Читать книгу The Combined Bomber Offensive 1943 - 1944: The Air Attack on Nazi Germany - L. Douglas Keeney - Страница 8

Before proceeding with the account of operations in pursuance of the Combined Bomber Offensive directive, it might be well to examine tentatively, in the light of the strategical situation and the intelligence of the enemy available in 1943, some of the questions that have been raised concerning the wisdom of the target selection in that plan.

Basing a judgment upon subsequent events, the giving of high priority to submarine yards and bases as primary objectives might be questioned. We now have the testimony of Grand Admiral Doenitz to the effect that the bombing of these facilities was not very damaging. He declared that the U-boat assembly places were never hit until 1945 and that the turn-around time in the pens was not increased by bombing. Eighth Air Force studies made in late 1942 and early 1943 concerning the effectiveness of bombing submarine installations had already indicated that such action was none too effective. There was great doubt about the vulnerability of submarine pens; in fact a study mad by VIII Bomber Command on 5 December 149 expressed the opinion that none of the U. S. bombs available at the time were capable of penetrating the roofs of the pens from any practical bombing height. Another study on the target value of submarines concluded that because of the cushion of excess productive capacity an attack on components would have at best only a very long-term effect. Submarine yards, moreover, were not considered profitable targets unless the then current sinking rate by air and surface craft could be doubled. “Even total destruction of all yards would produce no decrease in the number of submarines operating in the Atlantic for the 12 months succeeding the destruction. The COA report of 8 March 1945 explained this lag in military results with the statement that the number of submarines under-going trials and nearing completion was sufficient to make good the sinking rate at the time. This report also said that there was no conclusive evidence that the bombing of bases would substantially reduce the number of submarines operating at any one time.

It seems, therefore, that neither submarine yards nor bases met the tests of a good target for strategic bombing. One must conclude, however, that the U-boat was such a menace in early 1943 that any method that offered any promise at all should have been used. Fortunately, the strategic bombardment of yards and bases was but one of the methods employed against this enemy weapon. The inclusion of the Aircraft Industry in high-priority target position is not open to so much questioning. It is true that testimony of German prisoners of war has indicated that our bombing was not nearly so damaging as we believed it would be or thought it was at the time. The reason seems to have been found in the ability of the enemy to effect dispersal of the industry. Of course, the degree of effectiveness of the bombing as it developed did not to any great extent invalidate the wisdom of selecting the aircraft industry as a target system in 1943. One of the fundamental tasks of an air force is the destruction of hostile air forces by attacks in the air, on the ground, and against all installations which support air cover. The aircraft industry met the economic and military criteria for a target system in 1943 and it would have been a violation of fundamental principles of air warfare not to have given it high priority. Moreover the effects were by no means negligible.

The ball-bearing industry was accorded third priority among primary objectives of the bomber offensive, immediately after submarines and aircraft. Some of the testimony by German prisoners of war seems to minimize the effectiveness of the bombing of this industry also. That its effect was not more marked was due to several factors: the dispersal that was achieved, the ability of the enemy to cut down on the delivery time of the finished product from the factory to the consumer, the fact that in the aircraft industry ball bearings could be replaced by other appliances, and that the German army had accumulated in the vicinity of Magdeburg several months supply for emergency purposes. Allied information on the ball-bearing industry rated it an excellent target system from both the economic and military standpoints. On the basis of American and British knowledge and practice it was believed impractical for the Germans to have accumulated any great stock of bearings. Nearly half the German supply was turned out in three plants around the one city of Schweinfurt, and 10 of the product came from two plants near Paris. The damaging of the ball-bearing industry would be crippling to all other industry which used high-speed moving parts. The bearing industry was too valuable to the German war effort not to have accorded it high priority in 1943.

The information concerning the effect of Allied strategic bombing in Europe that has been obtained from the German prisoners of war indicates that attacks on oil and transportation did more damage to German effort than any other bombing. The target priority list which according to Hermann Goering would have been most effective reads as follows:

1 Synthetic oil

2 Communications

3 Aero-engine factories

4 Airframe factories

5 Ball-bearing factories

6 Airfields

Albert Speer, former German Minister of Armaments and War Production, ranked objectives in order of relative importance from the point of view of armament production. His first two categories were:

1 Key points in the basic industries or supplies.

2 Transport and communications although the effect of attacks on these was long delayed because of the density of the transport network.

Speer said that the attacks on the chemical industry were the most difficult to deal with, and he included synthetic oil production in the chemical industry. The former Minister of Armaments even went so far as to say that the attack on the chemical industry, without the impact of other military events, would have rendered Germany defenseless.

Field Marshal William Keitel rated the destruction of transportation as the most decisive influence in the defeat of Germany, and the demoralization of the Wehrmacht and the nation was of second greatest influence.

General Galland rated the bombing of transport facilities and oil targets in first and second places in his scale of effectiveness. He ranked transportation facilities first because of their direct importance to military operations and war production, oil targets second because of their relation to the function of air and armored forces and military and industrial transport.

