Читать книгу The Colonization of Australia : The Wakefield Experiment in Empire Building - Richard Charles Mills - Страница 11

In Europe, the chief British possessions were Heligoland, Gibraltar, and Malta, of which the latter were military posts under military rule [33] and hardly to be classed as colonies in any real sense.

While to the Colonial Office the units of these groups were all colonies, and subject to the same policy, their governments differed in principle and in detail.

There were two main classes of colonies. In the first were those in which the "old colonial polity" [34] of governor, council, and assembly, was established with local variation in detail. The governor was appointed by the Crown, the legislative council nominated by the governor, and the assembly elected by the people. [35] Legislative power was vested in governor, council, and assembly, but executive power remained solely in the hands of the governor, who was assisted by an executive council of his own choosing, and responsible alone to him.

In this class were most of the West Indian colonies, and all the North American, except Newfoundland. [36]

In the second class, consisting of what would now be called Crown colonies, were the remaining possessions. They had no representative institutions; both legislative and executive powers were exercised by the Crown through the governor whom it appointed, and the council, [37] which he appointed.

Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, Britain had, in dealing with the colonies, almost invariably followed one consistent line of policy in regard to government. Local legislatures were granted to every colony acquired by cession or by occupation; [38] conquered colonies, on the other hand, were ruled by governors and executive councils appointed by the Crown. From the beginning of the nineteenth century an entirely new line of policy was equally consistently followed. [39] All new colonies, however acquired, were treated as conquered colonies, i.e., they were not granted local legislatures, but were governed as Crown colonies. [40]

It was, indeed, a principle of English law that the Crown had "uncontrolled legislative authority over the conquered or ceded colony." [41] The Crown might, if it chose, govern a conquered colony by means of a governor and a nominee council, or it might grant representative institutions. Once such a grant had been made, however, it could not be recalled except by the Imperial Parliament. [42]

Another principle was that an Englishman, when he settled abroad, carried with him so much of English law as was applicable to his new situation; [43] and that this, in a settlement colony, could be changed only by a representative assembly. [44] It followed from this, that the only constitution which could be granted by the Crown to a settlement colony was one where the lower house was elective. Parliament, therefore, had to be invoked frequently in the nineteenth century to enable the Crown to change the eighteenth century policy, and turn a settlement colony into a Crown colony. This was effected by appointing a governor and nominated council to legislate for the colony without an elective assembly.

In the first class of colony the attempt was made to combine legislative freedom with executive irresponsibility; for, even where the local assemblies had a share in legislation, they had little or no control over the executive. The governor was, as in the Crown colonies, responsible to the Imperial Government alone; and he chose his advisers irrespective of the question whether or not they possessed the confidence of the legislature. This gave unlimited opportunity for friction between the popular legislature and the official executive, which developed into serious struggles, especially in the Canadas. There a further complication arose from the upper houses or legislative councils, which, while they stood in theory, though imperfectly, for the aristocratic principle of the British Constitution, [45] were in practice the mere nominees of the executive, with which they sided in any contest. There, too, at the moment, a long-standing quarrel was in progress between the governor as head of the executive government, and the elective assembly. In Lower Canada the struggle was embittered by racial feeling between French and English, the French majority supporting the assembly, and the English minority on the whole supporting the executive. In both provinces the contest, more violent in Lower than in Upper Canada, was fought out on various grounds, such as the question of the constitution of the legislative councils. Appeals were often made to the Imperial Parliament to redress grievances, and Canadian affairs were becoming a familiar topic of debate in the House of Commons. [46]

From the Crown colonies, where executive and legislative power was in the hands of the Crown or its nominees, there was much less complaint. New South Wales, Newfoundland, and the Cape of Good Hope had, however, recently asked the Home Government for representative institutions. In each case the answer given amounted to a virtual acceptance of the principle that the colony should ultimately receive representative institutions, coupled with a denial of the expediency of granting the request for the present. [47]

While the administration of both classes of colonies was directly controlled by the Imperial Government, in both groups the evils of government from a distance, and an administration out of touch with the people, were increasingly evident.

