Читать книгу The Combined Bomber Offensive 1943 - 1944: The Air Attack on Nazi Germany - L. Douglas Keeney - Страница 9

The basic measure of strategic bombardment has been the unit weight of bombs on target. The chief vehicles employed by the Eighth Air Force in carrying bombs to enemy targets were the B-17 and B-24 heavy bombers. The carrying capacity of these aircraft changed somewhat during the course of the 39-odd months the Eighth operated in the European theater, and the number of trips per unit time (sortie rate) also changed, but the quantity of bombs delivered always depended in a definite way on the size of the force of heavy bombers and upon the crews available to fly them.

Behind the sortie rate of the operational aircraft are very many highly important factors which are beyond the scope of this examination of the forces available to the Eighth Air Force for conducting the combined bomber offensive. Here the concern is to be primarily with the size of the force in terms of combat nits in too large for treatment at this time. The aim is to set forth the effective combat strength available to the Eighth during the first three months of the combined bomber offensive, and to make a brief inquiry as to why it was not larger.

The Eighth Air Force had been sent to the United Kingdom in the spring of 1942 as a part of the so-called “BOLERO Task Force.” BOLERO was the plan for the build-up of a force in the British Isles which was to launch an invasion of the Continent. This invasion was to be preceded by an air offensive designed to gain the necessary degree of air superiority. After that was accomplished, air forces were to disrupt the German industrial machine by strategic bombardment and to operate in conjunction with ground forces. As long as the invasion of the Continent was planned for the summer of 1943, the Eighth had a definite mission. But a change in plans occurred in July of 1942 when the decision was made to invade North Africa (TORCH project). The Eighth was, in consequence, left without a clear-cut mission for some time, or perhaps it is better to say, with its mission postponed for an indefinite time. Nevertheless, it continued to carry the fight to the enemy as best it could.

The size of the forces available was, of course, adversely affected by the strategical decision. During the last five months of 1942 the Eighth really served as “a giant replacement pool” for the Twelfth Air Force in North Africa. During that time the Eighth dispatched to the new air force more than 1050 aircraft, practically all its organizational equipment, and huge quantities of supplies. It supplied three P-38 fighter groups in October, one heavy bomb group in November, and two in December. In addition it provided training for other Twelfth Air Force groups.

During these last months of 1943 the Eighth never had more than seven heavy bomber groups operating at any one time, and after September it had but one fighter group (Spitfire). Its average number of operational heavy bomber aircraft was less than 100 during every month except December; its average number of heavy crews available was never much above 100; and its greatest average effective heavy bomber strength, attained in December, was only 114. The Commanding General of the Eighth was not exaggerating when he described his command at this period as “our piddling force of Fortresses.”

The U. S. air arm in the British Isles had its mission restated in clear-cut terms at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, but that did not immediately raise the size of the effective forces. During the first quarter of that year there were operational no more than six heavy bomb groups, one fighter group, and one photoreconnaissance group. The effective heavy bomber strength was even lower than it had been during the last quarter of 1942.

The failure of the Eighth Air Force to build up to greater strength was not due to lack of planning by the Army Air Forces. Back of our air strength in Great Britain there was planning of two general types. In the first place, such over-all plans as AWPD-1 (1941) and AWPD-42 had made theoretical calculations of the size of forces necessary to do a certain kind of strategical job against Germany. In the second place, considerable attention was given to the very practical matter of allocating what was available among the various theaters and charting the rate of flow of units and replacements. The Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement of June 1943 specified a definite build-up plan for the Eighth to be achieved by the first of April 1943. In September of 1943 the so-called Peabody Flow Chart set forth a rate of build-up for the air forces in the United Kingdom as well as in other theaters. A variety of other factors governed the flow of aircraft and crews to the Eighth. Over-all strategical decisions, as that to invade North Africa before Western Europe, continued to affect the build-up of force, and demands of the Mediterranean and other theaters were again to draw strength from the United Kingdom. As important as any other factor was the rate of production of aircraft and equipment, and closely parallel to this was the state of training of combat and service units. The limitations of shipping moreover, were constantly threatening to upset any planned flow of units and material to a theater.

Despite these difficulties there was an understandable demand from the European theater for definite commitments. The British wanted a reliable plan for the flow of new units in order that they might prepare the airdromes and accommodations for their reception. The air force commander wanted a chart of the arrival of new units in order that he might plan his operations accordingly. His forces sank to such a low point in February 1943, that he pleaded for just the air echelons of groups even though there was no shipping available for ground echelons. He needed to know the rate at which replacements, particularly crews, would arrive, for these determined the rate at which the old units could conduct operations. The theater commander needed to know the dates on which units and certain types of equipment would be ready in order that he might properly assign shipping priorities.

The AAF expended great effort in the preparation of flow charts for the United Kingdom, both to meet the needs of the European theater and to aid in the planning of allocations to all theaters. During the first quarter of 1943, and even thereafter, they were produced in quantity but all were subject to change without notice and none could be carried out on schedule.

