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All rational choice explanations start with explicit behavioral assumptions; usually actors are considered to be rational egoists. Strangely, a similar assumption is smuggled into much classical sociological analysis, albeit implicitly. As the normativists observed, sanctions exist even in the most solidary of groups. Why? Because there is often a conflict of interest between the individual and the group.

True, at those times when groups encourage their members to pursue their private interests to the hilt, no such conflict need arise (Young 1979: 51–66). And not all compliance to norms need be costly to individuals (Coleman 1966; G. S. Becker 1974; Barry 1970: 44–46). Some norms – which are also called conventions (Lewis 1969) – enable individuals to make decisions about a host of matters that defy rational solution (Durkheim 1951 [1897]: 254–56). These are rules that designate appropriate standards of conduct in diverse situations (“one should always drive on the right side of the street”), and people may comply with them simply because it is not costly for them to do so (Stigler and Becker 1977: 82; Thibaut and Kelley 1959: 127–200). In the driving example, noncompliance is in fact the more costly choice. Yet even though conventional behavior imposes few costs, the violation of conventions always brings forth sanctions (Goffman 1959). Naturally, conflicts of interest between the individual and the group increase whenever group members seek predictable and consistent levels of normative compliance from one another, not just fitful compliance when it suits the member’s fancy.

Whenever people are faced with two divergent courses of action ‒ one in pursuit of some individual end, the other in pursuit of some collective end ‒ I will assume that they will invariably choose the former. Since the obligations imposed by membership in a group generally interfere with and deflect from the members’ pursuit of their own goals, they can be likened to a membership tax. Once a group’s obligations are considered as if they were a tax, it is possible to predict how extensive, or costly, they will be in different circumstances.

The obligations of some groups can only be satisfied when members part with a rather large proportion of their private resources, whereas the obligations of others can be satisfied by substantially less onerous contributions. For example, the members of intentional communities like the Bruderhof (Zablocki 1971) face far more extensive obligations than the employees of General Motors. What accounts for variations in the extensiveness of obligations among different groups? The first answer has to do with the nature of the joint good that the group produces.

Recall that groups exist in order to supply their members with some desired joint good. This good can be attained only if members comply with various rules that are designed to assure its production. There are two alternative means of obtaining compliance with these production rules: it can be secured either through compensation or through obligation. In some groups ‒ for instance, firms ‒ members are compensated (in wages) for the time that they spend complying with production rules. In general, members would always prefer to be compensated for complying with production rules, because this does not diminish their own assets. Since the wages that motivate compliance must themselves be produced, however, compensation is feasible only in groups that produce marketable goods (and services) for the consumption of nonmembers.¹ General Motors can largely rely on wages to fill its assembly line because revenue is generated from the sale of vehicles and other products; since the Bruderhof is not primarily interested in marketing some commodity, it cannot rely on wages to motivate compliance among its members.

In contrast to groups whose rationale is the marketing of commodities to nonmembers, those that are principally formed to consume joint goods must rely on obligation to secure compliance with production rules. The greater the extensiveness of obligation, the greater the tax that members must pay to consume the joint good. Yet (according to the law of demand), the greater the price of a given good, the lower the demand for it. Why then do we find groups whose members consent to highly extensive obligations?

Such groups must provide goods of great value to their members. A rational member will seek membership in a group only if the benefit derived from access to the joint good exceeds the cost of the obligations ‒ that is, the member’s share of the costs of producing that good. This reasoning has one immediate implication: the benefit derived from membership in obligatory groups must generally exceed that of membership in compensatory groups. Why must this be so? Because the members of obligatory groups are expected to bear a cost (compliance with production rules) without a corresponding compensation. This can be explained if, in contrast to firms and other compensatory groups, obligatory groups produce immanent goods ‒ those that directly satisfy their members’ utility (by increasing their sense pleasures, happiness, and so forth). General Motors workers do not join the firm because they like cars, any more than the people who work in Silicon Valley like silicon chips. Most workers join firms because of their interest in wages, not in the commodities that these firms produce. Since workers do not get to consume the goods that they jointly produce (like nonmembers, they must purchase the goods if they want them), they must be compensated for the time spent in complying with the firm’s production rules.

