Читать книгу The Philosophy of Fine Art - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel - Страница 15

There is in Nature an external reality which is, of course, visible and definitely objective, but the inward unity of which, instead of presenting itself in the concrete inwardness referable to the unity of soul-life, only goes to the point of indeterminacy and abstraction. In other words, it stops short of the inwardness self-actualized in an ideal form and as the particular existence conformable to its ideal content. Its appearance is that of the defining principle on the face of external reality. Now the specific characteristics of inwardness in all its concreteness should be these. First, the principle of soul-life is asserted for itself no less than is potentially replete with content. Secondly, external reality interpenetrates this ideal arcanum, and by so doing fully reveals its true form as such external reality. A concrete unity of this nature is not reached by mere natural beauty: it lies beyond as the Ideal. On this plane of existence we cannot say that such a concrete unity enters into the manifestation of form. We have to deduce it through analysis, examining in their separation and singularity the distinguishing features which the unity supports. The form that informs here and the sensuous external reality fall apart from one another; or rather we have two distinct aspects which we are compelled to consider separately. By virtue of this fact, which we may either regard as a division of the material of sense or as a review of certain facts taken in abstraction, the inward unity, which is one aspect of the external reality, itself falls outside it; that is to say, it is not itself asserted in that rational reality as the wholly immanent form of the entire notion which constitutes it, but rather as an Ideality and determinacy imposed externally.

Such are the points of view thus presented us which we will now consider more closely.

First, then, we have to discuss

1. THE BEAUTY OF ABSTRACT FORM

The form of natural beauty in its abstraction is a form which is determinate and thus of limited range; in a further aspect of it it is focussed in a unity of abstract relation to itself241. On closer inspection we shall, however, find that the external manifold controls this form of abstract beauty by reason of its own determinacy and unity. We must not, however, imply in these latter any immanent inwardness or form of vital ideality, but regard them as purely material definitions and unity of the external medium. Forms of such a character are uniformity, symmetry, or conformity to rule, and finally harmony.

(a) Uniformity

Uniformity is, speaking generally, equality in external presentment, or, more specifically, the unbroken repetition of one and the same definite form, supplied by the determining unity to the form of objects. Such a unity, in virtue of its initial abstraction, is at the furthest extreme removed from the rational totality of the concrete notion. Its beauty is therefore a beauty which is referable to the faculty of the analytical understanding. The fundamental process of that faculty is to perceive objects in their abstraction, not in their self-determined completeness and identity. For example, among all lines the straight line is that which is most uniform, because it alone manifests one abstract and undeviating direction. For the same reason the cube is a figure dominated by regularity of content. All its sides are of the same size, the same length of line and the same angles, which, on account of their being rectangular, however much their size is changed, manifest no change in the form of their angles as is the case with angles which are obtuse or acute.

With this characteristic of uniformity we must closely connect that of symmetry. Form is unable long to rest in that barest abstraction of its determination, namely, undifferentiated equality. A diverse relation is sure to assert itself, breaking into the empty form of identity. In this way we obtain symmetry, which consists in no mere identical repetition of one form, but in a combination with some such form analogous to it, identical, that is to say, in its self-determination, and yet manifesting a distinct contrast with it. Through such a combination we obtain another kind of equality and unity, whose determination is more extensive and more varied. If, for example, on one side of a house we meet with three windows of the same size separated at equal intervals of distance, then three or four more of loftier size than the first-mentioned standing at more extended or closer intervals in relation to them, and again three more precisely similar in size and distance to our original ones, we have then before us a symmetrical arrangement. Mere uniformity and repetition of the same distinctions will never produce this result. We may find such distinguishing features in size, position, form, colour, tones, and many others like them, which, however, to produce symmetry must be harmoniously related to similar forms of construction. When we find a combination which presents to us an arrangement of such distinguishing characteristics according to some clearly uniform principle that then is symmetry.