Since the American Revolution the Crown had governed the colonies with a firmer hand. The tendency of colonial policy in regard to government was towards controlling the domestic concerns of the colonies. [48] Even in the representative group, the Crown's control in executive matters often extended to mere details. [49] The power which this centralized system threw into the hands of the Crown was, at this time, nominally exercised by a Minister responsible to Parliament, but actually by the irresponsible permanent officials of the Colonial Office. The peculiar circumstances of each of a variety of colonies could not easily be grasped by the Secretary of State. [50] He was, therefore, necessarily dependent upon his subordinates, [51] especially after 1827, when there were frequent changes of Secretaries—as many as ten in the next twelve years. [52] Mr. (afterwards Sir James) Stephen was Permanent Counsel to the Colonial Office from 1825 to 1834, when he was appointed Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, becoming in 1836 Permanent Under-Secretary. [53] He was a fervent evangelical, and an official of the Church Missionary Society. From his father, James Stephen, the brother-in-law and one of the most active supporters of Wilberforce, and a prominent member of the Clapham Sect, he inherited his passion for the abolition of slavery. Indeed, one of his chief objects in entering the Colonial Office was to help on this cause, for which he worked during the whole of his official life. [54] Another great object which he pursued faithfully was the protection of native races in the colonies from injury by the spread of colonization. He was always a zealous defender of missionary, rather than of colonial interests. [55] Even before 1830 his influence was paramount in the Colonial Office. At a later time his position as a permanent official did not shield him from attack. His name was identified with all the evils of colonial government, and nicknames, "King Stephen," [56] "Mr. Over-Secretary Stephen," [57] "Mr. Mothercountry," [58] were showered upon him. [59] In 1838, when Sir William Molesworth made his grand attack on Glenelg's colonial administration, Stephen feared that he was to come in for a share of the blame. "I am scarcely twenty-four hours off Sir William Molesworth's impeachment," he wrote, "in which I hear from Charles Buller, a great friend of Sir William's, that I am to have a conspicuous share. I am, it seems, at your service, a rapacious, grasping, ambitious Tory. On two unequal crutches propped he came, Glenelg's on this, on that Sir G. Grey's name; and it appears that by the aid of these crutches I have hobbled into a dominion wider than ever Nero possessed, which I exercise like another Domitian." [60]

Molesworth's charges, however, were levied only at Glenelg, whose resignation they caused, and Stephen escaped censure. A violent attack was made on him in 1839 by Sir F. B. Head, the eccentric ex-governor of Upper Canada. He alleged that Stephen's evil influence in the Colonial Office was the cause of the misgovernment of the Canadas, and described him as the incubus stifling Glenelg's measures. [61]

Indeed, the usual cry raised against Stephen was that for many years successive Secretaries of State did no more than reflect his views on colonial questions. [62] He was treated as the evil genius of the colonies, sitting in Downing Street, and perversely frustrating all attempts of the colonists to secure better government. Not only Stephen, but other subordinate officials of the Colonial Office, had the reputation of rulers of the colonies. In 1833 Greville speaks of Henry (afterwards Sir Henry) Taylor as the man "who rules half the West Indies in the Colonial Office, though with an invisible sceptre." [63]

Against all these attacks Stephen declared that he could only vindicate himself by divulging official secrets, a breach of trust of which he declined to be guilty. He also averred that he had abundant means of clearing himself in this way, if he chose to avail himself of them. [64] This being impossible to a permanent official situated as he was, his defence was never made, and the secret history of his influence on colonial policy remained largely a matter of conjecture.

It is difficult to say how much blame is to be attached to the man, and how much to the system. The evidence of his colleague, Henry Taylor, goes to show that his influence in the Colonial Office was overwhelming, though by no means sinister. "James Stephen," he wrote, "under the title of Counsel to the Colonial Department, had, for some years more than any other man, ruled the Colonial Empire." [65] And again, "for more than twenty-five years, during short tenures of strong Secretaries of State, and entire tenures, whether short or not, of some who were not strong, he, more than any other man, virtually governed the Colonial Empire. Not that he was otherwise than profoundly subordinate; but he found the way to bring men to his own conclusions." [66] Taylor, indeed, speaks of his own and Stephen's "usurped functions," of which, he remarks, they were deprived by the accession of a new political chief who reduced them for a while to their "original insignificance." [67] Again Taylor quite frankly admits that, when a mere clerk, he himself forced a measure upon an unwilling Secretary of State. [68]

On the whole it is probable that the permanent officials of this period wielded most of the power in the Colonial Office when they were not checked by a strong political chief. When men like Sir George Murray, or Lord Glenelg, were Secretaries of State for the Colonies, there is no doubt that the subordinates ruled their chiefs. Of the former, Stephen is reported to have said that, up to the end of 1828, he had done nothing, had never written a despatch, "had only once since he has been in office seen Taylor, who has got all the West Indies under his care." [69] Hay, another of his subordinates, said of Murray in 1830, "that for the many years he (Hay) had been in office, he had never met with any public officer so totally inefficient." [70]

