acknowledge and better understand non-human animal agency in language. Language games also consist of more than words: Wittgenstein emphasizes the importance of gestures and other non-linguistic expressions in creating meaning (PI§7). Gestures, movements, and other non-verbal expressions play an important role in the languages of other animals. Existing human concepts can offer guidelines for understanding the meaning of certain practices, and Wittgenstein’s ideas about how language games are related—by means of a family resemblance—can shed light on similarities and relations in human, non-human, and interspecies language games. Finally, Wittgenstein views language as essentially a public practice, arguing that meaning originates from the relation between language and world, which helps us to see why skepticism about the minds of other animals—human and non-human—is misguided (chapters 2 & 3).

My aim in this book is not, however, to present a full theory of non-human animal languages. Humans are only just beginning to learn about many non-human animal languages, and it would be empirically impossible to develop a final theory of animal language. Furthermore, rethinking what language is should not be a solely human endeavor, and it is not up to humans to define what constitutes meaningful communication for others. In order not to repeat anthropocentrism, we need to learn about language in interaction with other animals.

In further developing ideas about language and politics in an interspecies context, it is important to keep in mind that there is, of course, no such thing as the political animal voice or “the animal” (Derrida 2008). There are many different species, communities, and groups of non-human and human animals, and they all have their own languages and cultures. There are also many different relations and encounters between different groups of animals, including those of the human variety. In order to rethink language and politics with other animals, we need to take these differences into account. We also need to be careful not to use the human as a standard for measuring other animals, because this pre-excludes many of them, and makes it difficult to see them in their own right. This means we need to challenge human exceptionalism together with the view that there is a binary opposition between “the human” and “the animal.” We should pay attention to the variety of ways in which other animals speak and act politically, and search for ways to form new, better relations with them. This should not just be a human project, because other animals have their unique perspectives on their own lives and on their relations with humans, and their own ways of formulating these. Humans and other animals can, and already do, have relations in which species is not the determining factor in achieving understanding or intimacy, and in which humans aim not to oppress the other animals with whom they share households or land. These relations can offer us insights into how change is possible, and can function as starting points for thinking about new forms of coexistence.