Both these attributes, uniformity and symmetry, being the determinations of the form and unity of external appearance, are mainly applicable to distinctions in size. For it stands to reason that what is expressly posited as external rather than truly immanent determination is generally a quantitative242 determination, whereas the qualitative fixes the inherent character of anything. Consequently that which is assumed only to affect the external appearance cannot be concerned with the changes which are found in the qualitative aspect. Size, on the other hand, and its alteration regarded merely as size, is for the qualitative determination, when it is unable to assert itself in terms of measure, an indifferent determination. That is to say, measure is quantity, precisely in so far as it can give to itself an aspect which qualifies it, and thereby a qualitative determination is united to the purely quantitative one. As thus explained243 uniformity and symmetry are merely restricted to the determinations of size and their uniform appearance or arrangement of differences in symmetrical order. Further inquiry will show us that this due co-ordination of size is as applicable to the forms of organic life as it is to those of inorganic Nature. The human organism is, for example, at least in a certain degree both uniform and symmetrical. We have two eyes, two arms, two legs, similar hip-joints, shoulder-blades, and so on. Of other portions of the body the reverse is the case. We find no conspicuous uniformity in the heart, lungs, bowels, or liver. The question arises what precisely constitutes the difference here. The side on which uniformity, whether of size, form, or position mainly asserts itself, is obviously the aspect of the organism viewed from the outside. The uniform and symmetrical determination, in complete conformity with what we should expect, is most apparent where the fact as objectively determined is itself the external envisagement itself, and carries with it the least impression of inherent life. The reality, which is most constant to this pure externality, rests satisfied with the abstract unity congenial to it. Within the organism, on the contrary, where we find the heart of the life-process, and still more openly in the medium of untrammelled reason uniformity gives way before the subjective unity of life. Nature is, no doubt, in its opposition to mind, a determinate existence external and independent; but even in her we find that uniformity only pre-eminently asserts itself where externality is the predominant principle.

(α) Reviewing, then, shortly the prominent classifications of natural objects, we observe, in the first place, that minerals, taking the crystal for an example, as structures destitute of the principle of life, are characterized in their fundamental form by uniformity and symmetry. As already remarked, their form, it is true, is one appropriate to themselves, is not merely the determination of external forces. Through an unseen energy the form that makes them what they are as products of Nature creates their configuration both within and without. This activity, however, is not yet the completed energy of the concrete notion as an ideal principle, which directs the independent consistency of the positive reality, subsuming them under an ideal totality such as is present in animal life. The unity and definition of their form persists in purely abstract one-sidedness, and we have as the characteristics of a unity which is wholly on the outside the bare forms of uniformity and symmetry, the determinating factor in each case being an abstraction.

(β) Plant life is, of course, many degrees above the order of crystals. From the very commencement its evolution is marked by a harmonious articulation, and consumes material in a constantly active process of self-nourishment. But plant-life also is not yet really the living whole244. Although organically divided into parts, its activity is still one that consists wholly in assimilation245. It is rooted in the earth with no independent power of motion from place to place; its growth is continuous, and such energy of assimilation and self-nourishment as it possesses is not the tranquil self-subsistence of a completely individualized organic existence, but rather a continuous extension of its growth as an external object. An animal grows just as a plant grows, but at a determinate point that growth in its external size ceases, and that which reproduces itself in self-subsistence is one and the same individual. Plant-life, however, enlarges without intermission, and only its decease renders the further increase of its boughs and leaves impossible. And, moreover, all that it separately produces in this process is for ever the repeated pattern of the same organism in its entirety. For every bough is a new plant, and not, as in the case with the animal organism, only an isolated member. On account of this persistent enlargement of itself through all the separate plant formations whereof it consists plant-life is without the subjective animation peculiar to sensation and the ideal unity which belongs to it. And, generally speaking, we may say that plant-life, however much the digestive process is an inward one, in which we find nourishment is assimilated and the organism determines the form which is impressed on its substance out of itself by virtue of the increasing freedom of the notional type working through that substance, nevertheless substantially, through the entire process of its life, it remains rooted to externality without either a true independence or unity, and such self-subsistence as it possesses is continuous without a break. And it is on account of this characteristic of plant-growth, namely, that it is for ever asserted on the side of externality, that we find uniformity and symmetry to be the fundamental unity of its self-expression as it is a predominant principle of its structure. No doubt uniformity is not so regnant here as we observed it to be in the formation of minerals, and it is not expressed in the same extreme degree through the abstract straight line and right angle: but it prevails here notwithstanding. The stem for the most part runs on a straight line; the rings of plants of higher type form themselves in circles; leaves closely approach the configuration of crystals; and, at least as the basis of their type, we find that the blossoms themselves in the number of their leaves, their position and form are determined with uniformity and symmetry.

(γ) Finally, in the living organism of animals a difference is asserted in the reduplicated structure of the members. In the bodies of animals, more particularly if we examine the higher species, the organism is a more inward, self-contained and self-determined totality; like a sphere, it returns, so to speak, on itself, while still remaining an external organism. It is an external process, and yet, as a process, asserted against externality. The more important organs are those within, such as heart, lungs, and liver, and in these the life is bound up. Such are not determined under the simple characteristics of uniformity. In those members, however, even of the animal organism, which are fixed in direct relation to the outside world, symmetrical arrangement prevails. Among such must be reckoned the members and organs which assert the subjective principle externally no less than those which are the instruments of the active life. The sense-organs, such as sight and hearing, belong to the former; all that we see and hear is left as we found it. The organs of smell and taste already mark the point of union with an activity exercised externally. We only smell that which is already assimilated246 by the organ of sense, and we only exercise our taste through an act of destruction. We have, it is true, but one nose, but it is subdivided into two sections, each of which is uniform in structure. The same description is applicable to the lips and teeth and other organs like them. Further than this the eyes and ears, and the limbs employed in motion from place to place, or for direct control over external objects, in other words, legs and arms, are entirely uniform in position, form, and other qualities. We find, therefore, that in the organic world no less than in the inorganic uniformity asserts a very real predominance, qualified, however, by the fact that its presence is limited to those members which are the instruments of the organism in its direct relation to the external world. On those through which the life-process returns on itself by virtue of its own subjective principle there is no such impression of uniformity.