The people who join a group that produces some immanent good for the consumption of members (entertainment, sense pleasures, enlightenment, and so forth), however, do have an interest in helping to provide it without compensation, for utility is its own reward. Hence, obligation is likely to play the predominant role only in groups whose rationale is the production of immanent joint goods.

Yet the extensiveness of obligations also varies among groups that supply immanent goods. After all, Orthodox Jews, Mormons, and members of the Communist Party face far more extensive obligations than Reform Jews, Unitarians, or members of the Republican Party. What accounts for systematic differences in the extensiveness of obligations across groups?

It is reasonable to suspect that the extensiveness of a group’s obligations has something to do with the cost of producing a given immanent good ‒ that is, with the sum of all the labor, capital, and other necessary inputs. If security is more costly to produce than the entertainment generated by a weekly poker game, then we would expect the obligations of the protective association to be far more extensive than those of the poker group. Thus, the extensiveness of group obligations ought to be determined in part by the cost of producing the good in question. Evidently, there must be some minimal level of obligation that is required to produce a good in groups of a certain size, but how can the members ever know what it is?

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the good is produced under the frictionless market conditions specified in conventional neoclassical economic models. In this case competition among rival producers of the good enables members to determine the lowest cost of producing it and thereby to arrive at minimally extensive obligations in the long run. To the degree that there are many different sources of similar or comparable goods in the immediate environment; that members have perfect information about the availability, quality, and cost of all close substitutes; that they have complete freedom of mobility and face no barriers of exit or entry into alternative groups (implying zero moving costs between them); that exchanges between members of the group are impersonal; and that enforcement is costless, members will tend to adopt obligations that are just extensive enough, and no more than are necessary, to provide a given quantity of the good.

It is easy to show why this minimal level of obligations will be realized. Imagine the problems that the members of a protective association might have deciding how extensive their corporate obligations should be. Assume that all pastoralist members can receive an adequate amount of security from the protective association by contributing 10 percent of their total assets. This is a new venture, however, and the pastoralists have no idea how much it will ultimately cost to provide themselves with adequate security. Perhaps most are willing to contribute as much as 20 percent of their assets to attain it. Even if they initially agree to a 20 percent contribution, the rate will not remain at this high level for long. If they could obtain adequate security at less cost (say at 15 percent) by joining (or forming) a different protective association, then it would be rational for members to desert the first group and “vote with their feet.” (Note that in this case the availability of free grazing land and portability of their tents mean that the nomads’ moving costs are negligible.)

This out–migration will stop only when the initial group lowers its rate to that of its competition, namely 15 percent. Then suppose that another group offers security on the basis of a 10 percent contribution. (We happen to know that this is the lowest possible rate, but this information is unavailable to the pastoralists.) This leads either to wholesale migration or to a downward readjustment of the initial group’s rate. What will stop the process? Suppose another protective association lowers its rate to 5 percent. A host of new members will join. But soon they will discover that the association is unable to live up to its promises, for a 5 percent contribution is too low to provide adequate security. In the wake of this group’s failure, everyone will rush back to join the 10 percent group. In time, then, the competition between rival protective associations (or rate experimentation within one group caused by the threat from potential new producers) will induce all groups to offer the same quantity of security (for a membership of a given size) at roughly the same, or equilibrium, rate of contribution.² Whatever the immanent good may be, in this world of frictionless markets groups will provide it to their members at minimal cost ‒ that is, with minimally extensive obligations (Brennan and Buchanan 1980: 172).

