Читать книгу When Animals Speak - Eva Meijer - Страница 19

Rethinking language with other animals starts from two directions. First, it is important to recognize that humans and other animals share languages, or language games, in which non-human animals exercise agency. I will discuss this in more detail in the next chapter. Second, existing human concepts are already influenced by animals of different species, because humans and other animals coexist and coevolve. Raimond Gaita (2002) argues for taking the public character of language into account in interspecies communities. He gives the example of intentions (2002, 60) and states that it is wrong to think that this is a human concept that we do, or do not, apply to other animals. Rather, the meaning of “intention” is formed by interaction with, and influenced by, the behavior of different kinds of animals; humans learn what it means by watching the intentions of other animals and humans, by reading about the intentions of others in books, and by understanding their own intentions as intentions. In this view, stating that other animals have intentions is not anthropomorphic, not because of its truth value as a judgment of the mental states of other animals, but because animal intentions are part of what gives the concept “intention” its meaning. Because the meaning of concepts comes into being and can be subject to change in interactions with other animals, communicating with them in new ways can change this meaning. Humans can experience this at an individual level; if one grows up only with humans, a concept such as love might be mostly understood as love in relation to humans, something that a close relationship with an individual of another species in later life can change. But it can also take place at a social and political level; the concept of “rights” changes meaning—the way that it does with women’s rights—when animal rights are discussed, and would change meaning again if they were to be implemented in society and were further developed in interaction with other animals (chapter 8).

Rethinking language involves more than rethinking human concepts. Other animals have their own species-specific languages, something that will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Using the word “language” to describe communication with and between non-human animals is, however, contentious. It is seen as problematic in animal philosophy because of the anthropocentric history of the concept of “language” (see, for example, Calarco 2008; Derrida 2008) and in other fields of study it is often seen as anthropomorphic. Humans who argue for taking other animals into account in moral and political decisions are often accused of anthropomorphism, of attributing human characteristics to non-human animals (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013a). This usually refers back to skepticism about other animals’ minds, which is often connected to the fact that most of them do not speak in human language (chapter 3). It is argued that humans can never gain insight into the emotions and language of members of other species precisely because they belong to different species and their perception of the world is radically different. A primary problem with this view is that it is unclear why species membership is a relevant characteristic in understanding someone else; there are many differences between individuals from different groups, and while these differences may influence possibilities for understanding, meaning is always generated between different perspectives and comes into being through interaction, not by referring to a pre-given truth. Species membership matters, but so do other characteristics. Second, sharing a language is no guarantee of understanding someone; human language can, for example, also deceive, and the risk of misunderstanding is always inherent in communicating with others. A third objection is that it does not take the public character of language into account (see chapters 2 & 3). Finally, the seemingly neutral stance of denying other animals certain emotions and mental states is also value-laden, and, more specifically, a Western cultural construction (Aaltola 2013; Brooks Pribac 2013; see also chapter 3). “Anthropodenial” (De Waal 2016) is not a neutral stance, and has long colored judgments about other animals (see chapter 2 for its influence on language research).

Seeing non-human animal languages as languages and exploring what language means in the case of non-human animals and in interspecies interactions can help us to see them in a new way and better understand aspects of their behavior; it can also help us get a better grasp of what “language” can mean. Investigating how language and concepts tied to human language use such as grammar, which are thought to be solely human, can also apply to the interactions and expressions of other animals, and can, in a similar way, bring to light elements in species-specific as well as interspecies interactions that have been obscured by denying language to other animals. It offers us a new framework for thinking about them, and presents us with new tools for thinking about and building relationships, which can enable us to gain a richer understanding of the concept used. In the next chapter, I focus on non-human animal languages in order to further develop a non-anthropocentric view of language. In chapter 3, I shift the focus to the relation between language and world, and the role of language in creating common worlds with other animals.