Such, then, are the leading characteristics of the forms of uniformity and symmetry, and the manner in which they are asserted in the configuration of natural phenomena.

(b) Conformity to Rule

We now propose to distinguish the more generic conception of conformity to law247, so far as it appears on a higher plane of organic evolution than that already adverted to, and marks the passage of the same to the freedom of natural no less than spiritual life, from the more abstract forms discussed above. Taken by itself, no doubt, conformity to rule is not alone sufficient to give us the subjective unity and freedom of totality; but we do find in the configuration to which it corresponds a totality of essentially distinguished characteristics, such as do not merely emerge in difference and opposition, but betray both unity and determinate connection in such totality. A unity thus controlled, albeit still only positively asserted in quantitative substance, is no longer referable to essentially exterior distinctions of mere size numerically ascertainable, but already introduces to our notice a qualitative relation of consistency between these contrasted determinations. In other words we have here neither the abstract repetition of one and the same determinant248, nor a uniform interchange of similarity and dissimilarity249, but the contemporaneous association of aspects essentially distinct from one another. We find, in fact, our sense of sight gratified by the association of these distinguishing features in their completeness. And it is the principle of reason which affords us such satisfaction, gratifying our sense only through the totality, or rather through the very totality of differences the nature of the fact requires. Such a connection, however, still remains an unexplained nexus, which sense-perception arrives at partly on account of its persistent repetition, and in part through an intuition of deeper source.

A few examples will make clear the process of definition from uniformity to conformity with law. Parallel lines of equal length are abstractly uniform. A further step is taken when we compare geometrical figures of the same form, triangles, for example, but assume their size to be unequal. Here the angles subtended by the corners of each and the relation of line to line is the same, but we find such similarity in different quanta. Take again the circle, it does not possess the uniformity of the straight line, but at the same time the determination of abstract equality strictly applies to it, for all its radii are of equal length. The circle is consequently still but a curved line that awakes no particular interest250.

On the other hand, there is still less uniformity in the ellipse and the parabola, and they are only understood through the law of their form. In other words the radii vectores of the ellipse are both unequal and in conformity with rule, and the same qualification applies to the greater and lesser axis of their lines of differentiation251; moreover, their foci are not central as is the case with the circle. We find in these examples, therefore, a qualitative relation of difference assert itself in the law applicable to such lines and constructive of their interconnection. If, however, we divide the ellipse by means of its greater and lesser axes we obtain four equal sections; regarded as a whole, therefore, we still find the principle of uniformity paramount in this figure. Of a higher degree of freedom in its conformity to law is the oval. We know there is such a law, though mathematicians have been unable to express its formula. This figure is not an ellipse, but the higher curve differs from that below it. Still we find that even in this example of freer eccentricity in Nature, if we divide it through its greater axis, we have still two equal halves. The final expression of mere uniformity in conformity to law is shown in lines, which, as in the example of the oval, when divided through the smaller252 axis, give us unequal sections, neither section being a mere repetition of the other. The so-called undulatory line is an example of this, in the sense Hogarth describes it as the line of beauty. Thus the inclination of the arms as they fall on either side of the human body is opposed. Here we have conformity to rule without uniformity pure and simple. Such a kind of conformity especially characterises with its variety the conformation of the nobler living organisms.

Conformity to law is, then, an attribute of substantiality, binding together both its differences and its unity; but it remains still abstract on the side of its controlling form, unable to supply individuality with the freedom of motion, or rather by virtue of that form is entirely without the higher freedom of subjectivity, and quite incapable of revealing the vitality and ideality proper to it.

(c) Harmony

On a higher plane in the sphere of abstract beauty must be placed harmony. In harmony we find qualitative distinctions are held together, and further held together in a totality of differentiation, such as is based on the essential nature of the fact itself. This consistency of support is derived from conformity to law, in so far as that form unfolds what is essentially uniformity, and thereby passes beyond the mere characteristics of equality and repetition. But in doing this the distinctions of quality assert themselves not only in their difference of opposition and contradiction, but in aspects of a unity that rivets them together, a unity in which all distinguishing features, it is true, are maintained in their proper place, but still only as belonging to one single whole. This unity of accordance is what constitutes harmony. We may either regard it as a totality of aspects essentially distinct, or as the resolution of the element of mere contradiction asserted by them, revealing their more vital interconnection and ideal solidarity. In this sense we refer to the harmony of form, or colour, or musical tone. As an example, we have blue, yellow, green, and red as the fundamentally necessary differentiation of colour253.