Since rational egoists always seek to minimize their costs, why can’t minimally extensive obligations be arrived at in the absence of fully competitive markets? After all, members have an incentive to find ways either to reduce costs (if their initial estimate of the production cost was too high) or to increase costs (if their estimate was too low). Even though they seek to minimize their obligations, there are at least three reasons why members are unable to do so in the absence of frictionless market conditions. In the first place, each collective consideration of the level of obligations entails time and other costs of decision–making (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Buchanan 1975), and these costs rise geometrically with the size of the membership. Rather than incurring such costs, members will settle for greater than minimal obligations. In the second place, to the degree that members place a high value on continued access to the immanent good, they may be reluctant to risk suboptimal provision of it (this may account for the sanctity of the defense budget in the eyes of American voters). Finally, if there are no alternative sources of the same good, then initial members may levy higher obligations on all subsequent ones and consume the resulting surplus themselves. This will create a two– (or multi–) tiered tax structure within the membership and raise the average extensiveness of obligations for the group as a whole.

The problem is that the assumption of frictionless markets is extremely stringent and unrealistic, and to the degree that it does not hold, the minimal production cost cannot be inferred. Hence, it is more reasonable to regard the dependence of members rather than the cost of production as the key determinant of the extensiveness of group obligations.

Rational egoists choose to belong to a group because they are dependent (Thibaut and Kelley 1959; Emerson 1962; and Blau 1964) on other members for access to some desired joint good. If they could attain this good without incurring the obligations of membership, they would always prefer to do so. Yet their degree of dependence varies widely. Our nomads may have only one source of security ‒ their local protective association. But similar individuals living on the populated plain may have a multitude of security options; on this account they are likely to be less dependent on any one protective association. The more dependent people are, the more tax they must pay for access to the same quantity of a given good. This variable degree of dependence is indicated by the opportunity cost of leaving the group, or what may be termed (after Hirschman 1970) the members’ cost of exit. This is the difference between the value received from membership in the group and the value that is gained from the member’s best alternative, taking into account any costs incidental to the transfer.

To the degree that members face a high cost of exit, they are dependent on that group. As exit costs approach prohibitive levels, dependence on the group increases; ultimately, members may become beholden to it for their very survival. In this extreme situation (analogous to a monopoly) members will accept the most extensive obligations to gain access to a given immanent good. Correlatively, when the cost of exit decreases, members’ dependence on the group diminishes. When the average dependence of members declines significantly, the extensiveness of obligations begins to approach the minimum as specified in the neoclassical analysis.

Ultimately, dependence is affected by environmental shifts, many of which are beyond the control of group members themselves. It is increased by limits on the supply of close substitutes available outside group boundaries, a lack of information about these alternatives, moving costs, and the existence of strong personal ties among members. Let us consider each of these factors separately.

1. The supply of close substitutes. If the number of distinct sources of substitutable goods in the environment is not large, the chance of finding a better alternative generally decreases. Groups may collude and levy the same tax for providing a given joint good to their members. If there are only a small number of groups, this collusion may be easy to organize and enforce. As the number of alternative sources increases, however, the costs of organizing and enforcing collusive agreements grow disproportionately.

2. Lack of information about alternatives. On the one hand, since groups are more or less exclusive, knowledge of their internal workings may be relatively difficult to obtain (Goffman 1959: 77–105). Uncertainty about the relative advantages of alternative groups breeds inertia. On the other hand, many groups are able to restrict information about available alternatives. To the degree that members are unaware of the existence of alternative sources of joint goods outside group boundaries, they will be willing to bear the cost of more extensive rules. If people are unaware of the existence of a better alternative, they can hardly choose to take advantage of it. And information is always costly to gather.