Glenelg, too, is with justice reputed to have been the most incompetent and inefficient, as well as the weakest. Secretary of State for the Colonies of all who held office during the nineteenth century, [71] although Stephen would not have subscribed to this opinion. To Stephen, who shared his views on slavery and on the rights of native races, Glenelg was, of the Secretaries of State whom he had served up to 1839, "the most laborious, the most conscientious, and the most enlightened minister of the public." [72]

On the other hand, when men like Lord Stanley, or Lord John Russell, were in power, matters must have been very different. The political chief of the Colonial Office was then the real ruler, and the permanent officials took their proper place as subordinates.

No doubt there was much exaggeration in the attacks made on Stephen, and the suspicion with which he was regarded was often unjust; but the system of control by Downing Street which he represented was open to great objection. In such circumstances colonial policy was apt to change according to whether the Secretary of State was strong enough to take an independent line of his own, or was a mere subordinate of his subordinates. A consistent policy was the last thing the colonists came to expect from Downing Street, and it was difficult for them to know how much attention should be paid to orders and despatches which might soon be revoked. [73] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, later, called the system a central bureaucratic one, "spoiled," in some colonies, "by being grafted on to free institutions." [74] By this he drew attention to the striking fact that in the colonies with the freest institutions there was most complaint and least content.

This "essentially arbitrary government" [75] bore hardly on both classes of colonies, but only in those with representative institutions was there any recognized popular body to give utterance to the general feeling of dissatisfaction. As Charles Buller afterwards put it, "Power without representation is not so great an evil as representation without executive responsibility. It is better to be without a fire, than to have a fire without a chimney." [76]

The inevitable evils of government from a distance were accentuated by the indifferent ability and doubtful character of some of the men sent out to take office in the colonies. [77] When all the executive officers of a colony were appointed by the governor or by the Colonial Office, there was unlimited scope for patronage. [78] It was a source of complaint that men of broken fortunes were sometimes shipped off by their friends to lucrative positions in the colonies. [79] Charles Buller could write as late as 1840 [80] that "the patronage of the Colonial Office is the prey of every hungry department of our Government. On it the Horse Guards quarters its worn-out general officers as governors; the Admiralty cribs its share; and jobs which even Parliamentary rapacity would blush to ask from the Treasury, are perpetrated with impunity."

Daniel O'Connell, in 1837, told Mr. Ruthven, one of his former supporters, that "he stood convicted of crimes . . . of the most disgraceful nature"; that his misconduct had rendered him "totally unworthy of confidence as a public man"; that "it would be vain to expect that the Government could possibly do anything for him in Ireland, where his conduct was known"; but, that, if he would cease to contest Kildare, O'Connell "would try whether something might not be done for him in some of the colonies." [81]

Gibbon Wakefield tells of "colonial judges deeply in debt, and alone saved by the privilege of their station from being taken to jail by the officers of their court." [82]

In Lower Canada a receiver-general became insolvent for £96,000 of the public money. [83] There also a judge continued to dispense justice although he was proved to be an habitual drunkard, and even to have been drunk while on the bench. [84]

Even governors were not always above reproach. Wakefield writes [85] of "governors landing in secret, and getting hastily sworn into office in a corner, for the purpose of hindering officers of the sheriff from executing a writ of arrest against his excellency." Colonial governorships were regarded as suitable rewards for service in the Army or the Navy. [86] In Canada it was not until 1835 that the first civilian governor was appointed. [87] Of the first five governors of New South Wales, four were naval officers; one of them, Macquarie, was at constant feud with his subordinates; another, Bligh, was actually deposed by his own officers for his misconduct. [88] Sometimes these governors discovered unsuspected capacities for governing, and were both popular and successful, but training at "the mess table of a regiment, or the quarter-deck of a frigate," [89] more often unfitted them from dealing with free colonists. [90]

