Читать книгу The Combined Bomber Offensive 1943 - 1944: The Air Attack on Nazi Germany - L. Douglas Keeney - Страница 10

The combined bomber offensive was a joint undertaking of the United Staten and British air forces. The plan for the offensive that was drawn up in the theater in April 1943 and presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff stated that the capabilities of the two forces were complementary. The Eighth Air Force was the racier attacking precision targets by daylight. The RAF was the bludgeon destroying German material facilities and undermining the morale of the German worker. The coordination of the two forces was not left to chance. Moreover, the problem was not simply one of coordinating the efforts of two bomber commands. Much of the fighter support provided for the U. S. heavy bombers during the first phase (April-May-June 1943) was by the RAF Fighter Command. It was necessary to assure the closest cooperation among bomber and fighter commands of both forces and with RAF Coastal Command in connection with air-sea rescue.

The chief agency for coordinating the efforts of the forces involved was called the Combined Operational Planning Committee (CCPC). It was established about April 1943, shortly after the VIII Fighter Command but three groups of P-47’s into operation. This committee was composed of representatives of VIII Bomber Command, VIII Fighter Command, RAF Bomber Command, and RAF Fighter Command. After 15 October 1943 the Ninth Air Force representative was included. The committee was charged with the function of planning the operations against major targets. The plans, after completion, were submitted to the commanders concerned, and after approval by the Eighth Air Force Commander, they were given code names and filed at each operating headquarters against future need. When the VIII Bomber commander, at his daily operational conference, selected one of these targets for attack, the code name was immediately passed to all related commands and the operational plan previously prepared was put into effect.

The CCPC received the sanction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the directive of 1 June 1943. Certain terms of reference under which this committee was to operate were set forth in an enclosure to this directive which formally launched the combined bomber offensive. Not only was the CCPC given a planning function; it was instructed to “observe critically the tactical execution of these plans and to report to their Commanders of the four commands concerned.

The operations of the combined bomber offensive made full use of the scientific method in the application of air power to destruction, and this subject merits consideration. Air warfare, employing so man of the products of scientific research, might have been quite unscientific in its operations had these operations been controlled merely by the opinions of commanding officers, even though the latter possessed great experience. The Eighth Air Force agency for the scientific study of all phases of air operations was known as the Operational Research Section (ORS). There were, of course, agencies in the United States which mad valuable studies of the tactics of air warfare. The AAF School of Applied Tactics made many contributions to the solution of the problems of the Eighth and other air forces, but the Operational Research Section functioned in the field, secured its data at the sources, and drew its conclusions on the facts as they were found. As General Eaker’s report later pointed out, “Operational research was originated in the VIII Bomber Command … It is composed of a group of scientists who study every phase of our operations and of enemy reaction, catalogue results and draw conclusions. It has now been definitely demonstrated that the studies of this organization are invaluable to air force commanders and that operational research has a staff function and staff agency in modern aerial warfare and fills a requirement not supplied by any other staff section.” The results of some of the studies of ORS will presently be examined.

The scale of Eighth Air Force operations during the first phase does not now seem consequential. During the eight months prior to April 1943, General Eakers “piddling force of Fortresses” had engaged in 45 missions, flown 3364 sorties, and dropped 4715.7 tons of bombs on targets. April, May, and June were to see that eight-month record beaten badly on the sortie and tonnage counts. It took but 33 missions (two of there were wholly recalled) during these months to pile up 4267 sorties and drop 6435.4 tons on targets. Yet that first-phase effort was itself “piddling” when command with the over-all achievement of the Eighth During its 33 months of operations against Germany. Even though this effort of the second quarter of 1943 was small when compared with what was to follow, it did constitute the first experience with an expanding force and it did help to make succeeding efforts more effective.

April 1943 was a slack month for VIII Bomber Command, its operations falling considerably short of the record piled up in March. The reasons were two. It has already been noted how small were the effective forces; furthermore, the conduct of operations was greatly hampered by bad weather. During this month there were but four missions flown by the heavy bombers; and on only one of the four (17 April, Bremen) were there as many as 109 aircraft reported attacking the target.

Reasonably good bombing weather and the expansion of the force combined to make May the best month the VIII bomber Command had ever seen. The heavy bombers were out nine days during the month and dropped approximately 2800 tons of bombs on 18 different targets. Three of these were attacked by more than 100 bombers each. The last operation in May (on the 29^th) saw the Eighth break all its previous records, for a single day as well as for a month, dispatching 272 heavies of which 239 actually attacked. The May operations cost 6 heavy bombers against claims of 389 enemy aircraft destroyed.

The month of May witnessed also the initial experimental operations of the medium bombers of the Eighth Air Force. The Combined Bomber Offensive Plan had provided for medium bombers as necessary adjuncts to heavy bombers and as a vital factor in the support of combined operations scheduled for 1944.

The first U. S. medium bomb group to become operational in the United Kingdom was the 322d, which had arrived in the theater on 8 March. Before its May effort it was given eight weeks of training in low-level operations. This type of training indicated the tactics that were contemplated to capitalize on the speed and ruggedness of the B-24. Since these tactics were changed after but two missions, it is appropriate to inquire into the reasons for their adoption. In the first place, since mediums were to be used to support surface operations, low-level tactics would be needed, and training in them would be of great value. In the second place, the B-26’s were not equipped with bombsights for medium-altitude attack. Furthermore, it was desirable to learn whether a well trained force could utilize the element of surprise on an important objective.