At the Casablanca Conference of January 1943 General Arnold gave to Air Vice Marshal J.M. Slessor, RAF Director of Plans, a table showing the build-up of the VIII Bomber Command for 1943. It had a goal of 39 heavy groups and 10 medium groups, and indicated that the command would be maintained at this strength during 1944. Later in January Air Vice Marshal Foster received from Maj. Gen. George Stratemeyer, U. S. Chief of Air Staff, another chart which forecast the rate of build-up of the Eighth in all types of combat aircraft, but projected the expansion to 30 June 1944, at which time the heavy bomber strength was to reach 45 groups; medium bomber, 11 groups; and fighter, 35 groups. Strength was also forecast for 30 June 1943, and 31 December 1943. According to this chart, heavy bomb groups were to have 48 aircraft per group; medium groups, 64; and fighters, 100. About a month later General Arnold stated that changing circumstances made it impracticable to forecast the flow of aircraft with any degree of accuracy. The Commanding General of the AAF explained that the situation in the Mediterranean theater had occasioned the revisions of the Stratemeyer program of January.

General Eaker complained on 1 March to General Arnold that he was greatly embarrassed in his conferences with the British Chief of the Air Staff by not having accurate figures on the proposed build-up of his air force. General Arnold relied on the 24^th with another chart that forecast the flow of all types of aircraft as of 30 June and 3 December 1943, and 30 June 1944. He told the commander of the Eighth, however, that the figures were not sufficiently reliable to be used as definite commitments. They were simply the best estimate that could be made at the time on the basis of the training and activation schedule and the expected availability of aircraft. That was all that any flow chart could be because it was impossible to predict with exactness the rate at which men and airplanes would arrive in any theater.

Another flow chart taken to Europe in April by the Chief of Air Staff, and called in the theater the Stratemeyer Flow Plan, seems to have had more significance during the first phase of operations than any of the others. It evidently was the basis for planning on both sides of the Atlantic until it was amended by the Bradley Plan in May.

The latter plan, named for Inspector General of the Army Air Forces. Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, was the most significant step taken in the build-up of the Eighth Air Force and deserves somewhat detailed consideration. It had much greater scope than simply the charting of the flow of units or aircraft to the United Kingdom. It made recommendations for fundamental organizational changes in the strategic air force, provided for the organization of a tactical air force, and set up a troop basis for both of them. It had a difficult time in the War Department and was finally approved only after it was out of date. It did, however, serve the theater, the AAF, and the War Department as a basis for planning and therein lies its significance.

The Combined Bomber Offensive Plan which was drawn up in the theater in April 1943 and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in May, provided for the build-up of heavy and medium bomber forces by three-month intervals beginning with 30 June 1943. There was drawn up at the same time by General Eaker’s staff a troop basis incorporating the combat and service units for the strategic air force as well as for the tactical air force which was to support the invasion. All the units included in the troop basis were standard War Department units designed to operate in any theater. This troop basis was not accepted because it was believed that in a stabilized theater where bases were located in a highly industrialized nation a considerable saving in manpower could be effected by organizing certain units under manning tables. General Arnold realized that the air build-up plans for the United Kingdom current in April of 1943 called for more personnel (691,051) than could ever be shipped or than would ever be approved by the War Department. On 14 April he sent a cable to General Eaker directing that he initiate a study with the purpose of determining what economics could be exercised and telling him that he was sending General Bradley and two other officers to the theater for the investigation of the same problems.

Somewhat later in the month the Commanding General of the AAF gave definite instructions to General Bradley for his important assignment. The Air Inspector was to: (1) find whether the ultimate planned strength of 120 groups for the United Kingdom could be operated and maintained with no more than 550,000 personnel, and if that could not be done, to determine what strength could be operated with that number; (2) study certain proposed adjustments in organization and maintenance with the view of incorporating them in other theaters; (3)make an estimate of the operational saturation point of RAF and USAAF numbers in the theater; (4) obtain the preferences of the theater commander concerning the ratio of AAF ground to combat troops; and (5) collaborate with Generals Andrews and Eaker in preparing a troop basis to implement the plan for the bomber offensive.

The Bradley Committee visited a number of typical RAF and AAF installations, interviewed the agencies concerned, and on 23 May made its recommendations which were based upon the following assumptions: (1) that since strategic bombardment was the mission of the Eighth during 1943 and 1944, rapid build-up of the bomber command was necessary to success; (2) that there was to be a separate tactical air force to operate initially from fixed bases in England and eventually from the Continent; (3) that both tactical and service units on a station should be under the group commander, who was to have the assistance of competent air and ground executives; (4) that approved method by which technical control of service functions by the Air Service Command could be accomplished was through the establishment of control areas to operate sub-depots on tactical stations.