This then, in 1830, was the colonial system, or rather lack of system, satirized by Disraeli two years before, in his Voyage of Captain Popanilla. In that entertaining story the private secretary one day discovers an uninhabited island, which produces nothing, but is merely a bare rock. Its fortification is immediately ordered, regardless of expense. A president of council, a bishop, and a complete court of judicature are provided. An agent is appointed for "the indemnification claims of the original inhabitants." "Upon what system," inquired Popanilla, "does your Government surround a small rock in the middle of the sea with fortifications, and cram it full of clerks, soldiers, lawyers, and priests?" "Why, really, your Excellency," replied his guide, "I am the last man in the world to answer questions, but I believe we call it the colonial system." [91]

The total population of the colonies recognized by the Colonial Office was roughly 3,100,000, [92] of whom about 1,200,000 were whites, 1,050,000 free blacks, and 850,000 slaves. [93] Convicts in New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land numbered about 25,000. [94]

The annual cost of their civil government was about £2,360,000, of which four-fifths was borne by the colonies, and one-fifth by Great Britain. [95]

Their military establishments cost about £2,200,000 annually, of which one-fifth was borne by the colonies and four-fifths by Great Britain. [96]

About this time complaints were being made in Parliament of the cost of colonial establishments, but some of these complaints were hardly fair to the colonies, who were not altogether to blame for the expense of their military establishments. Especially was this so since it was the Duke of Wellington's deliberate policy to hide away in distant colonies, in small detachments, as much of the Army as he conveniently could, in order to prevent complaints as to its size and cost. [97] The whole position of the colonies was being seriously threatened by the agitation for public economy which Joseph Hume, as the mouthpiece of the Benthamite group, had for some years carried on. [98]

Current English opinion on colonies and colonization during the first third of the nineteenth century was dominated by two outstanding events—the publication of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations in 1776, and the American Revolution of 1776-83. When Adam Smith wrote, the official colonial policy was the mercantile system, whose aim was to weld mother-country and colony into "a self-sufficient economic unit." [99] Both were called upon to make sacrifices to this end, though the mother-country was undoubtedly favoured. [100] Hence had arisen restrictions on the trade of both, the monopoly of the colonial trade, the view that it was commercially advantageous to the mother-country to establish and maintain colonies, and that this commercial advantage could only be secured by political dominion. Adam Smith's doctrine of the evil of colonial monopoly struck a decisive blow at this system, and his conclusions were considered to be verified subsequently by the result to British trade of the separation of the American colonies. [101] He drew a clear distinction between colonial trade and colonial monopoly, insisting on the advantage of the one and the evil of the other. "We must carefully distinguish," he wrote, "between the effects of the colony trade and those of the monopoly of that trade. The former are always and necessarily beneficial; the latter always and necessarily hurtful." [102] He condemned the monopoly as injurious both to mother-country and to colony, and concluded that "colony trade . . . is advantageous to Great Britain. . . not by means of the monopoly, but in spite of the monopoly." [103] In considering the value of the political relation between mother-country and colony, he argued that "Great Britain derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies." [104] Peaceful separation, though he did not expect that it would ever be realized, [105] would, he suggested, free Great Britain from a large expense, and bring about an advantageous free trade with the colonies. [106]

The new and vigorous school of political economists, who wrote in Great Britain during the decade following the Battle of Waterloo, used the Wealth of Nations, with more or less adaptation and interpretation as the basis of their science. Colonies were generally anathematized by them as part of that mercantile system which Adam Smith had taught them to abhor. The economists, indeed, were sometimes tempted to overlook his distinction between colonial trade and monopoly, and impartially to condemn both. [107] At times they went further than their master in attacking, not only the supposed advantage of colonial monopoly, but also the value of any political connection between colony and mother-country. [108] "The monopoly of the colony trade," wrote J. R. McCulloch, in 1825, "instead of enriching, has really tended to impoverish the nations who have established colonies." [109] They taught that separation was the true colonial policy, and constantly cited the American Revolution as a conclusive proof. "Has the emancipation of the colonies," wrote McCulloch, "been in the slightest degree prejudicial to our wealth, commerce, or industry? The reverse, as everyone knows, is decidedly the fact." [110] In their eyes the possession of colonies under a policy of trade restriction not only conferred no advantage [111] on the mother-country, but was a source of injury because they caused expense and were likely to lead to wars with foreign powers. [112] "We defy anyone," wrote McCulloch, "to point out a single benefit, of any sort whatever, derived by us from the possession of Canada, and our other colonies in North America. They are productive of heavy expense to Great Britain, but of nothing else." Colonies "have the farther disadvantage of multiplying the chances of misunderstanding and contests with foreign powers, and of making a vast addition to the expense of war." [113] The only really profitable advantage which could be gained by the mother-country from the possession of colonies was that of commerce, which would remain, and even, as the history of the United States showed, increase when the colony became independent. [114] The economists, therefore, called upon the mother-country to abandon the colonies peacefully before the colonists took the initiative and separated on hostile terms. [115]