There is slight point in introducing further evidence concerning German opinion on the ranking of target systems. Oil and transportation run like a chorus through a considerable portion of their testimony. This raises two questions: why oil was not given higher priority, and why transportation was not included among primary or secondary objectives of the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan. As far as oil is concerned, this amounts to asking why it was not tanked above ball bearings. The oil industry (synthetic and natural) aside from Ploesti was much more dispersed than was the bearing industry. Synthetic production, which accounted for about 31% of Axis output, was scattered among some 13 plants. Only two of these plants were estimated to turn out as much as by each of the total Axis product. One was at Leuna, 570 miles from London, and the other at Ploesti, which was 640 miles from London. It was recognized in 1943 that the German oil position was serious, but it was also known that much a large portion of the Axis requirement was supplied by the refineries located about Ploesti that an attack on this complex would be necessary before attacks on the dispersed synthetic producers would show telling results.

The question of the exclusion of transportation targets from the early phases of the combined bomber offensive is relatively simple. It will be recalled that AWPD-1 (Plan for Bomber and Constituent Units to Arrive in the United Kingdom in 1942), AWPD-42 (the target directive given to the Eighth Air Forces in October 1942), and the Casablanca directive all placed transportation in relatively high priority. Transportation had never been forgotten in strategic planning, nor was it neglected in the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan. One of the chief ends of the strategic mission was to weaken Germany to such an extent that successful cross-channel landing operations could be undertaken by the Allies. It was just before and during such operations that attack on transportation would be most profitable. In the early stages of the CAO before the force war built up and before the timing would help ground forces, the transportation system did not present a telling target. Limited and scattered attacks would do little good because of the ease of repair. There was no small number of points whose destruction would prove decisive. It would be necessary to hit a great many targets within a relatively short time in order to do the enemy the same harm as an attack on one of his other systems would accomplish. The wiser course in regard to this category was to wait until the air offensive was well advanced and combined cross-channel operations were at hand.

Questions concerning the judgment to be made of the target selection for the CBO call for examination of several other systems. One, a question of exclusion, involves electric power. It will be recalled that the 1941 and 1943 target planning included this in high priority. It was not included in the directive of 10 June 1943. Field Marshal Goering, in his interview of 29 June 1945, stated that an attack on electric power had been feared. He also declared that the Germans had planned attacks on 21 power plants in the U.S.S.R. Field Marshal Keitel has stated that an attack on electric power plants, while dangerous, would not have stopped transportation on electric railroads because of the possibility of the switch to steam locomotives. The key to the thinking back of the exclusion of this category from the CBO targets may be found in the COA Report of 8 March 1943. This stated that while German industry as a whole was in large measure dependent on electrical energy for continued operation, in almost no instance was a single industry dependent upon a single plant. It rather depended upon a network which pooled the electrical power within an area. As a bombing problem, then, an attack on electric power resolved itself into the deprivation of a given region rather than an assault upon the whole industry, which was too big and too dispersed to entirely destroyed. There was also some doubt about the vulnerability of electric power plants.

The wisdom of the inclusion as target systems of industries manufacturing rubber, tires, and motor vehicles is evident upon examination of some of the data collected about them in 1943. The German position in rubber at that time was thought to be precarious, since one-third of her supplies was provided by blockade running and the reclamation of scrap, and the other two-thirds by synthetic production. Nearly one-half of the synthetic rubber was turned out by two plants, one at Huls, and these plants were responsible for an even larger fraction of the synthetic suitable for tires.

Tire-manufacturing plants particularly those for manufacturing airplane tires, presented a fine target system from the standpoint of concentration and vulnerability. Four plants located produced practically all the aircraft tires. The destruction of six other plants (including ones in Aachen, Harburg, Clermont-Ferrand, and Munich) was deemed sufficient to deprive Germany of more than 50% of all tires (truck, passenger vehicle, aircraft, etc.) Rubber tire plants were believed to be especially susceptible to incendiary attack. All these factors made the rubber and tire industry too lucrative a target system to be neglected.

The motor vehicle industry well met the tests of military significance, concentration, and vulnerability. Furthermore, attrition was supposed during the winter of 1942-43 to have been twice as great as production. The German vehicle position was such that it was assured that scarcely any vehicles could have been withdrawn from industrial and other uses for the military service. Although there were about 35 truck-assembly and manufacturing plants, it was believed that above 35% of the total truck output was concentrated in seven plants (Ford-Cologne: Opel-Brandenburg; Daimler-Benz, Stuttgart; Matford-Paris; Matford-Bourges; Citroen-Clichy; and Fiat-Turin) four of which were less than 450 miles from London.

On the face of the thing it would appear that any attempt to undermine the economy of a modern industrial nation would involve attacks upon the very foundations of that economy, namely, iron and steel, coke, and machine tools. The conclusions of the COA on these industries as strategic targets are pertinent.

Concerning the steel industry the conclusion was that the Western Axis position was strong and the destruction of one-half the plants would not produce such military effect for more than a year. Moreover, because of their ruggedness of construction the vulnerability of steel plants was not high. The Western Axis was thought to be more vulnerable in high-grade alloy steels, but even here the result of attacks was considered questionable because of the existence of a number of alternate facilities.

Coke ovens were considered vulnerable to air attack, but their number was so great that they did not represent a profitable target for achieving decisive results in the crippling of the German military machine.

The COA conclusion in regard to machine tools was that the industry did not constitute a high –priority target because it lay too deep in the industrial process. There was, however, a recommendation that the plants making machine tools for a particular industry should have a high priority I order to prevent recuperation when that industry was successfully attacked.