In these irresolvable data of the spectrum we have not merely the inequality we found in symmetry, but contradictory opposites, such as yellow and blue, their neutralization and withal concrete identity. The beauty of their harmony is revealed in the avoidance of their crude opposition, which is softened thereby in such a way as to put before us the concordance hidden beneath their difference. They do, in fact, emanate from one source, namely colour, which is not an abstract conception254, but an essential totality. So far, indeed, can the compulsive force of such totality carry us, that we can, as Goethe has pointed out, when we have but one colour presented to us, still subjectively recognize another at the same time. In the same way the tonic, mediant, and dominant are essential distinctions among musical tones, which the unity of harmony associates through their difference in one whole. We may submit the harmony of form, which is differentiated through the varied aspects of position, repose, and motion to a similar analysis. If we suffer any one of the subordinate distinctions to assume an exclusive predominance the unity which relates them will be destroyed.

Harmony, however, is not to be confused with free ideal subjectivity and soul-life. In the latter the unity manifested is not merely an interconnection and concordance, but a positive negation of difference, which, for the first time, reveals their concrete and ideal unity. A concrete unity such as this is not the result of harmony. Such concrete unity is, for example, that which we find in the actually melodious thing[255], which no doubt possesses harmony as its fundamental form, but at the same time possesses the higher characteristic of free subjectivity, and by means of song gives expression to that. Harmony alone has nothing to do with the appearance of subjective life, as such, nor of that of mind, although it is the highest manifestation of abstract form, and stands in close affinity to free subjectivity. Such, then, is our determination of abstract unity as we find it brought before us in the specific modes of abstract form.

2. BEAUTY AS ABSTRACT UNITY OF THE MATERIAL MEDIUM

The side of abstract unity which we have now to consider is not that directly related to form, but to the sensuous material simply in which it is asserted. The unity is manifested on this side as the entirely undifferentiated concordance of the particular sensuous material. It is the one form of unity, which the material of sense, in its purely objective aspect, is capable of receiving. On this plane and under the above noted relation256 the abstract purity of the materia in its form, colour, or tone constitutes what is most essential to it. Entirely straight drawn lines, which run without a shadow of difference in their straightness or strength, bare superficies and similar examples please us by virtue of their persistent regularity and their uniform homogeneousness. The purity of the heavens, the translucence of the atmosphere, a mirror-like lake the smoothness of the ocean's face, all give pleasure by virtue of this unity. We find the same truth brought home to us by purity of tone. The voice when purely produced, though taken quite by itself, possesses an attraction for us inexpressibly delightful; vocal notes which are not thus pure on the contrary, by permitting us to hear the organ of production along with them, disturb or weaken the pure resonance and definition of their music. In much the same way human speech possesses pure tones in its vowels, a, e, i, o, u, and its compound vowels, ae, ü, and ö. Popular dialects are particularly characterized by impurity of vocalization and mediate tones such as oa. Purity of tones consists further in this that the vowels are associated with consonants, whose sound does not tend to blurr the sonority of the vowel tones, as is too frequently the case with our northern languages, when contrasted with the way in which their purity is preserved by the Italian, a characteristic which makes that language so adaptable to singing. We experience an enjoyment of similar nature through the sight of colour in its simplest purity of tint, an absolutely pure red or blue for example, not by any means a common occurrence, such pristine colours being often weakened through the addition to them of yellow or tints of each other257. Violet can no doubt appear to us as a pure colour, but only in an external object, not, that is to say, as a compounded colour258, for it is not itself an elementary colour belonging to colour's essential differentiation. It is these elementary or cardinal colours, easily recognized by sense in their purity, which, on account of their crude opposition, are most difficult to unite together in harmony. Colours, on the contrary, which are blurred in their transparency by many other tints, although not so antagonistic to general harmony, fail to give us such direct enjoyment from the very fact that the energy of opposition in them is weakened. Green, for instance, is a compound of blue and yellow, but it is the neutralization of these cardinal colours, and for that reason less attractive to us in its own purity than blue and yellow in their secure259 opposition. Such are the points of most importance we have to remark upon in dealing with the abstract unity of form no less than the simplicity and purity of the sensuous material. In whichever aspect we regard our subject-matter we have to review that which is by virtue of its abstract character destitute of life, and a unity with no true actuality. Ideal subjectivity is inseparable from this, and such is entirely absent from the beauty of Nature even at the highest potency of its manifestation. This essential defect points us imperatively forward to the Ideal, which Nature is unable to reveal to us, and in contrast with which the beauty of Nature appears as a subordinate mode.