The influence of the followers of Bentham, led by James Mill, was thrown into the same scale. In 1792 Bentham urged on the French the necessity of setting their colonies free, [116] and the same advice he was prepared to give to the Spanish in 1826. [117] James Mill, too, fully agreed with his fellow economists that colonial monopoly was an evil, and that the political connection brought with it no commercial advantage. [118] If the trade of the colony were free," he wrote, "other nations would derive as much advantage from it as the mother country; and the mother country would derive as much advantage from it, if the colony were not a colony." [119] The Westminster Review, as late as 1830, went even further in writing of the "colonial dominion which has ever been the bane and curse of the people of this country." [120] In the opinion of the Benthamites a colony was, if anything, a better customer when free than when dependent, [121] while the expense entailed on the mother-country by the colonial civil and military establishments outweighed any possible benefit. [122] Moreover, to them colonies were not only causes of war, [123] but specially objectionable as a means of producing and prolonging bad government. Colonial government gave great opportunity both for patronage and corruption. In their formula the interests of the few were ascendant over the interests of the many, and colonies were retained in the interests of the few. "There is not one of the colonies," wrote James Mill, "but what augments the number of places." [124]

Practically all the economic and sociological writers of that decade in England, whether followers of Bentham or not, were convinced that whatever the value of colonies, and whatever their disadvantages, the time was not far off when separation would inevitably arrive. [125] They would have subscribed willingly to Turgot's dictum that "Colonies are like fruits which cling to the tree only until they ripen." Since separation was bound to come and might, if Britain were blind to her true interest, be hostile, they, with the warning of the American Revolution before their eyes, taught that she should take the initiative and abandon her colonies.

It is not easy to determine what was the general English attitude towards the colonies in the twelve years which followed 1830. Some of those who wrote then in favour of colonies felt that opinion was so strongly against them that it was necessary to show cause why the colonies should be retained. [126]

Gibbon Wakefield and his associates, whose work in colonization reform began in 1829, constantly complained that their efforts were met, not so much by opposition, but by indifference, and that it was distasteful to the general public to consider projects either for founding new colonies, or for improving the conditions of old colonies. [127]

Wilmot Horton, too, who conducted a vigorous crusade for pauper emigration to Canada in the years preceding 1830, complained of chilling neglect. [128] When, in 1831, Joseph Hume proposed to introduce into the Reform Bill provision for colonial representation, giving members to Mauritius, the Cape, Malta, Australia, and some other colonies, the House of Commons was moved to laughter. [129]

The Spectator remarked in 1836 that the British Parliament did not trouble about colonies except where the question of slavery arose, or when a colony like Canada was ripe for rebellion. [130]

Lord Stanley, speaking in 1834 on Roebuck's motion for a Select Committee to inquire into the political position of the Canadas, said that "he trusted the House would bear with him, though he was aware how difficult it was to command its attention on such a matter." [131] It was not a rare thing for the House to be counted out on the occasion of a colonial debate, [132] and scanty attendances were the rule. [133] It was said with some show of truth that "any party would rather lose a colony than a division." [134] Charles Greville's explanation why Charles Buller was not better known was that "his greatest speeches were on dry and serious subjects, such as colonization, emigration or records." [135]

A most important change in the land system of the Australian colonies in 1831 was received by the Press in silence. [136]

It may be that, in calling attention to the public indifference which they met, Wakefield and his associates were not unmindful that they were throwing into bold relief their own achievements in colonization; but, on the whole, it seems fairly clear that the general attitude of the British public was one of spasmodic interest. One colonial policy, that of separation—at its best purely negative—was still boldly advanced by the economists who had represented the only definite body of thought relating to colonies; and while, here and there, voices were raised against separation, [137] there were no others who had any reasoned policy of colonization or any well thought out attitude towards colonies. Moreover, when the subject did arise, the state of the colonies was likely to cause misgiving, especially when, to their expense, was added the circumstances, in the various colonies, of slavery, transportation, and racial and political strife. The general attitude of the British public towards colonies, then, in 1830, may be described as one of indifference tempered by uneasiness.