3. Costs of moving. Transfer costs, which must be taken into account in any decision to join or leave a group, are seldom zero. Since moving costs among the nomads are minimal, they can be very responsive to marginal differences in the cost of protection. It is not very costly to pack everything on your camels and move to another part of the valley where security is a better bargain. Were the nomads to opt for a sedentary lifestyle, however, then their moving costs would rise, thereby increasing their dependence on the initial protective association. It is far more costly to move a house than a tent. Beyond this, however, groups sometimes impose entry and exit costs. Entry to the most rudimentary rotating credit association requires character references, which are developed over a lifetime and thus are costly to obtain. Many intentional communities demand that exiting members leave some part of their personal assets with the group. Finally, groups vary widely in their exclusiveness; for example, younger groups are more likely to be open than older ones. To the degree that there are barriers to entry/exit (and to the degree that moving between groups entails costs), this increases the dependence of members.

4. The strength of personal ties. Sociability is one of the most important immanent goods that groups provide. Since personal ties tend to arise with repeated interaction– and thus only in the course of time ‒ they are akin to an irredeemable investment (or sunk cost) in the group. The probability of repeated interaction increases with limitations of supply and with costly information and mobility, lowering the chance that close substitutes can be found outside group boundaries.

If these are some of the factors that create dependence, constitutional and legal arrangements have decisive implications for generating them. For most of human history the number and composition of voluntary associations has been regulated by political authorities. As Adam Smith (1961 [1789]) was at pains to emphasize, without effective constitutional guarantees of individual private property rights and the freedoms of mobility and association, dependence flourishes. It is also strengthened whenever rights are granted to groups, rather than to individuals. This occurs in western feudalism, but the Indian caste system provides perhaps the classic example (Weber 1946 [1916–17]; Bougle 1971; Leach 1962; Dumont 1970; Barth 1962; Berreman 1972).

While there has been much disagreement about the precise definition of caste, nevertheless it is usually held that caste implies three things: hereditary occupational specialization, a hierarchical ranking of groups, and great social distance between them. Interaction between the members of different castes is governed by canons of purity and impurity. If an untouchable so much as gazes at the dinner of a Brahman, it will be considered impure. Exogamy is prohibited, and imbalanced sex ratios among the members of higher castes lead to hypergamy as well as female infanticide. The caste system restricts intergroup mobility and thereby limits the availability of benefits outside group boundaries. Less extreme instances follow from the distinctive legal status of groups such as Jews and Greeks under the Ottoman millet system, Indians in North America, or blacks in South African Bantustans. In each case the state makes individuals dependent on corporate membership by allocating resources to groups qua groups (Van Dyke 1977).

Just as laws that limit the individual’s alternatives outside group boundaries promote dependence, those that provide new alternatives lessen it. Here the development of the welfare state takes pride of place. The welfare state provides citizens with a wide range of benefits, or entitlements, that were customarily supplied by mutual benefit associations, churches, trade unions, political parties, and other kinds of voluntary associations. Once these benefits are offered to all as public goods, the incentives to belong to these other kinds of organizations erode. In this way, the growth of government welfare is implicated in many significant social changes, from the decline of the American urban political boss to the rise of divorce and family instability.

Due to constitutional and legal arrangements, among other factors, the competition among providers of joint goods is often restricted. The less competitive the market for the joint good is, the greater the dependence of group members. This means that the obligations (taxes) that the members of different groups adopt for the production of the same joint good are likely to vary. As the cost of leaving a group rises, so does the net benefit of remaining in it. And the greater this benefit is, the greater the willingness to tolerate extensive obligations. Although the average dependence of group members may vary, it never disappears altogether, for the members of groups always depend upon the efforts of others for the production of joint goods. The solitary consumer of private goods, however, need not incur dependence.

Since it permits the initial members of a group to demand higher obligations of new members, dependence also has implications for the evolution of group hierarchy. The older members’ ability to extract what in effect are rents from newer ones is, however, limited by the dependence of these new members. The less their dependence, the less extensive the obligations they will incur.

In summary, then, the greater the dependence of members, the greater the extensiveness of group obligations. The extensiveness of a group’s obligations alone, however, has no necessary implications for group solidarity. What also matters is the probability that members will comply with these obligations. It is to this problem that I now turn.