The strategical directives for the Eighth Air Force were delivered through the British Air Ministry, so in March when the commander of the Eighth was planning the operations of the mediums, he wrote to Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal and asked that certain targets in occupied Europe be cleared for attack. These targets required very shallow penetration of the Continent and included airdromes as first priority, marshaling yards, power stations, and port facilities in France, Belgium, and Holland. Mediums were also to be used on targets in Germany.

Air Marshall Portal’s reply suggested that the most important matter to consider in planning the operations of the medium bombers was to see that their activities were coordinated with other daylight operations. It was his idea that the Eighth’s mediums should give first priority to transportation targets rather than to airdromes. This was the policy of the RAF light bombers, and was in accord with the directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (In March the bomber offensive was functioning under the Casablanca directives which placed transportation targets in third priority.) The change to airdromes against priority for mediums, in his opinion, might prove profitable later if it were decided to shift the main effort of the entire bomber attack to the German Air Force.

Eventually, during the first week in May when the 322d Group was well advanced in its low-level training, certain industrial installations were cleared as freshman targets” for the 34 Wing which contained this medium bomb group.

The objective actually selected for the initial medium mission of 14 May was the power station at Ijmuiden, Holland. The same objective was hit three days later on the ill-fated second operation that finally convinced the Eighth Air Force commander that the low-level technique was not feasible in Western Europe. One intelligence officer of the 3d Bombardment Wing had been convinced of this for many months before the attack. This officer, Major Von Kolnitz, had advised the commander of the 3d Wing in December 1943 that in his opinion low-level attacks on heavily defended targets would be disastrous. Between the 14 May and 17 May missions the same officer made strong representations to the commander of the 322d Group about the dangers of the operation. It certainly would seem, however, that the first attack on Ijmuiden was not a fair test of the ability of the B-26 to surprise the defenses for the RAF had hit it on the 2d and 5^th of May.

On the 14 May Mission, 13 B-26’s had taken off and 11 of them dropped 10.75 tons of high-explosive bombs from an altitude of between 200 and 300 feet. The bombs employed had 30-minute delayed-action fuses. Apparently very little damage was done to the power station. The one medium that failed to bomb had an engine shot out by flak as it crossed the enemy coast and was forced to return to base. No enemy fighters were encountered, but nine of the bombers were damaged by flak. One ship crash-landed at its base and killed the pilot after the reminder of the crew had bailed out. Since this test was inconclusive, the second attempt was made three days later. Twelve B-26s got out on the 17th, and again one turned back, this time because of engine failure. The attack was again made from minimum altitude employing 30-minute delayed-action fuses. Of the 11 attacking, not one returned, although one of them, badly shot up, was abandoned by the crew near its base. The remainder were lost to flak, ground fire, collision and unknown causes. This was enough to convince the Commanding General of the Eighth that a change in policy for mediums was required:

The simple truth appears to be that worthwhile targets on the coast of Western Europe are too heavily defended to make low-level attack feasible and economic … . I am now convinced that we must discontinue low-level attack except for that against surface vessels. We have a plan to get some training and experience of the latter category. I am going to put the medium bombers in the Air Support Command and give them maximum training was part of the tactical air force to support any ground forces invading the Continent. Their crews will get their fighting experience by medium altitude attacks heavily defended by fighter aviation. This will necessitate the installation of some bomb sights, at least for lead aircraft.

The 322d Group was removed from operations, and the mediums got no more action against the enemy until July.

June operations by the Eighth fell somewhat short of the record achieved in May, for the weather kept both the USAAF and the RAF grounded during the first 10 days of the month.

The geographical pattern of the Eighth Air Force operations during the first phase of the bomber offensive calls attention to what has been one of the great tragedies of World War II – the necessity of fighting over and destroying so much in territory belonging to peoples who were enemies of the Axis powers. Of the 6,435.4 tons of bombs dropped by United Kingdom-based U.S. heavy bombers during the second quarter of 1943, just slightly more than half (51.4%) fell on Germany. France received 37.3% Belgium slightly more than 10, and Holland the remainder.

Bombardment policy in Allied or neutral territory occupied by the enemy was carefully regulated. Only military objectives (these were narrowly defined) were to be bombed and such bombing was subject to certain principles. The bombing of civilian populations as such was forbidden. The military objective had to be clearly identified and the attack made with reasonable care to avoid undue loss of life to civilians in the vicinity of the target. If doubt existed as to the possibility of accurate bombing, the attack was to be withheld. All Red Cross conventions were observed. Despite the fact that both RAF and AAF took every possible precaution to reduce the risks to civilian populations in occupied countries to a minimum, casualties could not be avoided. The protest of the subject peoples and their representatives to the Allied powers did not make the tasks of the air leaders any easier. They were faced with the fact that many of the facilities in occupied countries were contributing to German war effort, and they had no choice but to attempt to destroy them.

The efficiency of daylight precision bombardment is difficult to assess, but one can hardly study the operational site without becoming aware of the tremendous effort necessary to achieve even a small result. Some notice has already been given to the size of the forces available to the Eighth during the first phase of the bomber offensive, but it must be remembered that only the planes in commission can engage in operations. During April, May, and June more than two-fifths of the heavy bombers were unserviceable because they were undergoing repair, being modified, or awaiting parts. Planes in commission, even planes airborne on operations, are of slight offensive account unless they can get over the target. Of the sorties flown in April, May, and June, only 60 actually accomplished the mission assigned (effective sorties) of dropping bombs in the target area. The question as to the accuracy of the bombing is very difficult, particularly in the early period of operations. The scant evidence available indicates that first-phase daylight bombing accuracy was low, even lower than during the first quarter of 1943. This may have been due in part to the lower level of experience resulting from the sudden expansion of VIII Bomber Command in May.