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Quite distinct from Christian positions, in particular the Roman Catholic position, is Judaism's perspective on genethics. Ronald M. Green, a philosophical bioethicist with a Jewish background, alludes to this in his chapter. Judaism is, in general quite liberal with regard to a number of topics, e.g. abortion, in vitro fertilization, prenatal diagnostics, and research involving human stem cells. Not surprisingly, then, Israel has more infertility clinics per capita than any nation in the world. To be sure, debates are also ongoing among Jewish scholars and the public regarding the severity of a child's anticipated congenital abnormalities and/or the threat to the mother's physical or mental health that justify intervention. Still, the climate of discourse is quite different from that among other religions, in particular Christian denominations.

It may be surmised that this openness towards modern forms of medical treatment and diagnosis is peculiar to the secularization of religious perceptions that are found, in particular, among Reform Judaism. According to Green, however, this is not the case. The same liberal attitudes are prevalent among Orthodox Judaism as well. Thus, Green deduces that the foundations for this relatively liberal attitude towards genethical issues are to be found in the religious tradition and literary sources of Judaism itself.

In support of this hypothesis, Green identifies three broad principles as the supporting pillars of Jewish biomedical ethics that are relevant to genetic science: (1) the stringent obligation to preserve human life through medical healing and medical research; (2) a developmental view that accords nascent human life moral weight proportional to gestational age, and (3) Judaism's openness to the application of technological advances, including human biology, for the improvement of human life. Green agrees with other Jewish ethicists that these three ethical principles can be traced back to the Bible and the Talmud.

Following Green's analysis of the respective ethical discourses, it becomes evident that the three pillars are themselves based on three deeper bioethical convictions: (1) the fundamental ethical value of human reproduction; (2) a rather exclusivist concept of human life as fully developed personal life, paired with a quite restrictive view of the inherent moral value of basic forms of human life such as the fetus (in Judaism, the fetus is not regarded as a person), and (3) the theological concept of human co-creatorship with God, paired with the religious concept of the intentional imperfection of the creation that allows, or even demands, continued human effort towards perfection. Green himself suggests that Jewish bioethics based on these principles could be open for rather progressive forms of human genetic self-modification, including forms of human enhancement.

In many Muslim-dominant countries stem cell research is accelerating rapidly although Islamic ethics of human embryonic stem cell research have yet to reach consensus. This is at least the interpretation of Siti Nurani Mohamed Nor. According to her, a perusal of various scholarly Islamic writings suggests that there is a plurality of views regarding the beginning of life, but there is consensus regarding the existence of potential life in the human embryo; accordingly, the Quran declares that the unborn baby has the undeniable right to inheritance. Potentiality, according to Islamic interpretations, does not, however, accord exclusive rights to the embryo, including the right to life. Instead, lawmakers consider every action in light of the choice of the lesser of two evils, in this context foregoing the potential of gene technology vs. infractions of the maqasid al sharia (the objectives of Islamic law) which are defined by five basic human interests: life, religion, property, intellect, and family lineage. Islamic scholars find that human embryonic stem cell research does not contravene all five maqasid. There is life in these cells but the crime committed against them is minor according to the Sharia. Next, research in this area does not transgress religious barriers because it does not constitute playing God. Third, organ and body parts, including cells and tissues are not considered the property of human beings and consent is, therefore, unnecessary. Fourth, research is highly regarded as extending and protecting the intellect, and seeking knowledge is a noble act in Islam. Finally, research on genetic materials is allowed as long as regulations and controls are laid down to ensure that family lineage is protected within the bounds of legal marriage.

According to Pinit Ratanakul, it is – at least in principle – not difficult for Buddhism to cope with new scientific achievements such as genetics and biotechnology. The basic teachings of kamma and human nature do not exclude genetic manipulation through gene therapy. The reason for this liberal attitude of Buddhist ethics towards human genetic manipulation, and potentially some forms of human enhancement, is to be found in a general and structural affinity of Buddhism and science, as both see the need for the verification of truth by reason and experience. Beyond this explanation one might assume that it also might have to do with the fact that, in contrast to Western traditions, Buddhism denies the uniqueness of the individual person as a biographical unit of mind and body. However, its teaching of inter-dependence opposes any intervention that has negative social effects. Accordingly, in Buddhist ethical thinking only somatic cell therapy is acceptable, and only for therapeutic purposes, whereas its use, e.g., in cosmetic medicine, for self-enhancement is not. Similarly, germ line cell therapy is ethically questionable due to its potentially negative effects on humanity. The same applies to human reproductive cloning where possible negative effects are considered to outweigh positive ones.

In contrast to this quite accepting attitude towards genetic manipulation in general, Ratanakul argues for a rather restrictive position concerning embryonic stem cell research. This follows from the categorical Buddhist precept to avoid any killing of human life. Despite its open and tolerant spirit the Buddhist position on the preciousness of embryonic life is uncompromising even in the case of excess embryos. According to Ratanakul's interpretation of Buddhist ethics, this precept even outweighs the ethical principle of compassion with such human beings whose quality of life might profit substantially from the results of such research.