Important recommendations were made concerning the organization of the bomber command and the air service command, a troop basis and rate of build-up were set forth for both strategic and tactical air forces, and manning tables were drawn up for a variety of units in order to effect the saving in manpower that had been directed by AAF Headquarters.

The most important organizational recommendation for VIII Bomber Command was that there be activated the administrative units known as air divisions. A recommendation for such units had already been made by the Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force. This departure from the conventional AAF organization was based partly upon the RAF Bomber Command model, partly on the signals arrangements of British Airdromes, and partly upon the need for some decentralization in the administration of so large an organization as the VIII Bomber Command was destined to become. The air division was to consist of five or six combat wings, each of which in turn would be composed of three heavy ground. A heavy bomb group, made up of four squadrons, would occupy a single airdrome. The combat wing was not to have administrative functions but was to be entirely a tactical organization. Thus the VIII Bomber Command was a counterpart of the RAF there the bomber command is divided into groups, each composed of a series of bases, each base controlling three (3) stations with two (2) squadrons on each station with an I. E. [initial equipment] of twenty-four (24) aircraft each.

Other organizational recommendations affecting tactical units were (1) that there be air and ground executives at each station responsible to the station commander who would normally be the tactical group commander, and (2) that station complement organizations (for housekeeping functions) and guard organizations be provided for each station.

Important recommendations of the Bradley Committee also affected the VIII Air Force Service Command. The details of this mater cannot we covered here and need not be since the history of the Service Command is available. The significant recommendation was that decentralization should be achieved in the operation of this command through the creation of subdivisions known as control areas. There was to be a Base Air Depot Area to control the base air depots, an Air Service Strategical Control Area for advance air depots serving the heavy bombardment stations, and Air Service Tactical Control Area to supervise the units serving tactical aviation.

The Bradley Committee recommended that troop allocation for the air forces in the United Kingdom should eventually be:

It was intended that the air force strength should grow during 1943 at the following rate:

Strategic air force units were given priority over tactical units in the planned build-up, which was envisaged during 1943 as:

The so-called Bradley Plan was favorably indorsed by the Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force on 30 May, and by Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Commanding General of ETOUSA, on 8 June 1943. The plan was promptly approved by AAF Headquarters, and after much study, by the War Department, tentatively on 18 August, and finally on 8 November 1943. The over-all troop basis as finally approved was cut to 407,333.

The Commanding General of the Eighth stated that the Bradley Plan met the organizational and personnel problems of both the strategic and tactical air forces. He felt hat the rate of build-up and the flow of replacement crews and aircraft would permit six to eight maximum missions per month which would enable the Eighth to carry out the task set for it in the CBO Plan. He pointed out that the rate of operations was controlled by the flow of replacements, especially of crew replacements. This was to remain the controlling factor until fairly late in 1943, for the Eighth’s position with respect to operational heavy bombers was better than that for available crews until December of that year.

Headquarters AAF set about fulfilling the requirements of the Bradley Plan in June of 1943, some months before it was finally approved by the War Department, and this also thus became the principal guide for the build-up of the air forces in the United Kingdom, even during the summer of 1943.

The fact that the Army Air Forces and the theater had a build-up plan did not mean that unit and replacement flow would follow it automatically. The same matters of inter-theater competition, training and activation schedules, production of equipment, and shipping were still to govern. The question of balance between training and production was very troublesome. In fact, the deficiency of the Eighth in replacement combat crews became so serious before the first phase of the bomber offensive was over that it was to slow down the arrival of new units because AAF Headquarters set a goal of 1 ½ crews per aircraft unit equipment in order to be sure that groups could operate at full strength.

The demands of the Mediterranean theater, which had so depleted the strength of the Eighth in 1943, were again to make inroads during the first phase. Planned in that theater were two important operations which required more heavy bombardment then was than was there available. These were the invasion of Sicily (operation HUSKY and the attack on the Ploesti oil refineries (SOAPSUDS). Although they were not to be undertaken until later in the summer, the presence of the aircraft and crews was required for training. Consequently, the War Department ordered bombs groups scheduled for the United Kingdom, diverted to North Africa, with other bomb groups sent from the United Kingdom. .

Despite the drain of heavy group strength at the end of June, the Eighth had more than doubled its unit strength during the first phase of the bomber offensive. In the matter of operational groups the growth experienced was indicated by the total on hand at the end of each month:

The effective combat strength in terms of bombardment aircraft and crews was not so great, however, as the increase in units might indicate:

An examination of the above table makes it at once evident that the controlling factor in effective strength during all the first phase was the availability of crews and not the maintenance of aircraft. The wide difference between assigned and available crews is explained by the fact that most of the crews arriving in the theater had to undergo a considerable period of training before they were ready for combat.

The growth in personnel during the first three-month phase was more than 150%, the total climbing from 40,860 on 31 March to 101,349 on 30 June. It will be recalled that the Bradley Plan troop basis forecast the growth of the Eighth to reach 110,000 by 30 June.