Читать книгу The Combined Bomber Offensive 1943 - 1944: The Air Attack on Nazi Germany - L. Douglas Keeney - Страница 7

A committee composed of Brig. Gen. Heywood S. Hansell, Jr., Brig. Gen Orvil A. Anderson, the plans personnel of USAAF, the Royal Air Force, and the Eighth Air Force, was set up under General Eaker for the purpose of drawing up an operating plan to accomplish the desired result. The committee had as its task the establishment of target priorities and the calculation of the size of U.S. forces necessary to accomplish their destruction.

This committee completed its work in April 1943. The finished plan restated the mission of the strategic air forces as defined in the Casablanca directive and recommended the destruction of 76 specific targets that were to be found in the following systems:

1 Submarine construction yards and bases

2 German aircraft industry

3 Ball bearings

4 Oil

5 Synthetic rubber and tires

6 Military transport vehicles

It further stated that the destruction of the selected individual targets within those systems would achieve the elimination of commanding fractions of enemy production within the affected industries:

1 Destruction of the selected submarine yards would reduce German construction by 89%

2 German fighter capacity would be reduced by 43% and bomber capacity by 65%

3 Ball-bearing capacity would be reduced by 76

4 Destruction of Ploesti refineries and German synthetic oil plants would reduce production by 45%

5 Destruction of 50% of synthetic rubber production and nearly all of that for tires would be accomplished.

6 Destruction of seven plants producing motor vehicles would fatally weaken the capacity of the German people for armed resistance.

The German aircraft industry was placed second in the priority list of target systems, but the plan stated that German fighter strength was an intermediate objective of the bomber offensive second to none. That is to say that the German fighter force and to be destroyed before the combined bomber offensive, especially the American part of it, could b successful. It was pointed out in this connection that German fighter production had increased 44% and fighter strength on the Western front had nearly doubled since the entry of the United States into the war.

The plan emphasized the fact that the bomber offensive was in integrated RAF and USAAF effort, and that the capabilities of the two sources were complimentary.

A time schedule was worked out calling for AAF and RAF missions against a certain number of targets within certain systems in each of four three-month phases. The first phase was scheduled to run to 30 June, the second to 20 September, the third to the end of 1943, and the fourth to go into the early months of 1944. The specific targets for the Eighth during the first three phases were set forth in charts b category, and the distance from bases and the productive importance of each was shown. The RAF was given a certain definite assignment of cities in each phase for attack. In general, these coincided with the location of the USAAF targets. The precision targets of the Eighth and the area targets of the RAF were shown on maps using different symbols.

The Eighth Air Force penetrations of enemy territory were to become deeper as the offensive progressed. First-phase operations were to be relatively shallow and were to be concentrated against the submarine yards and bases along the coast. Second-phase range was to increase to approximately 400 miles, and about three-quarters of the effort was to be concentrated against German fighter aircraft factories and other German Air Force facilities. The third phase was to see attacks against all the principal objectives with continued effort to neutralize those previously attacked but capable of repair. Fourth phase was to witness the continuation of these operations with provision made for attacks against installations associated with a cross-channel invasion.

The calculation of the size of U. S. forces needed was based upon the experience of the Eighth in operating in the theater. It was stated in the plan that this force had conducted about 20 missions in the three-month period from January to April 1943, and that approximately 12 of these missions had been successful. It was stated also that the average number of aircraft dispatched by the Eighth was 86. It was assumed, therefore, that a force of about 100 bombers would be sufficient to destroy a target about 1000 feet in radius, and that about two-thirds of the missions could be expected to reach and strike their objectives. It was further assumed on the basis of Eighth Air Force experience that about 37.5% of the airplanes in the theater could be dispatched on missions at any one time. That percentage made allowance for airplanes in reserve., in depot repair, and being modified. Contemplating about 19 important operations during each three-month phase, of which 12 were expected to be successful, the heavy bomber force build-up for the U. S. continent called for in the plan was:

1 At the end of the first phase, 30 June 1943 : 944

2 End of the second phase, 30 September 1943 : 1192

3 End of third phase, 31 December 1943 : 1746

4 By 31 March 1944 : 2702

The plan also called for the build-up of the U. S. forces in medium bombers which were to be used in attacks on German airdromes and to aid in the heavy bomber raids by missions designed to divert enemy fighters. It was pointed out that medium bombers would also be required to support combined operations in 1944. The build-up program for the medium was set at:

1 By the end of the first phase : 300

2 End of second phase : 400

3 End of third phase : 600

4 By 31 March 1944 : 800

The plan did not provide a schedule for the build-up of fighter forces. It did, however, call attention to the need for extensive U. S. fighter strength both to protect the bombers and to help reduce the German fighter strength. It also called attention to the necessity for the creation of a tactical air force in the European theater in order to be ready for combined operations in 1944.

This rather complete air plan, which restated the strategic air mission with respect to Germany, listed target priorities, contained a detailed schedule of operations by phases, and provided for the build-up of United States heavy and medium bombers, received the approval of the U. S. Army Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations and of the Chief of the British Air Staff. The plan was taken to Washington by the Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force and presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who granted approval in May. The Combined Bomber Offensive directive based upon it was issued through the British Air Staff to the Eighth Air Force and to RAF Bomber Command and Fighter Command on 10 June 1943. The directive reaffirmed the strategic air mission as it had been given in the Casablanca directive; it listed target priorities in the light of the then existing strategical situation; it assigned tasks to the British Fighter Command and to the American fighter forces, and provided for coordination of British and U. S. efforts.

Target priorities were assigned to the Eighth under three heads: intermediate, primary, and secondary objectives. The intermediate objective was stated to be the German fighter strength. Calling this an intermediate objective implies that it was something that had to be accomplished before the rest of the offensive could be effectively concluded. It was pointed out that any delay in the attack on German fighters would make the prosecution of the rest of the task progressively more difficult. Enemy fighter strength was to be cut down by attacks on airframe, engine, components, and ball-bearing factories; by area disorganization attacks; by strikes against repair depots and storage parks; and by the destruction of fighters in the air and on the ground.

Primary objectives of the heavy bombers were to be:

1 German submarine yards and bases

2 Facilities supporting the German air forces other than fighters

3 Ball bearings

4 Oil

It was directed that the German submarine yards and bases receive maximum effort whenever tactical and weather conditions precluded attacks on German fighter objectives. The offensive against oil was stated to be contingent upon attacks against Ploesti from the Mediterranean.

Secondary objectives of the bomber offensive were to be:

1 Synthetic rubber and tires

2 Military transport vehicles

The directive called for the British Bomber Command to be employed in the general disorganization of German industry, with all action designed as far as practicable to be complementary to that of the Eighth.