Читать книгу Contemporary Sociological Theory - Группа авторов - Страница 60

The theoretical tension between structure and agency runs deep through the discipline, though in many respects sociologists have a penchant for emphasizing structure over action (an old joke notes that economics is a field devoted to how people make choices, while sociology is a field devoted to showing how you have no choices). While much contemporary work, particularly that on inequality (see Part VII), tends to emphasize stability and historical determinants, the work mentioned in the earlier text clarifies that any historical or situational feature of social life is simultaneously a resource that actors can draw on for action. Many times, these actions are inconsequential and in line with structural expectations (definitionally), but sometimes they cascade into radical shifts in society (Arendt, 1958). This dual nature of structures as constraints on and resources for action opens new research opportunities away from documenting structural differences and toward identifying structural opportunities for action.

Action models based on deliberate purposive action are well developed in economics and political science, which have traditionally been more comfortable with the individualistic nature of decision-making often implied in these models (voting, after all, is done privately in booth alone). Sociologists have taken the action challenge here to be largely at the point of social interaction – that action becomes interesting (and social-consequential) when connected to others. The work of Coleman and White on networks and the work of Hechter on multi-person games are the first pass on this work. The clear advantage of this approach is tractability – by simplifying individual action, researchers gain a degree of freedom for building complex models of interaction. What is less well developed thus far (but see Mohr 2000 and cites therein) is a way to build substantive models of linked preferences and subjective understanding into purposive-action models of social interaction. This was, in part, the ultimate goal of White’s (1992) final project in Identity and Control, though the translation of that work to practical empirical investigation is challenging.

At the same time, it should be noted that critics of rational-choice perspectives are many. First, some argue that the basic behavioral assumptions of rational-choice theory are simply incorrect – people do not optimize for their own self-interest, but instead act habitually, normatively, or irrationally. While some rational-choice theorists respond by changing what is being maximized (a seemingly irrational act – such as throwing oneself on a grenade – is made rational by referencing one’s perceived reputation as a dead hero), such maneuvers quickly lead to tautology. Second, critics point out that the complex interdependencies implicit in interaction make predicting future outcomes impossible. As such, simple rational-choice models that depend on people making judgments about future returns are unrealistic. Eric Leifer (1988), for example, argues that so long as the meaning of a social event is not determined until it is long past, actors cannot base action on future expectations. Finally, still other critics argue that sociology is best served by focusing on macro-level aspects of social organization entirely, and that the search for a micro-model of macro-behavior is not productive.