Читать книгу Contemporary Sociological Theory - Группа авторов - Страница 62

Michael Hechter

Consider the following situation. A large number of tent–dwellers live in an isolated and relatively unpopulated valley. Land is plentiful and free for the taking. Life is good, save for one recurring problem. The tent–dwellers are intermittently victimized by a roving band of outlaws who abscond with their crops and stored food. Each incident causes severe losses to a large number of households. To forestall this threatened loss, a majority of the tent–dwellers decides to form a protective association. The association determines that two measures must be taken to provide for the members’ security. All the members’ tents must be concentrated in one part of the valley. And members must participate in round–the–clock watches along the perimeter of the new settlement. Under this plan members alone will receive protection; those who choose not to join will remain unprotected.

Yet the ability to reach agreement on this set of rules does not guarantee adequate security. The security of these tent–dwellers is very much a joint good; its production is only assured when each member lives up to the obligation to stand watch. The member who neglects to do so in order to dally with the neighbor compromises the security of the whole encampment. Will the members comply with their obligation to stand watch? How solidary will the protective association be?

An adequate theory of group solidarity must be able to explain variation in the extensiveness of corporate obligations and in a group’s capacity to induce its members to honor these obligations.